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Summary 
The subject of this thesis lS Jean-Francois L_yotard1s 
L,;::! d iff !::.~ r"'I:2n!:l" 
.... - .. __ ._---_.- ... _--_._ .... __ ._.-_ .... _ .. -- .. -.~ . 
EI"jq 1. i '=:,h in 1~G9" Lyotard (b. 
phIlosopher whose best, 
1~83 and translated into 
192:::;) 1 s cI\""'j i mpor' t,(";;l,nt, ~-I'-E~nch 
book in Anglo-saxon countries 
1-'IOI.niI~VI2r'" b,:/ I"'j i ';:::. 01,-.1\'""1 d,CCOl..H""lt,. '=-!§!,_,_~_i..Lf.'21'-I:f:nct 1 s L':lot',o=\t-d I s 
most, ph i 1 o~,opl"'1 i cell book:, 111'llon 1 i vl'-e de phi 1 o':::;oph i.;2 II. Th is 
fact is of particular relevance because his importance, In 
France~ stems from Lyotard's work in political commentary 
and a ~- +.. c t- i t, i cis. m i:" s' rn j_~ c h ':=\ s f t- 0 m his s pee i f i cal I\,' 
F' h i 1 0 ':::; 0 phi c: a 1 v..1 0 t .. k ~, ( s t, (:t r' t, i n q tAl i t. h his E! 2\ r' 1 i est, boo k b_~ 
!=:t~~t~.ns;!!.il1~Xl~!,~?,9 i_~.) • 
My thesis concentrates on this philosophical aspect of 
his work and I have, therefore, chosen to specialise in the 
ph i 1. os()phy put, fort.h i n h.:.'~_I;t,Lff.l~l'~(~n'~. 
Th,,:~ aUii ,::tf my t,h~~'::·;is is t.o ct-it.icize t.he vat-i,:lu':S mode=.. 
of presentation used by Lyotard to define the central 
con c e p t. ;:1 f his boo k : t. h {:! ~;lj f t~.0.:=.§.r~~;j. D The ro 0 s t.. imp 0 t- t. cl n t.. 
presentations are the legal presentation~ the presentation 
In a philosophy of language and the presentation in an 
ontology~ but I have also considered the affectual 
bar:::: \-:: gt- ound t.,o I"'j i ~3 i r'jt.'=':~I·- e=..t. i n gjJ'_'E~x:_~J::-}!j~ t.oget.hel'- t"-l i t.h hi·:s 
t.t-E~at.ment. o'f t.he t.enn t,hl'-OU'=lh 'U"II~OI'- i es tlased cln t.he fel~ 1 i ng 
of 't.he ~~t.lb 1 i mE~ D 
The three main definitions of the diff~rend 
summarlzed as an irresolvable legal conflict~ a 
involving Incommensurable genres of discourse 
can til;? 
con f 1 i ct.:. 
and an 
absolute contingency between that which occurs and our 
interpretations of Phi 1 c1soph i cd.lI y ~ t.hr~ 
interest ln the term derives from this irresolvable~ 
aspect within diff~r~nds 
and universal norms. 
i ncornrnl:2t-tSUf' ab 1 e 
i ns-~o fa t- c\:3 t.I···j i s 
The purpose of this thesis 
aspect with particular reference 
modes of presentation. 
IS to investigate this 
to the differentiated 
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Chapter I - Introduction 
And it was as if the two of us had been living in 
passageways or tunnels~ 
that we were moving side by side~ like sOl..ll·~ in 
1 i k,~ times, finally to meet at the end of those 
passageways [ ..• J 
F· tJ .- L I .' <:to I . 1:1 t.:i.~ S '(.e !' his murder of Maria Iribarne. Castel 
traces the crime retrospectively, and begins his narration 
with the supposed end of any murder tale~ with Maria's 
d €! a t. h : I' I t. s h 0 '--lId b f:! s 1..·1 f fie i en t. t.o say t. hat. I 
Cast·e 1. , t.h,:;:· pa i nt.er· who k:i. 11 ed Mat" i 2\ I t- i bat-n,:". Thus, 1 ike 
reader to a pre-ordained conclusion. As surely as a tunnel 
must have an issue, Castel's story will t-esl..f 1 t. 1 n t.he in 
I drove the knife into 
Her· 
Thet··e no suspense ln S~batols novel, its 
outcome is divulged from the start, and it is not a desire 
to find out the end of the book that drives the reader to 
pursue Castel's account. What then is the motivation for 
following The tunn~l to its issue? 
-::. 
I f i"1 a ,.- 1. diS 
motor or sense; beyond the issue of a tunnel 
the latter rather than the former. In 8ab~to's novel~ t.he 
iSS-I.Af::! instead the plot leadin9 
:L ;-"; e >~ 0 '" a b I y f t" 0 m C c\ s t" e I I ';;'; i so lat. i on, a t.unnel of 
and rational loneliness~ to an outside world, 
life can be gIven a 
The reader's motivation is 
driven by the twists of the plot: 
kno~.;J~':; t.hat. I kill ed Ma 1'- i a 
Hunter". But no one knows how I e>~a.ct.l y 
what our relationship was~ why I came t.o 
believe I had to kill her. I will try to recount 
'i 
all this objectively' 
S~bato portrays Castel as an absurdly rational roan 
desperately seeking an outlet from the barren isolation of 
his rationality~ first in his obsession for Maria, and then 
am animated by the faint 
k ill eel II. The ql.. ... es t. is 
represented through the trope of the tunnel; Cast.el ' s 
_.":'i 
enclosed loneliness can be given In conjunction with the 
forlorn hop~ of relief at the tunnel's end 7 where the two 
love,'-s meet.:: 
hour for our meeting had come"w So, when the novel comes to 
a close, an issue has been blocked, and. an issue has been 
t.he is In t.he realisation of the twisted 
necessity of Castel's isolation: 
and that after all there was only one 
tunnel, dark and solitary: 
which I had spent my childhood, my yout.h, my 
For sense to be made of Castel's obsession for Maria, 
and for lessons to be learnt due to the outcome of that 
Maria must be pursued and die. 
death is only one of the it-
its sole end~ nor its sole preoccupation. Instead, 
t.o t-B.ke B.n e;<8.mp Ie 4 t.o 
reflect upon the excesses of reason in Cast.el' s i so 1. Elt.ed 
on cont.act. 
world, to the annihilation of his sole hope of 
~';ct 1 vat. i on: ., Th,~t-,~ was on,= pet"son who cOI_-11 d hB.ve undet-st.ood 
me". Throughout the novel, Castel exerCIses and attempts to 
liberate a rigorous and absolutIst reason. Once set. 
rationality gives rIse to an overpowering 
4 
.i.. _ 
I ... I • .! be the absolute and 
fant.d.sy:, d ':::' .::It. .. 1 c ~"? .:::, 1'1 i:' t.. :1. <='. ' '_:::. 1 •• ·11'-, f: :::'. l' +_·.I·-,·F 1.1 J. \.-, ..... _- .:::. '.=-.'., - t j , . 1 1 ~ .. _ d -,,_ ,< 1 .::;:. 
This kill :i. n9 bt" i n'~IS out. t.ht~ issue of the self-
obsession and inadequacy of reason in the world outside 
I'" at. :l () n ,:':t. 1 i t. Y q After the murder~ Castel rushes to Maria's 
house and announces to Maria's blind husband~ Allende~ that 
\I I dece i ved yol..~ and she 
deceIved us both. But. noltJ ~.he C2\t'", ' t. dec~2 i ve d.nyone 11 " 
Allende attacks Castel and repeatedly utters a sin91e 
locked In his cell~ Cast.~:::l slowly 
I n t.he~-se rnont.hs I have been locked up. 
tried many times to think the blind man's last. 
wot"d" t.hat. lA.lot-d foc.!..l." An infinite weariness~ or 
maybe some obscure instinct~ always prevents me. 
may be able to do it, and at that time 
I ItJi 11 also analyse the reasons for Allende's 
co ':5'-~ i C i dl!~ ._' 
Thus~ the outcome of S~bato's novel, Maria's death~ is 
1:.he ca 1:. a I ys 1:. for the playin9 out of its central 1 SSl·les. I 
have shown how the issue of the isolation and obsessiveness 
as well as the danger of its application to the 
world outside rational bounds, is brought to the fore as 
the plot of The tunn~l unfolds. This effect of unlockin9 
c 
'--' 
IS also the most efficient strategy for 
1.:'11'" '-~', I .. ·.) 'J', \''','-.,.1 - I I·L. I '1- - I' t: t· l t j , t I 
",. :- ' .. ,1_"_' i-"~·l{:\-'::· 1::::; le5 ... J.n _YO ... ,':lt-, .... :::.:. -'00< t .:;:. .. j l' 'f -F ':£:'1'" PI''' ,j . .:;:_= ____ :. ___ ~_=_:_~_ u 
Lyot.d. r' el' ~:. pl"1 i 1 ()':;:.o!::·hy lends itself to this strategy because~ 
like Sab~to's novel~ it focuses a serles of political~ 
affectual. legal and philosophical problems around a single 
defitv~d:, here. as a social. legal~ political, ontological 
and linguistic difference or conflict that can neither be 
measured nor resolved. Therefore. although Lyotard appears 
to set a particular end to his philosophical 
t.o ':::~:l VI? defini t.ion ctnd fi I'-m 
ph i ], osoph i cd.l 
fact his book tackles a set of current philosophical 
(such as the possibility of philosophy after 
and the role of philosophy In a postmodern 
capitalist SOCIety) as well as a set of recurrent. but. 
equally pressing problems from the history of philosophy 
(:=,I ... ICh ,::IS t.ht?:! pos~::; i b i 1. i t.y of just. j I,..Id·~ement .• 
ontology as the foundation for philosophical judgement). To 
understand the power and value of Lyotard's treatment of 
these issues. it is essential to study them in the light of 
must be understood in terms of the affectual, 
po], i t i Ci:~ 1 and philosophical problems the concept is set to 
highlight and overcome. 
~ecurrent philosophical 
problems w.)ile also taking account of the single unifying 
t'''''a i t . .::.rf L I~:' ,"'1)' f"f I:!O. I'" r=:. '!'"llj • 
-=-::.:!--.:::-" ---=::...-.-=.:...---:. and definition of a 
concept. of and 
the diffe~ence at the basis of 
po 1 i t. i ca 1 d.nd ::::oc 1 c:"\ I conflicts as well 
linguistic and ontological differences between sense and 
representation of events. In order to 
. t· ... L J t~~:::· ".:1. ,:e ·1 ••• f:1 L yl::n.·i::rT d "s ph i 1 o~.oph·y' ~ this challenge must be 
mr:~'I:." To consid~':2!" Lyotard's wor'k on these difficult 1 sst.aes 
vJ i t.hout. his i nt.t·· i cat.e philosophy of 
wo!..·, I d b~:::: t.o lose t.he impact and universal 
(this has happened in particular to Lyotardls 
on E·::p.Ai~ 11 y ~ t.o his 
definition and grounding of the diff~ren~ 
without taking t'ecourse to the issues the concept is set to 
account for, would be to miss the all-important point that 
if 1 n t.h:2 
context of the major issues giving rise to the elabo~ation 
of a. theory of irreducible difference (t.o 
su C ~'I a ~. p 121" f 0 ,... mel t i ve con t. t- cl d :i ct. ion s). Th t~ s ~ i n t.he 
same way as Maria's death 
the context of the general issues raised by S~bato~ t.he 
definition of the diff4rend cannot be understood without 
"7 
Issues addressed This 
reference will ensure that the necessary association of the 
the theory is analysed. 
How though can a thesis develop a theoretical analysis 
i SSl.4eS I" cl i sed and resolved through the 
application of that philosophy? It is usual, in criticism, 
for one of these moments to precede the other; 
theory is analysed and criticized prior to a criticism of 
its apr-:' Ii CC:lt· i CIt'"!; or~ the application of a theory is shown 
to fail and hence the faultiness of the theory is deduced. 
Unfortunately~ the selection of one or the other of these 
in Lyotard's work can lead to a correct criticism of the 
philosophy of diff~re~d~. Furthermore~ the above question~ 
the guiding question behind the strategy of my analysis of 
Lyotardls philosophy, is all the harder to answer given his 
positive reaction to the same problem in the development of 
.:. ·I.···~:· .. ·,t" y ···f d l' f f t~ tOO j::·nd':,· 
., I • .... _ 1, •• 1 ._ .... • .. .!. are to be seen as an intrinsic aspect 
-. 
written must take account of this dependency. Lyotard is 
aware of this problem, and he attempts to surmount it 
a series of numbered notes and notices where examples, 
philosophical studies, contemporary issues and 
t .. hi'=:'_ ,::I P_ f l' .... 1 l' t .. l' r_' .... ' :=t. t-"j ,:I. p_. f ,::._,.-, r_ p_ '-_I f t l-, - - t·· - t ]' - - I t - to rn"" - t- --. m l' " - ::I ,. , .... , _·r,='_' ':::! ••• '_c:\ •. '= =- d 0:: ,',e', 
juxtaposed and yet differentiated throug~ a complex system 
of cross-references and didactic classifications ( sect. i ot··,s 
and topics). The crit.ic must unravel and reconstitute the 
various issues and t. h e 0 r' i e s 0 f t7.:.~ ......... ~j iff.~. t· t§:.n9., 
and yet.!' 
philosophy must be considet-ed in 
with the issues from which it. has been 
art.ificially separated. 
The goal of this thesis is to do justice to Lyotard's 
conjunction of philosophical issues and philosophical ends, 
bl.~t. without surrendering the duty of the thesis ~n 
criticize a philosophy at its most profound foundations, 
that.:. 
I have devised a maln thesis that takes account of the 
t.he~~e 
Lyot.an::l's book a 1S a legal presentation coinciding 
vJ i th t!"'j'= 
inequity of a law based upon cognitive 
.. ff.::·,"··I".II-"'1 do _ •.••• _.< .. presentation that 
concerns and feelings about the possibility of philosophy 
C/. ft.121··· A,-~schw i t.z:o in a postmodern capitalist. 
soc J. et.y ,. of a philosophy free of t.he will to sublat.e 
difference through speculative reason. Further:o there are 
t.wo more t.raditionally philosophical presentatl0ns~ the one 
devising a philosophy of language capable of taking account 
of originary and untranslat.able dlfferences~ 
find t.he ground of those differences 
ont.ology that. draws an absolute distinction between events 
and represent.at.ions of events:o or between occurrences and 
concatenations of occurrences (the significance of the term 
II OCCUI.- t-ence II is explained in chapters IV and V of t.his 
1· -::.. -, 
feelings, st.rong sent.iment.s~ in the recognit.ion 
of conflict and incommensurability: t.he 
feeling of the sublime. 
is not enough just to study the various 
involves a critical dimension~ insofar as 
each presentation must be separated from the others and 
then be reconstituted and completed to make a 
theory~ philosophy of language:o theory of 
::-~I_.lb 3. i n:e :. leadin'3 t.e, t.he 
10 
the unIon of these 
t.his i nt.et" act. i on of 
philosophical issues and philosophical ends~ practice and 
t.I··IE!ot"y, FOt" t.his 
I have subsumed the different presentations of the 
diff~rend under one maIn conjecture the central and 
guiding thesis of this thesis - where the conjunction of 
the presentations is criticised and where the need for such 
a c:on j tH",ct. i on IS demonstrated. The hypot.hes i s 1· '= • -' . The 
the logic of the 
arguments in each one depends on points made in another, 
and yet, where one presentation IS grounded In a second 
these two contradict each other. 
In t.h i s t:.h~s 1 s, I will show hc,w each present.at. i on of 
Lyotard's main theoretical term, the diff~rend, involves 
claims that must be defended in a further theory or 
Pt"I::!~-:>ent.a t. i on .. I will also demonstrate how, once t.hese 
F't"eSent.at. ion':S t.aken as connected, 
contradictions and . . t . 1 ncons 1 s· .enc 1 es appear that cannot be 
resolved from within Lyotard's philosophy. For example, I 
will shc)w how Lyotard's definition of diff~rends as 
i t- toO e sol va b 1 e conflicts necessitates a f t~ ,.- t.he t" 
linguistic events in 
order to support his claim as to the irresolvable nature of 
1 i 
1",1 i J. 1 
over the different categories of judgement they 
legal category of the 
judgement of tribunals and the linguistic category of 
thesis corresponds to a particular presentation of the 
at"e 1 ink~~d a.cco t". d i n9 t.o my rnaln 
Chapters follow one another as the presentation from 
t.he fir' :::..~ t. IS completed - and then contradicted - by the 
The respective chapters and 
contents are the followin9: 
~ 
· 
Chapt.,~t- I I I : 
Chapt.er· I V : 
· 
· 
a f f ect.uct 1. back·~t-ound 
The p~-esent.at. i on of 
The diff~rend and Lyotard's philosophy 
The ontological ground to the concept 
.. t- .h 1-·' 'j' f t~.J· - - - j • I.) I" .• I ~:! 1._ 1 ~..L:- t I~:::.., 
The 
Lyot.ctt"·d 1 S use of 
sl_"b 1 i me; 
of di ff~t-ends a.nd 
t.heclt- i es of t.he 
Cl--!i:;.pt:-'::~:I-- \} I I :: 
Chapter II - The affectual context to Le diff~rend 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter 1 =:- t- C) i nt.:-r-oduce the 
rnl~r~I~+ n-f- ~ j--ff: L -~~j ~r 
--- -- I --- --- - -_- __ -__ - ~:_~~ __ ~L.!=lJ!:..._ 1. 1 I the context of Lyotardls writing 
To introduce this theme 
two approaches are possible. One could, as Lyotard does in 
hIS autobiographical book p ~~ 1-- ~ q t- ina t- i on~, -, 
--------_._ ... _------------_ .. 
resistance to universal norms~ through an affirmation of 
language games~ Ideas, 
academlc subjects and faculties. Or one could~ as I believe 
of c\ !j i -ff.~ r E: n d w i t- h i n ,:1_ -=, pee 1 f 1. c ph i 1 os oph Y c\ san a c t- i ve 
theoretical term. 
In this chapter, and the next, I intend to develop the 
diff~rend through the second apPt-oach 
mentioned above. Indeed - it is the goal of this thesIs to 
treated by Lyot~rd in a philosophy of language. A diff~rend 
will be defined, explained and understood as a theoretical 
term within a philosophy of language wherein it fulfills a 
14 
specific and essential f'ole. The philosophy in question is 
I ,! , .. ; r'. til·'· ,-j • ',"::. '"',''',.j 1 -- '::..' ,- t··,l-",. -, t'·: 
····.7 --.. " .... r' f t ._ • I._'.~ _1.- r:/ I ..... C'29 i m.~~. of sent.e.no=:s and 
that of referring to the locus of heterogeneity between 
names and objects~ sen~~nces~ r~qimes and q_-enres. 
-_ ..... _---- The 
'locus of heterogeneity' will be clarified as 
this chapter unfolds; however, as a working idea it is here 
temporarily defined as the disputed point between two or 
more conflicting parties involved in a dispute that cannot 
be equitably resolved lS, in fairness to all 
to note that an equitable 
solution IS not a solution to which all the parties give 
t.h~? i t- assent. n kather, the term equitable implies that in 
the resolution of the conflict nothing essential to any of 
t.h~? f (~c:t. Ions lost or bargained away (as it 
could be in assenting to a pact, for example). Those things 
::. ': 
,.-, .OJ 8'5'E:,ent i 21.1 t.o a 
it as a particular party with a specific 
grievance within the dispute. Note, thet-efclt-e, t.hat my 
definition of a locus of heterogeneity does not necessarily 
correspond to the disputed territory, but instead, is to do 
with the nature of the claims made on the subject of that 
t· ::-~ .... t- ]' 't· .•. , t~ Y 7 .. 1._. . _..... • This second clause is important for the 
understanding of of heterogeneity as they occur 
between sentences or genres of discourse. 
although these chapters concentrate on the 
t.I·",,:=! 0 ;." '2 t. t c 2' _1.. t" ;: .. '. +_.1·", P-_-:'. t·· t./·", ;:._ 1'''1 1.'-_' I"', t· I I." "1 t ~ . - ~ J~e ~ls~orlca~ con~ext of the 
cone: ~~pt. ':' f <:,. _c_I_J __ , ·_f,,_·_f_F._:._·_,_·-__ f"_·.t-_'(j.... ). "]' 1) -':1 j , t . ] 1 t· 
. >".. . i:I.'. '._ 1 ".J. on;~, Y _.elI.:: E! account, '::. f 
t,hl~ t.E'~I'" m ' ':l., roots in L~.'otard'~.~ ~Il··.=_,·+_,r_'t"y ,_-,.f ' + J Y r t" .2515 _·ance co 
universal norms in philoSOF)hy. A ~~,r_.lt-t_. ~',,'rnrn~t-y -f' tL 
_f _..... '_' .. ·r-Ie many 
varied forms that resistance has taken will be given. in 
t,et-rns 1._yc,,'.,t.,'::f_.I,-,j I·",:,.~_· ... · 11'- - j t - t . 
" "" -' =,':::!I ... ,_, It" 1. n'3 our at.tent.ion t.':I~ 
defend what he sees as heterogenous entltles: 
lies the purpose of this introductory chapter: 
the (_-C_)t",,_-p_n+_. (_~f ~_. ~~ff~~Pt)~ ~- +Ir--t--i"l'--l -t-tl·ty r ... J,I. ::... __ ...I,' ,_,=, _.,'=,_, e_, '_0 ,=,_ .... ,. will be 
i t.~3 hi st.Ot- i ca 1. roots in Lyotard's work in 
preparation for a consideration of the legal terminology 
and logic 8 used by him in t.he defini t,ion of a d(ff,er'end 
as 1 i n·;II..,1 i st, i c t.et-rn. This use of legal 
analogies in a philosophy of language will be investigated 
becal..~se it is an anomaly in a philosophy that seeks a 
specifically I i t-I':lI..~ i st. i c (t.his point. is 
t.hesis) • 
The study of the role of legal analogies,. togethet" 
wi t.h the!l. t- link~. 
and independent of a philosophy of will be 
effectuated through an analysis of Jacques Derrida's and 
Jean-Luc Nancy I s wot-k in criticising Lyotard's later 
philosophy. This analysis is of particular int.el·-est. 9i ven 
cc'ncern wi t.h t:::ant.ls and 
N(:~ncy Ct- it. i c i se Lyotard through their work on Kant 9 ~ 
will give me a platform from which to discuss 
Lvotard's relationship to t:::ant~ itself aD important aspect 
of his wor·k in L'~. di ff4t-pnd 10 (I wi 11 invest.igat,~ t.his 
in chapter V of this thesls where Kantian 
faculties and Lyotard's r4gimes and genres are compared). 
Of course, the question arises of why I choose to 
approach diff~rpnds from a theoretical standpoint from 
within Lyotard's philosophy of language. The answer to that 
question is three-fold; it takes account of what I see as 
the three main critical responses to Lyotard's later work, 
which in turn define and then defend or attack the main 
points they take from that work. The three points in 
question correspond to these three critical responses: 
1) Lyotard's work is primarily political, and must be 
judged in terms of its socio-political import 1~ 
2) Lyotard gives us a social critique of the relationship 
between philosophy and a socIety that he defines as 
pos t.rnode t- n; he must be judged in terms l::rf t.he 
:::~ ) 
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IS a philosopher attempting 
In a way that does not l':2c.i.d t.o t.he 
possibility of universal norms; 
f.~·h i J o~=IOpl···, i cr.:~ 11 y, w:i. t.hin t.he 
13 critical tradition • 
he must be judged, 
Kantian foundational 
Although the differences between these three responses 
condit.:i.ol··v_::~d tly f::.,-_i-_.,-_'t-'=. r·"I- l - -,- WL-l· -l- -n'-" of 
""' - ::r_~_rl C\.:=t ri '_rl ,_, '= 
L ·y,-_·,t.::. t-,.-i I 1-_.. t - .... \.... .L l. - L fL· t t 
""' . ..1 - _"_10 .. 11·:.::., r_·r .t.:: pt··ol::·onen·vs 0 eatCr-' v 1 ew concen .:.t·· cl .es 
upon. Such consider8tions are not helpful to my analysis of 
ownn I will, therefore, study the three approaches given 
above from the point of view of their specific relevance to 
readings of that book alonen 
The first and second critical responses condition my 
within the realm of philosophy, that follow on 
from their criticism of Lyotard's work. The first reading 
leads to a debate upon the critical potential of a 
philosophy based on diff~rends rather than on notions of 
community, common sense 
t··,aadit19 leads to t.he "so-,=alled 'post.modet-nism debate'll 14 
on the nature of 'our' (the present) society and the aims 
and aspirations a modern philosophy can still hold to in 
s·uc:h 8. ~~Or::: i f2t. y. It seems to me that neither of those 
d€:br.\t.es cCI.n be S'::I. t. i:~ f l:t(_'·t.· .. I-,.lt .. ·i. 1 \/ t- i=o- - ] V -i' tit· 1 J" ._'.,:,,1_1. .2'--1 1 n ... 1"18 PI'- <=\C ,·1 ca 
sphere; that 1S, further analyses of the modern, postmodern 
'1 . t . 1 , .] po 1~1ca anc SOCla. conditions will not offer a definitive 
or even a correct interpretation of the crisis facing 
philosophy in its relation to practical society in the late 
twentieth century (clearly~ the detection of a crisis is 
intrinsic te.1 t~I~.-_ 1:I~.~_t·.Ic:\-t~_'-.-_, ~,t... ~-t':I) l-~-t--f-t .. -r .. ,_, r let II... r II::! I::! I_I I:::!:, I analyse 
Lyotardls work in its theoretical guise as a philosophy of 
language that enables a consequent SOCIal and political 
critique. This avoids furthering two debates in a manner 
fuel the differences that lead to them, but 
I do not deny that practical concerns are important 
for Lyotardls philosophy and the understanding thereof. 
Much of these two chapters is concerned with the affectual 
those concerns must be analysed as an intrinsic part of the 
philosophy of language for their full i rnport. t.I:1 be 
Ta::s t"evl::.!t-se that analysis ... to commence a st."-Idy 1:lf Le 
l-lpelt"! i t.s Pt- act. i ca 1 WOt-k and 
prejudges the analysis of its theoretical 
import and misconstrues the status of practice in Lyotard's 
l':i 
book. It is this point that my thesis will defend prior to 
criticising the relation of practice to theory in Le 
The third critical appraisal I take.account of stems 
mainly from the work around the series of papers given at 
Nancy~ Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard. 
Many of these ccilloquia~ in particular those from 
centred upon the I rnrnCi.nt.te I Kant. wit .... 
particular reference to current philosophical 
his work. In chapter I analyse Jacques 
Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy's work on Kant with particular 
of t. h ~:! t: ,",'1 j -, w]· I'" ".j .-' I'" j .t-. i j- j c rn I ...• 1 ••• I::: ._ ..• __ ._, level against their studies of 
Lyotard'~ philosophy. Derrida and Nancy give a critique of 
ph i J 1 .. '~Opl···IY 
ctbi 1 i. t.y 
1· t- L -', 'j l' .~ ·t·: ..... :. t·· a=;. t-,.-i 
, -.!=---~~--'-' .---~~:.--=----:::!. 
in such an approach is i t.s 1 imi t.ed 
,::,:;' i:;, spec:ificc:tlly lingl.Aisi:.ic f':'I'-m of cl·-it.iqt.te. 
in Kant.ian 
critique; they may, therefore~ make criticisms of Lyotard 
that will prove 7 on closer inspection, t.e, be inval id. 
I will further their analysis in a study of the 
sp,~c i f i cCi.11 y I in91...1istic in di ffen:::.nd 
i ndependen+.:. of t.he cl·-it.icisrns directly related 
comparisons with Kantian critique. 
Thus, the structure of the next two chapters is the 
followin9. In the first chapter (II), I will situate the 
philosophical context of Lyotard's work as a whole 7 with 
and the study of the effects of capital exchange on 
philosophical, intellectual thou9ht. In chapter 1117 I will 
work through Lyotard's use of legal analogy - including the 
question of whether it is an analo9ical use with 
reference to Derrida's and Nancy's work on Kant and 
Lyotard. Only after these introductory chapters will it be 
possible, to analyse the concept of a 
a theoretical term in a philosophy of 
1 angl .. tage. It. is important to realise that in the next two 
chapt.et-s I e1nly int.t-odt.tce ... t.hat. is define, t.he concept. c,f a 
then only in extra-linguistic terms. The in-
--
dept.h analysis and criticism of the possibility and 
validity of a linguistic definition is tackled lat.er, in 
chapt.er IV. 
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!:..~ ..... ~_~_f.~_~!:!::.!l<:! in the context of its predetermining concerns 
When Lyotard's work IS considered as a whole, as an 
oeuvre with themes particular to it~ the multitude of 
topics covered in a variety of literary and philosophical 
'-.-_, t.·. Y 1 .:=0_ "'_-, rn =, I ........... _ --_-', .L '--,,,,,, ,-' - ] 'J - - t l' - t- fL' 
. _ t r- I •• ·r = _.' .. 1 •• ~:!' __ . U I 0 r-Il S papet-S ~ novels and 
philosophy books t.hemes and 
impossible task. Even if one sets apart his essays on art~ 
d l' F':.. .. -. l' f: l' ":11.11.:=0 19 -:: t·· d _...:::!-__ '-_'-:::.. __ ';;L;::;:_-:. (_t I I t-t,=·r.r·1 1'-+ l' - t- ,= ,E- 1" - t .. t- - '= 20 _I" ,,' ,__ _. ,_, , •• 1 c\ '= I II::! ,J .. 
_ ...... _--------- ------ . 
on his philosophical and theoretical work, Lyotard's oeuvre 
still appears as a set of disparate works with little in 
t.his cli vet-si t.y is perhaps the commanding 
trait in his work. 
Lyotard's philosophical oeuvre consists of a series of 
central, thematic books around which are organised groups 
of essays which mark the preparatory and conclusive phases 
of the creation of the principal books. The central books 
either in their style of writing, or their 
or their theoretical const.rt..-Ict. i ,:.ns. 
eh~!:.."I':lmen91o';;Ii~?~ QjscoUt"S, fi'3'-~t-e, L' ~cot-Iomie 1 ibidinale and 
in di ffet-ent. 
philosophical contexts varying from an academic study of 
phenc,rneno l,;)gy :0 to a theoretical study of the figural in 
discourse~ to an aesthetic presentation of a metaphysics of 
22 
1 ibido:, to the construction of a philosophy of 
Add i r'l'~ t.o t.h i s 1 i,:,=.t~ I must mention the one 
Lyotardian project not collated around a central book: his 
t-J 0 t- k for'" t. 1"'1 r::~ II :.; 0 c i c.. Ii::; m I:=! 0 U B Cl. t- b d. r'- i e II d. n d II F' 0 U v 0 i r'- 0 u v t- i I~ r'- II 
19~;4 t.o 1 '::;66 ~ that work is -chronicled in his 
It seems that the attempt to centrally thematise 
Lyotardls work falls foul of the diversity in his oeuvre. 
However~ if we cannot determine a common topic or style to 
Lyotardls works it may be possible to classify them in 
terms of a common motivation; that is~ find a set of common 
conditions the production of all Lyotard's 
core books - for example~ a belief in justice or a will to 
think through the implications of Marxist theory. Instead 
of enquIring about philosophical ':=Jod.l s~ what. sot-to of 
philosophy Lyotard seeks to create - be that a metaphysics 
a philosophy of I will 
investigate the motives at the base of the establishment of 
cl.ny~ of the philosophical theories invest i 9et.t.ed 
th,·- o 1 •..I';:Jho 1 •..1 t. L.yot.at-d I s OE!t~Vt-e a It. is through such extra-
phi 10sophicB.l (rnot-e d.ccUt-d.t.ely~ pt-e-phi losophical) mot·i ves 
and interests that Lyotard recapitulates his own life-work 
in his philosophical-autobio9raphical book P I~ t- e q r'- ina t. ion s • .. 
In the book each of his core philosophical theories and his 
wot-k II Pouvo i r' oUVt- i et- 1/ 1 S 
situat.ed within a context of i nt.e II ect·t~a I and affect.l...Ial 
mot:. i ves, a II F' i ]. ';i ,.- i rn I :-=~ In.J Co. V ! I t. h.~ t· c h Co. ,.- t.:.; dis p Co. t- .:=0. t. e e s s. a y ~.; i n 
novel 
sets or original thoughts and 
(1983) tries to give an ontological 
1 i t-";~jI . ..I i .:.; t. i c yet.:. 
II phr' c\'=~ i c II ) status to what Arakawa calls t.he 
II b 1 anI-:: ", conn~::ct. in·;! in th i s W2\Y IN i t.h my not. i on of 
"b I Co.n k '::':' kin II 
in I;\lh i ch t.he 
unIverse presented by a phrase 
wh i cl"'1 e>~p lodes at the moment the phrase occurs 
22 and then disappears with it 
cl.nd a f f ect.'-~CI.I background to Le 
seen by Lyotard as expressed In his 
Le mur du Pacifinue. _. _______________________ . ..:::1 __ _ Where he considers t.he 
up at. t.he base of 
c i v iii sat. ion s· which coincides with the heterogeneity 
to exclude so violently - for example, in the exclusion of 
black culture as barbaric and threatening. Lyotardls point 
is that real violence occurs as the administrators of the 
achieve a monopoly on 
-.. 
the e>~p I 0 i t.2\1::. i on of t.he powe~" ';:II~net- at.ed by t.h,~ II b I a.nk sf.:: in II 
._. t.he ·:=,ymbo 1 original heterogeneity 
exclusion of administrators from other cultures they brand 
24 
concentration camps are seen as the 
culmination of that violence. 
difference between Jews and Gentiles to generate a power 
all of their own. 
Lyotard does not only VIew his own work within the 
context of extraneous intellectual and affectual concerns, 
he also uses such analyses to study the philosophy of other 
t.h 1 nket-s .. example, Lyotardls article IIWi t.t.gen~~t.ein, 
solitariness and his concern for the times he I i v~2d in: 
I' W i t.t.gen~.i:.,~ :LI"', i =; a =;011 t.cl.'·-y t.h i nkl:= ,-- II, II He is not. so I i tat-y 
ignorance of the world of his times, but 
t.hE:m II ~L'1_ 
In this chapter I will use this approach of Lyotardls 
t.hl:= t.I···lol_~·::Jht.=; and feelings at the basis of his 
philosophy of language. Then, I will demonstrate that these 
thoughts have deep roots within Lyotard's texts. They are 
t.hO' . ..I9ht.~.; t.hat. as dominant themes in his oeuvt-en 
i nt.e 11 ect.uc\ 1 context, I do not assume that the context IS 
not. theo t". i sl~d Cl.n d i nsc ,.- i b I~d i n t.h~ phi 1 0 sop hy i t. mo t. i va t.e s • 
'outside' the philosophy of sentences they promote. I must 
j-- •••. , ... ~·I·· ....... ··'1- . ·t L .• . . .• 
•. ".;:;, ... ' ... 111,,"" ..... !I=~'.'~' '::= .. ,3. C:;:-<.. ',.:.1:;'.['· j"(i~:; 1 n T.I···p=· 1'~~':··ll I n~I-I(-·.'-·, ... , 
.. - - - - -.,.- -r 3 • 
There are great difficulties involved 
t. h 12 j rn 1=' 0 t- t. a n '.-= 1'_:" '-.• 1 'f '-_"-.. 11'·1'-_ ,:::._ r- v,, <:::. ,-_ J·l. :=. l' r" ~_- ,j .L. - t t '-. j I _ '-,  I.·U '12 -,er-'1 n, a 
text's conception. 
~'4 
- t- d fIi p t 1-- ." d ~ d ..!.;:._ I ..., ,.1 .__ , t-efet·ence t.o 
1· 1··'+.·.1-.-·.1·-'+.· .. l' 1-_.1 t-, <:::. 1't-, t l- - l' t- t - ~- -. ,- _.L. - .L. l' - t f .L. .L.' .L. _ _. r ,':::! I _.1== I 1-" ~.::! '_. ci ,_. U -, 0 a '_. e ~.~ '_. 1 S n 0 I •. 
the most valid reading of that text. Intentions and motives 
are separate from the text itself and cannot be considered 
with Gadamer and will ther·efore not demonstrate 
I ~=.':;'_. b.'_"· ... =·~.·.. 'f: - t- l - j' f f L .... j. 
_ _ 1_' .=-'=. __ .~ ___ l_· _,,:~, 12 t-~~.,. l':=; In any way 
0:: los,,::! -1:.0 Lyo"t.c,t· oj I ~:::.. i nt.ent. i ':'ns wi t.h t-egclt"d t.':1 mea.n in·:=! and 
import of his book. Despite this limitation, I 
retain a sense of a deep-rooted context to Le diff~rend. 
And, in order to retain that sense of a longstanding and 
important (in Lyotard's work) basis for t.he book, I will 
isolate cer·tain con(:erns of a very early Lyotard essay and 
highlight how they are retained and duplicated 
~iff~ren~. This method does not demonstrate that the topics 
chosen by me are close to Lyotardls intentions. It. does 
lasting topics In his work and t.hat., 
insoFar as both texts tr'eat them as central points in their 
c~ t- 91 . ..trnE~nt. =' t.hey at-e important topics in Lyotard's work 
spanning a long pe~iod of hi$ life. Furthermore, 
my method serves to isolate given aspects of Le diff~rend~ 
t.he 
must show how the terms 
05 paradigms~ as models~ etc .. etc. 
f'eview ilLes Temps IYlodet-nes ll ~ 
bv Jean-Paul Sartre~ commissioned three promising students 
to give their impressions of life and thought in the post-
war era from the point of view of those born between the 
to be mor~ precise~ in 1925 .. 
Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard~ 1 '125:- was one of the 
others under the s h a ,.- e. d t. i t. leo f II N~ sen 1925 II. Thus ~ t.he 
Yet, I claim that many of the points Lyotard 
expressed in 1948 remain central concerns in the far later 
work and, in effect, they condition the goals that direct 
the writing of the book. 
Lyotardls essay IS remarkable and very different from 
t·he ot.h~=!t.. t.WI:1 es~·ays in '11\1";'5 en 1925 11 due t.o i t.:'3 pet-cepti on 
of the holocaust as standing at the end of the Western 
liberal tradition of speculative discourse. 
t.hat. in the light of this self-destruction of speculative, 
will has t.el be 
int.o a 
political positions to be taken up vis-~-vi~ an immovable 
matter in the form of nature or of a Western historical 
with a common trait~ the withdrawal 
speculative and a concern for the concrete, in particular 
t.he 25 pol i t. i C 2\ I II I want to claim that 
is conditioned by his early perception of the end of the 
speculative liberal tradition in the death camps and by his 
conclusion that all that can follow such an end is a 
politics of dispersal limited by materialist constraints 
and a destiny that also generate the individual elements of 
t.hat. po 1 it. i c·s a 
to note the presence of Lyotard's argument 
f t- om II N~s en 1 ';:J 2~:5 II 1 n b§__ d iff e ,.- en I=;!.:, I divide the argument 
into four distinct points. In this section of this chapter 
I will only introduce those points as elements of the work 
In Lp differend. =-=--.=-.::~ Any discussion of the validity of 
expressing and proving the disparate thoughts put in the 
early essay through a philosophy of language, 
place in later chapters. 
wi 11 t.akl2 
The fout- po i nt.s I wish to emphasize In II NI~''=' en 1 925 II 
are the following: 
·'-:'1=' 
.t.:_ ! .... 
E U 1'- 0 '::0 e i::'.!"', ",'. ':: ... 7~ '····1 I 1 j=' T. i \I'::-~ l' l' til:=' ,.- -;:, 1 l' .= rn \ '-' l .- - .. -'" - .... - .•. .._ '. __ c.. _' ! l destroyed itself; the 
';;;'. , :: f:: r· t.2I i I"·, d ~~ '.-_-.l.:. l' t", ' .. ,1 -.i=.- ,_. - _. 1 1 1 - t· .j ·v t I I t 
'.-' I '=, r" t:::! ,_ •• ' <:I ..• ' J.~"':! _. r-, 0 1..·1 'J '-1 :.. 
and that fact must overshadow and condition all 
subsequent thought" 
2) N2zism emerged from a failed and seized up capitalist 
system and was encouraged in its destruction of 
1 i bel" Ei.l tradition by the development of mechanical 
technology~ which therein found its true destiny. 
similar destruction unless it takes account of its own 
propensity for horror - t.hat. is. , becomes dispersed 
non-total ising thought. 
4) Ma~er'ialist constraints and destiny are the limits of 
all thought; events precede and pre-determine, 
annul, spec,-~ I at. i ve t..he 
revolutionary thought of humanist enlightenment. 
The first point expresses Lyotard's main reason for a 
suspicion of speculative reason: the holocaust or shoah. In 
Lyotard does not present this point as 
following from a deduction; rather, he merely states that 
the shadow of the camps is thrown over the philosophies and 
political traditions whose forerunners led int.o, 
v--
i-· (.11--
reason and the belief in 
'j', ]', ',',',' "',.;', 'I'" ,,-=. .  1 /-·-'1""'·.., \" .. r' .... "i - ,-- I l t L l I 
- ' .... '0:' ' ~= ::'-,:':.. '.- I-.:! r" f:! (', c ~:! ('I1,:, '.,1 t='.:. n ,,' (',,::( ".:. p '., i 1 0 :-=:. 0 p h y ~ 
f i 9ht, dnd, 
engaged in a self-justification of 
wearing down. We will come out of war~ the XXth 
cent~ryls most concrete product, with a monstrous 
thought and morals" We are 20 years 
old WhE!t I t,I"',.:? CCi,mp:=: \lorn i t, t 1'''1 d,t, wh i ch t,hey hd,ve 
neither the time nor appetite to digest. Those 
its liberalism~ three or 
Thus~ there dre two aspects to Lyotard's reaction to 
the concer)tration camps that distinguish his feelings from 
post-war thinkers (notably the two other 
absolute pessimism when faced by the horrors of the second 
world war, he does not advocate a sense of a lesson to be 
fate or destiny of European 
philosophical and political traditions. Secondly, Lyotard 
sullied like those values implicated in nazism - take, for 
left bereft of philosophical values, 
and overwhelmed by the horrors of war and 
It .... __ 
1._.1:="."::1 
I" :!:!f 1 e;.; :i. 01"'," n 
as ground for an opposition 
speculative discourse and reason, 
l ,,;;· Ijl' f1='±'t- "'/'- j ~~_=--.: ..... 1' .. _ en 1925". 
where two opposite views meet yet 
ca.nnot. be reconciled into a The ca.mps 
t.he di ff~r'end 
between Jews and Nazls, that becomes the paradigmatic 
,:11' ff.L 1-.::01" j 
..... -.----'=...:-:.-~ .. :..!.!:... It. is from a discussion of 
t.h :i. s pa 1'" CI.d :i. 9m that he considers the failure of the 
sl::·ecl...tl ctt. i ve I'flove t.o ~-5I . ..Ibl at.e g_Ltf~J:-:..§rld~ and t.he obj ect. i v.=.:~ 
analysis of a disagreement. t.he 
thought within a general philosophy of language; 
ther'efore, the set ,~f phenomena known as 'the concentration 
represented by one a nCl.rne Cit" 
rigid designator (see chapter IV) that refers to the set 
.:lnd ,3.11ows di~·~c'-.j':.?,'.::,icln of that. set. wit.hout. showin9 all it.s 
con·:~:,t. i t.uent.s ~2ach t· i me it. t.l-"lis 
referential purpose, Lyotard selects the name Auschwitz~ a 
In the preparatory essay to L.;:: 
,-I'j' ,',:' f' ~ ,." ,::.t·· "'j .~~-"-.-.:::;,.-. .:::~ .. ..!.~::.. :> 
fl...w'lct. i on of 
speculative discussion as does the image of 
A tlame [Auschwitz] that designates that which has 
no name in speculation, an anonymous name. And, 
j:: 1 t' LI f tl ~ ..... '9_, 
',Ot- specl_~ a _·1 on, 'f .. , '-Ie !""'Iame 0 .. ·r-Ie clt"lOnymous 
lhere are two difficulties involved in Lyotard's use 
A· I 1'=,-'" fL' I' t. ":" 29 .. -=:, -
_.....:::!.:'-=::.!:L'!_·_· =- d. _ d. designator of the horror of 
can Lyotard define names as t"igid 
of a set of events and~ at the same time, 
retain the emotional anguish those events cause? Secondly, 
If ~~:F'ec:u la. t. i ve t-ea~·on IS 
dE:PE:nden·t upon a event., he 
the consequences of t.ha. t. event, int.o a 
definition of diff~rends in a philosophy of language? These 
questions are at the basis of an objection I have c\';:Ia i ns t. 
and "[) i SCt~SS ions, on: Pht- aset-
Auschwitz". Lyot.ard confuses a philosophy of language and 
an emotional argument based on his own subjective reactions 
t.o t.I·"le camp~~ a~-5 t.est. if iE:d by I'Nes en 1925'1. This object.ion 
in t.h is t.hes i s if'. t.wo ways. I investigate the 
possibility of a t-ead i.ng of Lyotard's philosophy of 
:.3:2 
'_',:~_I' 'F f: ':--~',J'" ,:...-- t",_,-,.I ',:_:_, (, J', I''', I t '( '( '( )' ,- ::I t't 1 
.1,.. C: '-, co, p ~,12 rOO ..,' • ,I:': '2 Y CI('V" .' r-1I2 s~:? ~,w 0 B. n ,:t V S e ,; I 
have t'aised; that solution involves a subtle use 
of Kant's concept of the sublime. My work 1 n chap-t.er-s I I I 
,:I,ne! I\! de'5p i t.e. of t.he sublime 
latet'~ because the theory IS dependent on the 
language that precede it; 
those theories may foul of my objection 
subject,ive emotions. 
For now, In this chapter, I will continue the analysis 
t,he bc,ckgt"ound. ~.iO what. rOl...jst. be retained from my 
analYSIS IS the importance of the concentration camps for 
his ph :i, 1 os(')ph i cc;ll th i nk i ng (as in l-.:e d i ff~!::.end) : 
t,o t h ~:: i t- philosophers of our hist,ot"Y] 
claim.- All that i~ real , L . 1 ]. S t" i::'. ',.·1 ona , a I I t. hat· i s 
II A' '-1-= ,-L- W l' t." II 
__ oo_-=-=!.l ____ -... --
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capitalist exploitation of technological 
and scientific advances can run itself out and disintegrate 
that is not wholly independent of the credo 
of that civilisation: 
In 1918, Germany alone grasped the meaning of the 
chc/.os. It''l which it. had fallen~: clnd na z i srn" 
capitalism become ri'3id, arose from a horror of 
t.hclt. c:hc\()':::'~ [.u.]. There was despair at the basis 
of those totalitarian systems. It was in Germany 
that the mechanical tradition came to f t- t4 i t ion; 
the camps signify whereto the exploitation of man 
can lead once it loses patience. In the XIXth and 
e~<chan':;Ie and 
speculation were associated to a position that 
lee! t·o of man i nt.o economy. 
gt- adua I 
undermining or catastrophic explosion of both 31 
is a 
simi lat- sense of the power of the combination of liberal 
capitalism and techno-science. Once again, that power is 
seen as teetering on the edge of violent repression. 
:34 
ends - how capitalism aided by techno-science 
can exploit the different and varied aspects of post-modern 
based on the total ising 
narratives that upheld those modern societies embroiled in 
horrors. However much society may have 
threats remain; both books allude to the 
terror involved in the articulation of different, disparate 
language games into one economic structure: 
is the major problem as Kant. 
()nce the fact. t.he ':=;00:: i Ct. I 
- understood as a multiplicity of 
language games with 
pragmatic rules and ways of assigning people to 
preCIse positions and is shot. t,ht-Ot~9h 
with terror, that is, t.he fear of death [ ... ] 
II deat.h /I in 
[ i nt.':::·I·-nrnent.] , 
32 [ . " . ] 
cd 1 i t.s 
unemployment, repreSSIon, famine, 
If t.his idea of Lyot.ard's is not developed, it. is easy 
t.o c: t- i t. i c i z e its inclusion in the philosophy of 
-;:I i ven by Le_ d i ff~t"'F.~(~9... E i t.het-:. Lyot.at".j' sci aims concet-n i n9 
capitalism and techno-science must remain just feelin9s or 
or, they must be defended through 
an analysis of capitalism that demonstrates an empirical 
'-,C' 
.. .J._' 
terror and repressive violen~e. Neither of t.h e':::; e 
options would be valid In a philosophy of language seeking 
. , 
d. ]. (J of t.ho:::.;e po 1 nt.s ~ t·hat. 
CCt.p i t.a 1 ism nl~cl:::~=~SCt.I·o, i I y int·o d. 
t.o t. 21. 1 i .::; i I'~I';J e cor', 0 m i c ~ y ,- .j- ~-. I'~I I L O .0 of' t-: - - t t l~ I t Lt· t l ~ =, :;:, o·.:! I nil '=! ~.::!'._. _. ~ ':'1 IOI.A'=I·-1 ~ o·r-Ia _. 1 S _.r-Ie 
to prove it by other means: 
The . t I' t Cclpl .. ·c\ IS_. tribunal judges negligible all 
diff~rpnds between phrase regImenS and between 
genres of discourse. Through its necessary mode 
of concatenation from one sentence to another the 
economic genre brushes aside occurrence, events, 
t.he expectation of a community 
·-t-1 
based on affects ~ 
eSS.B.y II .Jud i c i I~I.~>~ 
hi=; feelings concerning capitalism within the 
terminology of his philosophy of language, thereby avoiding 
a dependence on affects for the proof of his analysis of 
The emotive expression II cap i t. c\ lis m II 
~conomique'l); a genre that includes reglmens 
such as cognitive sentences and prescriptiv~ sentences, In 
an economy t.hCt.t. eVB.l t~,::\t.es. claims to power CI.nd 
terms of their performance or performativity 
" 1 eCl.st. t. i me t.(~ken to accomplish a 
;\ ., -I 
/""1 J. J. 
~ogethe~ 1'ollowing rules gove~ned by the measure of money. 
which of the cases they present 1. .:=. t.he frlOS t. financially 
one 
or~_-.Ianisation un(j'.~_·t" t.· .. ~I~._ ]·.~J~.jJ·.f·f:-_-.t--_-.I-J~_~.-_~ C_)'f fl\-t--\I" LY-~-t-j~-r I c., It::!.)'. I_I ' .. ' d' r I c:\ S 
feelings concerning capitalism int.o 8. 
terminology that allows his philosophy of 
art.iculate them and prove their universal validity: 
The purpOSIveness of capital not. lack 
over occurring sentences~ it imposes a 
of profitability, a subordination to the 
stake of all stakes (or ~:·o i t. seem~.): t.o "win", 
as measured through i nt.et" es t. 
ca 1 (::1...11 at.ed money 34 
,- . f ::.ve.n ]. we take into account Lyotard's translation of 
of I' cap i t.a 1 I' 1 n hi:;;::. F,h i I cl~.ophy of 1 an'3ua'3e, t.het-e ctre st. ill 
great difficulties involved in his theses concerning the 
link between capitalism and terror. Although Lyotard offers 
c\ "I,:ap i t.a I ";> t.o feelings about the 
capitalist hegemony, he only offers a short 
analysis of that new term in the context of the philosophy 
In La diff~rend~ 
._ ....... __ ... _ ........ __ ._ ....... _-_ .. _ .... _-........ _-- ~ .. there lS no prolonged 
(--, ~"i 1 '." ;~'. r_-=: =_ 1'- l' ..... -_. ':::.-. '-_I f 1'- "'" I'," "" 1'- I •• ~ 1- ,.. t t- -
• .T ~~ .~ - = 11<;;". I" •. :=: _", _·r It: 
\I 9B. i ned t. i me " as measure of the pecuniary 
performativity of various r~gimes of sentences from a 
Marxist point of view. His claims concerning capitalism 
remain unproven and dependent on arguments based on affects 
in the book that determines this term from a 
theoretical point of view. Thus~ when Lyotard's remarks 
in Le diff~r~nd ~~ 
status has not changed and they are not part of a 
consistently defended argument. Therefore 7 the use of the 
"Celp i t.a 1. "~ as cl warning of how iqnorinq diff~rends 
- _. ----............ _-. 
can lead to a dangerous hegemony, can only be exemplary -
in the same way as "?-)t-l'oSchw i t,z II is pat-ad i grnat. i c" Lyot.Qt-d 
cannot make a statutory use of his example; t.he st.udy I:)f 
the economic genre of capital cannot form the basis for 
laws and rules within his philosophy of language. 
As is the case in his use of the paradigm AuschwitZ1 
- ---------.. 
Lyotard's use of the example of "Capi t.al" must. t"1:::rt18.in 
peripheral to the theory of his philosophy of language In 
This Lyotardls analyses of 
Alit:: .-.• - w]· t .,. __ v __ !_= __ '_" _":_'::.. 2tnd I' cap j. t.C\ 1 II draw conclusions t.hat. CC\nnot. 
shown th~oU9h a linguistic analysis. All t.hc\t. Lyot.at"d' s 
ph i losclphy of enslH-e is that. his 
are possible within the constraints of a philosophy of 
':'; 1::= 
'_0'_: 
1 ,::i, j'''11~J J. ·1 !:ll~':.ll::! (::! .. I 1'-1 ·::-." ... ;· ... 1··· t ••• j'.·,". ·t .. ·. P_ '-. _:.' "".". \., .... ·.·.,1 ... 1. '.···1 ... ·.·.1, t.l. "'.' ..... ~,.. '.'.-".'-.. 1,"",,-.,'. '.-::,,~ ,r,.".' ·r',·.. '-".' .~ ; . t- -. . j 
.. - . I ~:l ~~~_~:..~: ... t.,:~~.t.:.~~r~~_ u 
if the paradigms and examples used In Le 
Lyotard1s argument will be circular and he will not be able 
to claim to have justified his theories independent of his 
own feelings concerning the holocaust and the rise of late 
capitalism. He must distinguish the philosophy of language 
:-=},t.lbject.i v~'? 
t.o 9t"ot~nd (:11' 'f f if~ t" "';' t" -I '= 
'. -.!--=..,,!~~ 
c,wn pal·-t. i CI.A 1 at" 
in a 
language. To do this he uses a linguistic 
t.he necessat"y possibi I i t.y 
(see .::hapt.et" IV) ; t.hi's 
analysis cannot depend upon particular events if it IS to 
be able to draw universal conclusions. If Lyotard does not 
separate his philosophy from the subjective impressions 
making up the background to his work~ then his philosophy 
can only be conjectural and cannot make universal claims. 
The point:. I have made above also holds true for the 
tl-", i ,." d st.sb j ect. i v': . . I j j . liN ,I. 1'::":-.. '5 II ImpreSSIons recor, er In ~s en ~_
thesis that speculative thought~ as present 
impressions on capitalism~ must necessarily lead to violent 
repression. Lyotard here encounters the same objection as 
its validity but is instead set 
an affectual evidence 
- note that this remark is 
only applicable to the step into prartical violence and not 
to Lyotard's t.heory concerning the linguistic status of 
~·-::.·r':;',~~c:ul~~.t.iv'~~: t.hot~91··lt. as n~2ce=:·':='i:::..t"i ly tot.a.l ising. Point. fOI_~t .. , 
which testifies as to Lyotard's belief that matter or 
11' rl" l' t. t~.''''I=_ 1 t· f I " "~ specu a~lve scope 0 ,·"e<3.S0n, 1 S 
In the limiting potential of mat.t.et" and 
The tT ans I clt. i on IS accomplished 
according to the following argument. In his early essay~ 
imp t .. e'=.·:=· ion ';:, regarding matter 
moulded by his extensive knowledge of modern art (It. is 
interesting to remark that this factor~ precocIous in the 
early essay~ recurs throughout Lyotard's oeuvre; indeed~ 
role of Lyotard's appreciation of modern art 1· '.::. '=. 1-' - _.-
wide-ranging In his work I give of hi·::; 
oeuvre~ as a thinking through and theorisation of deeply 
felt affects~ could be duplicated by a study of Lyotardls 
constant efforts to theorise the intellectual and sensuous 
impact. at-to of i t.s :~ epoch) • That. 
reading of modern art depends on a strong distinction made 
between matter and form. For Lyotard, form can be imposed 
1 ,-
... .-::. d i ~.-:; t. 0"- t. e d ~ added t.o 
4!l1 
In a 
dyn0mic~ uncontrollable process way beyond hls Influence. 
limits to the artist's powers of 
expression; those limits can be radical once the power of 
matter IS released: 
the war]. Actions are removed from their 
ambi t.ion; t.o 
undertake a project~ to accomplish an action, are 
abandoned figure, the represented has drowned in 
IS. Obj ect.s have 
liberating process as the 
goals of concrete projects, surrealist expression 
has accustomed us to works where signification is 
left to chance~ that is, where man has never been 
What. 15 also and more widely 
applicable to general forms of expression: 
To no longer be able to overcome matter, to no 
longer be able to assign something over and above 
that which occurs, is the deepest crisis to have 
41 
t · ]' r 313 .. ' . n,:;:: 
In L ~ J-~ 'J.: f f -"-1'- -.~ .. j 
-="';'---:::!..-~-~.!!-~' d.bove impressions concerning 
novel sentences - limiting the validity ()f 
h'~'~emony of t.h,~ economic genre comes up 
only one insurmountable obst.acle: t.he 
heterogeneity of both phrase regimens and genres 
The has 
do IN i t.h hl . ..Irnan w ill:. 1 n a ,0", y 
ha.s to do lAJ i t.h t.he 
It. IS a.t. of my study of the affectual 
context to Le diff~rend that I first note 
._-_ .. -----
of <''1 ffect, . . 1 mpl'-ess 1 on hypot.hes i s d. 
In of t.he 
'matter' and 'expression', Lyotard uses precise terms from 
new of di scou~-=.e" , 
Lyotard's ~xamination of his affects concerning matter. It 
is essential~ therefore~ to go beyond the project 
C ""','=1. P t. e :.- of 
philosophy of language. This further study will commence~ 




To contextualisation of LYOt..3.1···.j I =C. 
p j ... , i 1. 0 sop h y 0 f 1. <:1. n '3 U EI. '~I E! f , .. 0 rn l_-.. i?- •• (.j. i f._·r·-.. ':!:' •.. ' . t_" .. ..-=.-.I··.II--I .. I I.,·i l'1 . - 1 1 t I 
• . .,.. J. I' ec.a. . ··Ie 
two most important points to have come from the study of 
1 ) ideas that can be traced 
convictions expressed in Lyotard's 
.j':2mon::;:."!:.t .. 2it. ion in t.hl~ 1 cit. tel''' WOt" k • Those a. f f ect.IAa 1 
illustrative roles in L..-=. diff~r..-=.nd. If these roles are 
be reduced to an affectual claim devoid 
of ,~. fl .... l J. demol· .. ,~,t.I·· at. i on (see chapters III clnd IV of 
However, towards the end of this chapter I noted that 
Lyotard did give a demonstration of one of the claims I 
hi 9h Ii ';lhLed fl··om II N~:=:.. 1=2n 1925 1' • I n chapt.l~t· I V of t.he thes i s 
I will follow through that demonstration by reconstituting 
Lyo+.:.ard IS ph:i. lo;.ophy of i ndepel·")dent.l y of 
extraneous affectual examples and paradigms. Prior to that 
44 
st.I . ..Idy, I ~ •. ):i. 1 1 
in L.;:2 
-I J. f· f: .1:.\0"" .=-., ... "j L..:. ___ .... :::: ........ ..::: ..... ..:.. ..... 21.n appe21.1 
imagery and terms; the implications of that appeal will be 
studied In chapter III. 
Chapter III - The legal presentation of the differend 
Introduction 
In the preceding chapter I began to point out some of 
the subjective concerns at the basIs of Lvotard's work In 
was that the claims made by Lyotard In his philosophy of 
l~nguage were functions of beliefs In Le 
1-11' f- of: ,:!:. t- 1::'\--' I-~ 
.:::... _____ -::::.._-=-_~_:::!. u Lyotard's linguistic analysis was seen to be 
dependent upon affectual conjecture~ sent. i ment.a 1 b!~l iefs 
present·ed as factual evidenceu The question to be answered 
IS: Does the conclusion to chapter II hold 
t-h~~ concet-n 
To answer that question I will investigate Lyotard's 
F'l"eS'=';.I·-lt-c~t-iol--·1 of judqement- -:;,nd just-Ice in Lp di ffe~-pnd:. in 
order to determine whether their treatment 
unpl'-oven bel ief ~ or on some further deduction independent 
of the author IS a-Ffectual The 
occurs In three staqes. The first stage demonstrates that 
Judgement and justice are the central concerns of the book. 
By central concerns I mean those that give the philosophy 
of 
Lvotard's concern 
judgement and justice, between his use of legal terminology 
a,nd hi:s LL. L L' 1..' I.. t c\ \:' ',.:.emp·c ,.:·0 1 nves".,·l ':':;I2\·,.:,e ,he possibility of just and 
'...In i V~21" sc~.l Stage three of the investigation 
criticises both sldes of the distinction from stage two 
independently of one another. 
1\""', t.hat. f 1. ria 1. Lyotard's recourse to legal 
terminology and metaphors is criticised in the light of my 
WOt- kin ,=hctpt.et- II of the thesis; that is, with regard to 
whether the use of examples and paradigms diminishes the 
scope and import of the claims made in Lyotard's philosophy 
of lan'3uage. Her~~ my work will draw on Jean-Luc Nancy's 
and Jacques Derrida's essays on judgement as treated by 
I will show why this 
difficulty in Lyotard's philosophy is inextricably entwined 
And how~ therefore~ 
Derrida's and Nancy's works are directly relevant to my 
st.I .. ~dy of jucl'3em l:!!I·-,i::. in b.e diff~t-end. 
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The differend before the tribunal 
definition he offers IS the description of ~iff~rends as 
t .. e'.5O 1 ved .. Thi~~ 
definition can be found In works prior to L~ diff~r~nd such 
1 I ]' ,.,. +'.~ J l,=:.("-t., I~ ] 
_._...;._!...::.-=.-=-__ .::;:.:_-:...::._~:!..:::c._.:... • HOv-JI~\ie t- ~ 1n t·he a. second 
is given where a ~jff~rpn~ is defined in terms 
of a philosophy of language. This latter definition enables 
there are irresolvable conflicts 
From the study of the linguistic basis of "-eal 
events a set of rules is deduced that establIshes the 
depends on a translation of the initial definition into the 
~erms of the philosophy of I d.n91..~age. Tlr,e 
. . IS '~l 'len 
c\=, c\ I i n9U i st. i cent:. i t.y in C:1.cc:ot-dance wi t.h ot.het- 1 i n9'_·' i st. i c 
ternlS such as names~ sentences~ r~gimes and genres~ so that 
c\ .:-::.:. t. '-~ d y 0 f linguistic properties provides 
description of diff~rends understood as real conflIcts. It 
is through this translation that Lyotard can use legal 
t ... ~ l'-ms such d.':; .. t.o t- t. II ~ II V i ct. i me II ~ II t.~rno i n II ~ 
t.oget.het- wi t.h t.et-ros ft-om his 
ph i lo::.;.ophy (;I f lan9uage. In this chapter I aim to question 
the validity of that translation. 
4'=' 
Thl...Js~ concentrates on the 
of a philosophy of language~ both that philosophy and the 
~iff~ren~ can be mapped onto an analysis of more particular 
1 1· t-. ':_:1._.1 1· '""".-. +-_. 1· '.-_ .=._ t-.·I-_. 1· +-_. 1· .:-.~_ '=-: I L.I 1· +_·.1···. ,-I]· 1·-'::;' ,- .1- 1]· 1·- I . _. .L - -. V _. 1- .L r- _. I-:l - t :1 - - t ~ - - ~ . - .- ... . I .: .. =:, '_. ,_, • I:::! I:::!. I '_. :::, c\. I'. '_" _. I:::! ,_ _ •. ~ 
outside the theoretical field of linguistic analysis. For 
such <='.S t.he 
diff~rpnd as it occurs between Jews and Nazis. He also gIve 
Instances of specific r~qimes and q_-.enres .. -~---. a':=, 
r~qime of descriptive sentences 
--"'-"'---
and the economic genre of 
4·L") 
"Cap i t.cll" lhese examples are practical cd.ses t.o v.Jh i ch 
the philosophy of language can be applied. The 
point. is that the application IS made possible by a 
d~? fin i t ion 0 f t. he d iff ~ 1·- end ~ 21. nd t. he 1 i n g '--I i st. ice n t. i tie s 
t.I···ld.t. accompan·~1 It~ through a presentation i ndep'2ndent. of 
the philosophy of language. However~ I do not claim~ here~ 
t.o be applied to practical I:: a O:=:'I:"?:=-':';: 
explanation of the 8.ppl iC2l.t.ion IS facilitated by the 
independent presentation through the use of legal terms. 
In Le diff~rend the following definitions: 
t.he i nst.a.b 1 E: inst.ant. 
in language where something cannot yet be put 
i nt.o sent.E~nces ~ 
43 possible 
although that process should be 
--,-_, ,,"_':', 't·_'. -, f F 'j ] t 
r u 'OSSl~,e sen~ences, 
,-11' 'f: 1~' .=. ,.- ,::,~" ,-j 
':;:-' ---=.:--::::.!...!..::-
possible Thet .. ~~ lS 
t,he 
lead to them) because they are heterogenous « 
are supplemented by the following definitions that do 
belong to the theQ~Y of the philosophy of 
A~ opposed to a litigation, 
conflict between (at, b2a':=- t,) two pa~ties that 
cannot be solved equitably due to the lack of a 
rule of judgement applicable to both arguments ~ 
and 
I SB,Y t.j'''ICI.t, t.I-"let-e 15 a diff~rend between two 
pcl t- t i E!S when (~" t-'-~ 1 i ng II over their conflict is 
made in the idiom of one of the parties, whereas 
the wrong suffered by the other party cannot be 
expressed in that idiom % 
from outsIde the 
of language and of a linguistic definItion. 
Idnguage. The question that arises from this juxtaposItion 
15= Can Lyotard properly combine the two definitions. or 
IrJ'L :I. 1 that combination harm the specifically 
8.\" 91 . ..Irnent.~~ P' .. ·lt. 
difficulty 1~1 answerlng this question stems from Lyotardls 
intermingling of the theoretical 
of hIS philosophy Thl2 t.wo 
approaches are confused In a single style as Lyotardls case 
1S put. linguistic analyses and 
In t·.hl:::' d iff ~~ I'-I=-nd '= nm.=-·t·.h i nq II a '=. k '= II .. ..- :-=-.. ----'"::--::::.....- .~ -- ._.. - . - . ~ 
sentences and suffers the wronq of not being so 
---------------- -----------------------------.. 
done at that very instant. 
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pl-"Ii losclphy of 12tn·~ua·~E:~~ t.h,:~ concept. of Ils'_.lffel·-ing a wt-ong ll 
is taken from the legal exposition. 
pt· 0 b 1. .:~ mel. t. i c: m 1 >~ of 
in writing his book. Lyotard has chosen a 
comp 1 e~{ t.I·')e book. it. is the writing of an 
v..l0 ,,- k :. 
In the sense of poetics the genre 1 s t.hat. of 
Obse/"'vat. ion:.:;:. Thou'~ht.s and 
relative to 2t-, -tJ'--+ , I_I I ~:~ 1_ _. :. t.h,~t. is=, the discontinuous 
form of the Essay ~ 
However, in this thesis I will by-pass the question of 
philosophical genres as they affect philosophical 
and will instead study t.he results of Lyotard's style 
without considering that style in it.self .. 
the question of whether a philosophy can be separated from 
its genre of presentation is a vexed one, but I cannot here 
literary-philosophical debate too far 
Yet, in a limited sense I do 
the question of genre through my study of the 
possibility of Lyotard's philosophy independent. of i t.s 
The legal terms used by Lyotard 
II j ,-~dgement ... ~ .. t. t- i bt~na 1 II, II ins t.ance II, II 1 C:iW II and II 1 it. i gat. i on" 
loi et, lit. i -=Ie). A I 1 
----... -~ 
t.hese 
from French jurisprudence and have specific 
1 egc\ I not have a specific 
jurisprudential sense the term autorisatio~ can be added to 
t.he 1 ist. through the bias of the phrase II 1 I aut.Ot- i t . .6 des 
information is gathered from the 
The above terms all 
in t.he index of the book. 
" t.o Pd. 1'- a-31""' i:t.ph" (in the senses of the 
P t- Co ell ... ICt. i on 0 f eVIdence and Cot the adding of clauses, 
\.:- 2t. t- a '::11"" af' !···I S ;_ _ ... ___ .. _ __. .___ . t.o a law -
" I::' c\ t" cl, q toO c\ Co h e I'" II ) n 
---.. ------.-~-.- .. --... l_inguistic effects are described through 
sentences making claims and counter-
claims ~o one another and of paragraphs adding to a text 
1. i k(::! further clauses to a law (both these metaphors are 
analysed in chapter IV). 
The presence of these legal terms and tropes In L~ 
dependence on the 
t.hO'3E! terms are essentIal t.o any definition of the 
does it prove that Lyotard uses the 
in 't.he i t- Thet-e 1 '?'. no dOI..-Ibt. 
though, that the terms are mixed in with Lyotard's use of a 
example, in the metaphors of 
production and the adding of clauses, and In arguments such 
as t.he f 0 1 ], (:I W i 1'''1';.1 , which uses the metaphor of t.t- i bl.Ana 1 s 
presiding over sentences: 
1 .:::. q it·. i Hi c;, t·.':::' -. I ,t· I·" - I'" ]' .j- \I 
__ •• \_ ... _ cJ._"i _0 11_.1 . _°.1 :' 
authority of tribunals 
idioms:. fc~mt 1 ies of of 
d 1 SCOUI·--.:::·e, t.ha.t. ha.ve I"K' t.o co. 
hearing. It demands a t.he 
i nst. i t.ut. i or', of new t.t·· i bunCl.l s D I t. j- l' ,- -. v - w~ . _______ ~_:._=:5~:_~_' _;., 
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It is not essentIal, In this theSIS, to demonstrate 
t.h2It. Lyot.at-d 1 12-:;1 a 1 In specific 
j UI'- i sPt-l..-Ident. i a.l What. IS l~· t.hcl t. 
examples and metaphors be shown to be part of Lyotard's 
introduction to the term diff~r.:::.nd. The fact that Lyotard 
not. '--Ise II lit. i ga t. i on " In it.s accl .. -It .. at.e 
jurisprudential sense does not imply that he IS n()t. U~· i ng 
a legel1 sen :,::.: E~ .. I n:o=:· t.e a. d :' IS 
'=' i yen t.ht-ou·;:th t.he in cl cont.e~<t. of 
t. toO i b un a 1 s :0 law'3- a.n.::! Lyot.at-d a 
cont.,~~·:t. fOI'- t.he definition of the diff~r.:::.n~; 
belonging to jurisprudence that make up that context 
tor·t, victim and third party t.~moin , 
V 1· ,_·t·. J' rn -
._--=--" ~-~ 
The ~",or'ds Ft"ench t.et-rn i no I o9Y, 
1. i t. i '::I a t. i .:. n , 1 a w , j u d'~ e men t. :0 tribunal, damage and pla int.i ve 
P I a i 'iiDpnt) 
d i ffl~"-er',d" 
-----------_. __ .. 
+'. 1'- l' til .I t·· -'1 J 
.=-__ ..::.:_.Js~...:.. ~ a.nd 
do not. allol.A) a positive definition of the 
according to what it IS; rather~ they introduce 
cl.nd def i ne -I:.hl;2 
Thc\ t. 1 S :' t.he 
is not or ~annot a.'::::· such it is gIven as outside 
Lyotard explains that a diff~rend 
-----_._----
c\ conf 1 i ct. ~ 1· t-, V'-_I I v l' t··,· ..... _ b.-" u.' '-_I '-_I t- r," ,-_, t- P_ F' ::. t- t· l' - r t· 1- - t· ... .. it '-, _. '= :=.. ~ _ •• '(;:I. _. cCI.nnot. be 
resolved equitably by a tribunal applying a 1 a"". Th i s means 
that no tribunal can equitably resolve a case that involves 
not. t.hclt. t.,·- i b'-~nc\ 1 finds i t.sel f 
incompetent with respect to a particular case. This IS an 
important clarification since a judgement of 
is. cl 1 eg i t. i mi~ t·e judgement~ and the word incQmp~tance 1 S ct. 
valid term In French jurisprudence expressing the judgement 
tribunal which finds a case beyond its competence or 
i t.s j Ut- i sci i ct. ion. if a d i ff~t-end 
._-------_. 
1 ,-=:, 
reduced to a case of incompetence it does not stand outside 
the ]• '=: . -' its definition a nega t. i ve one .. Cln t.he 
con t. r' a t- y ~ a judgement of inromp~tance IS a legal exclusion 
from one particular tribunal and not all tribunals. 
d. out.s. i dl;2 t.he 
j l~I'- i sd i ct. i on of all bodies such as courts and 
tribunals~ although this does not imply that those bodies 
case invol vin,;! a di ff~.r~:~n~;!," b'_.lt. t-at.het-" t.hat. 
they cannot judge a case equitably. This complete exclusion 
1· ' .. -.', , ...•... ' .. ;'. I'::' \". I":".' ... " '""' ••••• , '".--. '::.,"'.'j I ....... ' .... :.,' ,", r·I··· ."', ro· l' I,·' .... , '1· " - - ,. I ". j j' f' f' . I 
- •. r-'.- ... ;;:, I I ~':t .. ·.·l~.:: ~L·.UI"·1 (" 1 .. Et·"el·",c .• 
..... _--_ .. __ ....... _ ..- .... _ ..... Ir.Ji·", i chi. s not. at 
t.~_-I~rn .',,".r~.- r.~I,·I~·I~II·.·" ... ~1 .. j 
.. .- r .J :'.11''' 1 ~.p t"·,,,.JC 1::~nCI2 ~ 
indicates a contestation 1n law. 
Thet"e!:ry, a negative definition 
of conflict between (at. least.) two parties that 
rule of judgement applicable to both arguments. 
In French jurisprudence a litigp is a case that can 
legitimately be brought to court in view of obtaining 
reparation or damages: 
Lit. i gat. i on. Jurisprudential term. Contestation in 
L;:\w" II He c\dded t.hat. what. he was demand i ng was i I''', 
line with the laws that stated: in 
Vet-t.':II...Jt., R4vol. rc .. rn. V" 56 ••• II 51 
as opposed to a litiqe. can never . . be 
equitably contested law:: it is excluded from the 
resolution. In order to 
further classify that exclusion and to thereby specify his 
definition of a diff~rend~ Lyotard constructs a model 
in det.cl i ]. 
litigation. This model 1S based on the differentiation of 
t.hl-? t.e t- rns 
.JI_-I\·- i ·:=;.pr·udent. i cll dclri1cl'=,es 
1. nt.et-es.t. ~ 01'-
someone in guise of reparation for a wrong. 
P I a i nt. iff n The complaining party 
does not use the accurate 
<:"'1 in Let",,1 .. !L 
and 
definition of dommaqe~ 
------"-'"--_ .. 
he does~ however, use the term in a 
legal sense where damage can be proven in a court of law 
and Ccln t.hen lead to reparation through the payment of 
damages or ~ommag~~-int~r~ts). 
constructs his model of cl conf I i ct. t.hat 
\·-,::rna ins. the possibility of an 
the definition of a tort 
( t.o t- t). I n Le diff~ren~ a tort is defined as a wrong that 
cannot be repaired through an appeal to a tribunal: 
A tort is this: a wrong compounded by the loss of 
t.he means of proving that a wrong has been 
In this definition of a tort~ Lyotard opposes a wrong 
payment of dammages awarded by a tribunal. 
reparation given to a plaintiff in the case of a recognised 
1 n cl t.o t- t. t. h E! 
----_. 
wrong cannot be recc~nised by 
or tribunal (Note: 1 n En'=, I i ;.h 
IS II Tor.t. 1 aw \I ~ t.h i s is not true for 
French jurisprudence). Thus, In ct case involving a tort 
there IS no way of proving the wrong suffered by the 
pIa i n t. iff: II t. h e loss of the means of proving that a wrong 
is important to remark, here~ 
,-~sUcll sen'E.·e to be able to give an accurate 
definition of a diff~rpnd as outside the Law. He further 
qualifies the definition by adding the concepts of victim 
and silence to the sense of a tort. When a plaintiff 
rnrnF']~l't-l- n~ ~ t_.I_~I~t_. t ... ~l~.-_· r._OI_~t-+_~ cannot reCOq_nlSe the wronC .. 1 _ _ ,,- . '-', :::, _ I (_. r 
done to that party and the plaintiff becomes a victim, a 
party excluded from any recourse to the Law: 
If t.het-e 1 ,= .~ prove the tort and no one 
to correspond to it~ and/or if the argument for 
the tort is judged absurd, then the plaintiff IS 
ruled out of court. The tort he complains of 
cannot. be not. iced. plaintiff becomes a 
v i ct. i m 54 
yet tnat D2rson 
it and th0refore the case IS rejected by all 
11 d~bout.~ Ii 
rejection by a tribunal). Thenceforth, 
1 ~; {;;\ vic t. i rn reduced to silence; IS 
t..o indicate a plaintiff rejected by all 
The p 1 2. i n t. iff IS listened to, but the victim 
maybe one and the same person 
s i lent. 55 
q 1 v~~n c~bove I deduce the following 
de. fin i t. i on 0 f 
legal litigation: a diff~rpnd is a conflict involving two 
()r more parties where, whenever a tribunal passes judgement 
CIvet· t.hE! confl ict., one of t.he pcH·t.ies becomes a vict.im - as 
the victim changes so does the offending tribunal. The 
grievance of a victim cannot be recognised by a tribunal, 
t.herefore neither 
Before such a tribunal the victim is rendered silent: 
I would like to call 
F' 1 <::1. i n t. iff 1 ,-;:, s t.r· i pped of t.he rnea.ns 
argumentation and thereby becomes a victim ~ 
of 
I;;!' _·:Ic._f.·~.-,·.!'_·':"-' _I·~ .. _',;:-_' .. ~' ..=! .. '-::·"!'· . L . ~ ~ }_ _ In OPPOS1~lon to legal 
c.j l' f t-' ~ t- 1::'1'" (-1":=· ,=!..--.::"----~,::--.= In Le diff~rend. 
---------------
consequences of that dependency. 
I 
c 1 i:l. i fii t.o h a 'J e 
will now analyse the 
Distinction: Judgement as opposed to the judge.ent of 
tribunals 
Prior to proceeding to the critique of the role played 
by Lyotard's legal model in his philosophy of language, an 
important distinction must be drawn between judgement as it 
in the creation and analysis 1 in91_.tist.ic 
I~nt. i t. i I~,=, of sent.ences, idioms) , B.nd 
judgement as passed by tribunals. 
Where there is a diff~rend the party in the conflict 
that becomes the victim alters according to which tribunal 
and by which law the conflict is judged. 
matter who becomes the victim, where there is a diff~ren~ 
subjected to the judgement of a tribunal there must be a 
This state of affairs 
one party to another through a change in the case put to 
the tribunal or through a change in t. t- i buna 1. It. is in t.he 
instigation of such an alte~ation that a judgement other 
than the judgement of tribunals is F'ut l·t-,tr_1 Fl-y _ _ • c l. • 
In definin9 t.he d i fJ~r~end. Ci.ccol·-d i n'~ t.o !:~:II·-t. and 
v i ct. i rns, Lyotard has gIven a negative definition with 
legal terminology and has, therefore, set the 
out.'=.. i de Thi~. e~<clu~.ion 1 ~. 
universal since the sllence that can fallon any of the 
IS not defined as relative to a 
particular tribunal but is given as a consequence of the 
diff~rend's exclusion 
----------
f I··' om equ i t.abll:=! judgement by all 
t.t- i bt.Jna 1 s .. HE!nCe, t.he judgement that a conflict is a 
diff~rend must be made by a body other than a 
tribunal. There must be a form of judgement distinguishable 
from the judgement dealt out by tribunals, a judgement able 
to recognise the tort present in di ff.§t"ends. 
----
As I have argued above, Lyotard uses both the negative 
definition and the necessary exclusion of diff~rends from 
the law of tribunals to introduce what is also a term from 
hi..:·; IS also a 
linguistic state .. In L~ diff~rend Lyotard Juxtaposes both 
definitions, linguistic and legal; for example~ 
To do justice to diff~rends is to determine new 
addressees, new significations and new referents 
sot. hat. t.o t" t b I:=! e ~< p t" e sse d and E:J a i n t iff s c e a s I:=! 
61 
This requires new rules for the 
l ·~.·.. f"I .. ' ..... __ ,·L._. t·,=_ F - r- r- 1· t ] t I ] t t . II 1 I r- • U =-;::, '. ~2 .:·0 ~ ~<.E' t- e'.5 '? _~_~__ -. 0 t- __ . _l:_I:) 
sent.E~nc~2.=' 57 
_ .. __ .. _----
[My emr.:·hCt. sis] 
In the negative definition of the diff~ren~ as opposed 
t·O d. 1 i t. i ga t. i on !' Lyotard is referring to tribunals and 
other specifically institutions. When he speaks of 
judgement other than the judgement of tribunals. That IS, a 
judgement where new linguistic formulation allows a tort to 
be judged through the creation of an idiom t.hat. can 
express the wrong done to the victim and hence avoid that 
person's silence: 
In t.he di ff~I·-end somet.hinq "ask~.ll ~~~~~-- - t.o be put. i nt.o 
sentences and suffers the wrong of not being so 
done at that very instant. [ ... ] It. 
of a given literature!, philosophy and, possibly!, 
of a politics to witness diff~r~nds by finding 
idioms to express them. [ .•. l We must avoid those 
In Lvotard's philosophy of language there IS a form of 
judgement independent of the judgement of tribunals and a 




1 ) \/ :i. ct. i rn In .:;;1 
the judging tribunal (Thi '.:::. 
the condition for the third reason below). 
2) No tribunal can determine whether a conflict lS a 
... ·11· f:'f I:!:' Ir ;::'1'" .-j 
.:.=-_ .. ____ =-__ .. ;.-:: __ 1-:. •. " 
:3) The formulation of new idioms for t.h,~ e:<pt""es::;:· i on 
of a wrong suffered by a victim can change the 
victim into a legitimate plaintiff. 
Thu~s :. in t.he 
creation of new 1dloms a judgement is exercised that cannot 
judgement of tribunals as it. 1S understood by 
applies given laws and 15 only 
receptive to idioms compatible with its own: 
The tribunal provides II t.h i s II t- ~q i me and I ()I"" .-~----
all and, by 
transcribing the heterogenous sentences at play 
in society <:I.nd in the discourse on society int.o 
its own idiom~ it necessarily inflicts a tort on 
t.he c,t.het-s S9 
'/-.' h ~_.~. .. . -" ;::'. '".1'.::. . ·. le.-:- '-I .f:: t -, ,. r ~ 
- - ." I ,,' ,_' .':='" 
(. ,::-,: oj ~ .. e. ';: .. :::. t. J.:) I'" t,,'. r-__ • '.' ',',"" . I '0'-.'. t". !-_'I-'_.. ,-_',:, ,"'·1 ::=. ]', '-",,' ,:"_"",.,, ':.::- ,'_-1 L-_' =-.,,"_"l_, t· t l t . 
"- - - - -~ r Jlme J~e queSJlon of 
in my critique of Lyotard. In t,hc..t, 
distinction, philosophy and justice (the Law) 
f 0 t" rnE~ t'. because, Lyot.at-d, 
philosophy must act as a WItness for the victims of 
will 
I 
D .. , 
!"',Y that the concatenation of sentences IS 
problematical and that the problem is political. 
we will create a politics away from the politics 
of " i nt.~.=! 1 J. ect,tEI l~. Ii and politicians. Wi t.ness i tY3 
ease of comprehension, during the rest of this 
will CEllI t·he 
In chapter VI of this thesis, I 
,=.how how adjudication IS based on a theory of the 
feeling of the sublime. Through the sublime feeling a wrong 
can be 
bd.S~d on t.he sublime is taken, in a large part 7 from Kant 
by Lyotard In order to make it possible for him to escape 
ft· 0 m t. h '2 con s t t" a i n t. s 0 f a judgement dependent on the 
application of given laws. 
Critique of Lyotard's use of legal terminology and 
metaphors 
My critique of Lyotard's use of legal terminology and 
metaphors follows thr·ee I rna k <~ gene \.- 2t 1 
criticisms of the reference to legal terminology in Le 
I may specify Lyotard's 
judg~ment of tribun~ls. ~:;e(-::()nd , given the answer to the 
above criticisms I model of 
understanding of the law of tribunals. And third, following 
Lyotard's use of 1S prejudicial to his 
philosophy of language. The central point studied in these 
IS Lyotard's privileging of the role of objective 
My claim will be that 
L.yotarcj's concentration on the objective nature of evidence 
sentences in his philosophy of language. 
Three questions must be put to Lyotard once he has 
negatively defined the diff~r~nd as outside the possibility 
of e'=!u i t.ab I e Becal...tse t.he 9i ffet-end has 
been defined negatively with respect to t.he 
three ques·tions can be translated into questions concerning 
those terms; jn this second form they will serve to clarify 
Lyotard's definition of the judgement of tribunals. The 
t · W~at rn(-~.I~ ...... -__~ ~ ll"t.l"n_~_t"l·'-_'t-I c:~t~ ~r_r_~_pt.~t'l~_ r_~~e ques "lon~~ at-e: rl __ " I"' - ... , .... M -, I ... , ... , '-,-
a plaintiff must establish 
suffered J~ genUIne and the plaintiff's 
rules as to the establishment of reality set 
down by the tribunal: 
The plCi.int.iff affirms that something 
demonstrate that existence in well 
1 -:;.' 
--=.:-
sentences and according to procedures for the 
establishment of the existence of their referent. 
Reality is always the onus of the plaintiff 61 
If the plaintiff cannot establish that reality, then 
at. 
• L. • J US .... ·l CI-?, Not.E~ 
how In my interpretation of Lyotard's definition~ I have 
substituted the notion of 
This substitution IS necessary if my presentation is too 
avoid difficulties In the understanding of Lyot'c!I'-d I s 
t,heor'y; for' hi rn:. t_, l-. ~_',' "t- ~-_ ... ;::, 1" v ~_", t- I' ~_--, ~_-', - - - - t- :J' I' t".., .L._ r ~, '_', .=\1,_1_1_1 1 • '=, I,., ,_, 
tribunals, this notion clashes with the more common view of 
reality as a single ha v~~ ane! 1 ysed 
Lyotard's demonstration of the dependence of reality on 
procedures of verification in chapter IV of the thesis. In 
this chapter I will study and criticise this idiosyncratic 
definition of reality in its role within legal j l..~d':Jernent, a 
Prior to that study I retain the distinction between the 
plaintiff1s onus of having to prove the genuine nature of 
the wrong suffered, and the court1s notion of reality as 
pIB.int,i ff" (My I~rophc!sis). 
Lyotard defends hls view, of tribunals depending on 
the establishment of reality and of diff~rends as being 
cases where that establishment cannot be achieved, by 
giving a paradigmatic diff~rend vindicating his thesls 
concerning the primordiality of reality In the judgement of 
t, t- i buna 1=:,. Th,~ bl~t,ween t,he 
French historian Faurisson and any witness of 
the gas chambers used in the perpetration of the Nazi 
holocaust. Faurisson claims that no one can prove to him 
--
the use of gas chambers In the decimation of millions of 
chambers were put to such a use. In his argument, Faurisson 
·t.·. !.-, '~.-_".' 1.·_".· C,'·· 'J;. f.· ..• -.-... ' ·1"· ]. ':.11'''1 .1.. j" -• .j.. ~. - I'f"' , . 
" I .••. 1 c\ ' .. ' .:.:. '_.1, It::!'.· (', ]. j"j 'J 
1herefore, gIven the absence of a 
no proof as to the holocaust. 
[". _. " : ~~. - .. ',_. . .. ". . _. - t· - I . . 
I"' d ' . ..1 ,. 1.::.;, =, u t , . __ ', c:\ I' ':::1 1 ...1 Iii 1= t I .. · c\ ncr:::: t" 1 t. E: t- J. 0 n : 
I,.>Ji tness? 
II I t··,~~.ve cH··,d.l vsed t.hou:=.ands of document.s. I have 
tirelessly questioned historians and specialists. 
I h i~l. V e :;:.12 i"'::t. ,.- C h e d in vain for a single deportee 
able to pr'ove to me that. he ~,~~ t---]ly ---t-
'-, - I::!c\.. '=,I::!~= I a I~as 
IS t.he 
condition which gIves one the authorit.y t.o say 
62 t.h;:-I.t. it. e:< i st.s 
11 E:':5 t.he 9 i fJ..$I·- ens:J bet.ween F a'-~t- i sson and t.he 
It. lies In t.he fa.ct. that. for Faurisson the 
deaths of millions if the witness saw millions die. 
Faurissonls case is a strong one because almost all the 
wi tnesse-:::; who could satisfy his criterion 
Witnesses of millions of deaths were in turn sent to their 
deaths so no one person has witnessed mass murder. Lyotard 
a:~·:· in some sens·e val id and 
that Lyotard agrees with Faurissonls verdict). 
F atu- i sson ' s t-ule t.he es tab I i shment. of 
I)) 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































it cannot apply one rule consistent with the claims of both 
I cl.m CI-- it. i ca. 1 of Lyotard's use of the Faurisson 
paradigm because it. B.llows t.o make 
inconsistent claim and then takes it as if a tribunal must 
cla.im .. In fact., Faurisson1s argument lS 
. . t .I.. 1 ncons 1 s ~.en 1_.; t.ha.t. is~ it cannot support its conclusion 
through the points made prior to that conclusion since one 
of those points involves excluding wltnesses for not being 
dec..cI.. The How can Faurisson claim that they 
dead given his own ignorance of the chambers in 
OF'>::~I'- c\ t. i on'? He cc\n on I y make st.lch a c I aim by assum in';!. t.hat. 
kill all wi t.nesses of 
functioning. Not only does this assumption not make sense 
if one takes into account the operators of the chambers and 
Jewish witnesses involved 1n the preparation of the victims 
(a~:., fOI'" barbers forced to cut the hair of 
t·ho:-=:.e abot~t. t.o die - see, the witness involved in that task 
interviewed by Claude Lanzman in his film Shoah). But also, 
Faurisson assumes the point he 1ns1sts no one has been able 
to "convince" hirn of, name 1 y ~ t.ha t. the chambers did kill 
syst.ematicallY. Must take his affirmation 
1:1 f " t. i I'" e 1 E=~ S SCi. n a 1 y s· is" d. n d II va ins e a.I·- c hilS. e t- i ou sly'? 
-. 
711..! 
All one can learn from Faurisson is the dishonesty of 
of that they witness t.he dei:I.t.hs of 
millions when all along the assumption has been made that 
witnesses can exist. After Faurisson's intervention 
t.he III.Nas el ho I ocaust.?·~ IS In no WclY 
advanced. This does not mean that it cannot be advanced, it 
forces tribunals to treat Faurisson as he deserves: 
him out of court. There is no diff~rend here, and 
fals·e paradigm to support his 
Lyotard allows Faurisson to l'~'~ i t. i mC!. t.e 
of t.,·- i bun8.1 =.: c •. s· requIrIng proof of the reality of a claim. 
-;:·:.uch 
adoF't.ed as a v8.1 id e~<c;..mple. In fel.ct., Lyot.C!.t-d can 
bl...lt. only if he gi yes· d i chot.omy: 
adjudication/judgement of tribunals (see previous section). 
In his adj t~d i .=at. i on independent of the 
the silence of a witness CB.n tll~ 
interpreted as a SIgn of the existence of the gas chambers: 
not indicate the negated i nst.ance, 
bt.Jt. onl y indicates the negation of 
i nst.ances. When s i 1 ent. one may 
( 1 ) t.he situation at hand is no 
business of the addressee; or, (2) t.he s i t·Ue\ t. i on 
71 
HOI,-\je\lJ~I" :' 
t.., ... i b'-~na 1 and t.hen 
Fau~lsson, Lyotard takes him as presenting the paradigmatic 
judgement of tribunals. 
Lyotard privileges a model presenting tribunals as 
supports his definition of diff~renrls given as the cases 
of t.r-- i b'-~na 1 s =.UPPOI·-t.S 
1 12 '::1 a 1 definit.ion of t.he ~iff~t"·.=:opd. I will now 
foundational role in the definition of the diff~r.=:ond. 
Alain Badiou G!uid Ct- it. i -=It·le, 
1984) crit.icises and notes t.he problems ensuing 
ft-om Lyot.at-d'~; j 1 ••• ,dg~:2rnent.s 
on the reality of a I·-ef~~t-ent.. Th,-~s, Badiou remarks upon 
lyot.at·d's limiting of judgement to a particular case: 
FClt .. him [Lyot'cll''',j J 
ques t. i on 0 f t.he 
everything turns about the 
This 1· ,.... .-.:.t like a 
i n pat" t. i c t~ 1 a t .. an En91ish whl:1 seeks t.o 
in I.Alh i ch 
stRtements of the pa~ties In 
t.J i. s (::.1 . ..1 t.l~ 66 
t.o Bd.d i Ot·l? t·t··lis prejudice towards .~. 
of IS carried through t.o 
Lyotard's philosophy of language, where the cognitive genre 
i'.:::. 1·-,:-::st.I·-ict. . .:~d t.c. t.t···IOSE: ·:=,er·,t.ences t.hat. e~~t.ablish t.ht::;: r·ectli"t.y 
referent. Because judgement is deemed to be 
solely dependent upon a correspondence to reality, 
of in the philosophy of 
pl·- i or· i t.y t.o ct rest~icted definition of cognitive sentences. 
false dichotomy has been i nt.t-oduced int.a 
theory, the same flaw 1S extended into the 
philosophy of language: 
[ ••• J The clumsiness of the legal ml~t.ctphot·· 1S 
E:::<t.ended by t.he defini t.ion of 
(of the sentences belonging to the 
cogni t.i ve 
defines the cognitive 
d:i ~.t i net. it appeals to the 
Badiou contends that this is an 
incorrect claim given the genrets function in deciding what 
a function taking account of criteria othe~ than 
real i t.y .. To emphasize this point, Badiou gives the example 
where there need not be an appeal to 
to establish the correctness r_lf ~_~. -I-l·rn 
'_. d. II ~ 
Mat.hematical sentences - and, In my op i n i on, .~.ll 
sentences the stake of which IS truth- fa.lsify 
[Lyot.ar·d IS] definition of the cognitive. 
Th i .::; means that there flisll in m2tt.hema.t. i ca I 
t.hou'~lh t. is not governed by any procedure for the 
. EO 
establIshment of a real referent ~ 
Badiou shows Lyotardls definition of the cognitive in 
hi =:.; ph i lo:::::ophy of language t.o be ·~ovet-nE!d by t.he 1 J:~'~a 1. 
context used In the definition of the term diff~rpnd. 
Badiou demonstrates the inappropriate nature 
of the application of Lyotard1s analysis to his 
philosophy of 1 an·~II ... lc\·~~~. The cognitive genre IS defined 
inaccurately due to this mis-use of the legal paradigm: 
ep i s t.emo logy [his defini t. ion of 
C t- i t. i Cd. I 
( j I .. ·W i d i c cd. ). [. a • ]. I t. is not directed according 
to the right paradigm ~ 
My remarks on the topic of the Fauris§on case rejoin 
Badiouls analysis of the cognitive genre. Where 
false dichotomy supporting Lyotard1s legal definition of a 
74 
t.o ;3, '0.·el·"lO;.,,!':~, fli='i.I ... 'J in Lyt::ot·a,I·-.j'r:::; t·.Jurk in L,~. ;j~ff'~rel·=~_. 1/"", hIS 
i nt\"· Odt·IC"t. i or': to t.he CO!"'ICt:':!pt. I) f <:t ~;LLf :F~i:=.~n~;J. Lyot.at" d us~:=!s a 
legal model. Within the model there is a distinction drawn 
between two forms of Judgement: the judgement of tribunals 
2nd adjudication (as defined In the previous section). The 
distinction ~)as been shown to be without foundation (s>~e my 
remarks on Faurisson) yet it supports important aspects of 
Lyotard's philosophy of language: the definition of the 
cognitive genre and the distinction between adjudication 
and judgement according to the cognitive genre. There lies 
th'~2 rn i '=.ti::tke ,,,,,to t.he foul'''ldat. i on of Lyot.at-d';::. ph i losophv in L~ 
!:::Il:..ff~~t-eD~;:J,~ t.wo r-~·t"(:!s~~nt.at.ions ax,:::! givE!n of t.he k>2Y t.el·-m~ t.he 
the first presentation through IS 
inaccurate and prejUdICeS the second presentation In a 
philosophy of language. 
Summary of results so far 
in t.h i s chapt.e t- I demonstrated how Lyotard 
used tOPlCS extraneous to his philosophy of 
the concept of Th,~ 
conclusion was that such illustratory and 
terms must not prejudice the definition of a diff~rend in 
the philosophy of language. However~ in the analysis of the 
fulfilled by Lvotard's work on justice in the 
presen·tation of his theory. I i ncomp 1 ~!te d.nd 
.L t"l i:<. C C :_"' r' <:1. t. e. n d. t. U t- ':~ 0 f L .... / 0 t. Cl. F' ,-._. I r"_":. '1'_'. l ..•• ,_::'_ (_-, 1'." ".'y' ,-._, t· . t· -t 
• _. r J U·=:· _-1 ce i:<TI'_ it.=. 
prejudice towBrds a restricted form of judgement In Law. 
F 1 ...1 t" t:. h ,~ ,." roo t- e. :. T n(lt.,~d -. fo 11 ov.J i n'~ Ala. i n Bad i ou .- how t.he 
inadequacies of the ct n c\ 1 Y'3 1. -=, ,_-,'F J' II ~ t l' - - W - t- - - - - . j 
.. ::. -' I_I;:! I;:! I;:! '_<='." ,.- 112' 
through to the philosophy of language. This 1 as t. poi n t. 1 =. 
very damaging for the pr'oject of defining a new philosophy 
of it. shows t.he influence of unsound 
practical analyses on that philosophy. In the definition 
and the use of the metaphor of the judgement of tribunals~ 
Lyotard undermines his philosophy of language. 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida on judge.ent in Lyotard 
and Kant 
Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques Derrida take the criticism 
of Lyotard's analysIS of judgement a step further than 
Alain Badiou's examination of the influence of a model of 
justice upon a philosophy of language. They investigate the 
question of judgement as the foundation of Lyotard's 
philosophy of language. That is. they consider the role of 
judgement in the determination of the goals of Lyotard's 
p~)ilosophy and study the implications for a philosophy of 
language presented as the basis of a critique of judgement. 
of cr it. i cis i n9 t.he mistakes following from 
Lyotard's legal theory~ Nancy and Derrida note the problems 
In a philosophy of 
:i n·ve-=:· t. i .~<:~ t. i on of t.he 
possibility of just judgement. Their critique is extended 
thus far by the intermediary of an analysis of the role of 
between Kant and Lyotard's work. These parallels are openly 
cldrn i t.t·eel by L.yot.i:lt-d in his bo,:,ks (fOt- e~<amp 1 e ~ in Al-l Ju·=:.t.~.~ 
I 'Et·· t L_ - r '''" l' - -:;'j'o,-
_.-_::.....L:::!..!'-' _ .. :::". d~-==' B.nd 
Nancy's and Derrida's work on judgement~ as it appears 
in Lvotard's books, follows four steps: 
1.) ThE~y 
concept in Lyotard's work. 
2) They state that the import of Lyotard's work lies in his 
investigation of the role of judgement in the foundation 
and deconstructIon of philosophies; it. 
importance to their own philosophies of difference and 
3) Both Derrida and Nancy then note how Lyotard's concept 
of judgement is evolved from Kant's work 
- ~ +--• 
.... . /
4) 
Lyota~d's work through 
i rnpot-t.a.nce of 
t.he b i a.s of Kant. I will therefore concentrate on point 4) 
and onl'.,' ~_-j.\./~_~ ~lrl~.)I~t .. i_-~_lrl1lrn~ ...I~lt.~~t·l·~_-.'.=_, I-_Ir, l' t 1)' ~ ~) t 
., '-1 _ _, po n •.. ::, I •. O.  Iy way 
and books I refer to 1n this section are: 
by Nancy, II L~~ 1< clt. I:;:QO 1'" e i n de I I .;:O!>~ c~s II 
--_.&.-----..... _ .. _. .cl.nd II Lapst~s .J I.A die i i " 
a.nd 1/ D i I:;:S I t- ae II in L.a factd t·e 
"Econorn i ml~s:i~. II in 
devant. loil! in V I t~n t.on 
---_ .. _._---_. 
All t.hes·e 
KClnt. Ot- Lyot.at-d (or on both of them). La 
essays dedicated to the 
t.opic of Kant. I s and Lyot'Clt-d I S ""JOt" k j 1...ldgernent. and is 
therefore of direct interest to the work here at hand: 
[ ] I-I -t-- ·.-_~l',', F)I~l·losoF·hers exam1ne how to . • nul::! I:::~:, • j t.ldo;:;te 
In the absence of laws. The topic is set through 
t·he one of 
studied at· t.he colloquium in Cerisy In 1982. This 
f elC '--11 t. s;;:! c1'::! i 1_·1 qe I'" ] ;:,] 11 .1.-1,::, '::. 
-------------.... -----~---'---.. -.. - - -_. t.o 
The prImary reference to Lyotard In the texts 1 i =:.t.,~d 
;:..bove j I.Ad':':;IE!mE!ni:. Ei.nd its relationship to the 
foundation of philosophy as seen within the context of 
philosophy caught between a modern and a post-modern 
What is meant by that context I~· ph i lo=:.ophy In 
cr'isis~ philosophy questioning its foundations and i t.:=.·; 
itself foundations. 
and Nancy see Lyotard as important insofar as he thinks 
through the possibility of universal judgements and laws 
govet-ned by a foundational philosophy - in this case~ a 
philosophy of language. The two quotes, below, i I I t-l S t. ,- Ei. t. ,~ 
this position with regard to Lyotard's work: 
A becoming-modern and post-modern of thought, of 
al·-t.:, or of politics held as one of its specific 
like a t.ype of infra-Hegelian necessity. [. .. ] 
One noted the fate or drift of the epoch. One 
f ,.- el g men t. a t. i on , 
d i =:.p05 i t. i \/es, out., 
Lyotard reminded us that all t.his 
implied in bot.h s·ense:·:.· of t.he 
expresslon~ it already involved judgement and it 
7'j 
1 n t.h i 5:. of 
modernity In the belief of having finished with 
judgement, the scene where authority reverts to 
the judgement of philosophy~ from Plato to Hegel, 
.J e c\ n ._. F j'" ;;\ t-, ':-,. .-.. ·.1 l' C. l y ..... 1.. -tid + ] 1 
- - - L~d-C comes an ~e. sus: t·ake 
there is a paradox, and t.hai:. 
paradox IS the signature of the post-modern, in 
fact judgement is neither founder nor founded, it. 
may be secondary, yet for that very reason there 
is no question of being rid of it.; and, if YOI...! 
hope to escape judgement, you will not be left in 
p~2c\ce 72 
The closeness in content of the two quotes gIven above 
Derrida and Nancy both take note of the same 
learnt from Lyotard: In the founding and 
destruction of philosophy by philosophy - the elusive post-
modern moment - an act of judgement has to be made which 
rol..~st. itself be judged. There is judgement when laws for 
future judgement are glven; when those laws are repeated 
t.here 15 al'::::'o j '-.Jd'~~::rnent .. FI.At- t.het- rnc.t-e, t.he clct.S of 
jurisdiction and repeating of in turn open to 
In the question of judgement at the foundation of 
philosophy Lyotard returns to and resembles Kant. This is 
because Kant is at the same time a philosopher of the 
() 'r In the Third Critiaup. 
.--.------------____ ... .-.1_--= .. ' 
judgement at the foundation of philosophy~ 
In each of the 
II 1_::1.' ... 11' Ij J' 1_.1 t- ]._ '.=_, .~.:, I!._ II "J L .. , 1 __ 1 l.. - ,- t· l_ . L t t . j t L . 
. ,r rid=.. .. ·rlE"~ t-l';ln _. _-0 J'--II ';Ie _·.--115 ca·:=;e?". In 
i<2t.nt. I '.7;; wot-k;o thl=:! deduct.ions (fot·· e;-;arnple,. liThe deduction of 
the pl.,.we concept.·:::·; of Underst.cl.ndin';l") are the arguments 
t.'-·I t.hey t.he 
judgements founding each Critique as legitimate and where 
".JUt"' i ,=:.t.s II ca 11 II deduct i on" t.~··,,=:! proof answel'- 1 ng t.() 
t.he quest. i on II 01_-1 i d jtu-is?'1 In a law ~51...1i t.u The 
deduct. ion is the establishment of right: t.he 
deduct.ton of t.he PUt-.:=! conc~~pt.s of t.he 
understanding must. establish the right of reason 
ln all cases 73 
Jean-Lue Nancy is very clear on this bringing together 
C::-tnd Lyot.a.t-d;, his work sets down each point where 
they converge and~ more importantly, where they diverge in 
their interpretations of judgement. And it is at the point, 
where Kant and L,yotard are explicitly compared, that I must 
separate Nancy's and Derrida's arguments. This i '.7;:. beca.use 
Nancy makes the step overtly; in his work on Kant he refers 
direct.ly t.o L yot.a t'" d (as in the post-script. to "Lapsus 
1···1':::' i··· ~-::, f ,:::, \.- ':::. ,j 1· ', ... ,::,,_. t- I" -1--
- •• _ 0_. ,__ •• _  •• " .'/ 1_" I ... ) 
Lyotard exploits Kant. i cln 
fundamental Kantian in the answering 
of a question that is not Kantian ~ 
set.s 2I.slde a long footnote to 
acknowledge Nancy's influence on his own work on Kant in 
on the other hand? 
connect criticisms of Kant and Lyotard overtly In a same 
text; instead, the comparison is made through a set of key 
concepts and metaphors as they recur in his work on Kant 
and in his work on Lyotard. Although this difference in the 
presentation of argumentation between 
approach and Derrida's implicit allusions does not imply a 
COt- r·espond i ng di ffel·-encE! t.he point.s of t.hei t-
criticisms - in fact they both rely on one another's work-
I will analyse their studies independently~ 
avoid any confusion due to their varying methods. 
First, I will investigate Jean-Luc Nancy's analysis of 
Lyotard and Kant on Nancy's criticisms of 
Lyotard stem from differences in t.hei r interpretation of 
Kant. t.hese interpretations appear t.o be very 
close - I have already mentioned Lyotard's debt to Nancy -, 
however, in practice small divergences in their respective 
?reat effects upon their 
Lni.erpretations of 
long and complex to glve in detail 
in this section. so it IS essential to retain the following 
guiding principle: In order to ensure the contingency of 
<:.11 t.h~~ not. i on 0 f St~b lime 
the occurrence of un-ruled events. whet-eas 
t.he reason to act without the 
provision of rules governIng that action. The occurrence of 
excess is ontological according to Lyotard, i t. 1 set. h i cal 
8.o::ordin·~ t.o N<~~ncy. Fe,,'" bot.h of t.hem e}~ces.s· 1S t.hat which 
'.: a 1""', n () t. b I=:~ "egu 1. at.ed ()j'- judged by pre-given rules and 
therefore calls for follow new 
f 0 1 J. 0 W r' t~ I .~:.; at. c.4.11 u For Lyotard. excess calls through a 
':=-ub 1 i n1'? f ,~,:~ 1 i ng; it calls through an appeal to 
b E~ :::~ t~ b 1 i rn e 0 f t. h e c: c\ t. E~ 9 () ~- i c (;1 1 I rn p E~ t- at. i ve .. 
How does his different interpretation of Kant allow 
Nancy to criticise Lyotard's work on judgement? In order to 
answer the question the conflict of interpretations must be 
cIa ,.- i f i ~~ d .. To I will retrace the dispute 
In t.he 
in II Lap~;u=-. .Judici i" the main point of divergence 
between Nancy and Lyotard is:-=. i n 9 1 e d 0 t~ t .. The point. is 
0/cludes the notion of a juridical 
Lyotard intends to keep away from the motif of a 
opinion:. 
foundation and of the origin. He 
in Ki:t.nt.':3 wor k j t.ld·;::Iement. 
problematics of the origin is reversed in favour 
of L .. ] . 
follow from Lyotard's point, t.ha t. t.he j tU- i d i ca 1 
fiction plays a substitute or supplementary role 
"l:.c .. t.het-eby 
surreptitiously back rnet.aphy:.; i cd.l 
thematics of t·he origin ~ 
The above quote IS a reaction to the following remark 
fl·-om a foot.not·e on Nancy 1. n Lyot.2tt-,j' S ~.:::~el:Jt·t~2t~:=, i ctsrnE.;.= 
Un 1 ike 1\121.nCY, I refuse to associate modes and 
of t.o 
[ .•• ] that such terms 
corne from a problematics of foundation or of the 
At st.ake in Nd.ncy' s t.vJO d i ffet-ent. 
understandings of the function of judgement in t·he Thi I·-d 
Ct- i t. i 9l~':::' in est.ablishing areas of legit.imacy for the three 
-r .... ! .... " ,-... ,._:::. 1-.-_' ' •• "'. (0" i-.:_;' :-=' .• '.=-_'" -. -F 'I -. ._, '1' t . (n· ... . I t 
' -. U , J. ':::! '::, .. ' ]. . ,:t .... ·'2 J : .. ·1'·:' '~:l co' n'! en .. 
created through a j tw i d i ca 1 deduct.ion 
'
·11'.·.·11.1. ~'.:.' .J. 1· '·-I'.:='. ,cl' J'. '.::.Ii ... 1 ',.- t=-.•.. , ~ .•.:, c·."". ','·1 ,.j t· . 'I·' - ,- 'f t- -. I'ii ,. j:: f'" . - t 
-J • . .• :, •• ' ':::! :::, U (J ].', '::! \ .• ~::! n ..... <::t.I·· E:~ i':'. ~7.. ?3.\ S . .1:..1.:. .' hey 
t.he 
'::,:. ~:! 1 f··· c () ,'.', '.":; :i. :7:,; t. E! ,". t. c\ n d a '-.( t. 0 - I e '3 i·:::·; 1. at. e d ''=. c i en t. i fie mod e I lS 
used analo~ically In the justification of the legitimacy of 
The self-consistency and auto-legislation of 
IS 
qualified as models. [, .. l. But ~eason cannot be 
This is the properly j '-H· i d i C<::t.l sen'::;e 
of t.r··.e . ... .] L. • C t" 1 .... ·1 ca. '::I'.Ae·::; \., I on: 'IOU i d j 1 . ..11'-1. s? II. I t. does 
not mean that the sciences must be legitimised 
bl.At. t.hctt. t.I··',ey must gIve figure to 
The jurisdiction of a gIven fCi.cul t.y is altAlays a 
fict.ion; t.his function of judgement is not 
to measure all things from a metaphysical origin~ b'-.It. t.o 
their legislation. Nancy explaIns that 
function as an obligation. According to him, jUt- idi ca I 
" fie t i () n i n ';1 1\ :' fictionalize legality, IS an obligation 
C:a t.el~ot· i ca 1 Imperative addressed t.o 
t() act. is to be obliged to legislate, because a free action 
to be =.II~Dll·ed .. 1_-~_~t"lt-II:.I~. t- I ~ . "- - ,_ 1- .II:::! -:: nOI,-.11'"! ~ 
it.I
'
_ 'I .. ·:ld not. b~~ ,:I.ddr'es·:::;ed '1- - r-t" -" I 
,.,1..1 J:::!~C orn u Laws must therefore be 
fictioned .. q._.·L·V~._~1 t~,~._, 
- I _r necessary non-existence of a-priori 
r'u I t~S fot, ~\ n d j 1...1\'" 1. d i cal II fict.1.onin9 11 is t.ht~ 
of the obli9ation of the 1.nitial imperative: 
Act so that the maxIm of thy will can always at 
hold good as a principle of 
unIversal legislation ~. 
imperative categorises i t.s it, 
affit-rn::=.. his 1 ibet-t.y~ makes evi I his 
responsibility, and destines or abandons him to 
7', li~.w 
Jud·~ement. ~ as an obligation 7 IS conditioned by an 
imperative that cannot prescribe the ri9ht law but only 
obliges judgement to legislate. Furthermore, the i mpet" at. i VI~ 
IS the only law that is not a fiction and it is t.he onl y 
law that cannot be " f i ct. i oned" . In t.hi s, it is sublime 
because it. laws of knowled9.~ and t.he 
fictions of creative judgement. No judgement 
can be eqt·IC\ I to the Categorical Imperative and Nancy 
t. h e t- e f 0 t- e , that. it must be the sole source of 
sublimity. This claim allows him to reverse the question of 
judgement from Lyotard's definition, where particular cases 
.:=; i t.I.A i:1 t. i 0 r·, 
conditioned by the sublimity of the categorical imperative, 
must necessarIly invent:. c.1.11 
I e·~ :i. t.. i rrr Cl. t./:=~ I y (Not.e t.hat. bot·h 
1 '':; a invention through the 
I e'3 i t. i rna.t.e. ) 
The di ·F"fer·/?::!nce 1 i .. ~s In the source of the necessity of 
i t"lvl:£!nt. i on; it. issues from the sublimity of 
particular cases; for Nancy~ it devolves from the sublime 
Categorical Imperative. 
My presentation~ here~ of Nancy's interpretation of 
Kant on judgement has been necessarily succinct. I do not. 
purport to have given a definitive or even complete account 
of his theory. The point of the short introduction to Jean-
l_uc Nancy's work was to give the background to his two main 
foci of attack against Lyotard's position: firstly, Na.ncy 
Lyotard's interpretation of 
hold true without the Categorical Imperative; 
criticizes Lyotard's a :-5:-50 CIa t. l. 0 n of t.he SI..-Ibl ime t.o 
particular cases. In this chapter~ I will concentrate on 
t.he these criticisms (t.I--Je second 
chapter VI, on the sublime). 
Nancv makes SIX critical 
~oin~s against. Lyotard's interpretation of In 
consider'ed in chapter VI. In the four remaIning points two 
the moment of Kantian 
interpretation and the moment of a theory of judgement. I 
1 ) Lyotard cannot preclude universal laws In judgement and 
free to be conditioned by any particular 
2) It. j~ a mistake to dissociate the reason we have for 
::~o and 
p 0:-::, $ i b i 1 i t.y bt.rt::. t.o t.he II i mposs i b iIi t.y II of t.he 
Categorical Imperative. 
4) Therefore, judgement must not be conditioned by events 
but instead, judgement must make it possible for event.s t.o 
be p .... l~sent.e.d .. 
I will th .... ough the reasoning given by Nancy 
in the deduction of the above po i nt.s. As I pt-esent. his 
;-,1 i 11 intci the termInology of 
point, not·es 
substitution of Kantts totality of a unity of ends by the 
a multiplicity. This means Lyotard does not 
judgements to the common measure of a final 
instead, for him, justice is to legislate against 
the possibility of a single end, and to prescribe the 
respect of individual laws without bringing them into d, 
unified totality under a single principle: 
1'3 never- to say t.he 1 ct,lrJ 
language, terror. 
the observance of the justice particular to each 
I\!clncy 
80 (';3ame) tI 
recognises two terms in st~ch a jl~st.ice: d. 
principle of plurality and a gIven, limitless set of 
instances. Each term serves to judge the other. 
The pl~inciple prescribes that particularity is a universal 
st.a t:.e ~ t.he s~:,t. of particulars prescribes one or t.he ot.het-
part.icular law to t.he universal principle. The pl'·oblem is 
that Lyotardts principle does not leave each particular law 
absolutely undetermined, because they cannot contradict the 
j udgement.s 
- and this is the Issue at stake In Nancy's 
fir' st. po i nt:. II"'. II [:r i es I I'" i;:"l~ "' • 
The second criticism made by Nancy against Lyotard is 
first. If Lyotard's principle of plurality 
determines the form a particular 1 etW Celt""! t.ake:, 
1 S not. t.h,~ foundat. ion fOI'- indeterminacy but 
L .. ] indeterminacy IS hence not at stake In the 
call in'~ 
j udqeml~nt. 
I: etS~::~ i 9nat. i on:: 
82 i t.SI~ 1 f 
WI'- it. of summons] 
In t.he of 
As shown above, for Nancy, judgement devolves from 
freedom's obligation to the Categorical Imperative and must 
i ts~:::l f be judqed as a function of the imperative. Th i ~-=- 1'=, 
also true of Lyotard's theory except, for him, judgement l~ 
conditioned by the principle of plurality. Nancy's point IS 
that for both of them every individual judgement IS already 
a pre-condition, Celt.e':JOI-- i ca 1 
Imper'ati ve Ot- HI~nce, like Nancy, 
cannot dissociate how we judge the particular 
reason why we judge: 
· .. 
._. :, .. l ;"': ], \.' !;::: ;". :.?: .. ;:. J 1 '-.' .• f! 
.!.. ':::. :.~'.: :. 
first principle [t·he 
not. imply 
1::'- ~.~. l' ~_'''' +_'. P_ '-I'·.·.·,,· 1=-_". 1_-' 'f f"" '''-1 ,." t l' ."., I 1 - 1- "1- j - t, - ~ . j ] 
, - <-, ,,' 1- _, cI.' _"' ',I 1= _,t:=,-m 1 nl~1 Cd,SI~S , 
example~ the particular Cel!""', funct, i on C~~2 __ "j..f" it, was 
81 c\ t,ot.cl.l i t.y 
Ni~ncy IS here alluding to particular cases leading to 
1 c\w::·:, sl..,lch a::::, II Ther'e 1'3 law" and "Killin9 is 
contradict the initial pt- inc i pIe 
of p 1 u r' cl 1 i t y • 
i~t. t.he time preclude universal 
laws and leave particular laws absolutely undetermined. In 
this criticism made by Nancy 
implies a prejudice on Lyot'c~I'''d I s part against certain 
parties involved in a diff~rend. If a diff~rend IS defined 
as a conflict that cclnnot, b~~ resolved, then any party 
making claims as to a definitive solution to the diff~rend 
a In Lyot,a~-d IS 
universal principle of p I u ,,- ali t. y (as gIven by Nancy) and 
hI;:'; defini t,ion of !;!) f.L..$t-ends. do not, always provide a basis 
j ,-.\s t on 
circumstances resolvable conflicts can be transformed into 
t.hl~ bias a9ainst universal laws d.nd 
that cannot be as easily dissociated as Lyotard 
leads us to believe ~ 
This is very important sInce Lyotard's theory depends 
on l·t-I,jl·v]·.r.j'_'~_l c~~p_.~. t"~_I't-'~~ ft-,~._,=_ ft-,-_m . 1 1 ~L <= --- - ~ ~. unlversa aws so G~ey 
may strike us as sublime. 
In the language of Le diff~rpnd, Nancy's second point 
ql...le~-::,t:. ions Lyot.Clt-d'~.; ne'~lclt. i v.~ d~~f i nit. i on of d. d Lf.J"-*t-enc! as 
ot~t.si de IS a tension between the 
the silence of a victim 
suffering from a tort, judgement In a new 
po s s i I:::r t lit. y 0 f eq,-~ i t.a.b I e t-eso 1 ut. i on a The second 
definition conditions the judgement and new idiom of the 
in the same way as the principle of plurality 
(:onditioned each individual judgement of a particular case. 
Any new judgement of a case recognised as a diff~rend must 
idiom 
judgement claiming to be a definitive e'=!u i t.ab 1 e 
judgement is excluded a priori. Thus~ Nancy has shown how 
the legal presentation of diff~rend~ is prejudicial to the 
sublime nature of our individual cases of 
Lyotard cannot at the same time give a 
theoretical definition of diff~rends and base them on the 
!:-..J "-: • 
. ' .:..,. 
necessarily conditions our judgement of those events. 
I will not develop Jean-Luc Nancy's third and fourth 
C I" i tic i '::,. ft1:7:; of L'y'otard bec~.I.'~~ .. t.'~l~_·y -:l~- t·-~t·-t~rn-t-t f tL 
- • - I (. I '= '==:, •. (:\ •. ,= '== (_. s· 0 _.r-(I::! 
his reading of Kant offers solutions to the problems 
encountered by Lyotard., The restatement does not offer any 
further comments on the intrinsic faults of the definition 
of d i f ·f~!Fet~;!:.; clnd I will ,:In J. y t.ake it i nt.o cons i del'" at. i on l. n 
The main outcome of Nancy's analysis of Lyotard's work 
IS the disclosure of the fundamental paradox of the 
definition of the diff~rend ~ Lyotard cannot define a 
d i ff!'~t-etJd cIS out.s i de t.he po·::;.s i b iii t.y of legal resolution 
without creating laws to govern such a resolution. When 
Nancy notes Lyotard's false exclusion of the fictionalizing 
of he pin-po i nt.s t.he necessat-y 
relationship between the judgement of tribunals and any 
form of judgement presented as more just. The lclw of 
tribunals conditions the laws outside tribunals. Once again 
the distinction: judgement of tribunals/adjudication~ has 
been demonstrated as artificial; yet~ as I showed earlier 
In this chapter~ it is essential to lyotard's philosophy in 
Jacques Derrida investigates the mechanism of 
the relationship between those two different forms of 
judgement. So I will now turn to his analyses of the logic 
,~) f 
Lyotard's definitions of judgement. 
The first remark to be made concerning Derrida's work 
1 ~:::; t.hat. he, un 1 i k,~ Nancy, does not offer an explicit 
criticism of Lyotard's phIlosophy; instead, his criticisms 
of Kant hold true for Lyotard. Derrida approaches Lyotard 
through the bias of a reading of Kant. Given the implicit 
nature of this critique, I will first demonstrate Kant and 
in Derrida's work. Then, I will 
demonstrate how the deconstruction of Kant also applies to 
Lyotard's definition of judgement. At no time, though, do I 
suppose Derrida means to associate the two, what must be 
proven is that his deconstruction can be transferred from 
one to the other. 
indicator to be used in drawing parallels 
between Kant and Lyotard In Derrida's work IS in Jean-Luc 
I\lancy I s IILaps,-~s .Judici ill. In t.he post.-sct-ipt. addt-essed t.o 
Nancy no t. e';:,; t.ha t. the IIfict·ional izin-;!II of 
juridicality cannot be excluded from Kant's work. It is not 
supplementary to a politics of the establishment of the 
faculties over given domains. The fo 11 ow in';! 
reasons are given in defence of Nancy's statement: 
1} Kant i~ trying to establish juridicality under one 
the Categorical Imperative. 
law, 
fiction to be excluded from thc main body of Kant's 
thesis. The fIrst point has already been studied In my work 
on II [:t i e'::; However, the second point refers 
directly to the work of Jacques Derrida~ 
thereby giving him as the 
forms for a critique of Lyotard through Kant. 
Thus, according to Nancy, Derrida's deconstruction of 
Van t ' s C t- 1. t. i c a I philosophy through the analysis of the 
109ic of supplementarity also app 1 i e'::; t.o 
philosophy based on diff~rpnds. In his work on Kant, 
Derrida demonstrates why a diff~rend cannot be defined as 
excluded from the creation and rule of the judgement of 
tribunals. The judgement of tribunals is not a removable 
SI...IPPI ement. t.o t.he ju~·;t. adjl ... ldicc\t.ion of di ff~t-ends. In 
presenting Kant's critical system as dependent on a set of 
incomplete excluslons~ Derrida makes a point directly 
applicable to Lyotard's own system based on the exclusion 
of types of judgement. The parallel drawn between the two 
the more valid given Lyotard's indebtedness 
to Kant's critical pl"" i 1 osc}I:·hy . adds 
further exclusions to Kant's system by separating judgement 
ft"om all 
it does not display, one must think those 
passages between of 
1 E!9 i t. i mit. y ] supp l'2rnents 
destined to relate fragments from an dislocated 
is a further connection, explicit in Derrida's 
between Lyotard and Kant on 
sup!=' I ern'2nt.at~ i t.y. 1S made in the essay 
Derrida explores the 
1 imi·ts of judgement through an analYSIS playing on the 
·.L l' +""::" .. '" t~ :::'1-" Y ;";;1. t", ( .. I t - r l' _... I 1'" J.. - t" F - + .L· ft·· f 1 I L + + 
... , ...J ... 1_' .... • '_;:;1.. t ,', •. I:::! '\'"I:::! "·a 1.·1 c.n 0 r:·.o t~a S Sf"IOt"". s .. or"y 
law". The point Derrida makes IS t.hat. 
legality and laws have to bp interpreted in the 
in judgement and in 
literary interpretation there IS an inter-play between the 
legal and the outlaw~ between judgements following laws and 
j l.~dgernel·"Its instituting new laws and altering old ones. 
Derrida exploits the instance of 0 
on t.he I c\w Ct.nd (less evidently) on the legality 
of literary texts~ in order to study the connection of the 
and the outlaw in the re-interpretation of the 
borderline dividing them. This process of continual t"e-
interpretation and fl...\rt.het" judgement demonstrates the 
impossibility of setting unalterable limits to legality and 
'" ., i-'J J. •. 
ins T::.8.nt. I"'Jhet-'~ 
passes laws, literature defines itself. It takes 
up positions on both sIdes of the line dividing 
1 <:\w " 
86 [ .. u • ] 
is to be before the law, 
to being before 
of "B'~fol'-e the 
t.he 
I a~.o.J " IS 
directed at both Kant and Lyotard. He wants to demonstrate 
that what holds true for judgement and literature in Kafka 
is also applicable to them~ justice as studied in their 
t.het-efot-e, ], i mit. ':=;, t.o 
in the philosophies of Kant and Lyotard. Thus 
Derrida addresses them together: "The t"eading I wi 11 now 
9ive The first target 1S 
Lyotard on judgement. The second target is Kant's theory of 
Alt.hoU9h Derridals only explicit link between Kant and 
1 r" .... In L:.. lot". Th2t1:. 1 i nk ~ and 
In allow me to use 
r:.1_:::' .. - t·· l' Ij ;::... 1 --.-_. (_-,." ,_. t". l' '-",,' l' .... _-.1·(1' ':::. ,-_, +1 . t.·· - t- t l' ,- l . 
- I, _ p·.{:t i ,,' '1 r"IIS 
L - \/.1. t- J' .~ • .L -'1 00 E' - ]' I" t 1 • " -. 
. • r.:l I:::! • 00' e __ -.!:.=.:":'L" ,,::..'2;:_~~:..L::..:::!L!:.:. my i:lnalysis of t.he 
distinction made by Lyotard between the judgement of 
tribunals and adjudication. Derrida's work on Kafka and his 
1-_lt,,·.L.J':'_':..t" W."_'II" 1: .. ,.= .. 1-_'.1,", L···::.t-,t Wl'11 t,,·- --t""'l'jet--j l't LtV j VI r t " r""~" ... . _ )1:= I_IJ I::.· I ,=1 -I Cr-Iap _.e t- s ani 
of this thesis where the topics they concentrate on - the 
infinite regress of judgement and the sublime in Kant-
will be studied in greater detail. 
In his E~ssay II Pat-et-90n II ~ Jacques Derrida investigates 
various categories and limits Kant uses in the 
classification and definition of aesthetic judgement 1n the 
T h tr: d C tOO i t. i '3.!d.§l." He attempts to demonstrate the dependency 
particular examples and rules defining given 
categories on categories other than the ones they define. 
Such extraneous involvement of the attributes and paradigms 
defining the inside and outside of a category will, in 
Derridals argument, pt··clve t.hat. all cat.egot- i es at-e 
interrelated and that precise limits separating them cannot 
be given. For example, if Kantls definition of the category 
of fine art is achieved through exemplary works of art 
given as paradigms, and if those paradigms cannot be 
defined accurately, then the category of fine art will 
itself be ill-defined. Derrida studies the plastic (frames, 
etc ... ) surrounds of 
do not belong to the same category as the work. For 
t.he 'f.- t- ;:1.1"1\. ~.-_". 1-_'.1 t-: -l r, _. l' to t l' t- '''1 - - t- t - 1 ttL 
- <:,.. <:l I _. "::;t 1_;:\, II::! on'=, ,:·0 .r-Ie 
category of decoration whilst the painting as a whole~ 
including the frame~ is said to present the paradigm of a 
work of fine art. Derrida demonstrates the 
dependency of works of art on their frames~ without which 
the works cannot be accurately defined. 
Thus, because the frames of a work of art can be said 
inside and outside the work (t.h i s i:=:. t.h: 
definition of a parergon)~ and because frames belong to 
aesthetic categories other than those of the works they de-
limit., accut- at.e 1 y 
aesthetic categories. Derrida generalises this point by 
extend1ng hIS argument from paradigmatic examples to all 
definition of limits. Any aesthetic category~ he clairns, 
rnl..~st. set. frames to the works belonging to it; 
the frames themselves will not belong to the 
category because they are the limits of the works from that 
t.he defini t.ion I:.f an aesthet.ic 
cat.egot .. y . ] 1~~ a .ways dependent on limits neither intrinsic 
nor extrinsic to it .. For that reason~ all aest.het.ic 
categories are interrelated by definition: 
on painting IS destIned 
t. h ,;? r .. :::! w ill 
an inside and an outsIde to the work. 
o F) 1=' C_' --.-.', J'. too' l' ,-_"1"','.·.-:, t. lOOt ~._". tOOl ,_'-.' ,:,,".'.-, '-.-_-.' ~.::.. f 1- - PO .L., - - • I .. I. 
.f ._ ~ _ . '_" 1 •• · .. 11:::: ',vOl' t<:~ 
a system the border of which mirrors the initial 
A t. =~ t· ;.::1.1-:: e i n D I::: ,.- too ida I ,=. cl n d. 1 y sis 0 f frames and parerga 
judgement determines a category~ can the limit between the 
t.he outside of t.he cat.egot-y dt"d.wn 
D0rrida notes the importance of limits of interiority 
and exteriority for Kantls analytic of aesthetic judgement~ 
The and. I yt. i c of aest.het. i c j udgement. p'2t-mat-1'2nt I y 
on t.I···I'::! possibi 1 i t.y of a 
d :i st. i !""IC t ion t.he intT insic and t.he 
e :-~ t. f' ins i c . cle'E.· t·het, i c 
intrinsic beauty and not to surrounds 
must. t.her' E!fo\""e know 
fur',darneni::.a.l presupposition of the fundamental 
how to determine the int.t- insic - t.he f tOO arned 
and one must also know what IS excluded as frame 
:::::: and as outside the frame 
The possibility of aesthetic judgement depends upon 
the exact definition of two types of pleasure~ i nt.et-est.ed 
and disinterested. Through the maxim of the beautiful given 
these types define two 
categories of objects: the beautiful and the non-beautiful. 
If those categories cannot be separated accurately~ if the 
limit between the inside and the outside of the category of 
t.hE~ beaut. i ft~ 1 dE~ f i n~:~d e:-:act.l y, t.hen t.he 
distinction and maXIm upon which Kant's analytic 
aesthetic judgement f· e :~:. t. -:=; m u s t. fa i 1 In the definition of 
aesthetic judgement independent of other forms of judgement 
j 1 •..Idgl-2ment. <=,.nr::i synt.het. i c Kant.' s 
critique of judgement depends on the accu~ate definition of 
d. cat.e·~lol·-Y n I will now show that Lyotard's philosophy of 
types of judgement. 
As seen earlier In the chapter~ In my studies of Alain 
Bad i Ot~ B.nd .J ectn -. LI...lc Lyot.at-d's of 
is based on a distinction between the judgement 
of t.t- i bl...Wlc\ 1. S and adjudication In the recognition of 
d '2 fin i t. ion 0 f adj ud i CB.t. i on, and t.he 
de fin i t ion ~..., i t. h judgement of tribunals. 
lOt 
1· t"1 'E:. l' 1:11:"'_" ~ •. '., l·II:.:.:'. .•• • t ~ I . . j' ,. .-
.'. r ~1.li .... a.L;!_g. .J 1,.H" 1 5'. 1 cr.· 1 on ot' t.he 
Lyot'ctt"d I s 
like Kant~ Lyotard must accurately define a 
hir:::. t.·.I'''I~.·.':',Ot·~.7' Clj- J·I,.j··'=ro-r·t· .L._ --t-I-j I r-
- - - •• ~ '~.,~'" I:::! I., 1 •. 1_1 ;j .,ct' II. .·1 -' n 
possible for me to investigate the transferral of Derrida's 
study of frames and limits onto Lyotard1s categories of 
In order to demonstrate the inexact nature of the 
limits of the categories used by Kant in his definition of 
aesthetic judgement~ Derrida applies a principle I deduced 
if examples belonging to a category do not have 
exact limits or if the rules for the definition of those 
limits are not definitive and comprehensive, t.hen t.h~:E! 
category cannot have been accurately defined. t=.ii ven t.he 
parallels between Kant and Lyotard's studies of judgement, 
and given their mutual dependence on the exact definition 
same principle can be applied to 
Lyo'l:.at".j 1 ~~ wor k. Once the premisses of the principle have 
be satisfied there will be sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate the failure of Lyotard's 
From prior work in this chapter, I can ded,-~ce the 
satisfaction of both premisses to Derrida's principle 
my study of Lvotard's definition of the judgement of 
tribunals I noted his dependence on all ill-defined. 
arguments as to t.h,~ non-
In the holocaust. In 
addition to the Faurisson paradigm~ Alain Badiou has 
demonstrated the arbitrary and inexact nature of Lyotard's 
definition of the justice of tribunals. If Badiou's work 
in this thesis - and the Faurisson example are 
then the first premiss to Derrida's 
1 S ~~a t. i -.:.; 'F i .:::d : the examples belonging to the 
category of the judgement of tribunals are ill-defined and 
arbitrary. When Jean-Luc Nancy's theoretical study of the 
relationship between forms of judgement in Lyotard's work 
1S added to this I further note the 
=:.at i s fB.ct. i on clf Derrida's second pt-ern i ss: t.he n_~les 
Lyotard's categories of 
judgement are neither definitive nor comprehensive because 
the distinction drawn between the judgement of tribunals 
and adjudication cannot be set accurately. 
.... . . I ] 1\.· 1S POSSl::r.r: follow Jacques Derrida's work 
on Kant and conclude that Lyotard's legal presentation of 
diff~rends is unsuccessful because adequate definitions of 
the categories on which the theory depends are not given. 
Lyotard's work relies on the drawing of a distinction 
betweet""l the j udgemet1t. 0 f t.t-ibl.. .. nals and 
( 
.1' I ... ', 1'.-.1 <-...... '-.· .... 1·0'"".1·-' t '-.'. ;.. . \ ]---., \".;.1. t·.' '1.' .::......... '.',".1 r": I'" .-. , •..• "., ...... , ••• \ l' ~ ~ '." '-1 ,'-1 J' .r: 'f: .:'-:. .... "."" ,.i .,. " 
- _. -. ..... • ~:. -_. ,. ::'. :::.' J. ! j c: .:=.,,:.!...,_'::-::-',,~':2_Jl;!~-2.'" 
disti0ction the definition of key terms~ such as t.he 
insofar as they are given as 
excluded from the possibility of equitable judgement by a 
90 tribunal Throughout this chapter I have demonstrated the 
arbitrary and inexact nature of the border separating the 
j l~cigement. of t.t- i bl.~na.l:~ and adjl_-Idicationll Lyot.at-d's 
definition of the ,-I l' ·f·f.:!:· t·· .::. t- ,-I 
.:::!_-_::-.:.. .. ..::::_.!.::.. in le9d.l t.et-rns rous t. t.het-efot-e 
inexact and arbitrary given his determination to 
I conclude that the legal presentation of diff.rends is a 
fa i ll .. -It-e I:)eccl.'-~s,~ it cannot underpin Lyotard's absoll~t.e 
cJ.alrflS. 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with the question enquiring as to 
whether Lyotard's use of legal examples and types had the 
same effect on his philosophy of language as his appeal to 
unjustified aff~cts investigated In Chapter II. In t.hat. 
I observed the influence of affectual conjecture 
beliefs on a philosophy making necessary 
claims such as the claim as to the irresolvable nature of 
I In order to justify the 
'.::.t.cd:ement. of t.he irresolvability of diff~rpnds essential to 
L.yotcH·.j 1'3 phi losophy in t::§! .!:Ii ffet~.§~_·lIj.:, t.he fOI...lndclt.ion t.o t.he 
philosophy had to go beyond conjecture and unjustified 
In this chapter~ I have undertaken a similar 
i f)V I::!! S t. i -;leI t. . .i. 01", of P t- e sen t. d. t. ion of 
so as to ascertain whether such a presentation 
can provide the required foundation to Lyotard'~ apodictic 
statements in his philosophy of judgement. 
Following Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jacques 
Vet- r' ida:, I have demonstrated how the legal tropes and 
examples used by Lyotard in particular~ the use of 
negative definition In opposition to terms from French 
jurisprudence and the use of the Faurisson case - do not 
allow him to accurately define differends~ and 
victims, the key terms in his philosophy of judgement. The 
IS essential to 
Lyotard's philosophy~ because it. is through them that a 
d iff .6 I'" .=. n I-I ,= 1-' -:. t-I 
.:'"_ ... ___ :"'..! __ .-=-=--..:.-.!:.:. _ -Co." 
I have further shown how the two categories 
of tribunals and adjudication~ the judgement sensitive to 
cctnnot. be properly defined if t.h~:=! t.e t- rns 
and the examples belonging to those 
categories are not themselves accurately defined. That. 
definit.ion i '::". in L=ec-----"d=-=.i, ff~t-encl since I have 
demonstrated the arbitrary nature of 
Lvotardls definitions and examples. The categories at the 
foundation of the philosophy of judgement are therefore 
inadequate because they too cannot provide the basis for 
the claim that ~iff~ren~s can never be resolved. 
To conclude this chapter~ I find Lyotardls use of 
]. eget 1 p t" esent.a t. i cln 0 f his philosophy 
pedagogically successful - the context and issues of the 
philosophy are summarised in a widely accessible form~ the 
C:1Ppl icat.iQt"I of legal justice to difficult cases. 
tl'-,E! presentation can play no in grounding the 
apodictic claims of Lyotard's philosophy. What is at st.ake 
is whether the philosophy proposed in L,::. d i ff~~t-~2nd is 
merely conjectural, or whether Lyotard has proven that 
certain ~ases (diff&rends) 
- -----._._--_ ....... -_. 
catl never. be judged equi t.abl y by 
law. IV, I will study the 
Lvotard's definition ~ ()r 
th!:: r' !2by 
provldir)g the status of apodicticity to that definition. 
Chapter IV - Philosophy of language in Le differend 
Introduction 
I will explain and c~iticise Lyotard1s 
ph i losophy () f 
philosophy of 
considered as consistent and complete~ is essential to my 
'.-:: i-.I ',-j Y ,'-, f I I:;:' I-j l' t-' f ~ t" .=0 ,." ,j- f 1-'11'-
._, .. ....... - .::::~ :-.:: .. __ ..:.....:._ .. __ ._= .. _-=_-1_.- -
1. ) philosophy of language~ ln particular his 
investig8tion of t·he in 
description of events~ is essential to any explanation 
events a~e never 
in SClence or ln narrative. The idea of 
In LI2 
Y' ! .. _. ;'i • 
j f i!:::~ 1,',:::(9'1 J. C.·.!·-.-_·.i ...... li" .• I;.··,·.· •.. i '.-_.1 'r'-; ·_l. ,-::to ','·'I( •. ·-,','.·\'_-;""-.C.',,;.-.-... , \···1'-_.1·,".·.. -,- ·t·; - .,. ;' 1 
• • U' 1.:-- ~:!}; F' 12\ 1 j""',:::, CoI.Xi::. ,:\ ::::.0 
linguistic descrIPtIons and the events they 
pl-'Ii losophy of 
underpins and justj.fies the necessary possibility of 
simultaneous existence of heterogenous, vet. 
equally valid, descriptions of a same event. 
The two reasons given above are the expression of 
my conclusions to chapters II and III clf t.t-. i s t.hes i s 
philosophy of language. In conclusion to chapter I I I , 
t.o be insufficient in proving the main premise to his 
equitably resolved before any tribunal. In t.his 
will demonstrate how Lyotard attempts to 
i n'-eso I vab Ie nat.ut"e 
a philosophy of 
language. I will show how ~~ff~r~nds become discursive 
existence of heterogenous 
a same event .• 
t.he heterogeneity of the 
entities Lyotard calls r~qimes and genres, will ._----._- be 
shown to be dependent on the necessary heterogeneity 
of events and the descriptions that follow them. 
.
·t '_i ':-_ ..11""11.'. I.') ,;:: I 'I' + I 
- I n V a::: eli'v::: _ t~'5 1 .:< '''i '=:. .' '::' c n '='.1=- t.12 "" I I I 
status of philosophies of 
In Lyotard's work. If I am to study the 
philosophy of language 
to statements that cannot be defended elsewhere in the 
book, then that philosophy must be taken as conslstent 
~tnd cornpl~2t.:.'2~ In ""'JOI··/'::S pr-io!'" t.o LI2 diffet-.end, t.his has 
not been the case. [)es 
Lyot.at-d l...Jsed 1 i n-=ru i s t. i c 
illust.rate and analyse 
specific events and their narrative context. EVI=:nt.s 
such ~~s t.he of a 
- ql 
, IV''=' t .. toO ~-\' • 
- _. I_·Y ~ out.side a Renault factory~ 
and trial of members of t.he Red Army Faction ~ 
explained in terms of a mechanics of narrative and the 
fll...!>~ of a libidinal economy. More general ideas were 
also explained through the appeal t.o B. 
the emergence of a postmodern 
society was understood In terms of Wittgensteinian 
language games applied to the context of modern grand 
9:3 
.. The st.at.I_~:~ used by 
In t.hl2se WB.S· descr ipt. i ve 
desct- ibed and e~{p la ined t.he 
relationship of event and narrative and, in t ...... is 
i i IZI 
sense~ they served as models, accurat.e 
could not be reduced. 
In L.e di ff~I·-end .. 
._-..... __ ... _--------........... - . 
and i t.s accompanying essays 94 
t~IP_ ~_'/.,nl~t-I~tr_'t-y -t- l··t t t· t t f t 
_r r- -, '-, - u r,.·et-Pt-'2 .·8 .• ·lVe s .·a ·US 0 .. hecq··y is 
St.IPP 1 ant.ed. The linguistic theory no longer models a 
state of affairs; lnstead, a philosophy of language 
grounds necessary laws ruling the occurrence and~ 
hence, our understanding of linguistic events (I will 
show that for L.yotard all events are linguistic in the 
course of the chapter). Th' . ./s, a is 
not applied to events independent of it~ but rather, 
events are understood as linguistic entities obeying 
language" 
i dz2nt. if i es t.hl~ linguistic model and the event, the 
former is no longer an empirical hypothesis in need of 
pragmatic verification, but is instead the ground for 
a 
int.et··PI··et.at.ion .:If event.s 95" It is with this status 
that the philosophy of language in Le diff~rend can 
that the definition of the 
legal conflict (or extra-Iegal~ to be 
precise) must be translated into the terminology of 
the philosophy of language before I cc\n claim the 
val idi t.y of 1 ingL~istic laws for the legal 
1 1 1. 
,. 
1 l.A.lil1 
o p~iori laws from a philosoPhy 
In the next chapter, I 
pr~sentation of Ijir~t-~_~.t-~_~.t-ll.j~.-_~ -~ ~ j' j . 
. cl :::r=:.. '1_ UI II?". 1 n 
Remark Lyotard's philosophy of language in Le differend 
must be reconstituted by the reader. 
Prior to my study of the philosophy of language 
must make an important point concernIng the 
nature of the work required for the systematic criticism of 
In Lyotard's oeuvre the role of linguistic analysis 
ranges from an explanatory function~ through the modelling 
affairs, to a foundational function, 
a I.: r' i tic a 1 enquiry into the necessary conditions for the 
occurrence of events. Those varied roles can be recognised 
through the use to which Lyotard puts the 1 i n-~ t~ i st. i c 
of as necessary condition, as 
96 Howev>? t- , t.he 
functiot) fulfilled by the linguistic theory does not entail 
c;i p a to t. i CIA 1 0:1. r' presentation of the i t.sel f n In 
Lyotard's work th~ function of a theory does not effect its 
112 
presentation. Thus~ it does not fQl].c_~~,.J t.~lrc_'rl,-1 t,,'~l.'_~. •. r I:: J. a 1 in t:. ~-J ·::t t. 
qiv~s ~~I~ t-lpr~~c~I~'y 
.- - -.- ' __ " __ '-.J~ ..... cor'pj it. ion'::; 
k Y'IOIt-11 edSJE: in a '_~'.J;.v •. 7_·.t-l f:l'~llj 
... , - .:. that the philosophy 1S 
presented In full as a consistent and complete theory 
L.yot.c\ t- d 1 ~-::, boo k s .. Lyotard's work omits the presentatlon of 
the theory behind many of the theoretical claims made in 
his philosophy .. have 
8. 
philosopher at all. The point of this chapter 
such damning judgements. 
To condemn Lyotard1s philosophy before attempting to 
reconstItute or uncover the theoretical work on which it is 
based is to ignore the following consideration. 
purposely omits the full exposition of the theories he 
r i·3ht. t.o Le Lyc.t.ard 
rfI€!t,hods t.ht-Ol-l9h whi,=h philosophy is 
justified and also the convention dictating that self-
justification must be provided in full in a philosopher's 
wc.,.- k. Cont, t"' a 1'- y t .• :. Lyotard takes the 
I::'II'-el,;' - t- t at l' -, t... -'f J',-,I"'.-. t_,l' f l' 1-_a'I-_,l' ,--t-, ;:::\'=, =_-.1-'_- '-'-_II'-,d::. rv" and sl,lbset-v i ent J;;;..: __ -::~..J...:::_:"'-::""".!::~ __ l, 1_,1 " - -' - - ..... .... 
to the rules of rhetoric. Therefore. he does not seek, in 
""11. sown WOI" k:o to provide consistent and complete accounts 
of his theories. Instead~ theory is used and presented in 
practical situations where justification and demonstration 
J. 1 .:~: 
are dependent on narrative and 
Much of the theory employed in Lyotard's work remains 
Howevel'-l' the omission of a consistent theoretical 
analysis from Lvotard's texts dr_,~_-_-, t-II_-.lt l'rlilF'ly 
- t.ha t. St-lch an 
analysis has not been undertaken 1n the preparation of 
t.hose t . .::! ~{t .. :-:; q An ignorance of this point leads directly to 
t.wo rn J. st.;:lk,~s 1n the critical appraisal of the work. The 
first mistake 1S to deduce from the lack of theoretical 
analysIs In Lyotard's books that he is opposed to theory 
ground. The second mistake is to take the 
included in the texts as the sum total of their 
theoretical background and thereby, to abandon any attempt 
at the reconstitution of the whole theory implied by, and 
iEt lll...tded t.o t.hl"'ol_"·;lh claims 99 Given t.he 
importance of Lyotard's philosophy of language to his work 
in I ha ve .:~ t.l..-Id i ed it. in chapt.et-s I I and 
I I I I:) f t.h i s t'/'')I:S is l' I will take care not to make these 
mlstakesn 
In t.he light of the above considerations, my study of 
Lyotard's philosophy of language goes beyond a purely 
I attempt. to 
reconstitute a constitent and complete theory from the 
disparate notes in the book. In so doing I hope to achieve 
114 
a proper analYSis of Lyotard's claims 
necessary possibility of heterogeneity as grounded In the 
ph i lO'Eophy of l..::\n':'::II ... 18ge" Not.e a 1 ~,o:' that this approach 
allows a clearer explanation of the elements of the 
I must take account of the inherent problems involved in a 
study going beyond exegesis. In reconstituting Lyotard's 
am in danger of prejudicing the analysis of any 
work based on it, by altering the theory mistakenly. I 
will, therefore~ take care to emphasize the points where I 
add to, or recombine Lyotard's stated work. 
Hollow links, naaes as rigid designators 
From my analysis in the preceding chapters I conclude 
that. in Ly,:.t.at-d I s wot-k ~di ffp..t..:end§. depend 1...lpon a not.ion of 
independent. 0 f the possibility of 
tribunal or another judging instance to recognise a wrong 
suffet-ed by a pat-t.y i f'l a conf I i ct .. Thl.. .. s:o the vet-y 
possibility of diff~rends must turn on a theory of evidence 
events that cannot be made evident 
tWI i vet"sa II y t.his 1· ,-::. 
distinction between tribunals, 
adjl.. .. dicat.iot1:o 
incapable of recognising 
t.he form of judgement 
sensitive to the wrongs suffered by the parties involved in 
, i C" 
.:. .... '-' 
such a conflict. _cj_"·"j .• J .. t_':,~~_'._<"·'._I-.-. .. "_._I:~l_'·_·~ ~."_". ·1-.· .. '-•• 1 tll:"._· . I: ., ., . 
__ I _ POSSl~le, realIty 
must b~ defined independent.:l~.·' r_lj- ---- ·t· 7 r~LugnlJlon gIven as 
fu j" t·he f' mo 1'- e:. that definition must disallow 
additional definitions -f r--l·t tL ~ 11 u ~c\ 1 .'y .. r"la·.. may a ow it. t"J be 
recognised universally. If l_yr_.t.·(~ .•. t·.j 1'- t b tl t :::, .·0 e a I e .·0 sustain 
!:::Il' f' 'F~_~ j'- ~_~t"I,j':::.. l' f11 t· L-.- F t" - rn 1'· tit L . - , .. ·r 1'= • 1_' t len oJ' p (.::'.CI~ _-r"ley occ,-~py 1 n his WI:' t- k " 
he must elaborate a theory wherein reality is possible yet 
cannot b~ universally established. It is nonsensical for 
him to repudiate the notion of reality in general because 
this would weaken the status of diff4rends themselves; the 
notion of a ~iff~ren4 is itself dependent on the 
of a given conflict (see chapter III). 
Wi t.!·-I t-espect. t.o Lyot.at-d I s pr,:,ject.ed 
philosophy of language seeks to validate a philosophy based 
rather than create an all-
encompassing metaphysics, he approaches the problem of 
reality negatively. That. Lyotard first seeks 
disPt-OV~~ t.heot- ies e}~cll..~din9 t.he p'Jssibi I i ty c,If di ffer~nds. 
and then works on his own philosophy to avoid that 
excll~sion. identifies two approaches to reality that 
render his position with regard to diff~rends untenable, 
both make claims as to the possibility of the universal 
recognition of reality. 
1. 1,C:. 
·~.· .. I·'I ,",-,_. I::' '_-I I' I' I·t'~. ',':. r-: '.J l' ,=_:'1"" f- t ,. , ~ -, .. - . ".. 0 .. PI"- e S '2 n .' a -.::- Ion c Reality is associated 
~l i t.h presentation and an c.'t·.'_l·~.-_r_t.'·.~ 
--_ - reality depends on 
whether or not it r_~.t'J t,p_ -~-~It· 
...... =tr 11._'·n I Q In t.hi~. approach the wrongs 
f - jt . t· '::;1...1' t E~ t- ec ,y v 1 C _.J. frI-::=; be associated to 
ostensible objects or loci, if either of these can be shown 
then the wrong will be taken as real. However~ In this 
view:. 
presentation or showing is taken to be universal; because~ 
if ~hat is the case, then a single tribunal will be able to 
recognise the arguments on all 
thereby contravening the legal definition of the term (see 
chapter III). The second approach to reality depends on the 
possibility of the cognitive representation of objects. If 
an object can be represented, cognitively described 
defined according to a set of cognitive rules and 
then it can be real; if such a definition is 
lacking then an object cannot be real. In representation, a 
cognitive definition is the pre-requisite for the reality 
(Note that Lyotard takes the strongest 
approach to reality to be the combination of the two given 
the cognitive definition of an object together with 
. t + . ) 1 .,s CIS _·ens]. on • 
Neither presentation nor representation necessarily 
exclude the possibility of diff~rends. This only happens if 
.. -
either ostension or cognitive definition are given as 
a conflict wherein -]1 d. 
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suffered by 
1 n d i S'-:.ut_.~.-::._. ,'- -. t·· t- ". t· t . j t 
... ._.cl. I IU _. -n:=! t" eC09n 1 se.. ,y a .:;. i n91 e 
tribunal, cease to make sense. Therefore, Lyotard develops 
i:! t.~"IE!':lt-y clf t··E:i:\lit.'." .. , belse,_-I ,_"·,t-, I-t--F-I- t . tl + t 1 ... ' '_I .~. -lames 1n .r-Ie CC:WI _.e!< . 
of a philosophy of whl~re un i vet-sa I 
definition and universal ostension are not possible. 
9 i t:.fI~I·-en.gs '~t.and r::1,-~t.side t.he dichot.omy 
events; he seeks to demonstrate this t.ht-C,u9h his 
theory of names - for example, in the case of Auschwitz: 
In this sense Auschwitz is the most real of realities. 
I t./~ ni":tffiE: f/lcH- k~~ t.hE! 1 i rn i t.s t.o t.he e~<t.et-It. of hi st.ot- i ca I 
vet·-- if i ca.t. i 0'0",. It does not follow, though~ t.hat. we 
thet-~~by becerril'=: involved in nonsense. The alternatives 
are sc i ent. i f i Cell I y es t.ab I i shed 
rnyst.ical 
clbSUt-di tv) 101 
Thr= event of Auschwitz can be shown to escape 
inc 1. I~S i eln in a universal cognitive discourse and to be 
outs i dl: t.he possibility of universal presentation, by 
remaining ineffable in universal discourse and by exceeding 
all forms of presentation: 
11 :3 
that would designate t.he 
speculatively unnameable. an anonymous name. And. 
[in t.he senSE: of 
speculative reason] 
[aaa]. The name would remain empt.y, in a 
mechanical memory, devoid of all concepts 1~ 
(It is here that we note the importance of the 
linguistic study affectual concern 
Auschwitz as studied in chapter II of this thesis). 
cognitive discourse 
ostensibility are separated from Lyotard's definition of 
To this purpose, he develops a theory based on 
names, because naming functions as a common factor shared 
by cognitive concepts, phenomenological objects and the 
establishment of the reality of things. Names will be 
j .:=o-=-·l· .-.t")::.t .• -,I--e. 103 , -_. =' ... ,-_.- naming, ostension 
and cognition to formulate a definition of reality whereby 
neither be cognitive absurdities nor 
marginal to the discourse of speculative reason: 
I realism that nobody can see 
"t-ecd i t.y" as sl-lch. This would suppose that it had 
a proper name, and one cannot see a proper name. 
To name is not to show 1~. 
il'} 
Startin(.~.". wit~" t_'~I~_~ .. f' r example 0 phenomenolo9Y~ L.yot .. ~.rd 
i n t,-::' h J'. 1,_"', ~ ,-._, t::o j'-I l' ,0_', >:::: • ..1 - F j t 1. 
- r ~- U~ 'en~en~ on p~enomenological 
~;t.I".ldy 105:. the determination of the reality of an object 
relIes on a privileging of the role of ostension. Real i t.y 
is decided in the action of showing, ostension: 
f:t Sf:~ns i b lei rflF:otOO ess ]'. '-_'tOOl l' '=. _. ;::. -=. I .... at- too' t " I' I d 
_. ...,- p" I· Wt 1 ·es;o 1 nr::.~ 
ce'.IIed t.he phenomenon. The 
referential function that is thereby used belongs 
to a subject's capacity - active capacity - to 
~~ I"KI W t. h.=o_ t ... l' rn ...... -_ ::Ol·-I,.·j F·' I c-' 1_-' ..... __• 1-_'.1 f' ·t· I·-I·..... .L. .-. l' 1-"" wh .... ,.. .-. Tn - t t e .... 
... , 00' o::C· 1 • I'=, I..J '::'0:: do 00' • I 
c~uses the effect or sensible impression [ .... J • 
This is what we call an ostensive capacity 1~ 
[ ..... ] N 
There are two components to ostension, these establish 
a relatIon between an indicating subject and an indicating 
the referent. The first component fixes the subject 
in a present time;o and ]. ,-. .::. the spatio-temporal 
wh i ch the erb j ect. is related, Lyotard calls this origin the 
III-'het-e'-now il cC1mpclnent. ,:,f erst.ensicrn as in: "l. (I -here-now) 
The second component of ostention is a 
that is the linguistic term directly relating the 
spatio-temporal origin to the shown object. In an ostensive 
sentence the deictics are the words I t.his 1;0 I t.hat. 1:0 et.c:o 
• • • =' they are the index finger, indexicals:o of the act of 
ostension 1~. Once a spatia-temporal origin is related to an 
It. is 
1212) 
t· i - -
.. ·f It= the snown object 
j) ~:! l' I.'::: t. l' f.~: '.-::. ,.,. '-.-.'. 1 .~. i.·.·. '-._-' .~. 1- - l' t- - t f 






I i ''''I':J t~ i st. i c 
in the acquisition of permanence that Lyotard 
det.f::ct.S a f 1 ctW In the privileging of ostension with regard 
to the definition of t-ea Ii t.y; this IS because a spatio-
temporal origin linked to an object through deictics is not 
On the contrary~ ostension only I ast.s as 
long as the act accomplishing the showing of the object, as 
The 
How1:=!\/12t-, t.hi:l.t. "ot-igin":, fat- ft-om being pet-manent.~ 
is presented or co-presented with the universe of 
the sentence mentioning the two of them. The 
origin appears and disappears with that universe 
109 with that sentence 
t j . l' :. t- p_ f ..... _- t- =t··lt_. a c _' 1 1 S P 2t y 1 n'~ '"" = as "9iven" 
it.s pet- rnanent, t-eal i t.y. Veiet. i es 
does not. 
be 
independent of a spatio-temporal origin so that their 
1 ::..:: 1 
t> ~-:~ I· ... e "t-: ~.R~I. 1'- 1'- "-.'_:'1'.-.1" ';-",-_, ]' j' I . 
- - .n~epenGen·t or a particular act 
onI'y" ·.l·t~ t_~~ll·~ '.I..-_~., ··1 '11 
,- POSS10 e WI the object's 
it,.1 i t. h 0 U t. 0 '"'_.-. t.·. '_=-. t", '_=, I' '-._' t-, w.:=o_ rn ,_ I J"' __• t. , I '"' - t"·- rn - - • 
.. .. _ .. ~I= Ict. f=:;" 
t_.~I~_~'.=,'_~ ~·j'.·lc_)I.' I-.:=o_·t~c.~,t".:=o_.t .. ,,·_-.·-.-._~. t,-, -..,'\-, ,-,t,)'--t -- - F---·tJ r . '-, • ..., - _' _, 1_. _. __ ,=, __ . ,='. =- cl '''_'='''::, I , . e t-ecd i t.y 
object. 1;::'· naro~'?cl it can be referred to independent. ,:)f 
ost.ens ion: "I show you th is .. " can become "t.he pink I~ 1 ephctnt. 
I :3howed yo!..·, 1 a~3 t. n i ·::;Iht." " 
When u:.:.ed In ostension-less reference names are qUasl-
delctlcs~ conditioned deictics that refer t.o an obj ect. 
given certain conditions. These conditions are central to 
Lyotard's analysis~ he contends that names must refer t,o 
t· i':l l d 1 y, t.hat. lS:- without confusion or 
contr'adiction with other objects designated by different 
names·. Fot- t.hi s to bE'~ possible, for names to designate 
must be situated among others according to 
rules that ensure the non-occurence of contradictions or 
at least within limited areas; for Lyotard, 
these rules are the equivalent of cognitive definitions: 
The plast.ici t.y «()f a pt-opet- name) is obviously 
I i rn i t.,~d by t.he one Ot- mot-e wc,t-l ds t.he name 
b~:! 1 on'~:;J~3 t.o~ and als.:. by t.he pos i t.ion it. IS -::liven 
names according to spatial~ temporal 
and anthroponymic relationships that also have 
12.2 
':':; -r:.:l 1 .t, 1 i rll i t.. ~-:; , 
associated to a 
name without altering i t.s dE!·:::, i '::In Ett. i on 110 
Rigid designations~ rendered possible by cognitive 
net ...... Jot-ks sl..·lch maps, 
f i ~<edl y of 
cogni t.i ve funct. i on~-::, interrelationships t.hat. 
d~signated objects become In a possible world 
. . 
fnl r·t·OI-ln':=1 its corresponding network. The reality of an 
()bj€~ct. in a possible world can be checked 
an object within a 
names~ they do not guarantee the reality 
of their referent unless accompanied by ostension: 
through sentential 
unIverses and is inscribed in networks of names 
<::\ 1 1 ow i n':3 reality to be plotted; 
t - .-.l. r" - I .. .=:, 1· -r. '=.. I··· .-:;, .f.. '=:-1··· '=:'1··· t. t-'=' =-1 ._.!.: __ -___ l! c\ 1', .-=-__ ~:...·:.' __ . ___ =-...1-'-:: ___ _=~_ .• L: ____ _=_ "'_' .• 
111 
To position a name within a network of other names 1;;· 
(of indeterminable cardinal 
=:.ent·ence:-:; linking the name to a 
It WIll be shown~ later (in the 
sections on sentences and r~gimes), that Lyotard groups 
one 
po:~s :i.l:::ll e :5 t. t·· 2I.dd ll~ t·h2l.t. 
insofar as t.· .. ~,~.~\ ..• · ~-t- t--t~-I _, ._ d I J:::! '::! t- a same object to 
[ ••• J a name can be placed In all instances of 
sentential universes and in the most heterogenous 
r~gimes without altering its designating value 
(this is its rigidity) 112 
TI--,I...IS:. a name bridges the gap between a variety of 
cognitive sentences (senses) and the object in an ostensive 
sentence~ the referent. For names to fulfil that f f...lnct. i or. 
they must be transferrable from one sentence to another 
without altering the sense of the sentence or the name1s 
t. his t· r- an s f ,~ 1·- 1S only possible if n2l.mes at-e 
for~ otherwise~ they would bring additional 
cognitive factors to the sentences they fit i nt.o ~ and t.he i r 
function could alter as the sense of the name 
changed with its various cognitive contexts. Names must be 
hollow links between a r·eferent and a set of heterogenous 
senses. Therefore~ an object can only be taken as real if 
it is named, shown and cognitively defined; this IS because 
t.he name as ha'3 no intrinsic sense and 
cannc)t alone ensure that an object 1S a permanent reality. 
to establish the permanent reality of an object. 
sense and reference must be joined 1 n ,:;.ne act. 
~",.'.l .• ';'.l!r:_-1.~I_c.-_"'_·!t_".'"II~, he I'" E! i:3 \'''11".'.,1.;,' L,·,"I.',I+_',;".·"I'· '-.• 1 f.'1 ttl . t 
.. ::J: .. _ - ~ y ,. .,' -·1 .' S 0' '., e POl n ,:. : 
II t.l .. ; .= 
.. -.I.~.=:. 1 ,-.~ 
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an 
T L··I'=-_· ..... , ;:1, rl" t=,_:' 'r"": I • 1 'f' l' 1 ,- t, 1-. 1 f l' r I - iI -q ~ 0' ·.e tOo eo' r-Il t-I';!e beca,use it, is 
an empty and constant designator. Its deicticity 
is independent of the sentence in which the name 
stands at an'," q_ive,t-I t ... ]·,rl\~,-_, ~ll~l,j l't ' I 
., '-. can ~·a ·::e many 
semantic values because the only ones that cannot 
be taken are those incompatible with the name's 
A statement of reality must use at least one 
name. It is through the name~ the hollow link, 
t,,~~I(~_t., .1_ ~t .. t.'~I'=-_· rl1l.~m~_~I~lt. t. __ , ~1~I,j! ~t t~I"'~ ml-,rn=I~lt t ,-~t-' r -, '-, r ... • .. , ,"'.' .,r - -  .' ...:::.+ 1 _""' I 
be linked with another and with the ber~ I am 
(Ctst.ension) . The pos':3ibi 1 i t.y realit.y, 
including the reality of the subject, is fixed in 
si9nified in 114 
Names must be associated with senses before these are 
'-~n i t.ed wi t.t--. an object, in an experience, because the 
experience of an object as real depends on the prior 
association of a sense and a name. Also, names - I~n like 
Kantian schemata do not operate in an exclusively 
cognitive role~ as a priori conditions for c09nition~ but 
function as rigid 
(.,. 1-.-_" of: ~_ I.'" ..... - _ t'", r'_. - t- j - - -'1 - l' t . 
1 d. I'. '_'_"".-! '" 1 ve Sl2nses 
of names have to be learnt~ that is~ positioned according 
to other names and their t .. efel· .. ent ..... _-._. f,-,ll'-'<Jl' t-., V'-I-Yl' t- -. + 
• • - -''''' 1'::0 do . 1'::0 se _·s 
of cognitive rules within different networks. Lyotard uses 
the above observations to make the following deduction. 
I:'; 1. v ~= n t.I'-1 a t. t-. a m esc a n 1"-":1 t. be set. tt-"j ._-::.r-·r=o_.t-I'j ..... _- t-IT_·1 y I-I 'f ::. ,- =t-..- .:. t'l ,+ 
- ... , .-=-= ,::..... -.. "" 
are dependent on the cognitive sentences they are used 
wit.h:. and given that names operate as hinges between a 
shown object and those sentences, if we accept that there 
sentences that can be associated with a particular name~ 
then it follows that we cannot determine a priori which 
senses correspond to a given referent. Furthermore, if we 
allow new r~gimes of sentences to be formed and aligned to 
a particular name, it follows that the number of senses 
attached to the name's referent becomes 
unlimited (if we accept that the number of possible r~gimes 
1.5 itself unlimited). 
Lyotard's argument is that the cognitive definitions 
associated to a given referent are contingent because the 
name referring to the referent fits contingently in a 
l1'l'] t]· I' . L. - i~ -11' f 'f: - I" - t- T ,,_-·-,,_-.t-,l' t.l· v ..... _- r.::.::· .... ,t ...... _- t-".-_ . .:.s. Th.:. ':'l-ltcorne , " .. ' . P 1 C 1 ·r_. y ' .. ' 1._ r:: . I::! ' .. , ...... .... _--I -- - '-
of this argument is to render contingent the establishment 
of the reality of an object contingent as it varies with 
the cognitive senses associated to the object's name. An 
'-.'.1 t·.1 .'J' I:.·.~'. t. ". 1-... I ~.-.·I ,., ........... '.-::.1. '!. J'. ·r.· .. \ .. 1 1-.'.11.=_'1.':'. ;.-'.' 'I'" '.' •• ;'. ',=-_., ,- - .1.. -, •• t· I' •. ] J' • ';. j" , ., 
- • I., w .. '1_.' I •. !;::!.- I ,.' .;:1., . V ;.- e 1. 2\ T~·E~C 'CO <:1.1""1 .;:~n(] J. es',; 
the establishment of 
and because the relation between namIng and 
meaning cannot be restricted a priori or a posteriori. 
The verification of the reality of an object (ost.ens i I::.n) 
associated with a given cognitive sense through the hinge 
of a rigid designator (name) can establish reality for a 
multiplicity of particular sense linked to that name. 
rherefore~ a multiplicity of contradictory and heterogenous 
cognitive senses can legitimately fit the name of a single 
evet-yt.hing has been 
signified of a name (that 
proven~ but also because a name alone is not a 
designator of reality (there must also be an 
associated sense and an ostensible referent). The 
number of senses that can be attached to a name 
Thl~ I .... efet-ent. pt-opet- name 
Auschwitz) is both strongly determined as to its 
plotting in a network of names and relations of 
names~ and weakly determined as to its sense 
'~I to, e .::;1. t. ni,..Imb~21·- of 
into which the name can 
fit 116 
L.yc,t.at"d is now in a nr_'~l·t_.l·'_~t-I t.~ -t·-t- t~-• - .'._ ::. _'0 _,f:::! ,.or I~ t-,~ 18.t. i onsh i 1=' 
between the study of reality In his philosophy of language 
Ot" confliC't.t~c!l definit.ion of t.he ~jiff~rend. 
Once it has been demonstrated that the reality of a same 
named referen~ can be established for a plurality of 
heterogenous cognitive senses~ Lyotard claims that the 
establishment of reality cannot provide universal norms for 
the judgement of variOlAS cognitive senses. This is because 
heterogenous senses can be legitimately associated to the 
same real object through the rigid designator essential to 
the persistence of its reality: the name given to the 
object. Hence~ it 1S in the nature of the establishment of 
t"ecll i t.y t.o 1 ead t.e. '';!i..ff~t-ends. The d i ffet-et-.t. pat-to i es 1 n a 
dIspute can make heterogenous cognitive statements about a 
object and the appeal to reality cannot divide 
correct statements from erroneous ones; as Lyotard puts it: 
.. R';'~cd i t. y imp lies d i ff~t-ends II (La r~alit~ comporte Ie 
is a very important claim in Lyotard's 
is the theoretical basis and justification of 
irresolvable conflicts at least through an appeal to 
t"rE!a 1 i t.y; he s t.a t.es the po i nt.:. mc't-e dramatically as: 
II Vengeance s ta 1 k s c 1,:'5e by t .... arnes II ( II at"tout- des noms 1 a 
vengeance r6de"). In the case of Auschwitz this implies 
.L_',l",·j-':I, t.·.. 'U,"I~_~', '."' t"'-_·.llr ,,-._-' '''1 I .~!-. 't": -, ....... i 'r' ,,, - ,- -, .. I I r, .. 'V ... '~', ,,' . ~:~ I '::: U _' ' I~::! I l;-~! '.-: <:;',1'''1 n ~:! V e ,,- ::I1::~ 
to every person's satisfaction: 
The reality of the tort suffered at Auschwitz 
[ ... ] remained~ and remains to be shown; and this 
cannot, b,:::, achieved because be 
Lyotard'~_~ ~.~t_.~_~+",p_rn~_-_I~I+_' r_,f t_'~IP_ t--l-t'l'-t- t-tw l't ,-, " r ~ d _' ,_, I I~ _. een j'-ea 1 .y~ 
rile to two different types () f cr' i t. i c isms. 
criticism involves a further questioning of the conditions 
necessary for Lyotard's theory of names to definitively 
1::] t ' tl pt- 0.,1 ,ami:\ _·1 se _, '-IE! appeal to reality. That is~ I question up 
to now unsubstantiated claims such as: that the number of 
genres and r~gimes in pt- inciple, without limit and, 
that. nE~me=, II fit, II into cognitive networks or sentential 
universes. Without answering those queries the philosophy 
of language in Le diff~rend will be incomplete; I will~ 
attempt this further study of Lvotard's work in 
the following sections of this chapter. 
The second criticism I make of Lyotard's work on rigid 
is that it does not take sufficient account of 
the history and complexity of the implied debates in the 
of logic entailed by an analysis of the 
relationship between language and reality. 
to names in turn referring to real objects. 
He has not entered the logical deb~t~_·~.~ t_.~,~t -t~lr~~lj '·'l·t~ '-, _ _ r '""' _ =, _.C'. 1 ..• = ..-.. _.j" I 
Frege and continued with Russell, Strawson, Wi t.t.g'2nst.e i n;o 
1<.1"" l pke, Quine and COUt·,t1.1.1_~~~ c.lt ... I~I~_~lr F~l·l----~-· fl· 
- -- - 'fl U~0Pfl~ts 0 oglC. 
in no way c~rl l_yi_~t<?~ljl~ v ..... -_t-y L 
.... , - -" - Spctt-se nO·I_.es l' 
compared to the detailed and scrupulous studies given by 
the philosophers listed above. Yet, Lyotard has presented a 
theory particular to himself - rather than adopt the work 
of kl""lpke, itself very close to Lyotard's definition of 
rigid designators - on which he bases for reaching and 
important statements for his philosophy 
What. t.hen i:H-e~ we t.o make of t.hcl~~e st.at.emant.,:::,·:·· 
t.wo possible t.he abclve 
One could make a detailed cl""itique of the bare 
theory present.ed by Lyotard in the light of the history of 
the logical debate into which his definit.ion of rigid 
designators must fit. Or, one could take Lyotard's work in 
the philosophy of language as a sketch offering a possible 
account of the relation between language and reality, and 
continue to study the philosphy in Le diff~ren~ as an 
L=tI"nc..19arn of d i ver'se clPPI-c,aches t.o di fferends, 
d~~~ j-~t -t- - pat-t~tly l.lt-ls~t.l·sfactory treatment of names =I.,I~:.nl s:!1· I' I • .' I c:\ _.~ I .. ' '"' 
defined as rigid designators. 
I take the second option because it 
fruitful approach with respect to the points I have already 
From chapters II and III it 
has transpired that Lyotard's philosophy depends on a 
disF'arate l~r~_~.~,~ ..·.t-lt.· .. ~tl·~_)I~I~ -·f - --t-Lt--l t . 
- -- - U d ~~ IG d JOpIC" He 
gives an affectual~ linguistic treatment of 
cli ffel"'E!nds~ 
-----_ .... _--_ ...... --- . I am interested in the problems related to the 
juxtaposition of those varied accounts of a common subject 
and WIll therefore pursue my study of Lyotard's philosophy 
of language despite the flaws it presents when considered 
t.I···I@ot"y .. This decision does not, 
however~ stop me from drawing the conclusion that Lyotard's 
theory of rigid designators cannot provide the basis for 
necessary statements concerning either the syntactic or 
semantic nature of language, or the relationship of reality 
his 1· ,.-=- spat-sel y and wi t.hol../t. 
clf arguments to stand as I=ohet"ent. and 
Indubitable sentences 
In the preceding section I have shown that Lyotard 
gives a definition of reality wherein the function of 
ostension~ naming and meaning introduces the possibility of 
diverse cognitive senses being associated to a same real 
object. Defined in this way, reality does not exclude 
i~ grounds them in the nature 
linguistic theory to 
serve as a satisfactory foundation h 1. :=-. c\ n a I ys i s 0 f 
in his wo 1'- k 
on naming must be investigated. 
The presuppositions are: firstly~ that names can be 
.... Ji t.h L yo t. i:\ t- d mt~st. 
demonstrate how the sense is attributed to a name and how 
it. t.hen fi t.s int.o a multiplicity of different sentential 
r~gimes; secondly~ that the number of heterogenous r~gimes 
including a particular name and referent IS, in principle, 
t·ln lim i t. e d . This sect.ion on Lyot.at-d I s. defini t.ion of 
sentences will study the first of these points in order to 
show how names are associated with a sense through the use 
of a sentence. Then, how that sense is allowed to alter 
i ndef i n i tl~ 1 y according to the concatenation of sentences In 
The concatenation of sentences is their 
linking into chains or sequences. 
Al t.hOU9h t.he second presupposition stated above I ro' :;'i 
essential to the expression of diff~rends it. 
will be left. the next chapter on the concepts of 
situation and presentation; this is because it depends upon 
-. 
cl comp 1 e~< clnalysis of time and occurence 
st.udY. It. is important though, t.o t-I~ca 11 t.hat. 
wi t.hout a solut.ion t.o het.et-o·~ene i ty 
1 -;, .-:. 
- 0_1":-
Lyotard's work on ~~I~I~PI~lr~~ 
..... - .... -. - ....... ~ can only offer a partial basis 
to the existence of diff&rends. 
---.. --.. _ ... -.. _ ...__ .. _-- If such a solution 15 
lackin9;t a multiplicity of senses and sentential r~gimes 
can potentially be 
meta-language that 
sublates heterogeneity into a single discourse, 
Lyotardls theory of sentences allows a plurality of 
different sentences to be associated with a name and 
referent according to three structures; these are: 
1) A general discursive structure explaining the link 
bl~tweet"1 Ij :l' '=.1-_'_11. 't~I".-:p_ ::.t~I,j '=.I""'P_I_-1' f 1'1-_ 11' ~~I"I '1' ,...t l' - t - .... ro,- Sl ,-.~ 
- .. - '-, -.... , :::J.... :=.~. 1- .,,=, =- .~I_ I 
as names, sentences, r~gimes and genres. 
2) A structure determining the relation of name 
sent.enee .. 
3) And a structure determining the concatenation 
(Lyotard's definition of discourse and sentences will 
I develop the three points). The structures give 
definitions for discourse, sentences and concatenation and 
set down the rules for the names int.o 
sentences and sentences into chains of sentences. The 
definitions and rules aim to account for the possibility of 
sense through the medium of names and sentences, 
I-~.;.,~ •• it-In.·_· t~ ...1 ll·r,nl·t,: t~- t f ~.- ~ - Jrl~ num)er 0 senses assocIated to any 
a name and a sense are necessarily 
associated following Lyotard1s structures~ but. t.hese mt4st. 
allow the sense and name relationship in general to remain 
:indetE!t'rnin8.t.:.e. FI.4t··t. l ··I.:o.<_'r·ro'-_' ... ·,-_ ..... t,./·-, 1-'_- ~t~'I'-tl't-- ro" t t 'd r ,~ =- ,., _ .. ' __ ... 1 I;:! ... s _. t-.o _. PI'""C'V 1 e 
definitions that forbid the 
heterogenous senses with the same name, because this would 
negate Lyotard's establlshment of the possibility 
n8.rnes de fined (empty) 
The first structure used by Lyotard is a general 
d i CI.,W~-5 i ve Ol"-"::~:o explaining how sentences follow one another 
or concatenate according to a discursive model. The model 
has four components: a referent, an addresser~ an addressee 
and a sense. The addresser has to demonstrate to the 
addressee that a sense belongs to a referent. In Le 
diff~rend. Lyotard restrIcts the model to instances of 
----_. 
dialogue where the interlocutors are in dispute. Therefore:-
both their legal and postal meanings; the addresser sends a 
message in order to redress a wrong; the addressee receives 
·tl--t W-I-- t·L-.-t 1'+ '=.e·.:. I ... -=;. t.el · .... , l·Vp_::\ t-I'::'W -.:::.enr.::.e t .• :. a 
,'I\:i\ .:. rn~'?ssa96~ a ct'l:::! .. ·r.c\· .. " _ .... 1" - ... - .... - -
name and and referent: 
:~.; ]. rn ','::' 1 i 'F: · ....,,1 '.' '-.'.' \"','-."_". 'J' '1 'j t cou.c ~na~ a sentence presents 
it,'::: ,.-, t • j ,::-,;' .j- ."' +. 1'-11:::' - - ~. _. 
_ _ _ .-. _. -' .... __ i ___ :::1, ::: ... "= :1 t .. :=.. E' t" 8.qm.:~ t.el '_._--.. - .. _ .._--.. , .... _--_ .. - it. ha.s 
~=:.; i nn t·h.::: wh i ch it. IS 
dl~~. tined , i~.nd the thing instituting the 
the referent~ the sense, the addressee and the 
set. t. in'=, UP of a sl~nt·ent. i a 1 
irlvr_.I].V'-,~·.~ ~ '.~]·.t_.I_.Ic:-lt,I·I-_'lrl I-I~ t~I--~ l·t--t-t----
". - .... , - - I _. r '_I =- r;:: I =- _. d 11._ '= .-:-
according to one another. A sentence can have 
and 
addressers. Each one of which can, 
be mentioned in the sentence 1~ 
Lyot.cl\"·d pt-esent.:=; SI2nt.enCt:::s as ___ i.f. (II ~=or.Q..r.Q..e sill) t,hev at-e 
fot- a debate between an addresser and an 
Sent~nces are used by an addresser to aSSOCIate 
a referent with ~ specific cognitive network, 
1-'+ 
_.1 I t.he sent.E!nce 
assocjation of that sense and referent as legitimate. In a 
the plaintiff is the addresser and the tribunal 
is the addressee; the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 
wrong he suffers from to do this he must first 
T h 12 F' e t- son ScI yin g s 1:1 me. t. h i n 9 1 S t. he pia i n t. iff ~ he 
must prove what is said thrnugh th~ use of well-
formed sent.Pt1ces and Pt-ocedUt-es t.he 
establishment of the reality of their 
R e cd i t. y i:-=; cd 1r.J C1. Y :-=:. t.\·-,,2 0 n 1...1 S 0 f t. h e p J. d. i n t. iff 121 
[IYly emphCi.s is] 
point.s rfll...I":?· t. be 
"s iml=·le" modE~l of sentences In a discursive context. First~ 
t.he model dOl2S not. explain how a sense 1 '=. 91 yen t.o Ct. 
sentence itself~ rat.her than in the general 
debate or argument. Second, a sentence can be 
in many different discursive contexts~ the model does 
not explain what In the sentence allows it to be associated 
cont.e ::< t .. The discursive context in 
sentences must be supplemented by an account of how names, 
sense and referents fit into sentences~ and how sentences 
concatenate to form debates. The concept of t.hl2 debclt.'2 IS 
illustrating the concatenation of 
·::;entences u The analogy does not advance the study of the 
f ounda. t. i on in the philosophy of 
because it returns the form of study to the topic of 
argumentation which is the very area Lyotard must ground In 
his theory of sentential concatenationu 
Lyot.at"·d must demonstrate that the medium for dialogue 
implies the failure of any attempt to secure a 
universally ascertainable form of reality. The performative 
commes second to an analysis of +':.he 
·J 1".",.'.1'-, J, r::: J. f-_" .f: '-_,', \." ' ..... \ .j. ::".' 1,-_1 •.. ·_·.1' ., •••• , "'_~'.'- .L. '. ' t v I .. ,.. • I ... !"I E! 2·E!n~:·E!I·-'C~:;:!~; .:.hcd~. concat.ena:t.e t.o 
1"~_, i.-_Ie.·., .~ •. ·~t.·"l·I-_-_'. t d'ff~ j . + } ... - .- ~·o LJ:._.!:..r..§!J.!... s. 1 S _.,::. i nt. t- oduce new 
new referents~ so that 
the tort is expressed and the plaintiff ceases 
bein9 C:t vict.im. This r~guir~s new rules for the 
122 
• 
The analogy drawn between the form of legal debate 
and the form of the concatenation of sentences cannot serve 
CI.S a demonstration of the contingent nature of the 
1 ... ?"3 association of sense and referents in sentences 
It. is:o howevet-:o important to note that the analogy 
drawn between the pragmatic structure of dialogue and the 
semantic structure of the concatenation of sentences is 
t- e pea t.l: d th t- 0 '_~ '3 h r:s u t. b-3!=-...:::d::..:l:.,.· ..:..f~f..::~::.;t:...-.:::::e:.:..t-.:.;:Id:::,_ Legal analogies are used 
in the explanation of the play between Kantian faculties in 
presentation and representation? and in the illustration of 
the mechanics of literary paragraphing in Gertrude Stein's 
theoret. i ca 1 wOI·-k orl W~- it. ing. Bot.h Kat1t.' s cr i t.ical 
ph i 1osophy cH1d Gertrude Stein's theory of avant-garde 
writing constitute important examples in Lvotard's book; 
they are present in the long philosophical notes in Le 
1:~:7 
r'::-or' (l)at-~~t.e ll'_~n-~.) 
"faculties" of i nt·u i t. ion, 
f C\ cuI t. i e s rn a k e 
law; presentation follows a series of legal representations 
holds between the structure of 
disputation and the organisation of the interaction of 
fac:u). t. i e~·::,: 
[ •.. ] the subject cannot have presentations but 
only representations; not only in the theatrical 
representations stand absent. 
objects but, rather~ in the juridical sense where 
"fc::-t.cu 1. t. i es" cease to air grievances and 
remonstrate with one another. Faculties criticise 
through a confrontation of the i t-
respective evidence 125 
Simi lat-Iy:_ when reading Gertrude Stein's work 
W 1'- i t. i n ';I ~ Lyot.at-d t-'2c8.11 s t.ha.t.:. t.he WOt-d E~i=tt- a-;lt- aE.l:l t.r aces 
t.O t·he C~t-eek 
and par' a -;11'- a p h ~ : i . e. : an 
the adding of a 
clause to a law; to make claims as to an exception to a 
138 
"1 r..=t.lf·J H 
I-=. J. ike 
Ther'e is an 
analogy between the interaction of paragraphs in a text and 
the arguments between the varIOus parties In do 
1,.-, Fr·r:?nch a t~at-~.9t-ap~.-le is a t.e~<t.I_~al division 
(and/or sign). It separates that which it unites. 
ThIs Greek word means that which is written 
bes 1 de2,. A e.iE~ ,.- c':..SI:§JI.!lffl.§l is an add i t i crna 1 clause t.,:, 
made by the defense to the admissibility of an 
i nd i ct::.mE!nt .. 
particularly in a fraudulent manner 1~ 
AnalogIes based on legal discourse introduce ideas of 
judgement and justice to the name and sentence relation-
ship. The fit-st.:. discursive structure assigned to language 
i 11 L~S t. t- a t.f~S t.he s'~nt.ent. i a I context of names, a.nd ensu t-es 
the definition of linguistic terms: 
To pelt- a9t- ap~-I is t.o Wt- i t.e BrJ,j, and besides, 
stLU. [.u.]" The diffe.t-~nd is int.rodL~ced again in 
the heart of that which must judge litigation, 
between the law and the case up for judgement In. 
1.:-{'j 
Pel tOo i~\ ';;.1 r ct 1::+" S 1·-,1-.-_',. t'"_; •• i-l \""1-_ . .-1::. '_-.·'1· .. •• ·JI. ','~I tl "'-_" ,~ .. '; 
-l _ .- ! .. , ~:! >=: '1_, ' •. ,1 a .L 
divisions In ideas~ and 
argumentation; they can be the indices of a form of debate 
interior to the text. Yet~ he aims to establish far more 
than just a parallel 
The pl::tssibi I i ty of 
confll·(_-t_.~ bIP_fr_lt-p_ ·th- l-w 
- • t::! d ~ m .... st. be 
grounded in language~ and the contingency achieved through 
his t. h e 0 t- Y 0 f n cHi! e SCi. S 1'- i '._:.11' 1.':1 1::1 ~_. '.=. l' ·_:-'t··, a tOo' '-11'- '=. rn • .f '= t bern -:. l' tOo. t - l' t ... - d _.. ... _ .. ___ . ,_,.1:\ t::! 
in a theory of sentences~ not analogically, 
intrinsic property of linguistic semantics. The 1 e';la 1 ~ 
discursive analogy can neither demonstrate the contingent 
aspect of the association of names with sense~ nor ground 
Lyot.ard 
linguistic structure~ t.he st.t-t.fct.I_.ft-e 
determining the relation of sentence to name. 
From his work on names and proper names~ Lyot.at-d 
concludes that names are rigid designators empty or devoid 
of sense; he completes that definition by adding that it is 
t.he inc 1 '-.Is· i I::.n of naml:=!s· i nt.cl seni::.ences t.hat· asct- ibes 
cognitive sense to them. A sense is associated with a name 
and its referent when the name is given in a sentence. In 
order to vindicate this statement, the definition of the 
sentence-name structure must be completed by a definition 
of sentences and an explanation of how names can be 
inscribed within networks of cognitive sense (see previous 
140 
s8ction on rigid designators). -f'lrl~ ·t~l·lr-T·· -£ ~~---
-. =.- _" I_I I I_~ r I J::! :::, .. :! t. d. S t< ~.;:. i ~=:. 
intricate because sentences must be defined 
without contradicting key terms introduced in the work on 
These terms are the indeterminacy of sense 
and the uncertainty of reality prior to the insertion of 
names lnto sentences. 
Given that the key terms (e.bove) are essential to 
Lyotardls analysi~ c_lf ~t-I_~I~Ot- t-.-rn-- -t-j gl·V- ~L t ~. 
- .- = c:( I:::! =- c\ II _ I:::n I_·r-,a. r .1 S 
theory of sentences must guarantee the indeterminacy of the 
association of names and sense, sentences must be defined 
independently of their sense and reality: 
Neither the sense nor the reality of a sentence 
at-e The sense is deppndent. on the 
t.hl~ felt-mer···. 
accordinq to the rules for the pstablishAmAnt of 
. __ .. _._---_._---.-_ .. .-. ..... _ ..... _--------=---:.....;;;..: 
[Ivly emphas i~;;] 128 
If these conditions are not respected~ then Lyotardls 
argument becomes viciously circular; that which should 
follow on from the analysis of sentences would effectively 
underpin it. Sentences defining the nature of sentences and 
concatenation are themselves subject to their own sense: 
.i.41 
[a •• ] the sentence giving the general form of the 
operation of continuity from one sentence to 
is itself subject to the form of that 
129 
Furthermore, due to the problems inherent In circular 
a fini t.e .j~=:sct"· i pt. i ve 
definition of sentences. Such an attempt w~uld privilege 
the r~gime of descriptive sentences above all others; this 
would allow that r4gime to become foundational, 
i nst. i tt.lt. i ng c\ meta-language of dialogical desct"· ipt.i ve 
definitions - that IS, finite descriptive definitions given 
in a dialogical context - disallowing the heterogeneity of 
r4gimes upon which Lyotard1s theory of diff4rpnds depends: 
r. an] the substitution of a sentence as occurrence by 
a phrase type (or the object sentpnrp) is required by 
r~gime, the definitional r4gime (the only 
terms that can thereby be introduced i nt.o d i scot4rSe 
are those terms taken as objects from a meta-language 
and given definite descriptions), and a genre of 
discourse, the dialogical genre 130 
The form of finite descriptive definitions alters and 
--
prejudges the form any new sentence can take and hence 
possibility of an unlimited number of 
heterogenous r4gimes of sentences. If a sentence belongs to 
142 
a r~gime of sentences I"" e t. ':=; 1'- C) •. ::j E! n I-' I ''=. ·r. ,-', t \"'.,.0-. 'r- L.I.., ,., l' I·n·-
'" _ ..... _. -_ ..... r;;::: r:=..::t -::! off i n i t.~:: 
descriptive sentences. then it cannot be given a finite 
descriF'tive I_-I~_-.·f··J·.t-ll·+ ... l·,_~t-1 l~l·t .. ~II_~I ... I~. l' +l ~ r L oSlng someJ~ing of its 
A sentence~ taken as the object of a description 
(as the referent of a definitional sentence), is 
necessarily transformed because it must be the 
referent of another, definitional sentence from a 
met.a .-. 1 at-'9t-lagE: 131 
define sentences 
presupposing prior definitions of the sense or reality of a 
sentence; furthermore, he must retain the indeterminacy of 
the sense and the uncertainty of the reality of any 
particular sentence. Not only must the definition of 
sentences avoid a cognitive or objective definition of 
seni:.enc 1 ell 1 t. y , it.. must. also avoid defining set-.t.ences 
according to their particular sense or reality. !3ent.ences 
cannot be defined according to their meaning nor the type 
of objects they are. This is because each sentence can be 
the referent of another sentence and hence, any sentence 
can be a rigid designator - a name within a sentence; for 
refers to the sentence "AII cats sit. Clt-, mats". Fot- t.his 
reason, the particular sense of any given sentence is not 
fi }~ed, but must be allowed to alter in the same way as 
names defined as rigid designators. 
So as not to contravene the preconditions for the 
definition of sentences 1 ' .... -::t_.~_-.,j =-t - v - Ly'- t - - j 
- ,- "" "_, I:::!," ,_, _·ctt I I_~ses a 
version of the Cartesian method of doubt. He cIa ims t.hat. 
or any appeal to its sense, 
resistance to the text of universal doubt. 
mimics the approach of the Cartesian cogito: 
Thl2 t.hinkin9 or t-efle~·~ive "1" d,:,es nr:.t t-eslst. t.he 
test of universal doubt, instead, t.he sent.ence 
132 [ II I dc.l...Ibt. "]:0 c~nd t. i me:o ft-l If i I t.h is ft-lnct, i on 
Lyotard contends that we cannot doubt that in the act 
condition of the doubting: 
From the sentence I doubt it does not follow that 
I am but rather, it follows that there is a 
sent.ence 133 • 
The e~< i st.ence t.he serlt.el· ... ce .. I doubt. II is 
indubitable. From this point Lyotard deduces the definition 
of sentences as those things the existence of which is 
indubitable, and he gives examples of further indubi t.able 
original sentence. Al·:=:o 
indubitable are the ~--, '_:':'1'-1 t_', I_=- t-,,_- .~_- ~_-, ." II t, I" - 1- - l' t.., I Wit 
-' ",= . '= =:' d, =:·en _,'2r',ce, '-'d, _. 
cannot, b~~ doubt.ed?":o "I" =' II dOt-lbt. II =' 
II The sent.ence "Thet-e 1 s 
I follows the sentence " I 
dOI...Ibt." II c •. nd so on ••• (Note: he would. also include the 
sentences comprising his own account and the sentence 
t. h i~.; t. h e sis) .. 
--------
WOt- k i n';3 fl"'om t.he -. t ' La t- _·es 1 ctn of doubt., 
gives a definition of sentences satisfying his conditions. 
A sent.ence IS d.ny thing the existence of which cannot be 
denied: 
escapes all doubt IS that there IS at 
s:.ent.ence :: what.evet- form a sentence 
takes l.o.] is must be a thing 1~ 
Thus, Lyotard describes a sentence based ontology: a 
est. II a This definition IS 
independent of the sense and reality of sentences, and he 
argues that it does not give a definite description of the 
'::·:·ay t,hat. 
Is his definition not a cognitive 
ct s€!nt.ence which 1· ,- " =- is t.o 
make sense and thereby to offer a meta-linguistic cognitive 
d f2 fin i t. ion a Lyotard answers this point by stating that~ 
definition offers a cognitive definition, it. 
i45 
fix the cO'.:,~_lt-I]'.t .."J:,v~_-•. ~~.-_'.'I~I~~_-', ~ ~ 
• - -~ 01 sen~ences or give a 
definite descrir-,~tnn nf' ~~lrIT~t-lrl-~c 
_..... -. -- -. -- _ • _ __ oJ II 
definition of sentences allows them to 
be any thing that occurs. 
into being of sentences~ 1!5 not. 
limited by any conditions; anything can occur and there 
cannot. be ,. t· a prlorl cons~ralnts on the nature of occurring 
In: Evet .. y s'~nt.el"iCe 1 s ~ evr=-r'y sent·ence sign if i es: 
si9nifies: t.het-e IS .. 
---------' 
it occurs is not what occurs~ in 
t.he (whet-e 
p 1·"':2Sent.2\ t. i on is not. situation). 
does not signify: 
Is, :5i':;Ini fies and des i gna t.es 
of the occurrence 135 
In this definition of sentences~ Lyotard does not 
clairn a status for his philosophy of language~ 
instead~ he gives an ontological definition of sentences 
based on "s81 f- t"efet"~:!nt. i a 1 ot-dina .... y 
language", the fact that any sentence presupposes its own 
ex ist.ence: 
meta-lanquaqe at stake In "my" 
it does not have a 1 o':3ica 1 
i .~:. s t-: J.·I t-,'-_. ·t.· .. l' 1_-11'", .L. L.. - • 
. 1:3 t-IO '_. ,,;.,:. t 1 ;{ t.he sense of a 
t.erm w Instead. th~_~ f'_.II~II_-+_.l·.r_'~1 -f ~L + I ~ J W G~e me~a- anguage 
the self-referential capacity 
ordinary language 1~ 
The use of an ontology based on the unconditioned 
occurrence of sentences ensures the possibility of unruled 
cases coming before tribunals in Lyotard's philosophy of 
1 ingl..d.s·ticall yl~ t.h,? PC1ss i b iii t.y of the occurrence 
sentences heterogenous to all prior definitions and laws 
governing the sense and reality of sentences introduces a 
insufficiency to judgements metered out by 
tt" i bl_~na Is. However complete and scrupulously just a system 
of law may be, it will always be possible for cases to 
occur that cannot be judged equitably by the system. The 
definition of sentences is a condition for the 
outlaw can always occur - in the sense where the outlaw is 
a case not governed by laws already in practice. 
ontological definition of sentences 
allows for the occurrence of diff~rends~ it does not ground 
their necessary occurrence. It is possible for sentences to 
occur that cannot be judged according to given laws~ but 
I_~ : 
gIven system of Judgement and an occu~~ing 
of i nt.o bein'~ of 
( "encha i n/:::rnent.s /I ) 
heterogeneity between laws and 
occurrlng ~vents. The definition of concatenation IS t.he 
the most important statement In Lyotard/s 
II Conc a t.en Cl. t. ion IS necess8.t-y, 
l'his statement IS the basIs 
poss i b i J. it. y cl.nel i ,.- t-esCt 1 vc'.b iii t.y 0 f d i.ff4,·-ends; I will 
intr'oduce it. in t·he following section and develop a 
critique of its premises in Chapter V. 
The concatenation of sentences 
The concatenation of sentences IS the third linguistic 
structure necessary for t.he foundc\t. i on of gi fL4t-end-=. 
Lyotard's philosophy of language. It ensures that the sense 
of a sentence cannot be fixed~ through the claim that any 
In a concatenation after a 91ven 
sentence and ther~by, alter its cognitive context and i t.s 
senSE! n ThE! opE!n endE!d con j I..-Inct. i on ~r_]~;J. can be added t.o any 
sentence, sense of the consequent 
sentence affixed to the conjunction cannot be determined: 
3entence emerqes trom nothingness and concate-
(AJ i. t.h that antecedent. p a tOO d. t.a >~ i s 
opens up between sentences~ and emphasises the 
surprise caused by the commencement of something 
once the said is said. 
of discontinuity (or 
con=:.t. it.ut. i \Ie of yet it also defies that 
threat through an equally constitutive continuity 
137 
For Lyotard~ the occurrence of consequent sentences l~ 
an ontological necessity; all sentences are followed by an 
endless chain of occurring sentences none of which can be 
in terms of their cognitive sense. Furthermore, 
all combinations of concatenation are possible and it is 
leads to the privileging of specific 
The necessity that there be: And a sentence IS 
not. logical (qt.Jest. i on: t!.qw?) but ont.o I 09 i ca 1 
(quest. i on: ~tlai;:,:,:{). Y,=:t. t.h i '.::. cannot. be fcaunded on 
c~ny ev i dence ~ feat- t.his would imply a 
of the concatenation of 
sent.ences and In a position to verify that it 
t.akes p I ace 138 
14.1 
Co:::oncc,. te.nctt.l,.:>rl ~~ necessary, a concate~2tion , ~ J. ~ 
not·. a concatenation can be taken as 
the sentence stating the pertinence 
will be a rule of concatenation. Such a rule is a 
constitutive part of a genre of discourse, and 
thIS sort of sentence, these are 
a concat.enat. i on 1· ~. :=r 
1 ,= .~ 
not. II t.he 
made appa ,- ent.: t.het-e 
be concatenation, vet. no t-I_~ I e 
correct concatenation. Put Into Lyotard's legal t. e t- min 0 log v 
this implies that a case must be .judged, vet there can be 
no correct way of judging the case~ judgement is reduced to 
of bl.At. nevet-
a conflict between two or mot-e pet-to i nent. 
case - two or more possible rules of concatenation. 
1 ·-· :::.... ':' line of demonstration 
e :.~ t·~-i!nd i no;:! from Lvotard's legal 
through his definition of names as rigid designators, and 
the ontological definition of sentences, to the ontological 
nec:e·::;·=:· i t·v a.nd cant. i n'~ency of 
The demonstration sets up the possibility of 
confl iet.s t.hat. can t-,,~vet- be equit.ablv resolved before a 
15tZI 
Not0 also., that the I::. 1.'- C.II_-·.I ',;:: ·.~:.i l' '.'>.-::.' t-.· t I .L _1 1 
- --" r:: 'v ,_yo I .. ·i::lr-(J on V 
ensures the possibility of diff~rends~ 
_._----------- . 
there remains the 
of the recoqnition ... _ .. _. __ ._ .. _.L ____ .. ___ .. __ ....
-. t.o be 
through his theory of the sublime <studied in chapter VI of 
this thesis). However~ it. is at the stage where Lyotard 
grounds his philosophy of diff~rends and his philosophy of 
language on an ontology of the contingent occurrence of 
sentences and concatenations their coming into being 
that d reconstruction of his work encounters 
The step from a philosophy of language to an 
ontology is problematised by the prejudice the terms from 
linguistic syntax bring to the undetermined occurrence of 
Throughout this chapter, I have combined Lyotard's 
disparate notes and remarks into a consistent philosophy of 
I have 
f 1 •• -1 t- t.he t·· noted that the 1 anguage rnl..-Ist. 
necessarily be grounded in an ontology if the thesis 
to be maintained t.he undetermined concatenation of 
sentences must be defined ontologically because cognitive 
and descriptive definitions contradict the prior definition 
of names as rigid designators. And, at this point, 
is i '·"It.t-()dl..-Iced it-Ito Lyotard' s at-.al ysis, my 
reconstruction must stop to consider two general critical 
quest. i Ot1S: 
1 ) Is Lyotaydls ontolot ...:.!' ... ! cor'·.~l·-_-t_.el~lt_~ ~Jl·~ ... I~,· jr,l·'.=-,·I -
- • _. .~ 1 1::. "',eor'V ot 
2) [ '1_'1-_-'. '=. L. Y '-•. ' t-_. c·', to ,j 1 '=. 1_' '=. L-.,",_ '-_I f' ,- t- t - 1 .. -I V _. I . + + L 
- - 1_ r _, I _.1_' '.)':. ..:! i'~p 01... _.r-Ie t-eSOf...lt- ces 
of a consistent and developed ontological account? 
The second of t_.~I~._~~_~. nll~_~·t.I·'-_II~I~ wl·.J.1 t: r - ..., .... _ _ ,e c':lvet-ed tn 
Chapter V on the concepts of presentation and situation In 
the presentation and situation of occurrences. Only after 
t,he WOt- kin st.l~dy the 
remaining undefined terms from Lyotard's philosophy of 
r~gimes and genres. 
with a consideration of the first question put above. 
I make four main criticisms of Lvotard's introduction 
ontology alongside his names and 
1) Lyotard defines sentences as ontological occurrences 
without considering insertion of names 
defined as rigid designators into sentences. 
2) Lyotard's use of Descartes' method of doubt In the 
introduction of the occurrence of sentences does not 
constitute a valid argument as to the indubitability 
of sentences defined as syntactical terms. 
Lyotard does not give a'~l 'o~_loro_o.o_oor_.loool·I~I~_o ,-,t- ~l-~' __ 00 I _ I ,_II£"I '_I (_ I':. t~ i·- t- e t-I ,=;~ s 
can be limite(j lOt-, ~loool(_-II~I 'o~_o w~_-oOy' -,- +- -lol-w i +0 
- ~ Co~ ~U d -v conca~enaJlon 
to be explained ~s a sequence of independent entities. 
4) The ontological definitions of occurrence and concate-
nation are prejudiced insofar as they are constrained 
by the syntactic and semantic relationships possible 
betowea:~\o'" 
The first criticism concentrates on Lyotard's claim 
thato sr::!ntoences contain rigid designators referring to 
referents and that thereby~ a cognitive context is assigned 
to the designators, and a sense is associated with their 
referents. In hlS definition of sentences as occurrence, as 
Lyotard does not explain how 
sentences so deflned can include grammatical object.s as 
refined as rigid designators. Nor does he explain how a 
rigid deSIgnator alone can constitute a sentence; for 
e:·~ample:. What.. 1· ,= _. the status of the rigid designator 
is a philosophy of totality 
\· ... CIW i mposs i b 1. e? II .. ? I 
sketches an answer to these queries in his theory of 
presentation and situation; however, it is still a flaw In 
his work that the specifically grammatical or syntactic 
aspect of sentences as occurrence is not explained in Le 
i~ l' of·f >!o, \ •. ~'t··, d . 
. ::J .. _.~_:. .. _::.: .. _ •. :.::: ___ :..",,:. u 
n Cd:. f U 1 f i 1 Instead, glveS an explanation of 
t.hl:::; t- e 1 et t. i Of'I=:,h i p between sentences :=.c ,..,-, '0\'· ammctt. i ca I 
entities 7 that is: defined in t~_rrnr_~ '_~f' t· ...... ·_·n_1·r~I ...... -_~ -.~ 
.... ,,  dt I' ... ';lent-es, 
rigid designators and the worlds their refer to 1~ 
A more serious consequence of the omission of the step 
from ontology to synt,a;,~ is the prejudice brought to 
t.I\"""tClet.et-mil"H:.-_1 ':II=C'--It-t-I?.t-•• -_~_ t\·' tl-- --t\-1' -.Lol d f' j t t· 
. ..I.Y _·r II:! =- .. ' ' 1_ r~. y e 1 nel syn .,etC _,1 c 
properties of names and sentences. sent,ences 
CI_" i v .... :~ a c: 0 ';;I. \"', J. t. 1. ve C.I-•. ·' t-. t .. ·. ,:;"._. ',..', ·t. t_ .• -_,. ,.-, c\-rn .-_ ... '=. t. y I' t- - 11 I d l' t·, q t L . _ II.- _. 1_ .r-,ern; 
sentences defined ontologically as occurrence 
must be of a form capable of assigning cognitive contexts 
inc 1 ud in';! t.hese al·-e 
rest-t- ict.ing t.h.?' •• t-lndet.et'·m i ned" nat.I.At-e .:.f OCCUt- t-en.=e. a In 
claim that occurrence can necessarily be reduced to a 
linguistic medium; what IS more, a medium well-defined in 
t.et"rns of rigid designators fot- example: 
designators account for reference in Chinese or ancient 
Egyptian scripts? Or in the case of onomatopeic names such 
text to illustrate this restriction of occurrence, but take 
M4morial [Lafuma edition n° 737] of his Pens~es. 
- -_. 
.:;.f t-eve 1 at i cat ... be I../ndet-stood intuited 
1 ing'...Iistically even through the communication of the 
-i c: .-i l. ._I~ 
t. ;;:\ k E! ·:::t '.:.:. ':-_-'1"', t.· .. ;:-_~.I.··I t.· .. J' •. _~;". 'j'. .;;: - • ,- 1 . 
. lurm In ~asca 's text and 
The prejudice brought to Lyotard's ontology 
of occurrence through a linguistic medium contradicts his 
of 
all-important argument: because 
is undetermined~ concatenation is contingent. 
Lyotc\,··d P 1'- e:,upposes t.he 1 i t-,gl...1 i st. i c 
This does not invalidate his 
philosophy of language, his account of names as rigid 
designators, his concepts of the presentation and situation 
of cognitive worlds and universes of names, it does however 
demonstrate the illegitimate overextension of the domain of 
app], ieat.ion of t.he philosophy. The hetE:t-Ct':!Iene i t.y 
established between rigid designators~ their referents~ and 
the cognitive senses they can be associated with, is 
assumed to be a property of occurrences given as sentences~ 
yet this assumption IS only possible if occurrence and a 
predetermined syntactical definition of sentences are 
The classic example of the problems linked to 
this confusion comes from Lyotard's own text; fot· him~ 
1· t-.-::- a sent.ence c\nd 
heterogenous, yet equally valid, 
there are therefore many 
concatenations to follow 
it, but this second point depends upon silence being a 
syntactic sentence _. a difficult point to defend if a rigid 
des i gt-lc\t.Ot .. , a referent and a cognitive sense must be 
recognised in the occurrence of silence, or death, or love 
The questlons t.hat arise from this problem 
are of the type~ Must silence ~efer to something? Dn~~ a 
rigid designator? 
The confusion of ontological occurrence with syntactic 
first introduced through Lyotard's mis-use of 
He exploits the familiarity 
of Descartes' method to lend universality, universal self-
epistemology~ Lyotard is able to make a similar 
II i ndub i t.c\b I e II sent·ence II I .joubt." and t.het-eby, 
the indubitabl~ occurrence of sentences becomes the baSIS 
for the universality of Lyotard's philosophy of language. 
However, such a step cannot be made if any presupposition 
II I t. h ink II 
Ot- t:.h,~ sent·ence II I t.h i nk II 1 n t.he =:.t.at.ement.: II' I t.hink' 1S 
an i. ndub i t.ab 1 e ~-=.ent.ence "; tOt- if t.h i s is t.he case, 
s t. i:~. t U '.5 is illegitimately confered on t.hose 
presuppositiotlS, because the method of doubt does not allow 
for· presuppositions that can themselves be put int.o 
ql..·I~"2'-::, t. i on. I t. 1. ~.; t. h i ~. rule that Lyotard contravenes 
?~nt.~t~~,:;.§_ - a =:~·'nt.ac~t i c t.et-m wi t.h =:.ema.nt. i c 
L=:: i ndub i t·ab 1 e:, it. IS through this 
- t t· t~-t t~- F'lr~_,t,I~_-rns t-I~_,ted 1n my first criticism 1_ 0 n _. t . a v en.· 1 0 n _. rid _. _. rI r: 
above are introduced into Lyotard's philosophy of language. 
t·h i r·d cl.nd C t- i t. i cis m s of 
introduction of ontology into his philosophy of 
follow from the application of the two earlier point.·::;:. on 
to the concept of concatenation. 
occurrence through the syntactic properties of s.ent.ences ;0 
Lyot.at-d cl.1 so prejudges concatenation;o or the occurrence of 
t2VE!nt.s in 
sentential form, implies that the sequential occurrence of 
events takes the form of a parataxis (juxtaposition) of 
=-.I~nt.encl~~:::' t.ha.t. a concatenation of occurrences IS a. 
sequence of sentences int.et--l inked by t·he conjt.Jnct. ion a.nd .. 
t.h i~:::. property of concatenation does not follow 
from the definition of occurrence as that which comes into 
being. Occurrence need not take the form of a serIes of 
. distinct entities, and concatenation does not necessarily 
i rn ply t. hat. n.:?w eVI~nt.s must be appended to chains of 
sentences as an addition or conjunction of them. Occurrence 
of d. sequent. i a.l concatenation of 
distinct entities if it is presupposed that an occurrence 
IS a syntactical sentence. I have already demonstrated how 
Lyotard cannot define occurrence in t.his way; t.he t- e f 0 t- e;o 
his analysis of concatenation is not ontologically valid: 
ever· yt hi n'~ In a chain of 
sen·t.ences. 
Tht-ol ... lgh C t- i t. i c i ;:::. m s I have st.at.ed a.nd 
developed above;o the function of the ontology at the basis 
", C"-:-1. ,_I f 
of Lyotard's definition 
Lyot.at-d d,:=!pends the demonstration of 
the contingency of occurrence and concatenation, clnd his 
how to concatenate 1 '=. 
not." IS oni:.ologic:al: 
1 =. not. logical (question: 
(question~ Whclt.?) II. 
-------. 
1S that the ontology 
him cannot. found those conclusions because 
they are presupposed in his introduction of occurrence and 
concatenation through the use of the notion of a sentence, 
and semantic definition in his 
philosophy of language - sentences contain names as 
designators and fit a cognitive context to given referents. 
The =.ent·l:=!nce sl···,ou I d not have been included 
._0·----_---
i n .t:. h e f CI 1 low i n'~ Lyotard's philosophy of 
e;'~I= 1 selj u 
i t.s ont.o I 09 i ca.l basis if the word 1S 
I understand the sentence that 1S 
t.he t·he t.ok,::.n sent . .::nce [in 
En·~l ish in the ori9inal], the sentence as event. 
A sentence type is the referent of an occurr1n9-
sent.ence 142 Sent . .::nces escape t.he 
not. beca,-~s.e 
but because they 
what is o~rurring [in En9lish 
143 da-=. Fallendl;2 
that which occurs, 
in the original], 
Conclusion 
_T 1'-1 ·t .. ·. L .• , 1-_-' '-_-. I"_-.'l···r , .. -_. 11_ "_:::. l' ,-_, ""1' , ..-_.:. .L. - .L. 1- - .L. • I.L I r • 1_.,._, '_ .. II::: '_'1.;,,1 0 P 10- e v IOU S C 0-, do P ,_. e f' =:. 
differentiated two moments in the work accomplished on 
presentations of 
d iff ~ t- end ~ 
----_._----_ .... 
Ct. '~Ict\!e Cton accot.lnt. 0 f t.he 
incompleteness of the domain under i n v est. i '~ct t. ion I 
demonstrated how statements made in the domain needed to be 
underpinned by the work from a different area~ for example: 
the statement of the 
had to be proven by a demonstration 
from Lyotard's philosophy of language. A second moment In 
my conclusions to chapters I I cl.nd I I I drew more direct 
criticisms of Lyotard's work. His clnd a f f ect.ua I 
t.o involve 
irredeemable flaws: the artificiality of the 
distinction between the judgement of tribunals and the 
(a s '::;1·'0, 0 v..'n 
I I I ) • 
The CO(''',,= I u=:· i on to i.:·I·-!l..s chapt.et" i nvc,l ves the sam'2 t.wer 
rnorn~:~nts .. These follow on from the main question of the 
chapter: Can Lyotard's philosophy of language provide the 
th~::~ot-et. i ca 1 that diff~r~nds are 
to this question led to an area where further study was 
Lyotard's ontology as presented through the 
presentation and situ~t_,J',(_)lrl - j' ~ . 
- -, eli"'!( 1_,0 ell'"! ]'J.f.!.E~~~: 
the key maxim from Lvotardls philosophy of language cannot 
be decJt..~ced from the ontoloq_",/ at t~,a f ~ t' f L f= ounua ,lon 0 t~at 
philosophy - the ontological study of the occurrence and 
concatenation of sentences. The claim "Concatenation is 
necessa, r"':l :0 
t ... 1,-, P_, d,::._ 'F )', t-, ','I, 'j-_,]', 10.','t-, (0',' f ,0'''-1-'' 11- t- 0'1-'- - 0',.. ,.. - t- +- j f 
o. '0' _,,' '::! "'_I::! d ::', oJ'::!' _·en'=e anI; 0 OCCI.H- t- ences 
as concatenatIons of sent,l::!nces, this is because the 
semantic and syntactic properties of sentences in Lyotard's 
philosophy of language prejudge the forms of occurrence and 
concatenation, thereby annulling the capacity ontology has 
for making universal statements such as the maxim given 
above .. 
Thus, this chapter points towards an area of further 
st"...Idy: t,he ,=clncept,~, of pl"esent.at,ion and si t,t.jatil:,n in Le 
diff~rend. to be analysed 
- ' 
in chaptet" V. It also brings a 
a philosophy of language and an ontology. Finally, note how 
a pat.t,el·-I"', is beginning to emerge between the analysis of 
the various presentations of the ~iff~rpn~. Flaws appear in 
Lyotard's work where he grounds a presentation of a 
in one area on the theory from another for 
t.he presentation on the philosophy of 
that foundation of one area in another is 
essent, i a 1 to the viability of the key statements made in 
each one; in chapter II the statements were: Diff~rends are 
is the l~ar8diqmatic diff4rend; 
.... - .. _ .. __ ._._-_ ... _ ........ _ ..... _._-_ .•. -._ ......... _.-- .......... ,-.. -_ ...... -... _ ................ _ ........ _ .. -...... -- in Ch8.pt.et- I I I: Di ff~t-ends 
---------
1· ,;: t-,J-d-. 
...... ::! ........ -... - ... .:-....... -.... I II-Ji 11 In chapters V and VI, to 
het.~=I'-cJ':;:IenousJ':o J'gent-~=s c,re incornrnen'E,t.Jt-able 'J • 
Chapter V - Presentation, situation and occurrence 
Introduction 
In this chapter and the next I intend to further the 
thesis that has emerged In my conclusions to chapters II. 
I I I will sharpen that thesis by bringing it to 
bear on Lvotard's concepts of presentation and situation 
(in thIS chapter) and on his use of the sublime (in chapter 
V I ) " rho thesis to be clarified and extended IS the 
fo 1 J ow i n'~I: 1 n t:.he e 1 abot" d.t. i on of h i~. ph i losophy 1 n '=~~ 
ana.lysis subjective affectual 
conjecture~ philosophy of justice~ philosophy of language~ 
-', Lyotard grounds the apodictic statements 
from each mode in the philosophy of another~ t.hi '=, ~.t.r· at.e9Y 
irresolvable contradictions between the different 
Fhilosophies used 
of j 1· f f.L t·· Pt- ,"~'= ~. ____ !:=_-=--1..=-~_~. d r?- p 21"'1 d :::. I_~pon apod i ct. ic, incontrovertible 
~.; t·el t.ement.::, :' these cannot be proven in Lyotard's theory 
w i tho,-~t. invalidating his diverse definitions of the concept 
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T l,.·i '_::', +.'.,1'''1 ~.-:._. --.. . 'J:. "=-0" r-" "." ,-_', F' ,-_',' '.==. L_O', ,'.-.1 - 1- -. I - t ' r - _~ dJU~~ was oJserved 'f i ," ':=, t. 1 n 
affectual concerns, 
given In chapter II, i::tl'''"j )'. n ·t.I·-I ._-.:. 1-1- ,j 1" - -- -. F L" Y f ' t . 
- -' ' , •• I..) ,::.'_1 'r' 0 JUs _·ll=e .:. r 
legal ph i 1 Q~~.ophy in I I I n His 
sentimental, affectual cC'.,n,_t=o_t-t-, fl-_It- t_.L-,.:::. -',I-t"t -f' AI -- L . t r..... I::! v I::! , . I_I _-I:.,Cr-,Wl .Z 
was ';;I i ven i:" context through the definition of a 
conflict that could not be equitably 
I" ..... __ -':;"-_.1 1 v .... -_~ d b .-:_~ f ".-_1 t- .=-0.-_ ::. .L. t- l' b I ,t- - I _ '-, 1_. '_. 'c:I. , and At-lschw i t.z 
Thereby, 
sentiments on the subject of the limits of thought, and 
speculative reason in particular, were given a grounding in 
presentation of the diff~rend. In t.ut-n" t.his 
legal approach to the incommensurability of events and the 
judgement of events was seen to be dependent on the 
apodictic statement: 
'''Ievet'' be equitably resolved. This statement was not 
legal philosophy itself and proved to be 
dependent, after my work in chapter III, on the philosophy 
of lan~uage given in Le diff~rend. 
- - - -------------
Through the linguistic definition of names as rigid 
des i gnat.or·s:o and through the translation of legal debate 
linguistic structure of addressers, 
senses and addressees, Lyotard ensured that the sense 
ascribed to any given referent could never be legitimately 
fi>:ed. Inst.ead~ t.hat sense be,=arne a function of the 
position taken by the name of a referent in networks of 
16::: 
c () (~W'1 i t. i \/ S' ,- .:::. ty-' .-. m _. 'j - . 11-' .-' .l.. ~- .~~ ~~~ ~~ or conca~enatlons of sentences. 
and a sense through a name or rigid designator ensured the 
nc:~. t.J..l 1'- e of by 
possibility of ascribing a particular just judgement to the 
name of any case up before a tribunal. The impossibility of 
.;:!q .. ~i table rl:::~~c,II.At.i':'ns of ~Ii ff~I,-pnct~. was 9 1 ... lclrant.eed by t.he 
I::lP_fl't-ll'i_~l'i_~t-1 ~f t-I~.rnp_ .. _~ -- t-l'ql'~ ~ . t ::l'd f 
- ~" d~ _ ~ ueslgna~ors ,eVOl 0 sense. 
However, Lyotard's l~r'~_' ... ll·~t_.l·'.-_ t_'~'~_-'_-"ry '-'1'-, t-'-lrnl'~ln w-- l·t--If· ~ .... - r _ C I =' c:l.::. .::,e 
dependent upon a theory of the concatenation of sentences 
that required a definition of sentences and concatenation 
from outside his philosophy of language. 
t.o t- et.a i n the irresolvable nature of 
di ff!~t-etl!js t.ht-ol ... lgh tirne~ so that di ffpt-ends I=o .. -Ild nevet-. be 
resolved~ Lyotard had to define sentences and concatenation 
in such a way as to leave the sentences and chains of 
sentences (,::oncat.enat. ion'S) in which names were to be 
positioned absolutely undetermined. If there were rules to 
govern which sentences CQuid include given names and which 
concatenations could follow from those sentences~ t.hen 
those rules would form the basis for equitable judgements 
of d i fferen'::'Js_ 7 hence contradicting their legal definition. 
In chaF't.et~ IV of my thesls, I demonstrated how an 
cabs.:. ll~te I y def i nit. i cln f::tf set-,tences and 
concatenation could not be formulated from within Lyotard's 
philosophy of language due to the determinated form 
1 t:,4 
Lvotard defined the ~em2ining terms 
phIlosophy of 10nguage ontologically; sentences were '~~i 1 yen 
as that which is, the being of which cannot be denied~ and 
concatenation was given as the succession of undetermined 
apod i ct:. i c st.at·ement. : II Conci:\t.l~nat. i on is 
i:l. c one a t.ena t. i on 1 ~::. not. II • The law i~. t.t··(1~ 
the heterogeneity of r~gimes of sentences 
incommensurability of linguistic genres~ and 
fact that in Lyotardls ontology everything 
th(3.t. te. IS· sent.ent.ial and hencl~ pat-to of a concat.ena.t.ion of 
sentences~ yet whatever occurs IS not determined by that 
which preceeds it In concatenation. 
The statement glven above IS the point where the 
tension between Lyotardls philosophy of language and his 
ontology becomes apparent. I will study that tension in 
as to emphasize t.hesls 
t.he of Lyot.at-d I.:=; d i spat- at.E~ 
clef i nit i 01"','.5 of t.he £Ii ff(!:.t-end in contradictory modes of 
my the definition of a 
is grounded In the 
the two modes of philosophy contradict one 
anoth8r. Lyotard testifies as to the necessary conjunction 
of ont.o 1. OSIY and philosophy of 1 n his bCII:)k 
P~r~qrinations~ where he also states different forms of the 
-
of 




" " .~ .... ~ .. __ .. CE- ...... ,~_ .. _.:I It. t.he ernpt. i ness ~ t.he 
nothingness in which the universe presented by a 
pht- 8.;:,9 1 :~, I:-~ ~ .. , F' () ~~ e ,j and which e}~t='l':'ljes at. t.he 
rnornE~nt:. t.h,~ .. Pl--ll'''ase OCCUt-S and d i sappei:oX S wit.h i t.u 
This is someth i no;:! 
like it. is always 
escaping determination and arriving both too soon 
[1Y\y ernphas is] 
what I call the apodictic statement or law. 
The st.I .. ·t~Ct:.I_~t-~2 of this chapter involves 
t.he bet:.w~=en thE! 1 ingl~istic arid 
def i nit. i ,::.t ... s elf Followed by an 
introduction of the key terms from Le diff~rend to bridge 
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t.he language and the 
ontology: presentation and situation. Then, through those 
I will study the contr~_.,j-.L·r.:.+_.J·.r_lt-ls t~ L 
- '- _·r la '1_. occ,-~ t-
Lyotard's use of his ontological law of contingent and 
necessary concatenation in his philosophy of language. I 
will also use my analysis of presentation and situation to 
in this sectlon the 
heterogeneity of the 
incommensurability of genres will The main 
SOI~ r' ce for t.he critical work of the chapter is Jacques 
Derrida's work on the interrelationship of language and 
Being applied t.h~2 and 
sententiality in Lyotard's philosophy 1~ 
Ontology and the legal presentation of the diff6rend 
The role played by Lyotard's ontology in grounding his 
ph i 1 c,sophy CI f language can only be understood to its full 
e}~t.ent. in the context of the legal presentation of the 
the definition of the 
stem from constraints inherited from the 
fut·)darnent.a 1 s t.e\ t.ernent. definition of the 
diff4rend: a diff4rend can neV9r be equitably resolved. I 
have given the argument from Lyotardls philosophy of 
1 .. -' ;~. ,/ 
J i n'~~u i::; t- i c of 
IV of this thesis. That argument 
works through the definition of diff~~~nds as properties of 
':.~::nte.nt- i c\ 1 
addressee, to the Ijefirll-t_-l-~_,t-I ~_If- t __ ~I~_ tL r n8_ml~, _fie 
crux of the debate, as a rigid designator empty of sense. I 
on which the argument and the translation from 
I have -::=;hown, I I I , that Lyotard first 
parties, tha~ cannot be equitably resolved. That definition 
IS a negative definition with respect to legal justice and 
what I have called the judgement of tribunals. In chapters 
III, I further showed how the legal defini tior-, had 
in ot-dl~t- to underpin Lvotard's claIms 
t-heot- i e-3 of 
judgement. The model for such claims is the following: 
[. ... ] it 1S impossible for the judgements of new 
t- t- i bun a 1 ::::- t.o not create new torts; t.his IS 
because they will will t.h ink t-hey 
.::11:, 0 \j e '.-_. 1 ,::Ct. '_i fl-I 1 ,,;::, l' " .. '. '=. ~ ·t·· -. t·· - r" .j.. 
- - ...' - =., .. ' c:t .. ' r-.: . I' t;. j"l '_. 0 T' 
J·.· •• !·_I ,:",_'.. 1 .. ·. I.· .. 1.'- i:"_-~. '.c. .. . , •••. __ , J . .... , ,'.-_~. t.·' 1 =_J. f" .- r' . ! t-·- .- of j . t'" 1'" i. I 
I ,'..' : 1~:1. _.1... IC_~ U ~_~ .. "-"':' ... ·~~!:~.§'~r~o:JS_: ~.Jhat.eve~-
.... I j F 'f: ~~, \." .:..:.\." '-1 
.:-.... : .... : ....... :-...... :"~-.. ~::.. ~ it. will necessarily lead to 
t·Ot"t. n Th i ~':' fa.ct. di t-ect.l y t.he 
definition of fj l' .j:: t-= p I'" ~':' .. t- .. -I '= 
-' -_ .... _-=_-::-'-=-..::.:. always irresolvable. 
The important point to be made In the analysis of the 
1.-:-.11'.'::' '="-.'_', J. v 1-_'. C ..~ ~_" " 0=0_ t-I l' +' t l .. - l' 1- . j .L..L. I t f t l • 
- - J v I .. ·rl'=· .JI_~I ·~I?-men'_· r_·at::e=:· accot-ln _. 0 ~flIS 
nature. To accept that a tort must occur when j t-ld·~ement. is 
to criteria of judgement other than the attempt to meter 
out equitable justice, legitimate way of 
t.o 
there is no correct approach 
t.o the 
b~~ t- eso 1 ved;. Lyot.at-d 
IS mak in'~ t.he wid'~I'- clcdm: t.het-e can nevet- be a jl_-lst. 
j ' . ..Id9E!rnel·-,t. of (~ d!. f,f ~ . r end. Whet'-e t.he n,:at.ion of a just. 
judgement corresponds to an idea of universal legi t.imacy. 
However, this wider inference puts a premium on the meaning 
of t.hl~ wot-d ",~~-=tl..~i t.abl y" in L.yot.at-d I=:. legal definition of 
(:0 i ffel·-ent. from a lit.igat.ion, IS a 
case of conflict between (at least) two parties 
1 r-,·~ 
!~2 '::\'...l i 1::. i:'. b 1 '2 f(j i~ n t. :: 
_. - --""--'--- - ..... _ .. - ...... __ .. -. ---._ .. '."'-' SplIt equitably}. This 
1S because t,here 
applicable to both arguments. The legitimacy of 
imp 1. y 'U",E! illegitimacy of the 
Therefore, if one and the same rule of 
judgement IS applied to them in order to split 
if it were a litigation, tnen 
IS inflicted on one of 
d i spl.xt.:.e 147 
[IYly ernr--h2l sis] 
judgement Lyotard means a 
t·o bot·h s 1 de:;;;, all H 
defini tior', he vJ i t.h hi·:::; i nt·e t- p ~-et·a t. ion of 
a case through a rule 
applicable to that 
then defined as a rule consistent with the rules of the 
genre of dIscourse used by a party to put its case, 
Thus, there can be no 
fot·· j ,-~dgement. of 
d l' f f ~ ,.- ,::. t·· .-,' '= 
. ___ ..: .. _._ .... -=--._~._! .. =-_.:::!_ u C:I'" i t.er· i a expediency~ utility and 
objectivity are all In 
-U-,is becau=.·e t.he appl ieation a sin91e 
1 sap t- i 0 t- i 
illegitimate insofar as i t. m,-~st be incommensurable to one 
170 
of t.hemu This contingent aspect of all judgements passed 
pl···. i losophy t.hcd:. lays claims to universal legitimacy or 
validitya.nd, 
c 1 c\ i ms. of . t.he 
contingent aspect of all j udgement.s of ~;I i.ff~t-end=. dep'=:!nds 
on two points that cannot be justified from within 
Lyotard's legal presentation; these are: 
1) lyotard's definition of rules of judgment presupposes 
a theory of genres of discourse from his philosophy of 
I angt.la';:lE!;: 
2) definition of ~iff~rends as 
on t.he incommensurability 
therefore, Lyotard must demonstrate that genres are 
In his philosophy of In 
order to demonstrate these two points Lyotard must 
develop his philosophy of language. 
The correspondence between the legal presentation of 
i t. ,=, de fin i t. ion ln the philosophy of 
is effectuated through a translation of the legal 
lnstances of the plaintiff~ the court, the plaintiff's 
argument and the wrong suffered by the plaintiff into a 
sentential model (as seen ln chapter IV). A sentence takes 
the place of the case and the addresser of the 
171 
court, t·he wrong 1S the refe·,r~_rlt_~ (_~f: t-~- -- t- . Lj Jrl~ ~~n~ence and G~e 
p J. Ct. i n t. iff I ';;:' a. r· '~::JI ... ;ment. IS i t.:~ The ~=:·I..·I to ~:; t. i t. u t. ion 
legal problem to being 
a property of the concatenation of sentences. The judgement 
t.t·· ibuna.l IS a sr::=!nt·ence followin·~ on ft-om 
representIng the case; this concatenation 
allows Lyotard to give a formulation of the 
j]. f·F.Lt-~t~ j. ~_ -__ --=--.:.-J..-l!::.. a 
The 
IS t.he [of a concatenationl. 
Not only do others precede it~ but the modes of 
concat.,::=!nB.t i on implied by them, 
take the sentence into account and 
involve it In the pursuit of a stake. They take 
effect through the sentence. 
14:3 
t.t-ans 1 at. i on of from a 
presentation to a presentation in a philosophy of language 
1 s of t·Wr:I-· fo 1 d importance; firstly, it is the basis for 
Lyotard's proof 
secondly, the linguistic definition of diff~rends permits a 
9~~t"·,et- a 1 analysis of each individual case of a diff~rend 
1 iL 
legal concept of tor~. Ih1::; 
second precIsion of t.h I~ ';!.tff:.'~.!:~.!:.·1 d 1 S v i t. a 1 
of individual judgements of them l~. This is important for a 
,.'-_,." l' t_.1' ,,,,_,~-_... .. f: J' t·· 1·.L L 
., 1 '-' • ' • ..I'~ _·1 ce ,~..!l.~~,r~et- a _. '::11 ven r_.r-,c\t. t.he det.ect. i on of 
(which is not the case 
given that some torts can be 
righting the wrong leading to the tort). 
~.ect,ion I will show how these two points of impol·-t.ance in 
the philosophy of language become dependent on Lyotard's 
t.ht-ough concept.s of presentatlon and 
'~ i t.I.Acl t i on " 
Instances, presentation and situation 
In making the transposition from a legal definition of 
Lyot.d.I·-d must. 
dem()ns t. t .. a t.e that the terms from the legal definition can be 
expressed in their entirety~ with their correct 
Pt-esent.at, i 01''',. The d Lf.f~t~.~nct t-efer t-ed t.o 
t.() in t.el·-rils f t- oro the phllosophy of I an·::I'-~Ct.ge. If t.his 
eql·1 i va 1 ence i'E not. me\ i nt.a i ned ~ then the philosophy of 
language will not serve as the basis for the demonstration 
of the irresolvable of .jj ff;."!:·I""·~'nd= 
... _ ... 4:._ .. ___ ::: ........ = ___ :. __ -=!. J,I 
1· .~~ .. I 
less conditioned than its linguistic expression, then the 
in conditions can invalidate any law holding 
true in the philosophy of language when it is transferred 
into practice. For example, let there be a factor in le';:Ial 
practice - say a factor of Aristotelian ehronesi§ or a 
factor of universal Wlseness - and posit that such a factor 
cannot be expressed in Lyotard's philosophy of language; it 
IS then possible for that ineffable factor to serve in the 
legitimate solution of ~iff~rends even though 
they are theoretically irresolvable according to laws from 
the philosophy of language. The existence of such cases 
indeed, even the possibility of their existence - would 
L.yot.ar·c/ ' s his 
A further point to add to the above remark on 
translation is that it is not only Lyotard's legal analysis 
that must be tranferred into his philosophy of language. In 
from my work in chapter III, I recall that legal 
judgement operates as a category serving to define justice 
j l.lclgemE!nt. act.ion 
therefore, Lyotard must translate judgement 
it··, general int . .::. t.~-Ie t.et~ rns .:,f t.he philosophy of language. 
All event.s and all t-ei::tct. i CWIS t .• :. event.s m,-~st. be acco'-~nted 
for. Ot.het"w i se l' he will .:::tnly have trans 1 at.ed t.he form of 
174 
wIshes to exclude~ instead of the j ud'~ernent. 
defined negatively t.o t.he of 
rejoin my work from chapter IV~ 
definition of sentences as all 
events. Lyotard will base the translation of all ~2vent.s .-
on this notion of occurrence and 
hence, on the notion of the concatenation of sentences. 
The transposition of practical events into sentences 
begins through the use of a bridging concept: the notion of 
mean a theoretical 
t.2r·rn used bot.h In anal ysis ctnd 1n t.he 
t. h e F' I d. i n t. iff, the referent of the plaintiff1s discourse, 
the sense of that dIscourse or argument and the j ud'~e. In 
other words - and here the translation 1S already in motion 
the instances of 1=3.=·e (t.he 
-------.---
plaintiff), the referent (the wrong)~ the sense adjoined to 
d .• j.j 1'- e sse e 
court, etc .•• ). The practical legal instances will also be, 
according to Lyotard, t.h,'? instances of a gIven sentence 
(its addresser, addresse, referent and sense): 
One =:.hould say: and the addressee 
at-e 1. ns tctnces a sentence in which 
i75 





.:=:. en·:; E: 
it ... 
Pt-esented by t.he 
IS 
IS the statement about which Lyotard's 
translation turns, I will therefore insist on the points it 
sets out to make. 
The fit· E, t. F'O i nt. t.o be made is that the sentence need 
not mention an addresser and an addressee, these instances 
indicated by the sentence. 
linguistic terms do not translate a practical 
event by an account of the participants, sense or topic of 
cli ~,put .• ~" Tht~s , legal instances are not 
di ,···ect·l y inst.ead~ t.hey at-e 
presupposed by its position ln a concatenation of other 
concatenation. It is in this sense that the addresser and 
d.n addt-e~.s.::::e CH.n be pt··e·::=..ent.ed by a sent.ence: 'It.he addt-esset-
and the addressee are instances presented by a sentence in 
wh i ch tf·-II?'Y m,-::tY 0'·- may not. be manto i onad" • 
concept of presentation is not a form of direct description 
or direct reference. 
1 ! .... J i. ;. J. 
instances is that it does 
not present an addr·esser and an ;::llj Ij 1·- ~_ -=:. '.= ... -.~_ L:"_' ;':1 .. -. __ , 1· r-: T' I - -'y ,> I ~ - - ~ ~ A II:::! 'A' e t- E~ 
USIng the sentence for communication. The sentence is not a 
dialogue between interlocutors not di t"ect.l y 
line; neither does the sentence refer to 
instances through being used by them in a 
d i =:.pIXI:.,~: is not. ;::1. 
fl'-om t.o 
independent. of i t, II. C) n t. h 12 con t. t- a t- y , a sentence presents 
cd 1 fOUI'- fashion in it.·=:, own 
presented universe wherein they are subsequently situated: 
~~ent.ence If. G i vel"·, t.he t.wo po i nt.s 8.bove ~ I will cant. 1 n,-~e my 
study of the translation of legal instances into Lvotardls 
phi losophy of 1 ar"=" .. -I{;. 9 0::.:' t.ht-ou·~h an ancllysi=:. of his mod'21 of 
presentation and situation~ it is in this model t.hat. t.he 
importance of his ontology becomes apparent. 
Sentences, presentation and situation 
My thesis concernIng the contradictions arising 
Lyot.at"·d I s rn '--lIt. i pie approach to the definition of the 
si tuat.ion; t.his is beci:r.use t.hey relate the different 
approaches to one another. Not only do they forge the link 
177 
between the legal i t·s 
definition it) the philosophy of language, t.hey riK~St. a 1 so 
becat~s.e 
presentation and situation are properties of sentences 
defIned ontologically. of presentation 
t-~_~f~_·rl~ed t_:i_~ +_:I~, ...... -_ 1_~I_-I_-I_I~t-I_~_~t-II_-~_- f t ~I ~ 0 sen Jences, and the concept of 
situation Issues concatenat.ion - 1\ F't-esent.at. i on 
1 '::;' t.hat. 2\ sent.ence OCCl.H-S \I : 
A pt-esent.at. i on 
I I t-, 1· 'v'':;:' t- -= ,::-. 
__ <__ .!_=.--..:.:'_.=::.. a 
[trly empha~, t s:l 
t.he 
s i t.uat. i on 
151 
analysis 
Lyotard's philosophy of language~ 
is int.o 
~ t-orn __ wi t.h i n t.he 
of sent.ent. i a I i t.y 
as I have outlined it in 
chapt.':2t" IV~ also applies to presentation and situation. 
~,O a~·:· not. t.o invalidate the philosophy of 
language, the concepts of presentation and situation must 
cont. r· ad i ct. the definittons and t"I~les of t.hat. 
philosophy, most notably: the definition of names as rigid 
designators empty of sense, the definition of sentences as 
undetermined occurrences and the law of concat.enat. i on 
stating that concatenation is necessary but a particular 
concatenation cannot be. Hence, my overall t.~",esi s wi II be 
1 -I':::: 
t ·.II·" 1-,.11 ... 10:_:.1 h t. t.:. (".1 .1'.-.• 1 >=._, '-_-'. ,." 1 ,.-, '1-... 1'-' J'. '.-_-:, 1.'_'.' ','-I .. :::,', I,'," •• t ....... - _. I'" r II ]. . f' 
, ,/"-. ·-,er·, . ve r' 1 . 'Y' t· .. tI·"p=:t.he t.. t.he 
bridging concepts of presentatiorl - d .~~. j ~n Sl~ua~lon '0 indeed 
c:ont. too ad 1 ct· f ol...lnd;:~ t. i on t.o Lyot.ar-d's 
philosophy of language. 
In addition to the requirement of not contr-adicting 
Lyotar-d's philosophy of lanQ._ua9.e or r_'t-It_.r_'l,_-'~_y~ ~l'- t~--'r-y -f 
- - ...... r, :::, _·r 11:'.. ,_, 
presentation and situation must also serve to complete the 
without explanation within the systems of the philosophies. 
I n my W()t .. k I noted the lack of cer-tain 
str-uctures essential t.o the philosophy of language. In 
par-ticular~ the structure explaining how cognitive senses 
were ascribed to given names or rigid designators and their-
referents when included "net.wl:,t-ks (:.f senses'l was not. 
givenn For ~iff4rpnd~ to be possible~ different senses must 
be ascrIbed to a same rigid designator each time it appear-s 
and networks of sense must be constructed 
out of concatenations of sentences~ both these properties 
of sentences will be accounted for through the concepts of 
presentation and situation. It. is important to note~ 
however, that this explanation must obey certain conditions 
for the definitions of diff.rend~ and rigid 
designators in the philosophy of language to be consistent. 
Firstly~ the possible senses that can fit a given rigid 
designatot- ml..Jst. not. be det.e t- rn i ned; secondly ... the 
concatenations ascribing sense to a designator must be 
1 '.].~ 
- : -' 
the heterogeneity 
that there can be no just judgement of a 
('j l' f ft.:. t- I:~"- ,-j 
.::. __ ._._-::: .. ......::::.!J-=-• 
In h:l~s rigid designators, 
Lyotard defines a t1~_-t_~wr_.'I~I!. rJf t-l'Ml'd ~-~l'---t t =,' ' . ..It:: =- ,::11' 1<:\ ...,,:, t- s as a 
and names of relatlons designating a 
corresponding set of 
1 clt tel'· s,::!t. is a world (Lyotard calls the former a 
Networks of quasi-deictics made up of names of 
t.hat. is: 152 a wCII·-Id 
The position of a name in such a network allows it to 
designate an object rigidly and establishes a strong 
correspondence between the name's relation to other names 
and the c,bject.'s posit.ion in a wot-Id of "t.hit-lgS Ii • Hc,wever, 
for the t.he':)t-y of eli ff~t-et.:!ds t.l:;' be sL~ccessfL~l, a name and 
its referent must not be rigidly connected to a given 
it must be possible for many heterogenous senses to 
fit a same name and object. For this reason, 
introduces the structure of a sentence-universe; names are 
connected to a sense when they are situated as instances in 
universe. Th~ connection between the i +.'=:. 
"'Jill 1-.) I:'-_~ ,_.-•• _ ~-.1_-1'_:-::_. ,_::' rl1! ~''''_- t-I"'? rl -,,-• .J.. L~' ,.- ,- ..., - t- - I ,-
.. ~ - -':r = '-'<::: _1':::0'= 1'_' _~:::, sent·ence-
universes can take the name as instance: 
name's referent t.akes a st. n:w) 9 1 y 
determined posItIon in networks of names and 
relations between names~ yet its sense is weakly 
t.he and 
heterogeneity of the sentence-universes that can 
take it as instance 1~ 
introduces rigid designators in his 
philosophy of lan9Uage~ he leaves the concepts of sentence-
universes and worlds of names largely unexplained. It is 
only once he has defined sentences and their concatenation 
ontologically~ that he returns to the earlier concepts to 
detail the form of their reciprocal functions - where the 
relation between worlds of names and sentence universes is 
the lynch-pin of the strong connection between objects and 
names and the weak connection between senses and names. 
This relation depends upon the concepts of presentation and 
s i t.t~at. i on II A sentence present§ a universe;o and a 
concatenation of sentences situates instances taken from 
worlds of narnes~ 
A sentence presents at least one universe. No 
matter what r~gimes it must follow~ the sentence 
1:::: i 
;::, .\-. h .~- j.- .~:, j ~ 
._. ...::.-.. --==--=:..---:....:.:!. 
t.hat. 
"'·:·_:·f··-- . :;:, 1 -;'11" I 1. 1 1._ C\ t. 1 () n :_ t.h~l.t. which does the signifying and 
that to which the signification IS destined: a 
1 ... ln i vet-se:o beca,-~se t.he 
referent~ addresser~ addressee~ and sense can be 
equivocal 154 
A situation is the putting into relation of the 
instances from within the universe presented by a 
sentence through the sent.ences 
concatenating with it 1~ 
If an occurring sentence does always present the 
instances of referent~ sense~ addresser and addressee, and 
if those instances can be related through their situation 
according to the sentences concatenating with the original 
then Lyotard can claim to have explained the 
difference between the rigid association of name and 
referent~ and the weak or changeable association of a sense 
wi t.h a t··larne. the requisite analysis of the 
relation of occurring sentences and presented instances is 
will argue, in the latter 
stages of this chapter~ 
analYSis without invalidating either his philosophy of 
language or his ontology in their roles defining the 
di fferend 156. 
1 ::::2 
I not.ed:. IV:. that Lyotard's ontological 
inc Ius i on 0 f nCI.mes def i ned cl~~ rigid designators in 
~.-= .• '_::' t-I i·.· .. 1::'_ t-II-_ P_ ~_ . .:. ,j ,=-_J·f 1· t-I'-_-' ,j ::. r-. I 'I·· j.- t - t- r" 1· ,- - j t l 
_. '-••• -=:' -~ • II '= _.I:::! II • P:::! I. 0 C C t-lt- t- en c e s ; _. (·1 e t- e ~4J 8. =:. an 
inconsistency between the syntactic and ontological form of 
·:=;ent.ent. i d.l i t.y, d.nd t.his flclw rendered the ontological 
grounding of the philosophy of language invcll id~ at. lea=:.t. 
In pe'.I···t. This inconsistency of syntax 
appears when the presentation of the syntactic instances of 
,=.ense 8.nd reference is associated 
with the presentation bl·-ol ... I·~ht. forth with an ontological 
sentence-occurrence and the situation related through the 
concatenation of occurrlng sentences. Lyotard does not 
sentence erp~pnt~ its instances~ neither does 
he acco1 ... lnt. fOI'- situation through the subsequent 
fu 1·- t.hl:2 t- t.'·""Jo=:.e 
of: sentences and concatenation 
they are not developed In cl theoretical study of 
and situation as necessat-y f'-.Inct. ions of 
and concatenation. The omission of this study 
of criticisms on the subject of the 
demon=:.t.I·- (~t. i ()n of t.he undetermined nature of t.he link 
and The most serIOUS of these 
ct- i tic i ~·:.·ms cll·-e bringing attention to the possible 
contradictions that if sentences do not in fact 
sense and a referent as separate I nst.ances. Fot-
such an eventuality would contradict one of t.he po i nt.s t.hat. 
.... -
'-"'-} f I'·' om ·~·.I···, i'::' ,'::' h i J ,-,.= .-, c. L .•.. 
••• , .- • M_ • _ .......... _" .- •• 1 ~/ 
i.~he the(_~t-\.r' i,_~'r~ I-tO ,- t J . . 
- ~ e~en~aGIOn and situation: the definition of 
From the definition of a sentence as that which occ,-u"s 
i ndl..,lb it,;:..!:. 1 y :. and from the consequent tautology: there is 
something therefore there is a sentence, it does not follow 
forth with a sentence, 
comprises the instances of a sense and referent independent 
,_',f' c,.nt-_"', :"_'.1'-,,-_, t, I"',.::a,., I'" " I '1-_, 1,'.-,1-"'.'1'·, tl .... -_. - t- -., 1- j +1-·' t tl- L. t' ~ 
.-. ., \::1, '::1_' ,=,_ 0' 'Id... _' 'Ie pt"esE:n'I_,c~ _,1 on I:' j 
conjunction of a sense and ref~rent in one entity, and that 
therefore any presentation is already a situation of the 
Instances of sense and referent. If this is possible~ then 
the rigid designator corresponding to the sense 
referent cannot be taken as empty oT sense because i t, rm..l'~-;t, 
make possible the relation of sense and referent situated 
is already a situation where instances are 
related to one anotheru rhlS case does not imply that the 
is 1'- igid, t,hat. 
relation can still be altered through new sent,ences 
concatenating with the first situation. The case does, 
hl::IWE:vet .. , imply that different situations are not absolutely 
heterogenous, they correct and modifY each other through 
the name associated to the various senses and referent. 
This name cannot therefore be a rigid designator empty of 
sense because, each time it is used in a new situation, it. 
carrIes forward a residue of former situations of its sense 
In stating but not demonstrating the bringing forth of 
the instances of addresser~ addressee~ sense and 
In sent.l:2nce ~ L y 0 t. c( t- d d. I low s the 
po'=.·;s i I:::. i 1. i t.y of a contradiction between his theory of rigid 
his theory of presentation 
for alternative accounts of the presentation 
of instances to invalidate his definition of names as rigid 
designators; take, for example, the theory proposed above, 
where the possibility of presentation already depends on a 
s i t.I . ..I\::I.-I:. i c,n of t.he instances of sense and referent. In the 
following sections, I will d.na lyse t.h i s ct-it.icism of 
theory of presentation and situation In order to 
gauge its reperCUSSIons on the other central tenets of his 
of the ontological de fin i t. i on 0 f 
::,ent.ence·=:. c •. nd IS 
necessary, a concatenation IS not". In the analysis it will 
become apparent t.hat. bot.h account.s. of t.he 
presentation of instances given above (Lyotard's and mine) 
are not compatible with those remaining tenets. Prior t.o 
thclt. will give a short section 
definition of genr·-es. To close t.h i s s.ect. i on I 
will i t.s conclusion in of t.he 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































'f .--, '.- t l"t':::' f", ,,/,:::, .. - ·t· I I '.- t- 't' ,...., - f: 
.,' ! .. ' r ._. .... .. _, .. " .. ': t • t a:=, !._, of 
lyotard's own philosophy. 
lyotard's theory of r~gimes and genres is based 1.·lpCII·) 
his theory of presentation and situation. The definition of 
the terms of r~gimes and genre offers, therefore~ a part 
so il.At. 1 on to the problems cl sent.ence ' s 
j, t.s inst·ances. Insofar as a r~gime is a 
precision of the mode of presentation of a sentence, it 
,?;.:p 1. a J.I·",S t.he ot"gan i '5 a '1:. i on of the presented instances; 
cl gent-e is a mode of the situation of those 
instances and thereby~ can serve to clarify the process of 
a problem inherent to the 
precisions brought to the theory of presentation and 
situation through the definitions of r~gimes and genres. 
The latter terms are wholly dependent on the former for the 
justification of their most characteristic properties: t.he 
heterogeneity of r~gimes and the incommensurability of 
Th i s clc::~pendenc:y is all the more i mpl:lt-t.ant. '3 i yen 
that the distinction of r~gimes from genres depends on the 
fore-mentioned properties and on t·he dis t. i nct. i cln 
presentation and situation. In this section, I will analyse 
both the precisions brought to Lyotard's theory by the 
tl?t'·rn~; 0"1 ~~gimes and genres, 
in those terms from the incomplete definition of 
the concept of presentation" 
I will first examIne the relation between r~gimes and 
genres~ and presentation and situation. A sentence r~gime 
( Qt" 157 IS synt.act.ic cat.e901·"Y. 
Lyot.i.~t··d ~ sentences can be c18.ssi fied., followin9 t.heit" 
grammatical form~ into different r~gimes~ 
cor t··e'.5pot'"ld t.C) t.he farn iIi at .. c09n i t. i ve., 
PI'" e~-::~c:t" i pt. i VE!:. 
(and other) sentences. A sentence-occurrence belongs tc) one 
such category independently of the concatenations it may 
precede or follow. The r~gime of a sentence is therefore 
1. i nka:::!d t.o its presentation: each r~gime corresponds to a 
mode of presentation of a sentence., it is impossible to 
translate from one mode into another and this factor 
ensures that r4girnes are heterogenous: 
The heterogeneity of r~9imes of sentences and the 
fact. t.hat. it, i's impossible to submit them to a 
same law (without neutralising them), is an 
incommensurability marking not only the relation 
f· 't·' - ~"~t"ld ol~,_~~t_-.t"I·F,t",ive sentences but also, 0" c09n 1 ".1 V,= '"' '" -
the relations of interrogatives., performatives, 
exclamatives? and others, 158 . . . . 
The heterogeneity of 
belonging to the mode of presentatIon of sentences. A 
sentence from one r~gime cannot be translated into a 
''::. '::-:'.1", t .. ~ ... '. t"1 i-_ ':-_J .$~ t .. f.-.• ll1n (·?I···f 1_-1 .L. •• t"f ''''_~. t- t .--.. - - , ,,- - .L. t... t 1 t· t· 1 
- I:, 1 r ~ 10::::1._0 _ .. .=.I:::! I ... r II:'~ _·t- i:"'-"::3 _ a .. ·1 on m'--Is _. 11'"1\'0 ve 
a communication of the sense presented by a sentence into 
sense presented by a different sentence, t.his 
is 
sense of the former through the sense of the latter. 
However, such situations are multiple and contingent~ so 
there can be no necessary connection between the sel'"lse 
presented by the first sentence and its translation in the 
Sentences obeying different r~gimes cannot be 
t.l"·an~~ 1 clt·ed one anot.her. Let· us just. 
COI'''fS i del'-, arbitrarily, the sense due to the form 
(syntax) of a sentence - thereby ignoring the 
A translation from one language to 
another presupposes that the sense presented by a 
co.n be 
restored by a sentence from the language into 
which the translation is directed. But the sense 
~h~ sentence follows. and on 
.---.::::. __ ._----------_. __ ..... _-------
disl-I-IIH-se in which t.he sent.et-Ice is insert.ed 
_._:.._.:.-.:.=-.. =-_ .. _-........ _-_ ......... _ ............ __ .. -_._._--_. ..--=:...:=-.-~.;...;...;;;--=-------
[ .•. l. A translation presupposes, 
(I will show, below, why the insertion 
d. S i t·I..,·:;\t. i on) • 
The above argument is not a sufficient proof of the 
heterogeneity of It. possible, 91 VE!n 
s i t.Uclt. i on, to translate a sentence from one 
r~gime into another if that situation IS taken into account 
during the translation. It. IS to avoid such a 
possibility that L.yotard adds a 
definition of the r~gime. More than a syntactic category, a 
r~gime also constitutes a situation of the i nst.clnees of a 
;:: ent.l=:!nce; that situation IS unIque to each 
\.- ~9 i me d.nd :' It''l t.his sense, r~gimes are modes of the 
presentation of a sentence: 
Those universes (pt-esent.ed by sent.enc1=:!s) at-e 
constituted by situations of instances <and not 
only t.he t·he 
t·he clddt-,~s~.et- and the addressee) and 
instances. However, the addressee of 
an exc:lamatlve sentence IS not situated according 
of the presentation in t.he same 
190 
~he addressee of a descriptive se~tence 
[ " ~ II] 160 
R~gimes are heterr_,n_'~ __'_'~lr_'l-l-_~ tlr_~~~_I_-1~~_' t-~l~_-\I j t 
- "::t - .... --~ -~ r ~.7 COt- ~-esponl .-0 
different modes of t-I-·-,e 
occurrIng sentences. 
This second definition of a r~gime IS unsatisfactory 
orO, tvJO cOI...lnt.s ~ it. 1S a syntactic prejudice to t-he 
occurrence of sentences defined 
ont.o J. 09 i c<:I.l1 Y :' 
a sentence's presentation of it.s i nst-ance=.· I 
studied it. in the pf'evious section of this chapter). If all 
sentences belong to a r~gime constituting a particular 
instances of a sentence~ t.hen t·his 
property holds true for- any occurr'ence-sentence; t-his 
implies a condition on Lyotard's definition of sentences as 
his ont.olo9ical 
sent-enCE!S IS prejudiced by a syntactic 
property from his philosophy of language. Furthermore, the 
j I.A~-;t- if i Celt. i ()n ':.:I i V~~I-'I t-he t.he 
heterogeneity of r~gimes is taken from the theory of the 
pf'esentation of a sentence's a t.heot-y t-hat-
()f r~gimes IS simply inadequate~ it IS based on undefended 
assertions and on observations of categories taken, without 
t- t- c\ d i t- ion a 1 linguistic theory and then 
ontology and phIlosophy of language. 
i- 1.- - t - ~- .-- .j ,- t- ~ l' t- 1- . I: . .L ' --
'.'\ Ii::: ... /:::!.I:.:.- •• '--' ,.::-.. . !;,1_'1 r.:'.lI'I'::J. Lyotard's grounding 
of language in ontology, his definition 
,
-.. ' f ;':'..- e, ,' .. '" l' r(.1·~_" ,:._-:. rn F··' I,,,,' ,'-.','. ~.-. l' '.~_. '-.-"_ ~.... t',.I·", ,:-_~ t!· t· . L ~ ,-~ ~ r ' - con~raalCJlons 1n~erent in that 
,';. I" '-•. 1 .',1' I=:! c:: t .. :: t.·'·-II-'.'_' I::;' .=-." 1'-- ~_ ..,. ,:I 1'.'.1 .... ,. ,::"._. r-._.', 1.-_11_.1. ':::,.' t ... I.-.1 .L. t_ - I 11- :I - .L. - t- rn 't :I 
... • " I .. ·r I'=! _. 'II I::;! ,_. I::;! 1 -,12'. OCCUt-I" ence 
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Lyotard's definition of genres does not encounter the 
same difficulties as hIS definition of r~gimes; there are 
compat i b lew i t.t,,,, and ont.o 1 09 i ca 1 
definiti()ns of Lyotard's affectual 
with the hegemony of Capital interpreted as the economic 
genre's hegemony over heterogenous r~gimes, his de fin i t. ion 
of the legal diff~ren~ is given in terms of a conflict of 
incommensurable genres, and the ontological occurrence of 
constraints genres put on 
following a sentence-occurrence. :3econd, 
genres ar'e not an irltrinsic semantic property of occurring 
inst.ead, t.he mea.ns by which 
but not necessary concatenations are 
Lj(,,+':,<:I,r·.j fil·-=;t. definl:=!s a ';.:JI~nt-,~ of discoul'-s.e as a fi:-~inq 
of the rules of concatenation in order to determine stakes 
and a final goal for concatenation: 
1~i2 
determine stak~s, 
enforce a single goal I_~~'C_~I~ ,·j.L~·r~T-I_~t-= __ t-lt. t- L . 
., - ~ !~91rn'~s: a 
c;t\"·';I..-Iment.at. i on:. 
I.::t.nd in 
I t l i:.o'} ~e~erogenous means of persuasion ~ 
In t.h is sense:, the rules fixed by a 
strateq_ies of corll_-_?_t ... p-_t-I._~.t_.l·'_'t-I ~t~lj t~-t-- -t-- -• = I ... rl~ ~ ct ~ ctS many genres as 
strategies~. each q_enr~.~_. 1:I~_·.fl·I~lo-.... ~ ~t_.~I .•. =_ '-_It- 1 j t-___ t~ goa anL a se ... ot 
rules for attaining that goal. These rules set down the 
f':II'-m fo\"" appropriate concatenations of 
Th,::!y direct the concatenation according to 
patterns that will lead to the fulfilling of goals and the 
achievement of stakes: 
A genre of discourse fixes the stake to the 
concatenation of sent.ences n 
t.() make 
1 i~I...I9h:o t.() induce t.ea t- S :0 etc ••• Teleology begins 
wit.h nc,t. wi t.h sent.ences. But., if 
sentences are concatenated, then they belong to 
163 (at least) one genre 
The hegemony of capital, 
concerns outlined in chapt.el·-
one of Lyotard's affectual 
I 1:0 t . .:' the 
economic genre where the rules for the concatenation of 
sentences are governed by the universal criterion, or 
; .~.~ 
stake, at performing 2 task II"'! ". tTl i \""', i mi..·lrn 0 f r ... 1 1''',,_,:. '.' ... ; ·L.I·· Ii '''~! 1. ',.' I 
Th,-~s , 
o f 1. net··· e i.~I. :3 i n '~;l st. C) (.~,' 1".:-. ~.','.. ...... ~ .. I. .- " l' i J . . . 
- ,i .... ,,3. j:.':; 1 "t .. 3. • ~1. 1 t.,·-: t. t-i i s 
possible concaten~t_:l·I_-.I·I~I~ I_-.It- . 
-, - ~~ ·:sent·E~no::e a.I·-e 
:i. n f a"lOtH' 1_-1 f +.· .. 1.···11-_-. "-1-,1--,1-" -. +. 1::"- - + l' -1- + ... -t-· . . + + 
.- - i _ C\ _. _ r I cl _. . '_I . I m CI S _. e " 1 C len _. a_. 
Under those conditions [of the economic genre] 
The heterogeneity 
given a universal idiom~ the economic genre, and 
a universal criterion: to gain time. There l l"' ::. 
c\ 1 so l~ 1 ••• ln i vet- SC\ 1. measure, the strongest currency 
L ... ] 1£.4 
the genl'-a IS t-'-~ 1 as ena.b 1 i ng 
conflict maximises the time gained in increasing the flow 
and amount of capital; therein~ Lyotard sees the greatest 
'LI"H- P ":t t '1'". '-. L .. ,p t· . .::;. t" 1-' (' .... :. t-,.-':' l' '1'". Y a 
.. • ... t_ •• -....: r ._... .... -.:t ._ .... _." a genre combining the judgement of 
di ffel"-ends wi t.h 
. __ .. -. "_"- Its own final goal and stakes - the most 
efficient way of resolving ~iff~rpnd~ inequitably. 
in diff~rend~, he also detects the only obstacle to the 
hegemony of Capital or the economic genre: 
Thr~ onl y insurmountable obstacle to face the 
t.he eCc.Wlom i c genre is 
of genres of discourse and r~gimes 
165 
the economic genre 'uncovers t.he d,--,c~ 1. 
na. t,-~ 1'- e 0 f general. The diff~r~nd 
conflict of incommensurable genres and yet~ it is also lost 
or dissipated through its concatenation or 
insofa,'- j t.,dged 
t.o one genre only. Th i =.. d'-~d.l i t. y t" d. i =:·es t.he 
F'1'"'ob 1. em of hOI,.,1 the incommensurability of genres can be~ at 
'~I'''OUI'''ld,~d in t.h':2 /='0 =:. S i b iIi t.y of d i ff~J'-':2nr;ls -
if .. :I J' f' 'f: r:=:. ,." .::;.,-- rj '=:. 
.:::.-=._-= __ -=~_.J .. =._::-~. did not. t.hr::~n gent-es wOl...lld not. be 
i ncommensu,'" cr.b 1':2 cd.t"Se - d i ff~"-ends 




J , an OCCI .. H- t" i nq '.::;'~ntr=:.nr-':'-J 1 s F',-"t. i nt.o F' 1 a"'y-.iJ:::!. 
--------- .,. 
a conflIct of qenres of disrours~n 
-_._-_ .. __ ._-----------_._-----.. --_ .. _------_._---
Thclt. ,-onf 1 i ,-to 
i=:. d. d i ff':-'I·"r:::.nd. ( 01'-
--.----. 
t· 1·- r=. ,-,.~ l_ ~ t- ,=: 
-=:: __ L-__ ::._.:~_=_ . .:.:'. II The multiplicity of stakes 
accompanYIng the multiplicity of 
cor'lcat.enat. ion ]. ,= . -' a "v i ct.or y" ovel'- all 
The d i =:. c a 1'- d,~ d concat§!nat. ion=:. t-emaln 
neglected potentialities~ forgotten~ repressed. 
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The problem highlighted above will become viciously 
incommensurability of t.he fact t.hat. 
proper to one genre is not 
t.ha.t:· of t.he C., t ... L~le (.~ ,..._-.1\:. 1',... L j j ~ 
- r __ :.7, nQ·'~' 9t"ounl e( 12! s:.ewhet~e t.han In t.he 
,:1 i f of.:!:· (." ~·t~I .. -I'= 
..::..-:.. ... --=---=---.. -:. .. :=!. ... in 
Lyot.a(·-d seeks ·t.· •• C.I --_.-. (_-. 1 ·V'=._' t· l • I I t L 
- J01S pro~ em J~rough an appeal 
the heterogeneIty of r~gimes~ I "Jill ignore this attempt 
given t.he criticisms r have made of the concept. of a r~gime 
in this section. Instead, I will move on to the next 
section of this chapter and enquire as to whet.her t.he 
ground to the concepts of presentation and 
situation can justify t.he incommensurability of genres and 
hence~ the occurrence of .. j l' 'F f: J. I'~ -·t- -'-= .:..-__ ._--=--~ __ Jl~ .• 
Ontology. presentation and situation 
Although Lyotard treats r~gimes and genres as closely 
related entities - r~gimes are included in genres and the 
heterogeneity of r4gimes is given as a condition of the 
incommensurability of genres - I am justified in ignoring 
the role played by r4gimes in the definition of genres 
bec:al~'.::·;~::: belt.I·", concepts depend more fundamental 
distinction between presentation and 
s i t.' ... JC'::'l t. i ()n. In this sectlon~ I will study the connection 
between all the above concepts and I will note how the 
dist.inction between presentation and situation depends on 
"'1 •... .- ," t t"", 1,-,1- . 1'-' -'J'~ ,- .L •. I ... 1 •• <:.1 1 •• 0\ i _. _. ._. A 1 ' ... ::', L .:" I ... ! ... j 1 .. .1 :./ 
incommensurability of 
genres to that rule. The importance of ontology over and 
linguistic~ semantic concept of a r~gime In the 
In Pt- inciple, ~:=:vet"y ~3ent.~3nce IS the stake of a 
which r~qime the sentence belonqs to. . _ .... ______ .. ___ .......... _.-tK.-_ ...... ___ .. ___ . _______ .. __ ... ______ .. _______ ..... _.~ ...... __ .. _. ___ ... That . 
concatenate with this 
sentence? The question i t.sel f issues from the 
II ~=~epc\ t .. ;:, t. i n'~ II t.hE: sent·ence i t.s 
because Ereiqnis 
-------...--
in the same way as the 
c:Jf Et-e i ':n-I is. _____ .a;..;..... __ •• as fat- as 
is forgotten; genres of discourse 
are the modes of the forgetting of the void or of 
t.hey fill in the gaps separating 
sentences. E-v - t- t- L_ -'1 I.., 1-' l' t 1'''' t-_. L-. 1::._ V 1_-1 l' I::J to' .-I;::l t-_. 1_-1 ro, en s - '= 1 _.r 11 __ "'::0 . I ... .j r I - r 
UP the possibility of ends proper t.el gent-es" If 
t.he roannE:t- of concatenation was necessary 
('filled), then there would not be a number of 
possIble modes. no gap woUld leave room for that 
t.o not·e how ~ l't-' t.l", ..... _- ;:.tll-_'Vt=a_ "'1'- t - btL • .. r _, '.., "~I.,,I ".t: ~ I:' .r", 
directed away from any consideration and 
st.udy 
sentences. The importance of ontology is underlined through 
Ly,:,t.at-d I '= 
-, I.AS€! ()f t.he t.elrrn E,"'eiqnis .. 
---... _--.. _---- . 
first. n':.t.ed in !:-~. 
91 ff§u:.:-..§n~. i ,''', <::1. lot"l9 not.e ':In A,," ist.ot.Ie:- D,=t" t- ida and 
Heideggerian ontology; the occurrence of sentences is more 
linguistic or syntactic property, it is similar to 
the occurrence of Being as it is given in Heidegger's use 
of the term Ereigni~. Note, though, that Lyotard's appeal 
to a Heideggerian term is of little or no importance to the 
argument of his book - although it might be of importance 
pl .... t·sl-le a St.lAdy of Heidegger's ontology 168 Inst.,=ad, the 
purpose of the term Ereiqni~ is to mark a 
.-_._- ....:: •• .;...:..:::-=. 
ret.ut"n t.o t.he 
ontology particular to Lyotard's theory of the occurrence 
of sentences. This theory is relevant, here, dl".fe t.,:. t.he 
fl.fndarnenta I law governing occurrence and concatenation: 
i s neC~2ssay, 
law will ensure the contingency of the genres governing the 
conca t. E.!'· ... a t. ions an of 
of of 
they fill in th~ qap~ c~F,,~r~tl-~ln 
- ._ -. _. ..J .- ... \.."--" _' I ::t sent-ences" . 
Lyotard must account for the application of the law of 
concatenation to his theory of genres for his use of the 
law to remain valid outside the treatment of the simple 
occurrence of sentences (given in chapter IV). To do this~ 
it is not sufficient to state that genres give stakes and 
goals to the concatenation of sentences. He must- also 
explain how those limits can be ascribed to concatenation 
despite the contingency of the following of one sentence by 
another. In other words: How can the law of concatenation 
still hClld~ if '::tenr-es can "fill in the gaps separating 
The answer to the question lies In the 
distinction between presentation and situation, where the 
possibility of genres is divorced from the occurrence of 
sentences; a genre will become a property of the situation 
of sentences~ whereas occurrence will be given in terms of 
their presentation. It is because a situation is contingent 
to the presentation of a sentence that a genre will be a 
yet possible aspect of the occurrence and 
concatenation of sentences. 
In the earlier sections of this chapter, I have 
described presentation as the bringing forth 
instances of addresser~ sense and referent 
through the occurrence of a sentence. When a sentence 
is a presentation of those Instances In the 
the possible situations that can 
to one another. In t.his sense~ 
po s sib iii t. y :' of 
c. l' t_·.I .• F~\ t. ion ~. L 'y 0 t. <::1. r' ,j (_-: 1 ;:.\ ]'. 1"\'·1 "-_-", T_'\'-I ;::. '1-_. ;:'. t"1 '_' ; .- l' t· I I .L. l' j j 
- - - ~ - v ~ JJ2G on , epen, s 
the prior bringing forth, or presentation~ of instances in 
a unIverse. Thereafter. a situation 1~ defined as 
of t.hl2 presentation of a sentence, of the 
instances brought forth by that presentation, 
concatenation with another sentence. It is at this stage. 
where the situation of instances IS accomplished through a 
that genres are in+.:. t- oduced . 
Genres are modes of the situation of Instances. No sentence 
instances it brings forth~ t.h i s c<:t.n on I y 
take place as that initial sentence is itself taken as an 
sentence, only then does a genre 
situate the initial instances~ and that genre is the one 
governing the concatenation of the two sentences: 
presentation can only be determined 
according to genre if the sentence is situated In 
another sentence~ that IS: as a 
presented presentation. This is ~"\Ihy '=,enn~s of 
there are such ~hings, can only 
be presented as genres of situation 169 
TI"" i :~; 
c':lncdt.~~ni:;.t i on:::=- II, t.h i s II ca 11 i n,;::"!'1 is in no WCI.·y· det.el·-m i nant .. 
in Lyot.2ll·-d I s an abso 1 ,-~t.e 
Ijl·~t ... l·t-II-._t.·.L·I-"_'t"i t.I~._~t.·.w=_=_t-1 t_·.~.-I~_"·-· -t-- 't- t . t t- , 
- - ~ ~~ ,- 1-' I~~sen"t·ct ~·l.:'n 't"C'U';:WI ~- -ot~"t-h by a 
concatenation of the initial sentence with a consequent 
sentence that takes the initial sentence as one of its 
no necessary relation 
between a presentation and a presented presentation, or 
of that presentation, and furthermore, any 
occurrence can take the initial sentence for inst.ance --
there is an infinite number of contingent situations of any 
PI'-esel---It-at- ion. This 1=:- a formulation of t-he IctW of 
of a a sentence can be included in 
concatenation governed by any genre because concatenation 
lS necessary, yet a particular concatenation is not. No 
genre necessarily governs the concatenation of a particular 
sentence, because the presentation brought forth by that 
sentence can be situated by a sentence belonging to any 
'3ent"-e. the distinction between presentation and 
situation allows g.;:!nt"es t.o be within 
Lyotard's ontology. What remains to be shown is why genres 
'::;'. to, :~:~ d j f t-= ,f.:. j'" ,=. t"· ,-t ,= ,-,,.- '-1 I •. -
.:..":.--:.--... ..:_:.-~ ...... :::: .... .! ..... -=_·.7:.·. ~. ~ '._ •.•.• I 
incommensurability and, more importantly, why there can be 
necessar·'.! relati~_~~1 t-.I~.~,,·.t.· .. I·.J~''''.~._·t-1 - -- t I 
, ., ct ~~n~ence s presentation and 
a subs~quent situation of that presentation. 
The incommensurability of ~,,'.~_~t",t"P_-~ 1'- - --t"--' f ~ - ~ ct ~u .~~~uence 0 
the contingent nature of concatenation all ied t.o t.he 
',,,:.1 ~:'I'''I t- f::~ 's 1'- E~ ',,:;:t. ]'. r" (:_.\· .. ,·t.· .. ;',,', t". l' ,""."1'-, '-_I f: ,,,. - , .. t - " j . ttl 
... ,...., .':',~:!·I ,,·I:=:tll=es cl'=COt- .. 1n,::! ,,·0 S ,,·at::~:2S and 
goals. A genre situates the presentation brought forth by a 
sentence when the sentence following it is determined by 
t.he 9 1=?t"Ir·"eu Thus, when the contingency of concatenation 1S 
restrlcted according to the rules of a given genre. then 
the sentences following that concatenation belong to the 
From one occurring sentence many different genres 
conca t.ena t. ion clccot"d i n9 to t.he i t- own 
particular stakes and goals~ which genre does in fact form 
the concatenation is contingent and, although some genres 
are more probable than others due to the r~gime of the 
sentence~ no genre is necessarily called for by the initial 
occurrence. Therein lies the incommensurability of genres: 
there is no rule to determine the relation of one genre to 
another because the belonging of a sentence to a genre is 
contingent and therefore~ the connection between genres is 
also contingent. Irrespective of the stakes and goals that 
make up a genre~ anyone genre is incommensurate to any 
·::.t.het" :0 because the rule determining t.he concatenation of 
sentences ordered according to the one to the sent.ences 
is necessarily contingent. 
contingency of concatenation 1 ,..· =. fundamental than 
the stakes and goals of genres: 
It:. 1· ,... • ::J enough to pay attention to this: there can 
1
0 
•• ' t··1 .J .. y t,._-::· '-_I t··1 L_o _ .,. ,- "". !." t - t" -. - II - t t . II Ivl ~ ;:: .. <;;.. 1.-1:: I'_I:::! !::\ •• ' a "·1 roe • ~:"oany ____ E'o?~) t.!.1 e. 
P o_s_s_i_t_1 _1 ~ ..:~n t- p S )-.!I:::;.'..::;:'-~:..;t:::..&. 7:.-.-_"..:'2::.!a~,=-!-!.h 
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[jVly ~"2!rnphC:1 sis :I 
Each t. i m'2 CI. "'_-.'_=' 1·"1 to. '='_.1·-1'_- =_ 1· '=. '-'-I t-I'- - t - t- - t - j J.. I" - '"' ~ _ _ _ _CI. ".!:: ICI. _.I::!'I_•• II::! '::tent",:2 1 S 
contingent~ there is no relation between its actualisation 
and the non-actualisation of other genres - other than the 
necessity of the concatenation of one sentence at a time. 
The actualised and the non-actualised genres are therefore 
I n t.~··II== concatenation of sentences ruled over by 
incommensurable genres the legal definition of a diff.rend 
and its definition in the philosophy of language are 
btO Ol.19ht. t·he t.he 
concatenation of one sentence onto another~ 
presented by the is ill e';d. t. i rna t.e 1 y 
restricted by the situation of the instances belonging to 
in the presentation of the second sentence, 
t'h ' 
.' ere lS a diff~rend between the actualised situation and 
;:d J. 
pr~sented universe. 
involved in a dispute. 
fhe passage from one definition to the other is effectuated 
in dispute argue according to 
those genres are incommensurable because of the 
... l' 'f:'f PI'" '=-1'" (j ':" !:::!_--_"'::::'_'-=-_'!"-::_'::" bt-Ol...lght. a b01..-1 t. 
contingency of concatenation. Thereby~ the legal diff~rend 
the i t .. common 11'"1 law of concatenation: 
when a sent.enl=e I:)CCI.-I r s , 
C()t"tcc\t.enate .. 1· .= .~ 
how to concatenate is cont. i ngent .• 
[un"l. Genres of discourse determine stakes~ they 
a 
at-·31..~ment.at i 01"'1:0 nB.I·- t- B. t. ion in 
j t.Jd i 1= i al are heterogenous means of 
persuasion. From this~ it does not follow that 
fH_i~ft:'?_[€!r.!..9,,§, bl::!t.w~~en sent.ences at-e 121 iminat.ed. Ft-.:.rn 
each sentence a different genre of discourse can 
inscribe the sentence towards a different goal. 
f r' 0 rn t. hi:=! 1 e \! t=:' 1 n of •... ¢:. ,= j I:::' 0::: +. - .' 1·-, '-, 1 - ' .. -. . _..c -. ,-. . •. 
. ______ ••••....• _ •..•••..•••• _ ••...•.•..• ::: •. ___ ::. ___ !._ . .::: .. "L)D .. :-=.-=!. __ •• ::::.:d ___ .~_...!::=.: .. _:=..Y"~! J:_._~:~.L __ ..':.~~:~.:J:;".· 
Thl? illustrate the first 
part of my main theSIS. The various defi~itions of the 
depend upon each other; the legal on the 
definition from the philosophy of language~ 
on the ontology of the occurrence and concatenation of 
this point is brought to bear, 
on of gent-eS as 
incommensurable as it relates to both the legal definition 
a,t'ld t.h'=: d,? fin i t. i ()I'"I in t.h'= ph i losophy of 1 al'"l';lI.-Ia';le. FI.~I·-t.h,=t-, 
the chapter demonstrates~ through the study of the concepts 
of presentation and situation~ that the incommensurability 
of genres depends on an ontological distinction: the 
bringing forth of an occurrence as distinguished from its 
in a network of sense (and sent.ences) u In t.he 
final section of this chapter, I will complete this first 
part of my main thesis with a demonstration of how the 
ft-lt"ldc.'\ITI'?I'-lt.cll ontology given at the basis of the distinction 
proves to be inconsistent with the legal philosophy and the 
philosophy of language. This will answer the question left 
unanswered above~ Why can there be no necessary relation 
bet.ween a presentation and a 
subseql...Ient. 
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· . }. m c:!. '~~l "1 I"'! c~ r' V 0 j""' c:· J. :.0.·· •.. 1-._. "-0" I···· •• 'J', 1.'-_ ,.OJ' ~ o. 'j" o. -,. ,... I' - .... j' , I . _&ct.w~~~ ~~~~ 02cqueS 
I! Ti''',:ls is ~::.t. i 11 
+ t-.,::.:a 
_'I I ._. of presence~ Derrida would 
sayl'. The two arguments given by Lyotard are: an argument 
diachronic nature of time and the synchronic 
nature of occurrence~ and an affectual argument turning on 
Stolb 1 i me generated by occurrence. 
These two arguments can be summed up respectively 
L.y.;:.ta..I"·d I S .::lese t .. i pt. j, on of occurrence brought a
--
;:, 
the presentation of a sentence; only the second expression 
will serve to refute Derrida's accusations concerning a 
metaphYS1CS of presence. This ], s bE~ca,-~se t·he t.et-m i.!._Y._iE1 
' ... IS~::! of t.he r·lot.ion o'F t.he "9iven" in plac:e of pt-esent.at.i':ln~ 
status of occurrence in time. Lyotard notes that both Kant 
and Aristotle can be interpreted as still depending upon 
falling into metaphysical time. 
For this reason~ he introduces the term Arrive-t-il? gIven 
-,- .L Lo ..... ." ,0' ,-.L l' o. ,.. o· f t,I::.-~. ]'. t-,.-.=- ::':'\'''I,j ,'-IL-'t-,-be l' t-I'=-'_ ,_- ::.11 ed f 0 t- by t.he C\ =, ' .. ' rio:::: -._, _. I:-.:!;:, I... ' •• " I ,_, -, ... , . ., ... , 
feeling that nothing could occur: 
t.he sent.ence as as what. 
at"r' i ve=·, is not. a question of time, but a 
question of being/non-being. This lat.te .... q .. "esti,=,n 
The F'1""r:,blem t.o in t.h i ':5 chapt.e t- IS, 
ther'efot-e: L.~.."ot.Ct.t-d IS 
complementary to his in 
presentatlon~ or, are the two terms inconsistent? I will 
begin to answer this question through a consideration of 
the distinction between presentation and situation as it is 
is") I 
L.y()t:.ar·.j fit-st. int.t-od,-~ces t.he D_L_ a whel'-e h'~ 
attacks Kant for confusing presentation with situation and 
for putting the former under the aegis of the latter~ this 
repression of presentation 
1· '= ·t· t-_-=- . I f8.VOI ... lt'" of +A-/I~ wb_~'!-::. t.het- e is (II ce '=I'-~ IiI Y a II ). The 
demotion of presentation IS explained~ 
the ter'ms of the study Lyotard uses to interpret 
Kant's faculties - I have shown aspects of this study in 
(:tnd IV. His point is: in Kantian D a t- st. ell '-~ n q 
-- ---.---
(presentation), the separate faculties of presentation and 
situation are brought together in ct where 
presentation must necessarily fall under situation because 
d i sput.i:t t ion J ,_ . . :=. form of situation; t.hat i ::. ~ p t- esent.ed 
instances are situated according to the legal dispute: 
bl .. ·,t is lnstead a situation. This repression of 
( ',5 i t.ua t. i (:1/'-' ) [the FI'-ench 
carries the meaning of a legal complaint] is 
encouraged by the doctrine of 
faculties and~ once all IS taken into account, by 
.:. f t.he II s,-~b j I:::Ct. II • 
in Kantian Darstellung] 
.----.... --.... --.-~. a I"'~::: not. ~::vent.s 
but are writs of summons. The question of the 
the types of sensibility, IS quickly forgotten 
1· .... ::;., 173 
Th,-~s , Ka.nt. t.he ~-5d.me d i st. i nct. ion bet.ween 
presentation and situation as Lyotard and, thereby~ he 
faces up to the question of the ther p i~, but only to be 
subsequently driven to reject the distinction and to fall 
into metaphysical i 11 us i on: II TI· ... e rilr:::t.aphys i ca I ill us ion is 
to treat a presentation as if it is a situation. Philosophy 
of the subject lends itself to this illusion'l. According to 
Lyotat-d:, Kant. is I E:d into error by his dependence on the 
in Kantian critique is the site where the faculties enter 
dispute and therefore, where all presentations 
.-::: ~ ·t· I '-', ·t· cO::"j 1-'" .I.. I. .. -.' ._, .' _..~ c-·· 
._:.J. ••• · •• ·!c .... ~_'. &-.Jy ~'i It-IT. "-J' '=7i-';III'1.-":' I.,,--,!.'-
... _ ...... . _.Ir- .. ' ... ··._:s ! .. . 
11_ .,' ·j-!···II! ....... j •. I" _ .. /.- ' 
'-;:I •. '. ~ 1- 1:1. I . II:~'" I::::! 1-- ("Ii:;;' i) ..... to. ,:;;, -c:: ,:::. "-1 -/- :::, t i ,-, to. j- I ! -j.. 
. - ..- .!- .- ._,/ _.. '_' ....... ..'._ _. I _I _'1 ' •• ' only a situation: 
The Idea of a given (of an immediate given) 
way of greeting and censuring the idea of 
presentation. A presentation does not present a 
universe to somebody, but is: the occurrence of 
(ungraspable) presence of that universe. A 
is given to a subject who receives it and 
wit.h <::liven is t.o ..111..--... ________ • 
I: My ernphc~ s i ~; :I 
Lyotard's philosophy of language enables him to avoid 
Kant's dependence on the subject where faculties wage their 
Instead of faculties, sentence r4gimes and 
genres of discourse come together in concatenation, and 
occurring sentences are not given to a subject but arrive, 
concatenation. The II t.hetOO e i ::.11 0'-- i 1 Y a is the mark of the 
presentation brought forth when a sentence occurs, and 
situation is the putting into relation of what is brought 
forth when another sentence concatenates with the sentence-
It- L - -jl·ff.L,ooPI--j . I _~.~_~__ I::!. - ':'Jl._:1 presentation does 
mediation through a subject; in effect~ the subject becomes 
a situation of the instances brought forth with a sentence-
occurrence and IS, ·t.· .. t .. ,' '::'.,". "". J-_-' '''I~: 1-,'.' ',." 1-.-,' •• " I"',' '-_', .... ! ,'_'" ~",''''c:r '-.-,.' .!,- ... I" - I~' ~ • t· 1 r l ct '! .. ::! .-.:.. =. ... e r'l ~. 1 Ct . .;. 
of presentation itself: 
The universe presented by a sentence IS not 
presented to something 
lon'3 as t.he 
is t.he case. A IIs,-~bject.1I is si t.uated in 
a universe presented by a 175 
1'1- • . I r 11 S l. ~':,. W '''1 1::: r e the ontological there is. or 
---------_. 
i 1 y a.:. is 
introduced to the concepts of presentation and situation. 
The presentation brought forth with a sentence-occurrence 
is t.he t.j·"I":' t" ~I l' '= ...::... .. _-= __ =--____ ~. II Further concatenations taking 
2tt"l t.he 
l·nl~t.~I-:\t"II-_.t-_d'.~ t.lt-I-_I· .. 't'_~.~I~' 'fl-lt-t'~1 t·y +~- t~-t-- l.'-- • _ , -Ir .~ _ _·r .1. "·r I).::! . -'= __ -2 .• So, in order to 
t.he di stinct.i.:.n of 
and si t.t~at.ion, Lyot.at"d I'nust. an 
ontological basis to the distinction between the th~r~ l~ 
1S, 1· .- • ::r. t. i me :' t.he endless processIon of 
Lyotard must demonstrate that ontological occurrence -
the sentence-occurrence cannot. be an 
instant in time, or an instance in concatenation, and st.i 11 
be itself, the same occurrence. In this demonstration the 
division between the there is and the Is there? is made 
211 
f· . , . . .. 1 ;.- :;::. ·t. " L 'y',-, t·. te, 1'- d '= +. ! I d 'J.; ... ,-. .;.. i'-,I--' ·rr. _. '1 1 
. . . - .... -. _. -.: .• ' -" - --: ."':.' '.,- i._ ct J. of ·!-.I·-,,,, t. l -,.""....... l' <:: -, ._. . __ f_-=_,-= ___ ,::. 
but. t.j·"1 i ~~ cll.::' F' tOO 0 ;-_-1. '-_.'j.-, j-. '=-,_. ~"_-; -=:: l ' t . I . 
- - ~lm JO a me~ap~yslcal 
1',:'. ,-_', t··, ,-_'. l-,-_' !::. 'to ~. C.'I···, .-, 'f: '1- J' f",.::!· I 11- J' ._.t.. l . + + I 
- .. J - '-. ..' • "= ~ ••. , .'_.fl r",E: !·-eJe.c _,':s; -,·-ie.t-efot-e:o he t.ut-ns t.,:, 
an C..II ... ,t.O 1 09 i CCt.l In 
r.Jt-Ijl-'_-t- t_,r_, !~·vr_.'l·,j ~_·\t-I·,~J j j ~ - ~ ~epen, ence upon metaphysical time and 
must ground the distinction 
b'::lt.we~:=n Pt- e.!sE~ntr:'.t. i c,n ctnd .... _-.1· t_.I_';:.+ ... 1· '-._' tOO, t L L . I L f 
.- .. In ... ~e P~l osop~y 0 
distinction is developed when Lyotard discusses Aristotle's 
,·-esolut.lon of t.ht::~ Pi:tt"'ado~< of t.he "n,:.w" 9iven in t.ime and as 
the origin of the measure of time. I will not:o here, give a 
detailed account of his interpretation of time in Aristotle 
because this would involve an analysis far removed from my 
I will take Lyotard's conclusion to his interpretation and 
demonstrate first, its relevance to time as concatenation 
::"~I'-II-I ,-J'-- .... , 't· t" ,::.t'll- - - '=. t.t- I~-:' too ... '""' ,..I " ___ ~ __ '= cl_ .:..!..!_  __ _ how its limitations 
lead Lyotard Into his ontological notion of the Is th,::.re~ 
(At-too i v,:.-!-t.- i 1'-;:0) • 
In the conclusion to his interpretation of Aristotle's 
- ... ·L'jy -'f ,L 1' rn - L\ .. - ... ···t-j :It--W''' '-slit :._ ,jt':.l 'j,::._fl· .... 1·+_.i,:'n elf t.he ;;;. \.' "'. I_I '_. II~ :. .'y I_I ~"c, I ,_ <:I .-::. _'.~ ,-, _.'-, , 
"now l • ur P I'· ,:sen"t. moment. in t.irne. For At-ist.ot.le:o if t.ime is 
to be constituted of a sequence of instants before and 
after one another:o then there must be an origin from which 
we can determine which instants are past and which instants 
'J r" 
o!. ::.:. 
":. j '-.. 
...:.....::...~ 
w j"', 1 I.: I'-j F·' i::, S r_. ,.-::_'.I···,lj .",. '_l·L_. '_J ,L- ~_-:, ,-_- '_""'. t-, L'-I'._-· -I - .;.. - .' . I .'. ~ ~ • ,-,:=,_.':::!j-mlt-leG 1n 
time~ then each time we refer 
given to the measure of time 
know whether that origin is 
1· ,... :=r an 1 r·I''=:. t.c~nt. 
~t_.,-_, ~ .... I~!·~_· I~"'-_'W -_- t--~ _._! . ~ '-, It::::",} t.) i 1..~ 1 !"', 
and t.h,~ Pt-ob 1 em 1 '=" 
-I " we 
an inst;_~.t-It_. l't-, +l'I'll-~ If .+ 
-' 1::!:' 1 ... IS~ 
i::tnd hence t.he any 
it is not, then each now determines a different 
measure of time ~nd no now IS the same as any other. There 
is a paradox in thinking time as a succession of past and 
instants because the origin from which past and 
futur are to be measured must belong to the succession - if 
is to be one time or Time - but~ there IS no WctY of 
determining whether that origin, is 
instant and, therefore, whether it determines 
is It. IS t.he 
solution of this paradox that is of particular interest to 
At··isi:.ot.le escapes ~..,hat. Ly,:,t.ctt-d calls C1. "e.§t.t-acht-onisrn" 
by defining the now as~ on the one hand, the same now (the 
as a different or rather, as an 
t. J' ro,::. l' i'. ,-',r,-,' t·· '= 
..':...!.. .. --=----.-:: ......... :: ..... "::.= ... -::!--.=- • The now given as the measure of past and 
futur to which one IS always the same now: an 
ins t.an t. in t. i me; "now" 9iven as Pt··I=:.;ent.~ as what. is II nc,w" ~ 
is always different and does not belong in time. The key 
d i st. i nct. i on,. is bet.ween refet-ence i t1 t.irne and 
t . .i. m.::~) , i~ allows Aristotle to note a slip, o r- f ;:1. 1 1 :. of 
'-•. '. t·· 1'. ':-.-.1 'J;. I"·, .::. J. to'. )'. fli ,=,_., I·.·.·.' to '-•. '1 'f' II t··I'·. '.1 1" if ;::_t '=. . t 
- ~ -- presence InJO vulgar 
i t"lt.o t..h1: now cl =:. 1 !""IS t. ::'.I···,t.. .. Wl-,':'_.t-, t_.L .. ,,::-_~ ~- - .. .. ~ - r 1 .IUW as occurrence, now ~ 
is referred to, it to i t.se 1 f b,-~t. 
ident.ical t.o any it. 
therefore, impossible 
t"1~t.(:;t.in it.s individualit.y 9!_4Ci IJCCl.At-t-ence. This 1 ast. Pt-e1pel·-t.y 
will be exploIted by Lyotard to demonstrate the distinction 
to, taken as an instance by a sentence other than the one 
t.·hE!n it. is no t.e. 
itself occurrence falls into concatenation in t.he same 
t.irne. This 
of Lvotard's work into Aristotle 1s study of time 
apparent in the following quotes: 
occurrence. as occurrence. I 
. __ .. __ . __ .. _ .. -.... _----... _ .. _.--_._ .... _--_ ... _------_._. 
as a 
sentence-occurrence. [ ••• l. There is t.het-e is, a 
~ + I Qt~ ~c n_I_-.~I_'t-t-et-l~e, as what... which in sen ence ~a~L 1 Q_ _  _ 
truth is not the now but now. However, as soon as 
that occurrence is taken within the universe of 
anot.het" sentence et6 log6) referring to it as to 
an ent.it.y (t.o e i ria i ) , 
.- --
then now becornes the now 
and can no longer be taken as what, as was the 
'"'' h I::!!,"! i. t. 
un;:). \j () :i. d i:i. [) 1 e ;,:;. l·/-. ,::-, toO ;=, ·r.; n n 1-' f Ij l' -:\ I- l - t- .- j'- v 
_.--. __ .... _.-. __ ._ ....... -_ .... _ ..... __ ._.:. __ -:._~--:....:!:-..::: __ . __ .. _ :=:.--_._ . .::._ .... !":'_~.~_.~.:..J~_ and ·t.~.ke=. 1::·0 
a regimen of sentences In 
At-ist.Clt.l,: disconne,-t-.s t·.hr:::. dia,-ht-I-,nic '-'E'r:::.t .. -=-t-I-t-~·-t ________________ .__ - .. - _____ ::._ =-_____ -=--~.::d...~E:....:::. 
• •. - 'r'" - ... . ,.. '1 . L E ___ c:!~ _____ t...tL _____ Jk-l. __ !:::!.!:..!.~_y.?:_C§..t~s ____ 0 T_~.ent.§!nces f toO om t.he ____4 _____ ... ____ ...... _· __
<t.he sent.ence -. 
occurrence). The 
( Cl. f t. e t" ) , when it. is ant. i c i pat.eel 
Ot- when it. IS II rna i nt.a i ned II (t.he now) 
177 
[My ~=rnphas i'~] 
Lyotard to ground the distinction elsewhere than In his 
Thet-eby, the difference between 
presentation and situation, the root of the possibility of 
(jl'ff'~--=-'j- t-t· ---
- ._t ~-r.!!....a. II::! ..l,o.Jt::!I:::!\·1 sentences, diff~rpnds between genres and 
legal diff~rends, is guaranteed from outside the arbitrary 
- -----_. 
defini t.ions of r~gimes and genres. Thet-e 1- ,= -':0 t.hough, a 
problem inherent to this inscription: Aristotle's argument 
depends upon a metaphysical distinction and cannot provide 
the ontologically necessary foundation to occurrence sought 
and required by Lyotard (because of the ontological nature 
. , .-
..:.:.:. 1. ._{ 
•",',1 'f' l..." '.;L '_=:" -I - jO' • 't" r', r 1._1 I::.~ 1 I···l 1. .. :. "1 C:q--l ~'::, (_",I "I' '-,-_'. :,C __ ·,.I,·'·j t .. ·. '-_'':', r,'. -I' 1'.='. L_-=.: '-.-:' _. j' j.. + ' 
• - r _ cl,nl COI'''jCa·,_.E!t-I<:'. _·101"'", ':0; e '::: 
d'''l i~~ r-~' t,12 to I V) u h.l 0 Ir ,) " 13, S t_·, r.' "I,I".·~ 1_-1 t- l' ':-0,_. _1 ','-1 r,'-_-,', 1." ~-', '-_,I' ~,,' .' j 'l t ' 
- ~ " OU~SlLe VU.gar Jlme -
measured diachronic 1S 9iven 
presence In Aristotlels work, and only then does 1'+_, t- 11 
'a :t 
altered, into vulgar as L.yot.at-d i ~~ well 
the dist.,irl(_-t_,l'I_~I~1 tl~_t_,w._~P_(~1 t-lr,..)W ~~ F - j t· , 
-,- '1'-,=S I2nce an, A-Ie n':'w 11'1 
time is a metaphysical distinction, 
by 
.Ja.cques [:Iet"('" ida t,hr2 essay !ICtus i a 
et 1:';1'- a,mm.t~" 178, II Th is is =;t, i II c~ met,aphysical IIreadin·~1f sJ...Ib-
ordInate to the hegemony of presence, Derrida would say 
7:3) If • Lyotard accepts this point and 
recognises the same problem in his own text: 
t,hey [sentences in concatenations] II ha.ve 
II nc,w II • 
P 1"·I~sent.a t. ion, howevet- ;. is that. a sent.en'=e 
clnd as what .. , clnd t.hen;. t.he 
sent.ence is not. In t.irne .. "VU19ctt- 1I t.ime is wit.hin 
the universe presented by the sentence. 
~.~~~: .~.~: I'-~,~, i'-. __ j-2_!!, ___ ~~t_L:!_._ CI LL __ t. h~r.§Lt§.. __ QtJJL_.Y_I..~ 1 o;@.r. __ t.:.trne..2.. 
is IIvulgarli t,:.oo 179 .. 
- . 
[My emphasis] 
l -t Ly ;--t-j t-l't~:J- ~Il'm~~_lf l'(~ aq_reement with Jacques r1US:, 0 .'c.o:t ,_ .'::. r _ , 
Derrida over the metaphysical nature of the privileging of 
presel'''lce befot-e .. VI_~ 19at- t. i rne" in At-istotle. This is 
.; .C 
J. I sentence is present~ then it. i:~ 
time of the concatenation 
sentence and belonqs to 
1'_-1-_11··,1_-' ;"_"' -1-•• '::'._', t .. ,··.·: ..' t .. ·. l' 1_-1 t-, '~:'. .. / .. 11 __ 1 '- " ~ , ... t .- .. t + j t 
"' , - '.j ;:,~,· •. J..::::_.I::::tl_· c.·::tn S_.~I.nl- ot.t.:·side sent.ences CI.nd 
L.yot.r.tl"·.j ml..lst. dist.ance his 
defi n:i t. i 01'"1 0 f t.he tl'-,el::'!= j,.s ft-om At- i. st.ot.112 IS def i nit. i on of 
the now~ 
... -.... --_. "'J iII his d i st. i nct. i cln bet.ween 
presentation and situation stand up to Derridean scrutiny _ 
the distinction must not depend on metaphysical presence. 
The t·. I""I=-· 1'- I::' 'L' ':: 1-_1 f 
:--....:::..-=--.--:.-.:::!. . not. 
. L. L.. -. y- - J' ,-. '!:::.!Jl:]_~:="_ ... ..:..:?. 
as presence stands to vulgar t. i rnl~. R2~t.hI21·-? 
fOust. I ,.. t .- .,=, 1'- -, .':. 
._.-=!... ___ .:~."L~-: .... ~ , t·hE! accompanying the 
occurrence of sentences in concatenation, t.hat. +':.he 
advent of the sentence instead of its presence 180 
fot- thl~ (II v a) 
--_._...&. __ .. - in the 
Lyotat-d flit.IS t. 
retain the Aristotelian notion of the necessary difference 
between occurrence and reference to occurrence and also~ 
p!"eset"ve t.he bet.weet-, a 
presentation of its lnstances and the occurrence of the 
I '= t l-II=-' t- .:; •. :;. '-_I t-..... .:::::.. __ -·r_:::.--=-:.... t. he ..:...t-...:;P::..---=l:..,:S::;.. • The 
satisfaction of these two conditions will ens,-" t- e t.ha t. t.he 
distinction between presentation and situation 
in Lyotardls ontology. If there is a necessary distinction 
.-.' i _ . .'
"_ .L ... 
d i 'E, t i (""'let i. or, In t.he br' i nq in'~ 
::...; ' . ..Ib:3e'::-.jI ... !I?::!n t. s i t.uat. i on:, t.hen t·he 
t_lrol_'I~I'_-1 tn Ijl'T-f~~- j t t 
- ~ -' ... __ !:!J __ 1:::!t,-l'- S Ie _·"'Jeen sent·ences wi 1 1 
have been established. The situation of the 
by a sentence through concatenation with a 
'.~et"lt_.~_·t-Ir._p._ "'1'11 tl-_~. t-------t-:l t· t 
_ ~ r- It::!'_t::!:;,:;,o]. y con _·1 n';3en' . and yet., 
any t.o t.he At-tOO i ve-t.·- i 1'-:;' .. 
- ...!--
including silence~ 1S a concatenation with the occurring 
sel·"Ii:.ence .. - II C:o t"lC a t.en<;'.t. i on is nece''ssc{t .. y:o a concatenation is 
The ~~.hI2rl: is t.cl.kes place and 15 an occurrence 
( E tOO e i -=In i '.::,) " • ___ -.0.. __ it. pt-esent.s nothing and to 
it does not present itself, it. is not. 
it. is not presence. A presentation 
ini:.o S/:I·-It.ences as 
181 
Simply: one never knows what Erpignis is. A 
sentence in which idiom? in which r~gime? Tort is 
182 ti 
j:.hat. is, 
Evet"J t.he 1 e9a 1 ( \I t.o t- t. " ) depends upon the 
ont.ological dis t. i nct. 1. on bet.ween and the 
situation of occurrence in concatenation. Here, t.he full 
<:.. "1 ). 
presentations of the diff~rend 
... ---_._ ... _ .... _--
( 1 I=:' ,-':::' 1 .- .{:: to' - '-' + I I -. -I 
. J. - :t .. -~ :a d 1 ,=, __ " _-to. _ :a In ·3 . 
philosophy of language) have been shown to depend upon an 
d i ::::··1-.. ·1· ,'-1'-._+_.1· '·_-11"·,. I W l' 11 t-,'-_IW --1- - W L + I + t 1 
:, . IU (·,ow _·,--ICI. _. on ,:·0 O'3Y 
~_·.r_'t-lt ... lr~.·c.ll·.(.-.·.t.· .. ,.=.:, t_·I~I~._'. t.· .. ~I~_~'_-.·II~l·=._-._ l·.t_·. 1· j t j 
,., r r- ~ - • S SI ... lppose, .C' -:;It- CIt.WI' • 
The first and most important function of Lyotard1s 
ontology based on t.he J So __ ._"tl"'E;;..r§{? 1 s t.o rna i nt.a i n t.he 
distinction between the presentation brought forth by a 
1 at.er· 'L. t· s]. ·1~·U2t _·1 ons of that presentation. 
in t.:.h,~ 1 i 9ht of t.he d i Sot. i nct. i on , wholl Y 
r:.::ont.j.t"1'3ent. nat.I.,H'·';:! of t.he concat~~nat.ion of sent.ences is 
established and thereafter .. the heterr_lq._~_-t-IP_l·t_.y r_lt- t-~-'l'rn--I:::! ':;I "e:, :' 
incommensurability of genres and t.Y·le 
For this function of the 
ontology to be fulfilled, the distinction between the 
situation. This IS not the case. Presentation and situation 
occurrence of sentences, cannot serve as a representation 
of presentation as it. is defined in his philosophy of 
First, I will demonstrate this difference between 
ctdvent. and sentent. i a 1 Thet-I, 
following Derrida~ I will show how presentation is in fact 
sections of this chapter, I out. 1 ined 
Lyotard1s definition of presentation as the bringing forth 
of the four instances: 
referent, in the occurrence of a sentence and within the 
'-WI i ve ,.- se t.he sent.ence. t·his 
assoclat·ed wi t.h t.he 
ontological definition of sent.ences t.ha t. wh i I=~-' 
and with the representation of that occurrence in the 
i~ important not to confuse the presentation brought forth 
in the sentence and a presentation pres~nte~ within its 
universe because such a presented presentation would be a 
. t t . ;.; 1 .:., .... c:\ '.1. 01--, :: 
The presentation brought forth by a case-sentence 
[a sentence-occurrence] is not presented within 
the universe presented by the sentence (it can 7 
b~ marked in the sentence~ fot- examp 1 e 
t ·.y" t· L_,.::. .... ::. l' '= ) • " ..:::.!:-.• _I _ .0-1 183 
I have already criticised Lvotard1s presupposition 
that a sentence-occurrence brings forth, or can bring forth 
the sepat-at.e i nst.at1Ces, it-,sofat- as sl.tch a 
I::' 1-" !.=.:'. '.=.:. ' .. .'II~I ,r.::.1 ,-.'.1 ' •. -;, ]'. -1'_'. ]'. ,._'.', 'I'-'! ... ,- •.• "' I .. ...., ._\ • - t··,': i::"..! _, • ..1 1_.1 l:."". ~~!:-:::. the 
inf.l_"'_·ct_.l·t-I~.·_ ~_-.'.Jt-,r' ... ~I-_~_.l·'-_ ~ 
.- .... , -,' cons , •. \- ·=1 i nt.:=:. 
'.·1 n d r.::b'!:! t .. I-n ]'. to,. ~-.-• ' ".'.'j - I" .l... - 1 ..... ] 
'-.' •• 1 ... 1_' c. (-, 1 ,- ,::, '-11-'.-' '1'- 1'- .-:;. t-II- .=-~ ,= L, I,;:;, t- ~, 
_. _. ...... _ _. __ of __ _ _ •• _' ... .  '_ -:::.:' I am 
a step further in my criticism and show how t.he 
sentence-occurrence, by the expression I~. 
t ... "', p-::!.. . _r .... _ --: .., .... )'. t·, ::. ,j I-{ l' t. l' 1-_1 t-. t - t L t 
r - ~ JU ~~er~ IS -, cannot Ie described as 
1..·ln i Vet-5e Clt- as a Pt-e5en·t.at. i on of 
i ns'/:.anr::-:es. 
move I h.av~~ des.:: 1'- i bed from presentation. tht-oU9''-, the 
ontological definition of sentences and the expression of 
the tt.et·~§: __ j s:' t. Ct t. h E! q 1..·1 ~:! .. ~.:. t. i 1:1 n ~ 
In: 
everythin9 that arrives [OCCI...II·-S]:: .1..2. si9ni fies: 
However~ there arrives 
is not that which arrives, a s 9~--:!!:lIj i s not. :3.~j-.9. 
(01'- , 
and even less: 
to the meaning (the content) 
I:)f oC:CUt .. t"encl?-. Designating and not designating 
occurrence because, it., t.he .is 
situates occurrence meaning) and 
Aristotle notice). Rather? is would b~: Is there? 
.-.. --, .; 
.:~.~. 1. 
Thus, t. i-I ~-_.... ,00'" t"1 t.,_o., 1,_-,·-.= l' '-_.;;l 1 .,' .-. +' l' I . t . t- t L t 
- r - -I _ '._,= , '-11 "·1 on 0 _·r-Ie ·=.·en _.ence as 
representing occurrence prior to concatenation (and time). 
This i rnp I i cat.es the distinction bet.ween 
presentation and situation and reveals the importance of 
Aristotle's study of the fall i nt.c, t. i rne t.o 
d i ~~t:. i net. ions. The 1· '= • oJ • t.his 
association of the Is th~re? 1· '= • oJ • 
tl"-r- 1''-":::!..!..':_~ ____ o __ ;:!. :0 That. 1 '=" 
-' u wit.h 
presentation does not hold. The definition of presentation 
in the terminology of the philosophy of language already 
constitutes an answer 
it is already a concatenation of the initial 
occurrence, that is~ a situation. 
This difference between the Is th~re? and presentation 
1· ,0. =- encountered first where presentation is discussed in the 
context of occurrence defined as the question of being and 
non-being. Lyotard himself notes the difficulties involved 
in naming the occurrence 
i 111..~sol·-Y!' i Ilt~sionist., in indicatirl'3 
1, t. "" T C) cle~-sc: t" 1 be t. he que s t. i ':'t"I a s an ex is t.ent. and... i rl 
part.iculat-, clS a "Pt··eset-lt.at.ic1t1" is to t-educe it to one side 
.... I·~.·--:I 
.L- -l..."":_ 
of the dichotomy- to beinq as opposed to non-being, t.o 
presence in time or in concatenation as opposed to advent: 
whc'.t. 
1 '=.: not. question· of time, but. a 
question of being/non-being. This 1 at. t . .=:~ 1'- q 1 •• ·1 e -=:. t. ion 
is cd.lled 1 ~'. pos'::'; i b I e t.hc.. t. 
Silence, not given as a 
but as a non-sentence, 
non -·v . lha t. a 
---.--. 
1 ,-:=.. 
feel in'~ is t.he 
som,~t.h i n'~ 
forqotten in the orcurr~nr~ of 
_._ .... __ ..... "' .. _--_ ..... --_ .. _----_._-------,-=--=-
~or~.pc\ r' i ~:'-'n t.o 
So when Lyotard distances his work 
an>~ iet.y 
t.hd.n not.h i ng. 
t.hat. s~nt.€!nce 
binds it. in 
,j.=:!pendence upon met.aphys i cs of pt-esence, when he 
int.o t.he he bt-e.aks ·the assoc i at. i on of 
presentation with ontological occurrence. 
t.he fot-t.h t.ht- o,-~gh 
PI·-e-=:.entc\ t. i on and wi t.hir·1 can b,~ s i t.uat.ed by 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































dOI~Jn d i f'F ~...:. I'" ,::;. t", (::I' t· i- ~; .1-:. __ . __ '_....:-..: ____ ::-.: ___ .. __ . .." r I ~l ! ... l'~ t" ,:=. .-. 
fr'om s()-ca.lled 1 it. i qat. ions. 
In the above quote t.he 
c\ if fet-el·"ld. 
-----_ .. -.. -----
i t.s t.he diff~rend:t t.he 
incommensurability of genres, law of concatenation, 
presentation and situation, are associated with ontological 
in t-esi st.cl.nce t.he 
against the economic genre, t.hat. is=, 
agaInst a single approach to occurrence. 
connection between, on the one hand, 
on the other hand, 
situation~ genres, concatenation and 1 irlk 
is effect.l_-Io.ted t.he 1 i ngu i st. i c concept. 
Pt"esen'l::.clt.l on: is the expression of the 
t.hen t.he 
connection between presentation and situation must be 
yet necessary, because whenever the 
is put into time, into concatenation, then it is no longer 
identical to itself and its individuality is lost. The flaw 
-, .-'.1.:: 
.. :. .. L·_.f 
in Lyotard's argument is that h1S 1 in I.: r. ..... !.- .,:..-::: '-"1·-,·1- -; l l' .-' L" I. II r _ ._~r:: .. I ' •• ·i_i. _. t ... !! I, 1 ,-, ._. 
concatenation of ontological 
::.l I:J \/ ~-':I.I·-I·(-_. .. F' t .. ~-_.' .. =~ ~_'. ""1'(-... :".'1. '(-_. l' '.::-.11'·', 'f l' ',.', "'_~' --.".', .~. I·· c. I -- t 1- - t· .-, + t 
•• • - 1. -- r '". 10;;:; .-2...--::..J.."::::....:..fL:. ]. n s y n ,,' c\ c ,,' 1 C §!".!.!..=! 
semantic frameworks through its definition as the bringing 
in the form of the universe of a 
sentence (the semantic framework issues from the specific 
that must be brought fot-t.h:- t.hat is, t.he 
referents of the rigid designators belonging to t.he 
The presentation and situation distinction at the 
i:c.n ont.o 1 0';;;1 i ca I but· inst.ead" it issues from the 
privileo;:lin9 of individual sentences over concatenation. To 
demonstrate that this privilege is a metaphysical prejudice 
in favour of the sentence as presence is beyond the scope 
of this thesis. I will, however, develop a short study of 
Jacques Derrida's alternative analysis of language:-
demonstrates how present linguistic entities depend on 
their former and future situations for their realisation. 
This will show how presentation can be studied as a form of 
by the future. I will start the study of Derrida's book 
Lyotard's work in Le diff4rpnd. 
imp 1 i c i;:t t. ion s Cr f t.he 
relation of occurrence and time. Unlike La 
t.he OCCut-t·oence and 
concatenation of sentences; instead, Derrida considers the 
cause of Lvotard's opposition of presentation and situation 
by developing a set of connected tropes wherein time and 
play the major role 
pal'o <:td()}-: :L ca I It. 
what the tropes have in common:, 
1° ,.. =-
in defining what is 
that allows Derrida to 
allude allegorically to the key relation of time and 
prE~C i SE~ I y, t.o of 
ontological distinction between presentation and situation~ 
is given through the advent and concatenation of 
sentences (1 have shown~ above, that this distinction is in 
fact metaphysical 
source of the distinction through allegorical studies of 
relevant tropes. This means that where Lyotard seeks to 
and concatoet")ato i on, implies, 
allegorically~ a different conclusion to the paradox of the 
relation of occurrence and language. The difference between 
t.he thE!Ot-y of cli ff$tOO!§ln':;t§. and {:Ieyor ida's conclt-lsil::tn 1 ies, 
in the opposition of the metaphysical ground to 
in =:::,ch i bbo 1 et.h D 
----_._-_._--_. 
--; .-\ --; 
.;:.~.~ i 
At first sight., it would appear t.hen, that. Lyot.ard and 
Derrida's works have little in common: Where lies the link 
between an allegorical study and the philosophical search 
fourldatl'r_lt-I~~.) It-I f--t t~e t·· 
_ c\,1._ •• , _·r I conn~:=!c _·1 on 15 in 
the t.opic shared by ~~ diff~rend and Srhibbolet.h: t.he 
source of intractable conflir._t_. b~_,t_.w~_~Qt-1 p~-~m-t1'- r t· 
.... I,;:t';:! a _. L ... ~at- _·185. I 
will demonstrat.e t.his link t.hrough a list of the aspect.s 
Lyotard and Derrida share in their studies of the topic: 
around the question of occurrence and language leads 
to a new angle on the question of the transcendental 
schematism 1~. This consequence is the same as t.he one 
considered by Lyotard in his work on Kant's concept of 
present.at. i on (Vat-st.€! 11 unq) , 
-_._.--_ ..... ---_ ..... 
as it operates in the 
t.t- ans.::endent.<:..l schematism of the First Criti9u~ (I 
have outlined Lyotard's st.udy eat-l ier in t.his 
chapt.et-) D 
2) The fundamental paradox raised by Derrida concerns the 
a measut-e of time and therefore, in t.ime lSS. This 
paradox rejoins Lyotard's work on Aristotle, where the 
opposition of occurrence and reference to occurrence 
--, .'-,,-, 
..::.:...z.:.:.:=, 
::".' 'f'" "r"': '-,'.' , •... (·.·.1· '.=-." -. I" ... -t-: ,I;: L' I " 
... _" ct f ! ;::!. 1 r,::!;:: ·I~. 3. "'v': t=.:;! fn I:~ (::t «2 J.. for the study of the 
,'., ,-,"', ~ (" /,,, '''. t- '-,;::, ,. I'" -j .... '" .. - .. , " - L. • • 
.•. _ ..... " I;;;: ,I ..... " ~:! 'I. ', •. ,-,'I·j' .... C!t~I"·,a·I".lon of s'~nt.ence,= .• 
in t.ime:- 1)~_t"t-l·'::I~_. F'-'I't"t- - t ::I ~ '_I _ I ,,' =- 1._''--1 ,,' ani investigates the 
relation conjoining that paradox and the problems of 
,J·udq .. eITI~_~nt ~t-II::I lr_~c,.I~.lJ.~t.~.· l't"v-l j . tL t' -~... ...., - .7 I '-' vei 1 n fie q'-.jI~S _·1 ':jn ,:If 
is and what IS outlaw. Vet" t .. ida 
follows a natt~._·rrl ~]'I~l'l-t" t- L t d l ::I' 
I'" - :::. • II d. "'_' YCI ,,·cOtt" s '::It"OUt"'I' 11· ... 9 of 
PI'" esent.a t. i CIt"! of in t.he 
ontological study of the occurrence and concatenation 
-"f ,. .. -'t" t - r - - ,- 189 '\' - t - I"" t Lt· I,,, :.'::. 1 .. ,I::! 1'_1:.-::. • '1'_' _·e ~ c\ :.e, ~ _'''-'(:t _. 1 n this rnat.t.l~t- t.het-e 
devant 
judgement (see my comments in chapter III) 
[:Iet-I'- ida makes t·h i s connect, i on oV.2t-t.1 yin Scr-.!i..t.;:!..b,~ 1 El,t.h: 
190 
4) Like Lyotard? Derrida relies on the radical break 7 or 
discontinuity~ between occurrence and language for the 
capacity to discount any sublation of differences in 
t!::!,r 0 '-~.9J::l ____ iE!!J_3E~E· P ~ c\,..:l:...-_ . ...:t:...;. c=-' _---=Ct==--_....;;;d i a 1 ~ 1- t. i cal 
(I will demonstrate, belclw, 
that this is the point where Derrida and Lyotard move 
further apart: in the justification and study of the 
abyss separating occurrence and concatenation). Again, 
of 
5) Lvotard's definition of the holocaust, represented In 
t.he ~ll "':-: ,-I···,w 1· + .. -;r r: __ -::!_·:!...== _____ .... __ -..:.=.. :" is e'::J1 ... la 11 y in 
measures his study of conflict and legality against 
t. h I:=! ya ". d;::, t. i c k of holocaustic annihilation and the 
"d i ffe,···,:=!nd II bet.lrJeen .Jew:s and Gent· i I e=:. 192 
dating, circumcision. poets and poems, and schibboleths 
the same topics Issues as those 
by Lyot.8. I··· d What. l=~ of 
particular interest in the context of this thesis IS that: 
ln studying the topic through analogies, Derrida avoids the 
dE!pendence presence which is, as I I···,ave 
dernon:s t.'··;:1 t.ed, t.h<'O: flc~w In Lyotard's work. I will not. 
investigate the consequences of this difference In approach 
because my sole concern, here, is to show how Lyotard's 
metaphysical tack 1· ,= .-' not· t.he 
of 
occurrence in language. H~~nce:, I wi 11 conclude this short 
t.o pO''::- i t. i on by t.he 
alternatives he offers to Lyotard's metaphysical statement, 
These alter~atives provide 
. . 
j:la~~ 1 =:. '.3 t 1.·1 d ':/ of involved In the legal 
arbitration of conflicts of irreconciliable parties, In the 
'3i:\rn~~ W,:;I.j cl'::; L.'.'lot.Ct.t-d I '_=. 1. ::;'I'J l' '=. t·\- - j--Ilt- It· j-• • ... ,..... - .. ' • II:=! 1_' _. ,Cta _·1 on 01'-
However- , i t~ 1 S i mpot-t.ant. t.() 
t- e\,f'la t- k on the essential difference between the two notions 
of basis and foundation at issue here. Derrida's basis is 
clt"li:llogical ~ not. ent'Cl i 1. any fot-m of 1 0':;.1 i cal 
whereas Lvotard's f o'_~nda t. ion should provide 
ont.o 1 ogi cal nec~:=!':~;S i t.y -. I have shown In this 
chapter, this necessity cannot follow from his work in b~ 
cj l' 'f: f "::'1'- !'=·t" I-I =-_____ ..:.":_.-_. .!..c:..· 
So cIS t.o illustrate the paradox of unique occurrence 
in t. i me Vet- t- ida demonstrates the 
paradoxical nature of tropes corresponding to that more 
fl ... lnd';'.rnent·a 1 st.clt.e. Fot- example~ he takes the trope of the 
unique occurrence, unique by definition, and yet, how every 
commemorates~ to the events it harks back to, and to future 
event.s it. comes to announce" This double definition is 
sl..-Immed UP by Del·-j·- ida t.hl·-oU9h t.he e>~pt-ess i on II E i t.het-, 
where the date can be either one thing, or another, and yet 
it must also be both at the same time: 
IS not an alternative~ 
1 =, not, The 
F' ~'I S=._'I···II-_'l··rll-.·~_· I"',.;:, I ....... • I~_·.I t'·II:·.1 t.. ..- -. '" t ~- -. j l' .- L. L. L ) ,~, ._. .. 1 .... '-.1 • I ,,' I cl,1, ' .•• '!,., onE! ct t"IO·I_.r-I~~ 1'- , t.hev do not. 
even stand side by side. That which is the same in any 
. t . 1 . t F-:'O::~S J. .' 1. 1. ~. Y of 
and constituted there. The 
and t-et.u~-n, of the 
of anniversaries and of preservatIon, the 
reason and its essential 
i t.·:::.:~ al'''e also i t.s 
i n~~an i t.y 19:3 
Derrida turns to a further trope to clarify this dual 
nature of dates, their 1· ,... :. 
linked to what it leaves behind once it becomes past, the 
its occurrence is given through the trope of ash 
;'..,," f: t.· .. .::.._ I'" f)' t-·· 194 L l' I - _. -..- l-
,,,' . ~:! .... r:. I:::! <:I .• -=.0 r I testifying to the presence of fire~ 
language, commemorate the passing of dates 
- the poem is taken as the paradigm of the trace of a date 
i r, E";;:-J~' i bbo 1.~~tJ:t, 8.nd t.he bClok is based C\t-o'_~nd t.he poet.t-y clf 
However, the trace of a date wipes out that 
which was unique in its occurrence and therefore, t.he 
or annIversary of a date is also its 
C.~nnu I ment. 
WOt-cls 
The annulment [the annulment of the return of that 
which cannot return] takes place whenever a date 
!.·_·· .. :_,_·~_~ .. l_··:_,.-.:~. ,),I'''! d !''': () I,~j J. \"', J.'; t. ,=,_., 't'" c:-:' t' -I l' '_i ]'. + .. , \.,1 ":.' j , 
- - - 'l Y i.·~Ji·-!r-::: i'-I ~~ I a 1:.102 
is promised to a loss of 
When it arrives only insofar as it. wipes 
195 
Derrida can offer an allegory to take the place 
of Lyotard's account of the loss of a presentation in its 
is an allegory for IIA presented presentation is always a 
Lyotard deduces 
to concatenate is not'l; Derrida~ on the other hand 7 cannot 
which t.he of t.he 
dat.as and dat.in,;!. W~-Ien t.he 
foundational proposition is only allegorical~ then the laws 
that follow from it are no longer apodictic. However~ 
Derrida's approach is 
dependence upon the metaphysical presence involved in the 
definition of presentation it. is this metaphysical 
definition that contradIcts Lyotard1s claim to ontological 
t ... ecessi t.y in his philosophy of language. 
supp 16:rnent. stl..~dy wi t.h a 
met.aphys i ca 1 in 
allegories, he never has to define that which is as opposed 
to that which occurs ontologically: 
T .;:: 
J.I 
1· ~. '-. i mpo;·-t.a.nt. 
I cliO :. I am 
commemorating that very thing promised t.o 
be forgotten, destined, for a limited time, to become 
et na.me, [n _ • J , 
nom de r.:oe j'" sClnne :: 
--_ ... _--------'_ ... _-_ .. __ ... __ ... 
196 
So, Lyotard!s fall into metaphysics and the consequent 
failure of his ontological grounding of the philosophy of 
.. j I' 'f jO' .:!;. t- ':::'j'''1 ,j ,= -
.:..--.--=---.::: ..... -.. ~-:.";!.. where he trIes to overcome the Aristotelian 
- is not a necessary fall; 
options are open to Lyotard. These do, 




thesis concerning the inconsistent nature of Lyotard's 
dl:-2 fin i t i .:. 1""', s 0 f t. hl~ ~;Ii.f. f I;? t- e nl;!. i n d iff e t- en t. ph i los 0 ph i ca. 1 
I h.7. ... VE! ~.;hOWI·"1 hOI'" t. ""1 e t.he 
d i ff~t-'~nd, 
_ ..-----------... _-.. 
'~i 'v'en as a leqal term and as a term from a 
philosophy of langua~e~ In an ontology IS incompatible with 
the ontological definitions of sentences and concatenation 
in the philosophy (:rf J. clngt·1Ci.ge u Th i·:=; 1 S beccH..Ise t.he key 
d i st. i. net. i (.':It"l 1 n Lvotard's ontology, the distinction between 
presentation and situation, IS not ontological but. IS:. In 
fact, metaphysical. a contradiction 
claims Lyotard makes In his 
pl''',i losophy of "All I':::; a sl?-nt.ence":, 
is not." and 
the metaphysical nature of the distinction that IS supposed 
to ground those claims. This contradiction at the core or 
de f i 1'''1 i t. ion'::; () f t.he ~;Li.tfkJ~.§.!:.-ld given in Lyot.al'-d I s book 
because they too depend on that foundation. In t,he fai lut-e 
of his ontology, Lyotard must also suffer the failure of 
1 1 t t I, -.- - 'f Ij I' _t:..o f .~_./. tOO 1::'-:- to, Ij --'-_', ~.' '2 ':~! d. F' ('" 12 ~,I:;-n _' a _' U I 1 ,_, he cannot prove that 
1 1_:::'. '_:-~I ;"_01, 1 ,-II' .f.' 'f' 6 tOO t=' t- I-I '= , _-_, __ ~__ -..J .. ~_-:!. =- irresolvable conflicts. do 
occur and can occur. 
Chapter VI - The sublime 
Introduction 
In the same way as chapte~ II introduced the concept 
this chapter will show how his work after 
fi t.'::.·. 
philosophy advanced in that book. In order to establish the 
1-:=t. t.e ,.- t ... ~ >~ t.-::; 7' 
I will study the role of the sublime in the book and I will 
the development of that concept. ]. n t.he es·::::;ay·:=; 
The concept of the sublime IS of particular 
In the contextualisation of Lyota~d's philosophical work on 
Ij J. ·f· oj:: ,~ t- .:;"J t- Ij to,,::. (- ... , I "=. ,:.:. 
__ . ..........:::.. ___ =...J . .:-.. - - - c. -< -- .- it bridges the gap between 
extensive study of modern art 19'1 In chapt.el·- I I, I 
drew the parallels joining Lvotardls affectual s t.a t.ement. S 
on the end of speculative reason and his work on the crisis 
These pa~allels were 
1 '~=J 2::; II and f t- om my 
study of t.hat. ~:?!s~·:·ay, I pointed out the essential role 
played by a reflexlon on art and aesthetics on Lyotardls 
m81n ~IJhilosOI~hica.·JI. t_··I~I~.-_~.r_·.llrJ·.~._'.'. __ ~,_ I~: ~i . . "1 
- ~lVen ~~lS prlVl eged position 
in Lvotardls philosoF'hy ... 1·~_.· I tl IS remar~a I e that Le 
does not further its philosophical analysis through a 
(.-_·r_)rnF'C:~lt-l·'.~tr_lt-1 ~JJ·.t ... I~1 rfl,_~,j~_~t-'~I ~ j ~~ t 
-" ~ at'·,_. Cl.n, aesl_'fle ... ics. This omission is 
r-ern,:died wl· ... en t.h.:;~ t-c,I,: c,'f t·he t.heot··y of t.he sl,.~bl ime in Le 
pi f of ~~ t- ~rl';;! i :-:-; ~5een i , ... , t.I'-,e conte ~.: t. ':' f Lyc,t.a t- diS WOt- k on t.he 
~-:.,-~ b 1 i rn ~2 in artIsts such as Barnett Newman. ThroU9h t.he 
~·;l..4b 1. i me:, 
ca ft·et·· it.; the ideas advanced in those texts are given an 
extended philosophical context through their association 
with the philosophy of diff~rends. 
not only give the later works a theoretical background~ the 
development of the concept of the sublime also helps to 
and e~·~plain f I CI.WS and difficulties in t·he 
of the role of the sublime rectifies mistakes In Le 
cli ff,~t··e.I"'ld~ 
.. _-------_ .. 
this chapter will go beyond mere contextua-
lisation and will help to explain some of the issues raised 
in chapters III, IV and V of the thesis. This does not mean 
that any of the criticisms made in those chapters will be 
rather, the study of the sublime introduces 
- It t . V c ·-ll·t l' ·-t ... s t.,_-, t.L-I':::' r·I·-,""I_bl,::._ms encol...lntet-ed and c.."\ _"et"na p.l e ~'-' _~ _. 1 •..1 - r"... r-
solved incorrectly in the philosophy of diff~rends. 
In ~_,.,t- t.· .. l,~ ••. ~_. ~_~I .•. !,~_.,·jl.J·.!·I-,'L.-_~ --to. - t-
,. .- '.-;:.,r::! \/ t:=:':; _,,:-
eXF,lain ho'" +.· .. I~I'_~I~~.-_' r._·!~_'.I~1 t'I~_~ ~'. ~ ~., 
...... - ,·Ol·-rr. 0, J U':J'="2rnent. sens i t. i ve t.o 
,::I -J' 'f"f A t- '::-J ,o"j,j .-:; -,:, .= 
. __ .. =-__ =--_=:_ ... _ ... _-::!. c, ._1 opposed 
the judgement of tribunals. In chapter III, I called t.he 
'fot"rnel'- of t·hf:.=!=,t.~ jt.jd·==IE!rnent.~~ "~Idj' ..... dicc\tion":: in t.he ·:=;.t.lb 1 i me 
1· ,. .. -, a solution to the definition of adjudication as 
able of' 
the reasons why the conflict in question is irresolvable. 
the theory of the sublime can help in tht~ 
explanation of Lyotard's definition of the occurrence of 
sentences, insofar as that occurrence is opposed to their 
situation in concatenation. I tAl i 11 show ~ below, that the 
occurrence of sentences can be justified in terms of the 
feeling of the sublime. Finally~ in Le diff~rpnd, Lyot.at-d 
idea of a pol it.ics sensit.ive t.o ~i . .ff~t"§nds. 
This politics is given ln opposition to the economic genre 
and the basis for such a politics lies in 
Kant's use c,f the sublime feeling of enthusiasm in his work 
200 on history and politics 
It. is important to note that, although the sublime 
the full exposition of the 
theory is not given in that book except in the context of 
Kantian enthusiasm. The role that can be played by the 
sublime in the definition of the 
sublime in t.he definit.ion clf ':)CCl4rt-ence is nelt. 9iven in Le 




chapter with an exposition of 
the aesthetic definition of the sublime as it relates the 
Only after this 8xposition will I considet~ 
Lyotard's work on the Kantian sublime as it relates to the 
politics. Because the main purpose of this chapter 
put. L'2_~;1iff~~t-l~nd :i.n cont.'2~·~t~ and becat~s .. :=! my main t.hesis has 
been put forward 
I will not. formulate an extensIve critique of 
Lyotard's theory of the sublime. It is a theory that reacts 
to the falilngs I hav'2 '-~ncovet-12d in b~ di ff~I·-end and 
it requires a study beyond the scope of this 
thesis. The lack of a definition of the sublime in this 
IS due to the complexity and diversity of 
Lyotard's understanding of the concept; for this reason, a 
complete definition of t.he subl ime will only emerge 
gradually as the chapter develops. 
Occurrence and the subliae 
The possibility of explaining Lyotard's theory on the 
occurrence of sentences in terms of an aesthetics of the 
s .... lb 1 trne, t. t·"1 at. 1 s, in terms of an aesthetics based on a 
feeling or affect accompanying the occurrence of an 
aesthetic object, is revealed i t1 twc, ways. his 
, ........ 1 '-_', '_:::, ,_:::. tOO, '_=-.J. '_=, '=. ,_-, "I~ t. l -, ;::_,'. t. ' . t . t l 
- f_ accoun~ ~o ~ne ~~eory of 
t. h E! '31..-1 b 1 i 1',·,,-.-_., ,j ,-._.· •. ·u ~.:"_'. 'j'. '-_.' F) ~.-_~ .. ,-.j J'. \.-, t· . - .j.. _. tOO j I t j , 
y _. y '-' .... !:\, S s' ~·LI' 1 e':::, t:.n c\ tOO t. and 1 n 
'=,' ·i:.I..Ki j, ,::,,_. c. ,_,-,·r: +-\.-, -. --I 11- ] l' \./. - I • 
- .' ~~! :::, -' .J. I~.::! ;:'.1"'1(:' OCCLI t·· t- enc:e 1 n t.he w,:, too k s CI f 
painters such as Maccheroni 7 Arakawa~ Buren and Newman~ 
Lyotard returns to the philosophy of language proposed in 
t.o illustrate and explain these 
wot-ks. This relation of art criticism and philosophy of 
language has already been alluded to at the beginning of 
I rnent.ion~::d Lyot.ar·d' s, c'-I::·pt-eciclt.ic,n of be 
in terms of Arakawa's paintings 7 
philosophical-autobiographical PE! t-'2-=1 tOO ina t. i ,:,ns: ._-_ .. __ ....... _-------.- ItLe 
a.nd 
1 ingl.Aist.ic (01'-:. bet.t.E!t.. yet.:. II sent.ent i a 1 II ~ II pht- as i c") st.at.I...ls 
t.e, v-lhi:\t. AI···a.kawa. ci:Ellls t.he 'blank"'. 
di ff4t"'=nd .. 
--"-"-'-"'-'-"-' . 
Lyotard uses his philosophy of language and his 
e~<p 1 c\ i n t.he pa i nt. i n9 Hent- i 
Maccheroni. Lyotard argues that, although the first merit 
of Maccheroni's paintings of serles of simple figures in 
simple colors is in its break with an artist's obsession in 
t.h~= r·,::!pt"~"2sent.at. i on pf. sornet.h i n9, -t.ht? i rnpC1t-t. ,:.f Macchet-on i ' s 
figures does not only 1 ie in t.he importance played by 
combinations of figures in the interpretation of his art. 
Because Maccheroni's figures have to be organised into 
~.'.'.~.-;.-_". (.- -.', .•. __ ".'.=: .. " .\.. 1"',.-'1"/ ... i - r'o -. T' \ •• _ l I' . ] 
• 1 -. t.,_ •• : •• : ' •• J '_J \' i 1_.1 _' . ! ct \/ ;;:! -:::. "', a ,t:. :, 1 rn ;::, . E: ;.- ~~ i i:l t. i ':1 f't 
to the artist's sensual 1~~_~C,'t-~.-_~P __ '.~lt.~_·.~_.]·.I-_'I~1 f' ~'. ~ ~, 0 a SUwJect matter 
t.he ·fl·( .. ~.I_.II~'.~_~ ~I~~_- ll·~.·.'~_- t < - ..... ~  sen _.ences ft-om a 1 irili t.ed 
language~ their importance comes from the combinations into 
wh i ch t.hl:?o':'l ca.n t ll?- ]'. n r-__ • ,.._-~ 1'- t, I_::.,j a H 1_-1 W .-_-~ '.; ~_. 1'- -. rl'I-' t- ..,.. fl' t-,Ij -~ rn .:::. t- t - 1 rit - ,- -
- ~ V -, • _ = _< c;, = I _.e' ~ 1_' . '= 
uniqueness of each it. IS this unIqueness that 
allows the figures to be combined in an infinite number of 
with representation is made possible, not ... 
through the multiplicity of but through each 
figure's individuality and through the impossibility of 
any numbet-
cOl'nb i na t. ions: 
Desp i t.e t-l-",e fact that each figure concatenates 
with other prior and posterior figures, according 
fi'~lut"e, bl..·lt.:. 
fot- the formation of series, the 
that each figure is:- not. t.he fit .. Sot. 
201 each time, the only figure 
So, Lyotard's appreciation of Maccheroni's painting 
borrows two aspects from his philosophy of language as it 
It takes the opposition of 
~/ent.E!nc~?s clS individual occurrences and in concatenation~ 
and, more importantly, it exploits the heterogeneity of the 
sentence-occurrence t.he sent.ence s i t."'.la t.ed in 
~rom th~s~ i.~r~_·.!I~~.-_".·I~t_·I·.~.~~.-_~ ~ t' 
-. 01 sen~ences. Lvotard 
suggests that Maccheroni is not intent on illustrating the 
mi . ..!} t. i p 1 i cit. y 0 of linguistIC combinations afforded by a 
plj~5t.rfiode ,.- n, post. '-1"';=1::' t-esl=nt"'.-I_.T ..-l· v,:::_, .- t·· T t I.J+ 
. ct ... , .1 __ ' instead~ that he 
1· ,-. .... :, het.E!I'-ogene i t.y 
lIyoid" 
of sentences at the 
figt.n-e and 
sent.ences and 
basis of such a 
rnt~l t.ipl ici t.y: 
H:L :.. [IYlacchet'-on i 1 s] idea could be that in the 
sentence~ the most common work of language, lies 
the secret sought by painting in its most extreme 
asceticism: to present~ and nothing more. And:-
when he directs his plastic art towards language~ 
he is not aiming at the gossip of the combination 
that cross-multiplies matrices of figures, but at 
the void from which a sentence tears, and thank 
to which it proposes the worlds it presents for 
inst.ant. 202 
Lyotard establishes a 
connection between the occurrence of sentences and the 
Furthermore~ the paradox 
implicit to the advent or occurrence of a sentence is 
repeated in the occurrence of an aesthetic figure: t.hel·-e is 
a void separating the sentence or figure qua occurrence and 
their concatenation in chains of sentences or series of 
f i c.·=!. 1..-1 t" I::! ':!:; .. 1\1 C •. ·I ,.,. 1 •.. \ '1. c .•• ·.. ..... I"~ -I • + . + . ~d" w~~.,ermlne Jhe concatenations to follow 
a sentence-occurrence, and no interpretation can capture 
.L'j" - 11,- - -I" ~ .. ~. II ~. f' I' I . . I I .... I~~ :;JI;::I.~.· I::! ' .. ' 1 • .1' eCf.(: "'1 1 nc ). v 1 c ua.l 
In assimilating sentences 
Lyotard appeals to the concept of presentation as given in 
Le diff~r~nd. The heterogeneity of the presentation brought 
t.hat. 
presentation ensures the uniqueness of each figure: 
However simple a sentence may be, it. must. 
present. It presents one or many universes [ ... l. 
One or many strongly organised microcosms blossom 
out., their Instances perfectly positioned, like 
the parts of a flower or a night sky. Their time-
in one stroke, are immobile, 
van i sh it"!';! 203 
The van i sh in';!, evanescent quality of presentation is 
the sole guarantor of the heterogeneity of occurrence and 
situation of occurrence. I ( i n chapt.et~ V) t.hat. 
Lyotard cannot defend that evanescence and, at. t.he same 
time, retain the definition of presentation as a bringing 
forth of instances. To call occurrence, the Arrivp-t-ll? in 
sent.ence 1:-1'" a Pt-esentati,:-n 1:lf set. 
lnstances, is to reduce it to a situation and thereby, to 
lose its otherness or evanescence. This will a 1 ways be tt-ue 
s8ntences of Le diff~rend~ once the sentence 15 ._ ... _._._-_._-_. __ ._._----- . 
t-ep 1. <::tcE!d b\.·J t.h~:: f i ';-" .. -.11 •• '1"''::: ... ' '.' ·i. '1-•.. f";::"Y I .... L ~ ~ J ".... :,e POSS 1 C' 1 E! ''':-0 e~<p 1 c\ i n 1::·he 
necessary evanescence of occurrence or presentation and 
~~ t. ill t- e t. c\ i r', t.I···,,;:! n ~.-_"'.-. t=-_ •• , '.':::' '"".-•• '. l' t.-... ,,' t I-I ,- - t' - - t - 1- - t . t L 
- 7 o· _ .•• U 1'_0 .-I::!' tct _·12 W 1 .·r-t OCCI..-It- r'ence ~ 
t.he situate presentations. It. is not . 
.... :.I .. 'f:f:J·.,·_-.l· ... ·.··.I·-'t .... 1' •... ,-_ .. ' .-j·-·rn-,t·.-tl--t·- ·t·\-- \ +- 't f 
- ~ -<::! '- ,=, _.' i:t •. t::! .. ··I • .::! ·-,e .·~~t-09enel .. y.:. oCcut-t-encE: 
Lyotard must also demonstrate their 
c:onn~~ct. i on:: ev·:=!r·y concat.enat. i on 1· .--.J a 
concatenation of occurrence; only in this way can he 
introduce heterogeneity to concatenation and 
The uniqueness of individual figures is not justified 
the role of the sublime in the definition of occurrence. 
is in the sublime that Ly.:.tard will define figures 
impossible to capture, to represent in their uniqueness, 
yet, equally impossible to ignore: after the sublime, every 
reaction to a figure and to the feelings 
generated by the figur'e, and yet~ no reaction can be equal 
t.r;:. t.hai:. The c lu~.: in Le diff~rend leading to 
Lyotard's later work on the sublime is in the feeling 
accompanying and prompting the question of occurrence 
" An'· i v,:·- t. - i 1. ? 1\ ;0 '" Is t.1·".et-e? '" , a feeling of anxiety or 
- . t t~- f~ct. t.hat. ~1_~n'Qt.hl·t~~_ arrives rather than 
.::.l4rpt-1Se a· ·r.'=.... _...... .... 
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TI"'1~2 feeling making us t.he fa.ct t.hat. 
t.h,~ a.s wha.t. 
t.irne;. 
i ~-?:. C c\ 1 1. e d f 0 I'" by ct f e,~ lin q : j -1-. j ,= 1::. ,-, ,= ':: i b I.=. t· h d -I-_______________ • _________ .1 _____________ • ____ • __ .l.--_____ -=..--=-___ -=-: ~ __ __L_ ... _I _I .," " .. ':::. 
not gIven a~ a 
sE~nt.enc.;~ as a non-sent.enc~2, a 
non-vJhat .. '=·UI·- -
'---" 
the feeling prompts and 1 ·-=. F't"ompt.ed 
by the occurrence of the presentation brought forth by a 
And, because presentation and sentences are well-
defined:. 
something absolutely undetermined and heterogenous to the 
t.hat. incll ... lde it .• Where occurrence IS 
assOCIated with a sentence, i nt.t-odl..~c i ng 
=/o::~nt.ence as a fact that cannot be ignored and that must be 
----
concatenated becaus.=. it has bpen fplt does not guarantee 
the heterogeneity of fact and concatenation. In work later 
to remedy this flaw by 
through aesthetic 
figures rather than as a property of sentences. 
:245 
Aft . .;::: 1·- L t=o .. -ll··F f: J., 1·- =:. t·· .-, ---:--::------_~~_ .. _.!:=.....!!:.J. ~ Lyotard accounts for· t.he fe~21 in'~ 
of SUt-pV·l se anxiety accompanying occurrence in t·lt-JO 
different yet related 11\1 c~ v.. s. f_·1 t··1 ·r_.I·-I':::'_ '-.. ·'1···1 ~-_~ l-I - I·· j 1- - - ~ ,- - - 1· t 
. r cl· II ~ . 1'= cI. =. . .=, '_"_ c\ _. e =:. 
t.he fee lin·;! with Freud's explanation of Nachtr~qlichkeit . 
. _-------------" 
1,-•. 11···,,;::: r· E! t.I···, f~ reaction to an event or an object far exceeds the 
rational explanations of the relation between the reaction 
8nd i t.s cause n FOI·- in the case of a phobia. 
Lyotard accounts for t. t-I'2 0 v'-_ .... t- - t- t=o_ ::. ,-_ to. 1· ,-_, t-I t, \ .. I ,... t - t 1· t- -. t I· - - t '-, Y'=' _. ct _. I'::, _ .. I i..-I. _. it. 
is the re-enactment of a more original shock: 
first shock to the system, 
wh i ch it. does nc,t. feE: 1 ~ c,.nd t.he II t.oo 1 at.e II of cl 
second shock where something is felt that cannot 
tll2 wi t.hst.ood 205 
lhus, the feeling of anxiety and surprise accompanying 
occurrence would testify as to the original 
and 2@6 (In t.he ot.het-
explains the feeling by uSIng the theory of 
th2 s,-~b I i me on avant-garde art and, 
pa t- t. i cu I a t- ~ on the painting of Barnett Newman. In t.\·-,i s 
t.hesis., I will concentrate on the second of the accounts, 
becal..~se it. is closer to Lyotard's notion of occurrence In 
b~ diff~rend. It 1 ~. howevel·--.:. 
Freud's explanation of Narhtr~qlichkeit allows Lyotard to 
.-. ''"'----------
ground the heterogeneity of occurrence and concatenation In 
feeling~ while t-et.a i n i ng a connect. i on bet.ween t.he 
of 
\""' ~::t.a i n ;:1. ~.]' r" l' 1 - l' I 
_ :::,. it dot- In-=: 
the0ry of the sublime. 
The eSS21.YS II L I i nst.CI.nt.:. Newman II and II LI: s'-4b 1 i me et. 
llavant-garde ll , from the collection L1inhumain, contain the 
major part of Lyotardls assimilation of occurrence and the 
s ..... bl ime .. In those essays, the theory of the sublime IS 
t.aken:. not principally from Kant, 
sublime and the beautiful· 
-_ .. __ ..... _ .. _ ...._ ... _-------_._._._._._---_ .. - , the reason for this choice is 
S:, -to too a t.eg i c : Lyot.at-d r·~2!t.cl i ns Kan-t. I ,- al=co'_~nt. fClt- t.he ;:."j 
(:~:.~p 1 i:ln;~t. i eln ()f t.hl: t-O Ie of s,-~b 1 ime feel inqs in t.ha: 
t-ealm, this role requires a ()t-
modified theory to the one developed around occurrence. 
When Lyotard uses the sublime from Kantls work he is 
its function in the Conflict of facultips 
t- at.I·".et- t.han he does, 
mention Kant in the context of occurrence and the sublime, 
that Kantls notion of 
([:rat-stellunq) 
-.----.. ---~ 
is sub 1 i ffil: if viewed 
(clnd if r:rat-'.;!t.elJut"l'a. is undel·"st.oQd follQwin9 my t-eading here 
I<ant. ~..., i 1 ]. always be ri9ht to the 
det.t-iment.:. of Hegel ll • This strate9ic manipulation of his 
interpretations of t.he sub I i me deroc,nst.rat.es 
Lvotard's mercenary attitude to reading other philosophers, 
insofar as they contribute to 
It is important, therefore, to judge Lyotard 
t j ... , ~ .•• ':'. 1 .. -.. '_-1(' "', ~-•• ':'. t" 1-.-.'.'1"',. 1.'_·' 1-.-..... 1_·." 'f: ,'.-, I' '.-=. ' 
- own argumen~ and not 
according to the merit of his i nt.et-Pt-et.at. i Ot"l=·. In Le 
is secondal'-Y to exploitation 
toward the ends of the book's proJect: to provide a firm 
foundation to the concept of a diff~rpnd ~8 
Lyotard uses Burke in order to associate a specific 
sublime feeling with a particular aesthetic figure, or mode 
of representation~ so that their combination corresponds to 
the question of occurrence, Is there?, and to its relation 
to the heterogeneity of occurrence and concatenation of 
According to Lyotard, the key to Burke's study 
of t.he sub Ii rne i. s :: f i 1'- st. 0 f a 1 1. , that the sublime is a 
feeling, and second, that it IS complex, insofar as it 
mIxes pleasure and pain. These feelings of pleasure and 
combined in the sublime, are further qualified as 
II dE! 1 i ght. II and Ilt.et-t"ot- lI :: deli9ht.:. comes ft-oro t.he suspensil::.n 
of a terror inducing threat, it is the feeling of negative 
pleas!...I!"·e t.hat. c:ornes wit.h t.he t-~~l ief of menace; 
t",~'I~_. f l' f p- 't- (~_·I~'~ f~_~~r r ··.;::~e l.ng ().. · al I .• ..J ""' felt when the subject is 
threatened by the loss or deprivation of something vital. 
After terror, comes delight~ and the combination of the two 
leads to a sublime feeling: 
ml··.~. ].I~.· !·.Jl-t·.-!~, ~_.I~, __ ~~ .. · . ~ l • ,I t·E~ \ .. j'-':' t- [t.he 
terror that comes from deprivation] 1:-0 mak;~ up 
the sublime feeling~ there must also be, tAW i toes 
Bt.w ke:. a S'--ISPEH',~, 1. on f tIt L t 1 o J~e ~~rea~ eading to that 
terroru H~rl~~ t~,~ 
..... --., .... ,- threat must be held back, kept 
dis t.8.n l_-·l-'_-. ··rL-,;'_I.t_. '=.'_./-.:::r-.I-_ .... t-.'= . .-· _. l' r-, t L j . . . I . 
- r ,- -- -c -'-. .fle , IffilnlSr')lng 
of a t.hf·~";!,"::\t. provokes a sort of 
pleasure which IS certainly not positive but is 
instead a relief. This pleasure is still a 
deprivation, but a secondary one: the soul is 
deprived of the threat of loss of light, of 
life. Burke calls this secondary 
dePt- i vat i ()n !;IElJi.,:;!t.!.t clnd d i st. i ngl...J i shes it. frl::.rn 
positive pleasure 209 
The correspondence between the pleasure associated 
wit.h t.he qt.Jest.ion Ills t.hel·-e·?I' tn ~-:.§_.!..jif.fet··'~DI:;!. and Bt.lt-ke's 
definition of the sublime feeling is striking. Lyotard 
describes the former as anxiety or surprise (t.aken in t.he 
strong sense of astonishment) and also describes it as the 
- meaning the fear that 
there may be no more sentences - this corresponds to the 
terror and delight combined in the latter. Although it is 
not made explicit 
or prompting occurrence is a sublime feeling. This last 
remark is made more apparent once the connection between 
the sublime and occurrence is studied in the context of 
encountered In Le diff~rendu 
·..--·----·· __ • .. __ ·_ .. _____ ... __ 00 __ • is seer'-I as 
the moment when an event not a sentence, In t.his 
.- at- t" i ves but. ] ,-• ='"1 not yet situated 
understandings, interpretations and meanings. 
prior to presence i~ represented by the image 
of which 
it has vanished (Note that this 
"1l' f f~ t" .:-~.t- ."' u !::--=.:. __ .. =-..:::-1.!:_. 1~ - it. 
in 'U"JI::: vo j, d 0 f n i .~~ht. II ) • Lyotard classifies this 
occurrence as the paradigm among causes of the sublime: in 
the moment of occurrence there is the terror caused by the 
possibility of non-occurrence and the delight in the fact 
that somethlng has occurred. These two, terror and delight~ 
make up the sublime feeling that accompanies occurrence: 
Sublime is the arrival of something despite the 
and announces that everything has 
a minimal 
is t.hat. lip 1 ace" 210 
is associated with 
because of the terror caused by the possibility of non-
occurrence and because of the delight caused by the 
. f tha~ t.-_-~t-~t- t_.ht-~, .. ,~_l-. t.he arrival of something. suspensIon 0 . ~ ~I _ ~ 1~r 
IS felt~ occurrence is disclosed in 
nature of being there, of arriving or 
and of not arriving or happening 
duality was given through the couple being/non-being. This 
1 1-.. 1 r-, •• ', 't, :::. ,;::. '.::' ..,1-.,"-•. 11'''1 :. c. '·""-1-' 1 t· t- ""'r- - - 1',.. - l' t I .- t - -I 
- .... ,- ... ,- _ ••• _" 0;;;, II._I:::! ;:;,';;:, .'_1c1..,J::I,-I,. t.hat is 
gIven meaning or j. ntet··Pt-et.ed, becau':se t.hen, 
t.hE! P i'I"""" ]' t'l l' ] l' 'J- Y .. f _. :::'.-';' .... .' _.. '_I is II Occu t- t- ence is t,he 
IIf2111s11 CIt· bt~t. 
which, once it is there, takes its place in the network of 
t.hen 
longer be a sublime feeling because,. 
possibility of non-occurrence is I c.st., the feeling of 
terror caused by the threat of a deprivation of being is 
Thl_~s'} indicat.es t.he 
occurrence of something and not its presence; that which 
is not equivalent to that which 
in the moment of sublimity. And therefore, 
the feeling of the sublime raises a question concerning 
being that can never be answet-ed:: II Is t.het-e? II 
question undermining all conceptions of what is and of what, 
It is not a question about the sense or reality 
asking oneself what. it. is:- what it signifies, 
prior to the guid, say - in a 
tha t II i t. a r t- i ves II , q'--lod. 
25i 
And~ In a manner of speaking, arrival 
''''I .. 't=o_,=.t.l· '-_'1'-1'=. ":Jtll-II't 0.,1.. - t l ... _,- . j 
.., of - - - {... __ of _ ..... rld. _. fl!:t=- cl.t-t-I vel n t.he 
question precedes 
question as event~ and only rjl:.es it. 
. t· .-:, 
1..:::.J...:w 
itself wit~1 t_'~lt=o_ t=o_~I~_-t-1t. ~~-t ~-f f ~ 1_. riel.. r u:t S jt~st. 
Occurrence arrives 1n the guise of a 
to arriving in the guise of 
Is it. E'OS!oS i b 1 a=o? a On 1 y II 1 at.et- II is t.he point. 
of the question determined: Does this or that 
is it this or that~ is this or that 
possible";:- 211 u 
In ,=_1 lnhtuna. i t-, ~ the feeling of the sublime undermines 
'=1 i ven mean i ngs , interpretations and understandings 
as once 
wit.h t.he 
1· ,-. :::." felt.~ t.hese ';:I i ven tll21 i efs are 
of t-epresent. i ng 
the cause of the feelinga There is~ therefore~ 
always an aspect of uncertainty in all judgements following 
the experience of a sublime feeling. The sublime undermines 
the belief in speculative reason because it discloses the 
limits of reason when it is faced by occurrence. This in 
that avant-qarde art, defined 
...:-.=:::.:...;...::.---..... _---
by Lyc.t.at-d as 
has the power to question~ 
-. 
qL-lest. ions concetMn i ng t.he spectator's beliefs and 
j l~dgemet1ts: 
1-'1'-'\ I"'l" .- , ...... -. I.. L . 11 . =_.:= .. :::..:~_.·_·._I:::! ~ __ ~_-:, 1."'··1~2 \"J 1 1 ';=. I q"'ldnn~ T~-' - t .- ~ I.. - coo t '- ._ .. __ ... _. ___ ._.__ .. _. __ .. _ .. ____ ... ____ .-=-__:::!._-=_=_~_-_. "_. __ II::! . __::: 9:=' t·  __ ~~ __ .:::..!:. ": 
~:lv~-:~nt.·-·qE~t"·d.:::' j '::, 5+".i 11 r,-, dr=of~- r t·\·· - - -~ t . 
. _ .... _._. ___ . _._ .•• __ !'___ . __ ._:: ... __ .. __ .:..:.~ ______ .. _;~ ___________ :~ .. :::. ______ =._.~- cL-:: ____ -::..:l..'",::! _EX....-= =,'::l Hi£ __ --::.J:...;. ("::..;.'I:...;·-'--=C::...' ·::...f 
mind O\lE::I'- -j-.imr:::. Bnd t·I·-- f·--I·· -f tl.-- 1-1' 
........ _ ...•••. _ ...•. _.""_ ... _ .. __ .. __ ._:.._._._ .. ~7._L __ .. =. ._. _____ .. .!::_I~__ I::!'= 1 t ~ I_I •• ·r II-' SUL..I 1 ffil=- is 
t.I·-I';:! nam.::.:· f ,'iI'- r ~- - r I - d - .. ....... __ .......... ___ ._ .. _______ -=-____ . ::.-. ____ ._. __ -::_...!.SL:-~ __ ._._-.ltJ_I-ll U.S 
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[My empha'5 is] 
The essence of the move from Lp_ j'ff6 j t tL t t '1 '_I'-e'!"J~ ... o _fie _·e~·~·s 
fulfilled by the sublime. Where, in the earlier book, an 
ont.o 1 CI':;:I i ca 1 .:::\C'.C •. I-_,I_'t",·!-_. '-_If' ,-_"-_1-_".·11'- t- ..... _-I.-I·-_~_':o ,.,:.'"".-. -1- '-1' qt- - j t - {"I tOO -, - j -_ 1 ' ""' ' _ 1 • .It.;:! =- _ II:::' .1_1 ::. I_I _~t II. a 
necessary heterogeneity bet.wl=en 21.11 event.s a.nd all 
j ud-:;lemer·,t.s bet.Wt2el"', a sent.E:nce and any clf i t.~;:. 
is necessat·y ~ hc.w t.el 
].:oS cl::lnt. i t-l':;Ient. II '-:0 ]. n t.he 1 at.et- co 11 ect. i on:o t.he 
feeling of the sublime associated with avant-gard~ art 
provides the possibility of undermining or undoing any 
be equal to events or to occurrence. The ground has shifted 
from occurrence to the feeling of the sublime. 
This move from occurrence to the sublime avoids the 
CI'" it. i c isms I made against Lyotard's ontology and the 
metaphysical distinction he drew between presentation and 
si tl..~ation. I noted how Lyotard introduced 
contingency to the concatenation of sentences by exploiting 
- -:' 
1::. \'.'j ,=.:: ~~: \/ <:,. n E: :::':,'::: '.-_-' f_:'. ',"', t-.. '::1' .. ', '_:::'. '1' J'. t. \/ '::' ·t-: - i. I 
. _. -' - (.fCCU I'" r' (::nc~:: c 1- () ..... JE:Vf:?t- ~ 
i:l.ch i ,;~ved the concept of the 
F:·I·-e:-::..;~r·lt.i::\t.ior·1 t.ft-I-_.·II .. ·':_ ... t-,+ .... t-I-.·_I!·-t·I·-, ty - + I t 11f '. d sen~ence anc ~hereby, 
-::'.V ;:·t··I':'_-~"'.-_,· r_-.. f=I_I·-It:. '-'1-';:..11' t~., .. ' - f '- _. _. t 1 "- b = - - ,~~ -~ U ULLu-rence was os~ ecause it was 
in rigid syntactic and semantic properties 
Lyotard's definition of sentences. The 
sublime, on the other hand~ does not fix occurrence; a 
sublime feeling suggests or alludes to the evanescence of 
bl_.rt. i t. doe:.:; not. involve a universal definition 
or description of the nature of occurrence. The sublime is 
a feeling, and does not impose any structures on Its cause, 
t" -21 t. he r' , limitations to the reason of the 
This suggestion of the limits of reason 
when faced by events alludes to the nature of occurrence as 
the universal state of events, 
occurrence in any way. 
Once occurrence is separated from sentences and 
representation, and once it. IS ':1..-.1 Y indicated through the 
fee]. i t"I':;I of t.h':2 s.ub 1 i ml~:=!, t.hen, t.he i ndet·et-rn i nC:~.I=y of 
concatenation can no 
Instead, indeterminacy becomes a condition 
feel in9 avant-qarde art generates a sense of -_. __ .-...... _--_.-
d i SOt- i ent.at. i on;, ':.f scanda 1 and of lack of norms, for 
example. This sublime 
basis t.he necessat-y st.at.ements Lyot.ard I s 
philosophy of language~ 1 .:~ ','-1 J~'.! 'r_o, ;:1. j-' - - '1' l' 1- -, I" - . '\ 
- ~ >.:::1:=: . 1':-:1 .. l,::,'::8·::'·::':·':\ !.- 1 ... Y 
associated wJ·.t_:~! 1 ... llrll_·\'=._t--.~,:._:tl~ 
• v r Of .- _. '=at~=.!::.!s ~I '-~n i vei'-S2~ 11 y 
·f-.= .. ' 1''' ... :, 1··L.. ••. -t-l\, l' L + r 1. I ' • .'!.1 ;;I.PI=' 1 ~::!=, '1.:·0 f:!\/en ~.:=:. incidentalIy~ when some~ 
and not all subjects go through a feeling of terror and 
Thel'-€: 1· ':: •• 1 justification for clc\ssi fying 
particular events, or events in generaI~ as sublime, their 
II ~~J..Ib 1 i rn i t. y II 1 ,-. . . ::: t.he t. i roes II\Ihen 
1·-ICl.PF'ening ~::.E:.!~at-=!. t.o gl~nel"·at.e a sub 1 ime feel in'=,:. s,-~ch a 
generatIon is incidental, it is neither guaranteed to occur 
in all spectators, nor guaranteed to occur at all times. 
This insecure aspect of the sublime is made apparent once 
of avant-qarde art 
-._-----"'-._-
is nc,t.ed: what. is avant.-
')13 
may not be avant-gard~ tomorrow ,-
indicating occurrence demonstrate how the approach of the 
book must be altered; Lyotard cannot prove the necessary 
he can, though, offer an analysis 
or affects allowing the recognition clf 
r;:, -:-. t- t·. l' ,." I 11 .', t- _J]' f f I~ t" I:::' I''', Ij I.-=, I' COo' _ ... _. <:;, !:::!,_. ._~_-=~_._=." This second option falls far short 
earlier chapters of t.he t.hes i s to demonstrate the 
impossibility of j 1...1st. j ud9E:rnent.s tn cases 
it. .j()es howeve \.-;t show t.he impl icat.ions clf 
Lyotard's analysis of occurrence in Le 9.1 ffet-~nd if the 
false distinction of presentation and situation is dropped: 
Lyotard has to take recourse to a study of feelings insofar 
\.- ,"",_-". T ..·. ]'. '-•. "1"',._:::,. J. ,. I ! ._; .. , .- -I' - ,- .i.. • I 
•...• ' ! . ..I·:=,~';!l,j~:!I· I! .. · 1 n 'r::. '-H:! 1'- ep 1'- esent.a t. 1 on and 
reaction to events. 
Ij- ]' f:.I:: ~ t- -~ t·· 'j .--~ . ....!-=--!::::--)!:::.. Lyot.at··c! s t. 1 •• ·1 d i f£!S Kant.ian ,-~se of 
In the next section, I will 
anl:11 yse t.hi!l.t· st.,-~dy :::'.t··,lj 1'(1:::'.';.'''''_- rn"_'I"'~_-~ F - l' t j . t·· f 
..... '""' Yo ~ _"_, n _·121 Ct-l·1 C 1 srns c. - t.he 
theot-y of t.he sub 1 i rn.:!! its.:!! 1 f 215. 
The sublime in politics 
I to, t. 1.-, .... _- l' t-, to' t·· .-.,j '_'1-_ T_. l' ,-_, to, T '.J- t t- 1',.. - t_ - r- t .,.... I-f ..... .. _. _·r I ::, I_r Id ... ' ... __ . , 
sec:':lti.j f,'t-IL._+_·.l· '-_It-, ,-_,j- T_.l-I~_·. f' - -11· ..... -. - f tL I""' '-1' tl ~I.-
.... r '='= 11'=, 1_, .r-'€! ::,UL.' 1 me o· '-Iet- '_·r ,an 
its role in the indication of occurrence. In this second 
t.he r::: I ,t, 1 1'. rn ,::._, r::: .-_ .... \.- V ~-::. '-_-, l' 1'-, t t_, = """ " p 1 c\- t-, c\- t ]' ,-.10-1 ,-, 'f l-J'-' W _.... _ ... _·r =/, ......  1 _ r. _ 
c: CI.I·' be This of t.he 
recognition of ~iff~rends, arises in two distinct, yet. 
judgement and the philosophy of language. The legal 
Pt-.:-~,;.;el· .. ,t.a.t.ion of diff4t-~nds enl=ol_~rlt.et-S diffic'~lties whet-e a 
judgement capable diff~rends must be 
distinguished from the judgement that leads to diff~rends, 
the judgement of tribunals. I expressed 
that distinction through the opposition of the judgement of 
t. t- j, bt-lna 1 s and II ad j t.ld i c:a t. i on II :' the judgement sensitve to 
diff~rend~. Although I criticised that distinction, I also 
not.ed t.hat. L.yot.at-d did t·)c.'t. e>:plain "adjudicati.~n". In t.his 
chapter, I will outline such an explanat.ion in terms of the 
.-.1=..- .... 
. ~._r!=1 
feeling of the sublime. The philosophy of language from Le 
r;l_±..· f· f_'::'::- t-_e 1._·-.1-1"_-._1. ,-._ ..•. I --_-.,_-, 1·- ,-J ,-" I 1· 1- - ,_..- ..- t I j j- . , . 
- - ~ ::'"1 -~ • ,= =, c l• ~ _. -~I· yo· 1·-'::-CO'=lI"-, 1 "to 1 on ~ but. t.h i s 
Ij 1· ·f t-: ¢. t·· ,:=, t- Ij C .--_-.:.--=--_:.~.J __ __=!. ;'1 bet.w~:::en 
genres of discourse. Lyotard uses his theory of t.he sublime 
t.o incommensurability of ,- -Ul::~ 
det.ected. Because genres generally corresF'~_'t1d t ... ,_~ . 1 ::::,(:iCla 
conflicts can t,~_-., i_~~I~lt-~.~._·+_:~_~t-l·'-.-_.~.~_'::I -,- F· 11·t· I r - ~ cr. =- _.' 0 _. I e a ~ 
t.h i :=:. i:=:. why I call the use of the theory of the sublime 
The first remark to be made upon the use of the 
poilitieal sublime In t.he 
in the philosophy of language. This follows from my study 
of the relatIons of the different presentations of the 
book:. I In 
and V of this thesis~ how the claims from the 
pr·e·=:.ent.Clt. i on in the philosophy of 
language. The same pattern of dependency holds true for the 
feelings in the recognition of legal 
the function of s,-~ch fee 1 i ngs is only explained and 
justified in Lyotard's theory of the incommensurability of 
genres and the feeling of the sublime. Thus~ In the legal 
Pt··e,=~enta t. i on:, t.he feel in'~'5 1 S rn~?nt. i oned, 
insofar as they form the basis for the possibility of the 
adjucation of diff~rends~ 




.. __ .... __ ._--_ ... _ ... _-_ .... -.- [the diff~rend]. 
---_ .... _---_._---._- ()ne must 
~~)~~at-ch ha \""' d t.I-•. 1 f J'. ~1"llj 1·~I""._·I'·, t~I .. ll L"-._·' --:. f .L.I f 
- -A . ~. or ~~e ormation 
and concatenation of sentences that are capabl~ 
9 of __ !..~~ P t- ~~ s~? i n~;;! t. he sl..LE f ~ I'~ e!1~;:!i dis.= 1.:, s ~.;;L_.!2Y__ t. hat. 
fee]. i nq [ .... ] 216 
--...... -...... -.... -.-.. ~. 
[IYly ,::~rnphas is] 
In the diff~ren~~ 
sentences and suffers the wrong of not being able 
to be at that moment. Then~ human beings~ who 
believed that they used language as an instrument 
of communication~ learn through the feeling of 
institution of new idioms [ ••• ] 217 
[My emphasis] 
Lyotard does not explain the relation 
leading to their it. 
to recognise the conjunction of two opposed 
feelings that characterises the feeling of the sublime in 
the philosophy of the conjunction of Burke's 
lIi:.el·-t-Clr ll and IIdel ight. 1I (see pt-eviol_~s sect.ion). 
-. !=. 0--' 
_..:.~ ._1 ,_-, 
I-I J' -t-: Of' ,:!:, 1"'- ,::: ••• -.,j .;.-= 
: __ : __ .:.o_=:~ .... :,".:!...! .. _ J...~ translated and explained 
il": t'::::i-m':;:, of t.hl2 incommensurability of genres, then it 1S 
possible to account for the relation between the feeling of 
the recognition of incommensurability and 
of ,-I l' f·f ... · t- - t- j'= 
-I t: ~ .. . .. !. • Hal--e:. Lyot.<:tl·- d doe::::; 
not use the theory of the sublime he took from Burke In 
order to explain occurrence, instead, he appeals to Kant's 
use of the sublime in his historico-political texts 
and t.he sub lime l '. Whet-e BI,.~t-ke' s defi nit. i.:,n 
is suited to its role in the indication of 
the evanescent quality of occurrence in general, Kantls 
in the validation of Ideas of 
r'ea=:,C'I'''' , al"'"tr::1 is t. !"'II::! 1'- '::: f ':' t .. I:::: sui t.ed t.o t.he t-ole ,:,f t.he 
t"':':!'::O':'::ln i t. i ,:,n of !j iff '~r.:.§:D~:j s. -, t-h is IS at. 1 east. Lyot.at-d , s 
interpretation of the two positions: 
I: u n u ].. H E~ [ ~::: ant. :I robs Burke's aesthetic of what I 
1· ,= • ..1 its major stake: to show that the 
is prompted by the threat that nothing 
21B 
And yet., 
sublime to underpin his account of the recognition of legal 
diff~rend~ and of the incommensurability of genres, he 
abandons Burke's sublime, linked to occurrence, and returns 
t t ' ~f t"h~ sublime in politics. The question is: "·0 t<an . s use... --
of the recognition of 
all :. boi::·h depend on an 
CI V I::! t·· w h E! 1 min '·o·::}. of I:=! .;:. •.! 1. -i. t-! '-•. -.1 ,-._. :::'.1 ... 1 '=: .• ~.~ ... j. tl '.~I .I.. t .. - _. - t- .; 1 t . += -J '-, _.. I_·r II::! 1_.1_1 I J _·Inc _.1 on 01 P ll:=!c\sut-e 
and pain~ delight and terror~ and in both cases the feeling 
that cannot be 
adequatly represented, the representation will 
to the occurrence, they are incommensurable. 
Th:~ disi:·inct.ion ckll=::!s not. lie in the feeling, nor does it 
in t.he incommensurability of 
occurrence and representation of occurrence~ i nst.l=:!ad, it 
In Lyot.al·-d 1 'E, interpretation of Burke that 
in the nature of occurrence in general, i t.·::, d,-./a 1 
state of being and non-being that threatens the occurrence 
in his reading of 
will show that Lyotard believes the feeling to be 
incommensurability of Ideas of reason and 
their presentation in imagination: 
The imagination attemps to provide a given object 
intuition, that 15, t.o pt-c,vide a 
presentation for an Idea of t-eason [ ••• 1. It 
fai Is:, and thereby experiences i t.s impotence. 
B ..... t, at the same time~ t.he imagination also 
to accomplish ha~mony with 
2i9 
Lyotard exploits two subtly different 
versions of the sublime, the first is not overtly expressed 
c:-_\ '=. ;:\ ,_ I '=. '=._' ,-_', j-: r 1- - -- I ,I-. ] l' rfi - l' 1- J.. I- J.. tit t I I-
- ~ ~- .... ,'=! ~-.,--,. '>.: ., ' .. , -Ia,_· lOOt:: 'U _. -lave shown hClw 
it is developed as such In his study of Burke 1 n th,:;: 1 at.et-
IS taken as a version of the 
220 I-:::ctnt. i ctn s.I ... lb 1 i ITJ>? e>~p 1 i c i t.l yin ,=-I~ ~=!i of f~'I'" end I hct ve shown 
related to Burke's sublime in the previous section of this 
.I-_.l-I'-_ .... '=. 1 '=. _, :.r·-.!j I l-I '_"::!. \.1 P_ ;::. I ,_=",-_, ',' 1 t-I r_. l-I':_" '-1-" t-I'- 11 I"" l' '-1('-1 .l.. '-I t- l- -, t- ,... - - t- l' _. t-r _ _. '-, r v ... \ r _ _ _ _~ ~ _ 1_. _ _. r '0. _. .::, '= 1 __ • , , I:, 
implications of this connection for the 
remainder of the argument of the book. So, now, I will move 
on to demonstrate how Lyotardls differentiation of two 
versions of the sublime indicates two faults In his work. 
The fir··'st. IS a repetition of the central thesis of my work 
i ncons i st.enc i I~·=. bet. ween t.hl~ d i ffet-ent. 
of t.he t.h=: ~i ffet-end 1n Le 
rj J' f f':' L- •• t- j " 
_.:._ I I:::! I' • I will argue that Lyotard has to introduce, 
subreptitiously~ two inconsistent versions of the sublime 
because of the inconsistencies concerning his ontological 
legal and politIcal 
covertly, two versions of the sublime is also an 
indication of the second flaw in his work - and, this time, 
t.hE! f i:tU"1. t. 1:::'; intrinsic to use-_-, '_~T- t.· .. I~I~.·_'!:I!~]·.=_~ '-.. 'i-
r _ ~ t.he subl ime .. 
I will claim as to the uselessness of such theories, at. 
t n t.t .. , E~ S nt'-j e \.- 1-'_-'. r:::. '-_.1 f' r_.1 t··I·'::.,_-, -1.-_1" •. ' .. ' - \' 1- '.L. • 
,... - '-... .. c~ .-, C\ POI '_. 1 C S , 
-;:11 '.len t.he 
vexed nature of the relation conjoining the feeling of the 
~~ub 1. i me t.o i t.s "cal.AseSI';t or prompt.~~ .. This relation allows 
Lyotard to attribute the feeling of the sublime to~ on t·he 
an indication of occurrence as being and non-
and~ on the other hand;t to specific historico-
events testtfying as to conflicts 
incommensurable genres. 
Prior to pursuing a critique of the theory of the 
there remains to answer my earlier question 
concerning the reasons for Lyotard's use of the sublime in 
role;t as inspired by Kant, in addition to its 
role in the definition of occurrence, as inspired by Burke. 
I already began to outline such an answer, above;t 
considered the role of feelings in the recognition of legal 
di ffet"et-"js .. 
------_. 
t.hat. is, in the recognition of irresolvable 
conflicts through their adjudication (in my terminology 
fr'ol'fl chapt.€!t" I I I ) at.t.empt.s at. 
resolution through of t.r ibl_-Inal s. This 
of a leqal di ff~t-end depends ,-~pon lithe feel ing 
_. ._-_._ .. _-_. 
of pain accompanying silence (and the feeling of pleasure 
account of the diff4r p nd it is important to note that the 
appl ica:.~ioJ2 of such an idi.:.m:o "capable of exPt-essing the 
("11' t'" t'; ¢:' t- ~:. t" (-I ,::------,----==--,::~--},,::!, b ",'/ t ,\',-; i':' t, t'" ~-::, ,-::. 'J.' l' "-I'''''! I f " .... _ ._. _ :"":1:, 
i too t-~~=,O 1\/2lb], ~-:"' .. '. - ... ," 'F II' '."j- 1-'1" 'J' t L' t ' 
1_1_1' I I." .. '" _, t I . Y .. fl~~ ,Lt,:},'/eO...::: .. !..9.!'J. of t,he new i d i om 
the moment of recognition or adjudication 
co',..!!=' led w j, t.I·", a feelinq... of F'~l't-1 ~I_'~_~' f 
"" -" r as ~ Clt- e>~arnp 1 e,. the 
feeling accompanying the silence of survivors of the 
holocaust. 
tribunals represented, in Lp diff~rpnd~ by the argument put 
fOI'-wat-d by the revisionist historian Faurisson (see 
historian by the crIme of Auschwitz is a sign for the 
common person'l. Thus, it is the sublime feeling of pleasure 
once this recognition is acted upon,. once the tort is 
through the creation of new torts. 
The problem with this use of the sublime in Lyotardls 
presentation of the diff4ren~~ as it 
1· c .... t.hat. it. incomplete and inadequate. The 
feeling accompanying the recognition of the diff~rend is 
neither comprehensively described~ nor is its relation to 
in terms of the definition of 
cli ffel'-ends 
---------
sr::o.~ci ficall Y:. 
Lyotard's presentation IS therefore incomplete until it. is 
developed through a justification of t.he i t-t-esol vable 
nature of diff~rends in his philosophy of language, and 
of 
'f' (.~~ ..... :,'. 1 l' !'-."::.,' ,'.-_,f.' t.,I.-I ,_··._ I 'l' L ...l.... ... • 
- .. .. I - ~ S 1 ...1 O. 1 r(l'::: '(. () ~~.Lt!.!~ t .. ~~t~1 d.§. i;:::. '~i \,1 e 1""1 ~ Ct. 1 s () In t.he 
is not enough to state that a 
feeling of F)leasur~_- ~.I~lrl_ F·~.·.'_·t~l_ ~-.ll,_-,w·_=. ~,_-,t- ~.~I=_ ...-
- .... , - ~ " r ~ t- e c C/'~ n 1 i::. 1 .:. n 0 i 
irresolvable cont'llcts~ the relation must be justified. 
t.he C !.~ i t. i cis rn s I mctde of t.he 
III of this thesis invalidate the 
tl=l'_~_i.~, f(_~t- L·.·'i_~t_:~~~I~ -IF'F'll'-~+l'~t- -f - ~~--~" -f ~I tl' -.. .r _"...I - c _. - '_<.., _. ,_, 1 ' ... ' i.,-;. '_·r 1':='_' \.7 '_I ,_. ·-,12 s'_~' 1 roe ~ 
at least to that partic~lar presentation. In chapter III~ I 
demonstrated the artificiality of the distinction drawn 
between the judgement of tribunals and adjudication - this 
demonstration turned in part on a criticism of Lyotard's 
s"t.t,ldy of t.he legitimacy of Faurisson's position. Given that 
the application of the theory of the sublime depends upon 
this distinction~ I surmise that such an application is 
inadequate until the distinction is defended further. This 
defence takes place in Lyotardls development of the concept 
st.t-ldy of t.he '::sub 1 i me 1 n t.hat. 
having taken note of the incompletion and 
inadequacy of its use in the legal presentation. 
A'-.. ~ presentation of the diff~rend, the 
role of the sublime feeling in the philosophy of 
linked to the recognition of diff~r~nds. Howevet-, in 
not. defined as 
i I'~ t-e',5O I vab I e confl ict.s but. as t.he rneetitY~ of 
incommensurable genres; 
J ,= .~ t.he 
another, where a tort must be 
c~used that cannot be righted without generating further 
wrongs. Lyotar'd introduces this conflict of genres In two 
ways: first~ from an analysis of Kant's work on history and 
politics; and second, from an analysis of the hegemony of 
the economic genre~ or 
The theory of the sublime is developed from the work on 
and IS then applied to the study of the hegemony of 
the economic genre (see chapters II and III of this thesis 
ql.A.~st. i on 
to be answered through the theory of the sublime is, In 
recognIse the meeting of 
incommensurable genres? Lvotard's answer is: When a sublime 
indicates such an incommensurability. I will look 
first at the Kantian aspect of this answer and only 
analyse the more properly Lyotardian use 
o f t.I···fI~ s,-~b I i m,~: 
T tl'~ _.!;:.9.r t. 
[ ... l. The tort that 
CC~.p i t.a 1 ~ ~ '·',-_,I_'l.j ~_.~I_'~ t.P_ ~ inflic s on sen ences ~ ~ rr,~_ 
un i ve I'~ sa 1 even if the tort is not. 
diff4rend must bp 
-~----------------.--
[My emphas i =:.] 
L. ' . ..J '-•. 1 t .. .,.-.;,. \." I.·.",' '.......... ·~ •• ··\···i 1-.-_."_.'.' t" ·.··.1 '-•• ', .c:, t .. \···j· L_-.·! ._ .. It:' .; . • " 1 
' :~:-I..' •. 1 mE~ i:.-'\n'~ 1 t.:=;. ,.-.:. e 
will not, here, pass comment over the validity of Lyotard's 
i nt.er·pl"·,::!t.a.t. i on, I develop an analysis of 
Kant's original theory. These tasks would go beyond the 
s·=ope of t.his t.h,::!=,is, which 8.ims t.o jud,;:te t.he met-it. of Le 
as a work of interpretation. My main interest in the 
connection between Kant and Lyotard lies in whether lessons 
learnt from the former can elicit the theories of the 
latter; I am already following one such lesson in studying 
Lyotard's selective appropriation of BJ_~t- ke and Kant. 
accordlng to the different circumstances in which he wishes 
to exploit their work, namely, in the realms of ontology 
and In deference to the field of Kantian 
interpretation, it is sufficient to note that Lyotard IS 
Ct- i tical of Kant's theory insofar as it can lead to a 
pol i t.ics so the sublime feeling becomes 
party to a system of just judgement-~ t.he 
feeling must only serve in the recognition of diff~rends 
rather than in their resolution: 
[ ... ] [lIqivenll, event., 
of our time [the postmodern epoch] would 
induce a new type of sublime, more paradoxical 
than [Kant's] enthusiasm, and where one would not 
feel t.he irremediable gap between an Idea of 
V' ':'.-.',' ,~ .. :'. '_':::, '_-."1"'1 '.-.... ', \.-, 1", ... 1; T' 1'-' -', .J... I cll' ", J' • .. ·1· - ..... - t- + I L • 
00' .'=, ' .. ' ,~.' . '.-.: I ',_I_.!lTiE!S CIf'- ~,''', "_,0" !'-ea 1 i se II 
'+ 11.:. It One would feel~ Instead~ the gap between the 
different sentenc._~ f:~_',I~"L;ll'~_~~ ~I~II~ +.-,I~j~_·l·l~ ~. 
.. - -, - ~. t-"2=·pec '_·1 ve 
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Put simply~ Kant's use of the strong feeling~ 01'-
(Gieist.esqefClhl) ~ 00_- . . . of the sublime allows 
for a negative presentation of Ideas of reason in the 
i f/lc\9inat.ion .. Even through such ideas cannot~ 
have int.ui t.ions i 1 .... 1 the imagination~ in 
eXI~erience th~_~I~~_'. ~~~_', ~._~.vP._.t-lt .. -_-, W~ll'-~ --tOO 
...... • r '_.r I '_c:\ I:, if not represent 
such Ideas, at least valIdate them. Thus~ an Idea of reason 
sl-lch ::. .... ,.~::" constant progress towards the 
bet.t.er II cannot correspond t.o in t.he 
i malo;:! i nat.]. Clt"!;o cet-t.a i n event.s can C'CCl·W t.hat. so 
overwhelm the subject's powers of apprehension that an Idea 
of reason must be turned to in order to apprehend and 
understand the event. In the occurrence of events prompting 
a sublime feeling~ the understanding is exceeded and in its 
place the subject must turn to reason and Ideas of reason 
for an explanation of the occurrence of the event and the 
feeling accompanying it .• Thet-efot-e ;t although the event 
cannot be a presentation of the Idea of reason, this latter 
is validated negatively because it is to such an Idea that 
the st .. bj€~ct. is compelled to turn in order to explain the 
coincidence of a feeling of fear and pain i nd ..... ced by an 
event that does not actually threaten the subject - in this 
f~:!I:::l in9 of 
in additl'r_"I~1 tr_, r-l't- - ~--ll' 
- r'(;\ I:, ,:\ • I::!I::! t-I':;I 
in the subject when an Idea of 
reason is found to correspond with the event. This pleasure 
cl::.rnl:;:S f 1'- om the realisation of t.r·le t.he 
imagination to present intuitions corresponding to Ideas of 
pleasure and pain indl...lcE!d by an c1vet-whelrnin9 (yet. "safe") 
event validates Ideas of reason ne9atively; no presentation 
of t·he Ideas is given~ the validation is therefore not 
posi t.i ve, and yet the event and the feelin9 together are 
indicators as to the validity of the Idea. The 
classIC example of such a is t.he 
enthusiasm felt by distant spectators of the 
t" QV-IIl'tl'-r-1 t~IPl'~ ~_-tit_.~II_'~l·~~ro V~.ll·I:t~.t_.P_~ t_.I~IP_ Idea of reason 0;;.. "_ 1 _. I_I :0 _·r._ I r ._ "" - - '-, -
stating the progress of humanity towards the better: 
enthusiasm of the spl:;:ct.at.ot-s is a 
Beqebenl'-Ie it. 
--_ ..... -----_ .. _-_ ... __ ... 
t.he ·::;ent·ence 
st.at-In9 t.he pt-o';;:Jt-ess o'f hl_~man i t. y t.owards t.he 
be t.·t. €! 1'- :- it. is becc\I . ..Ise as c\ti aes t.het. i ca 11 y p' ... we 
feeling it requires a common sense, 
that is not more than an undetermined spnsu~:- but 
. 11 t' ..,l- + 1+ 1·r.:::. a- 1"1 ::.ffp_r_+_.,-~a 1 st.l a COI·-,sensus Iy t- I ':::,or 1 -'. -' - ... , 
lhere are two ways In which Lyotard uses Kant's 
1· ,... 
- :::.,. Th,:;:: fi r·st. i =. t.he one I 
have been studying throughout thl'S 1_-.~I~~t~_I~ j' ~I 
- r -'r" _ ,::~f'JI 1 .:=:. I", '-Ie I..\se 
of the sublime for the recognition of diff~rends. The 
second is the use of the sublime as the basis for a 
politics of the diff4rend as it is outlined in Lyotard's 
introduction to hIS book: t.o 
build a philosophical politics away from the politics of 
II i nt.e I I ect.t~a 1 s 1\ and politicians. To bear witness to the 
diff~rend". In order to be in a position to bear witness 7 
one must first have recognised the occurrence of the 
and thus~ the sublime feeling testifying as to a 
irresolvable conflicts. Note again that such a politics can 
dispel but. .:.nl y indicat.e its 
the sublime outlined above are explained in a cursory and 
()ft.el"'l I will now show how this 
akwat-dness is due to weaknesses in the theory of the 
itself. In fact, having stated the function of 
sublime feelings 
Lyotard only goes on to study that function in the 
recognition of the incommensurability of genres through a 
single example: the conflict opposing the economic genre to 
the genres its exploits on the way to fulfilling its goals 
In capital and the decrease In 
F,t-odl.Act i on t. i ml;'.. I·ll·-,,",.t_·. 1 ""_-., ,·1""-'1·- .... · .- ttl .. - j _. t L t I. 
-- - v-. '- ,_ 0;;::, d. _. _·r II:::! ':/'"1' OT _,r-Ie '00,(, 
1'" t::~ n d E: 1'- S t. hi;:! f ',." t",I.-_· t. I' ,-_"1'-, -, f' ,t· I" t 1 . 
- U .. ' 'ie St,I', 1 rn~:! .- and t,het-E:by t.he t-C' I e 
and possibility of a politics of the diff~rend mc're 
complex and less effective in the recognition of diff~rends 
by questioning the definition of the sublime. The accuracy 
of the definition is undermined through a taxinomic survey 
of t.he different forms of feelin9 the 
Kant, after Burke, recognises sublime feelings 
other than enthusiasm. Notwithstanding respect, 
of course, and admiration, sadness [der Kummer], 
if it f i nd'.:5 its foundation in moral Ideas:. is 
also one of these 224 
The import of these remarks upon the diversity of 
sublime feelings, feelings that involve a conjunction of 
pleasure and pain, where that pain is not directly caused 
by the occurrence of an object but rather, by t,he 
realisation of the inadequacy of the understanding in the 
comprehension of the occurrrence - it is for this reason 
that the feeling is said to be disinterested lies in the 
Pt-ob I ernat. i zes t.hei t-
Ideas of reason. Lyotard is aware of this 
t.he lat.er essay ilL' int.er@t. dl~ subl ime". He concludes the 
,= '--'.1 ','-I·.'-_~·.· J'. '-.J' .... -_: •. "". ~_-'j. ~f.· .. 'j, ,-_,1.'-1 '-_I ·r .... : -I- t- -- ' - . . - I: 1 
- _·rl~:! '~jl\/e.I·-Slr.:.y ot SI..-I-'· ime. 
fee 1 i f'p=,::; 1<.c:J.nt.~ not·es 
1 . f' + . C !:\SSl "lCe! .. ·Ion resemble an anthropological t.!:l :.( t norny. 
lS~ then, that through the sublime a non-
1-._. t·· l' ...... l' 1"_-.:::' J. '=-".1_·1 t" v 1::'_ Y I· .... l' '-'1" + + I. • + I 
\ ... , - It ·~.,·I.~ t-e·-·en_·et .. r::.an_. S ct-it.ical philo's,:,phy. 
If t.his is possible, then the sublime feeling cannot be a 
critical term associated with Ideas of reason and with an 
insufficiency of the understanding: 
It [the sublime enthusiasm] has many brothers, a 
whole generation of other sublime individuals. I 
cannot, here, give the full collection in detail, 
not. even t.he CI:' 1 I ec.:t. i CIt"! listed by Kant., II a.n9€H- 1i , 
lIc:ha91"-in ll :0 II [t.he sc'ul ' s] i mpet-v i I:)t~sness 
II hl.Am iii t. y II :' t.he j ,-~s t. and ft-ee 
sublime and great [ ... ] . 
not. fc~t- fr·.:)rn t.(:tk i no=! ovet- t.he ct- it. i ca I s..E: i t- it .• :)nce 
... _ .. _-------.. --------_._---------------_._---_ ... _----- -------_. 
- -I - l' t- [ '1 225 <:\'-c~ I •• u. a 
._ ... tn-...... _ ........ 
[My emphasis] 
The anthropological bias that can take over from the 
critical definition of the sublime is the basis for my 
first criticism of Lvotard's use of the Kantian sublime. 
The sublime feeling cannot serve in the recognition of 
:27 i 
incommensurability between genres if the 
f 0 1 low i ["'1';/ empi~" iCed 
,- I - ,_.,- . -. - _. . - 1-"- 22E, 
_ cI. :::..:::. 1 T ll __ c:'. t. I I_I; i :::.. " t.h i sis. 
In Lyotard's sale description of t.he tOO 1 E! 
of a. In of t.t··,,=:! 
incommensurability of 1. n his ctccouni::. of t.he 
the economIC genre. The problem posed by the 
possibility of empirical anthropological classifications of 
sublime feelings Issues from the connections such studies 
dl'''aw bet.t"t~~en t.he and t.he i 1'- t=c\t~ses n Th~2S.~! 
connections contradict 
supposed to command over the understanding, insofar as the 
generation of the feeling by events becomes explicable in 
terms of the understanding instead of Ideas of reason. And 
the negative validation of Ideas of reason, that is, 
rendered inoperative by 
the existence of 1'" a.t. i ana. I (in the understanding, 1 .. I~ Q 
cognitive) explanations of the arousal of such feelings. 
Lyot.at-d, his account of the 
" i s not. fin ish e d " 
because it witnesses and attempts to express in a new idiom 
the feelings indicating the hegemony of the economic genre 
ovet-
other genres according .L. - - - t- l' .L. - t- l' -'1-. ,_-, f F' t-'=_, t- f ' ... ', t· 1'0 ::. '/-_. l' V i t. y '_"_' c\ ,_ ' •. I;:! '- . "" 
t.o capi t.al in t.his. 
• 
-; --; .-. 
-::.:. i L 
1..\10 r- k 1- ,= -, submitted twice to a rule of exchange [to 
achieve the exchange in the least possible timel. 
The conditions of work in a capitalist system all 
t-f.~_'~I __ 'lt-_. ft-I.-.II-fi' ~~- L f' 
- 1 ~rl~ ~egemony 0 caPltal~ where time 
1-,.::· ':;;Ia i ned. 
t-hs=o s9-called workins 
f t-I_-IS t- t- at- i oro. • hlun iii a r_ i 1-11--.) a t- s=o 
.. -_ .. - •• _ .... _. __ ._ •. _-_._ •• .1.._ ••. - __ .•• _ •• _ ... __ .. ____ ._._ .. --=_._:':--.... ____ ._. __ ..  .. bc,t-n of.. and ---~-------
[IVly ernpha!=.- is] 
The list of feelings given in this quote resembles the 
II sl.,lb I i me indi viduals 11 blamed fot- t.he 
introduction of the 
Lyotard's list IS as varied as Kant's 
and henc€~~ same c t- i t i ,= i sm: t-he 
anthropological, empirical nature of the list indicates the 
survey within Lyotard's study. 
The feelings he has collated and defined as sublime are not 
they do not necessarily 
indicate a diff~rend. Although there is no doubt that a 
conflict is by those feelings~ nothing 
'-_-:It.{,=,- r' <~nt,~2,::!,=:;tL··I"_·J, ]'. I'" t- 1-_-'.','.::,,'-_" -1"',--_',:,_-, '1 ~.-_' :',_",'-_"'., ', ... ',><:;.,::-i-_. '-_.,t-: -i- j" - - t-1" - l ! v . r::. _ I , .. ,' if::! ,--on" I CT~, n ::." ... ICr-1 '::1, 
9U,3t" <:\nt.el::~ ("~()I,.,f 1 d e,r-'II \,!' t"E~Sf..i 1 t, f,'·om t.he I'd i s i nt.er·-est,edneso::" of 
+. ,\'-1 ,:_:.. 1;: ~-,_~ '=_.' 'j. I' t-l·~_. --.-. -. .j:: t" ,_-'.,-, ~I t \., . L.. • I ' t f' I 
. . ... _. I " ,,' ··I~? 1 rn p 0 S S 1 L) 1 1 .. · '/ () . . e ::-~ p a i n i n 9 I:. t- f u 1 1 y 
"-e 1 at. i on t.o the conflict without 
appealing to an Idea of reason such as that the conflict is 
i t- t"12S0 1 vab I e ~ a Howevet- ,. because of t.he 
diversity and empirical Lyot.at-d lsI ist.,. t.he 
feelings can be,. not only related among themselves in 
ot-det-s of intensity and closeness (a taxinomy)~ but also ~ 
~elated to demonstrable causes themselves measu~able and 
interrelated (unjust dismissal,. inequitable pay structures~ 
exploitative hours? no share in profits,. distanciation from 
executive declsIons). Therefore,. it· is not necessary to 
pos 1 t. iB.n in order to explain 
sublime feelings, in describing them as part of a web of 
()1:.het- it. is possible to offer a cognitive 
explanation of their arousal In line with the explanations 
91 ven fot- less strong feelings. ft-t-lst.t- 2.t. i on and 
humiliation can be explaIned as well as - and this does not 
imply completely or even S2.t· i s fact-ot- i I y di scomfot-t.,. 
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In order to deflect this criticism of his use of 
sublime feelings in the recognition of diff4rends, it lS 
not enough for Lyotard to insist on the intensity of such 
feelin9s - fOI'- exarnp Ie, in ilL I i nt.~t-~t. du sub I i me II and Le 
diff~r~nd he follows Kant in statinq that sublime feelings 
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benchmark for c0mn;_~.~1·~r_ll~f ;.~.I~llj 
r I - - classificatiion and therefore~ 
t t. pc..I·-t. i cu 1 ar I y lI,j i s i nt.e ,.- e'=- t.ed II ~ 
inexplicable quality of sublime feelings. Once 
such f.:=:e 1 i n9S issue from observation and classification 
they do not indicate irresolvabl~ conflicts, 
incommensurable genres; this is because there is a seamless 
F'roq_ression ft-r_'fn t-_.~I~_~P_ f--ll·t-~- ~ r _ ~~ I'::t'=' '_·0 less 
complex but more easily explicable ones. 
The nature of feelings does not have to be fully 
understood for it to be possible to discount the radical 
break Lyotard posits between different kinds of empiri~ally 
observPd phenomena. Each t. i me he describes a sublime 
feeling and claims that it. is disinterested~ t.hat. t.he 
connection between feeling and cause can only be explained 
c":\ppea I t.el t.he ideas and 
incommensurability~ it will be possible to counter that 
description, a taxinomy feel in';!s • 
and the myriad other feelings and sensations associated 
with the same cause and connected to it through sufficient 
cognitive explanations. As I have shown in considering the 
example of the feelings involved in the hegemony of 
Lyot.at"d can defin~ sublime feel ity~s as 
di s intet-est.ed ~ but. he cannot. dis i nt.et-est.ed 
feelings. In this failure~ there also follows the failure 
of a politics based on diff~rends: if diff~rends cannot be 
, '-
..::.. ,/ .... } 
recognised through sublime feelings~ then the politics of 
()f no mat.er·- i ,) 1 :. nQ 
j-i 'F rr ¢:. ····I::;'I···llj'= ~_ .. 1.:. .... ___ ": •• ~_:,:;_ ........ _':::!.. ;r. no incommensurability on which to worK. It is a 
blind politics, and hence, properly, a mute politics. 
-- . :::. 
Conclusion 
I have demonstrated 
versions of the sublime 
primarily on Burke and a sublime based primarily on Kant. A 
consideration of thes~ versions separately 
where Burkeis sublime IS not suited to grounding 
Lvotard's conception of the heterogeneity of presentatlon 
~nd in his politics, where a theory of the 
sublime taken from Kant fails to ensure the possibility of 
the recognition of 
imp 1 i est. h e impossibility of 
Lvotard's politics based on In 
addition to these criticisms specific to Lvotard's use of 
my main thesis concerning the co~tradictions involv,::d In 
different presentations of i n L~-=· 
To vJ i t.:. 
IS the source of hIS appeal t.o 
the first theory, 
Sl.JF·PO t- t.-=:; 
ontological occurrence; the second theory. 
!-tv ... ..• Kant's historico-political 
and 
incommensurabilities between genres can 
Lyo-!::.at··d is fot-ced t.,:, l~se t.hese t.wo ,-ont.t-adic_t.,=!.rr vet-sions 
the sublime becau~2, ~~ I have shown ln chapter V of 
this thesis, his ontology based on occurrence ca~not ground 
the possibility of 
to the question of being and non-being, cannot 
be defined in the same way as the feeling I inked t.o the 
recognition of diff~rends. The former should, but cannot 
indicate a universal property of the presentation of 
t·he but. cannot. i nd i ca t.e t.he 
existence of particular These two functions 
cannot be reconciled in one theory and for this reason 
Lyot.2t-d is left with two contradictory versions of the 
sublime. 
Chapter VII - Conclusion 
Throughout this thesis, and more specifically at the 
end of each chapter~ I have made pointed criticisms of 
t.et~rn in t.he ph i lOSCtpl·",y CI.,jvanced in Le __ .dtff..¢I·-end. Some of 
these criticisms, fot" instance my analysis of Lyotard's 
dependency on Faurisson's deeply and offensively flawed 
J~ I . t . j r-lt~SC: '~JW 1 .. ' Z :. S t·an( as ind i v idUCt.l i nd i ct.ment.s 
of a particular presentation, In this case of the 
for example my 
the distinction between the 
tribunals and adjudication (see chapter III), do not imply 
an irremediable flaw in a particular presentation but 
Instead, they point to the reliance of one presentation on 
another. This reliance is then criticized from the point of 
view of the contradictions that occur when the two 
presentations are considered in conjunction. for example: 
Lyotard's definition 
his defini t.ictn c,f in his 
philosophy of language. These latter critiCIsms compound to 
verify the initial main thesis behind my work, t.hat. 1 s, 
t ~-·t t~- jl'ff-t~-tit r-·t-~_~~_,t-lt_.~tl·r_)t~J~ Oi- t~I~_- concept of the 
·r Ict. ~·r J'=' t:::! '= - "" - - -
~iff4rend depend upon one another and yet. lead t.o 
and inconsistencies when t~J-_-v - t I dt-e _-ctt::en as 
cornp I ement.CI'--Y. 
The two different types of criticism I make against 
Ct- it. i c i srns specific 
oresentations and criticisno~ t.r_, t,-_- t_.~I~.~_t-, l-t- t~- + t t-
,. - ,-,I"' 1 _·r 1'= con _·e}~ _. 0 
hvpot.hes is,. imply two different 
conclusion. The sF·ecific ooints irldl-r_~.t .. ~_ nt-r_,bl~_rn~ tL t t ,-- '-, r- _ _·r-,a· rnt4S_. 
be for· philosophy 
successfully the concept of the ~iff~ren~ through the 
particular presentations he has chosen for the definition 
of the terNI. For example, the success of Lyotard's legal 
work on Faurisson and the judgement of tribunals. As such, 
this type of criticism does not provide a platform for any 
genet-a I Lyotard's philosophy. 
However~ it might still be possible to take those specific 
point.s In ot-der observe patt.et-ns Ot-
s, i rn i I at" i ties in the problems encountered in Lyot.at"d I S 
Such patterns could ll~ad to more general 
and I will therefore list those points and 
study their resemblances further down in this conclusion. 
Criticisms taken in of my ovet"all 
hypothesis, that is, criticisms related to the dependency 
and inconsistency of the various presentation of the 
lead to more general and ftu"t·het" 
r_r_'nclusion~ t-_.~I~t-I t~le -FA-l'fl' - F '+ A ' ~L 
- r ... ~ - r - ::. -'-'- ,_ ,-01 n _,s. 9a 1 n, '_,r-Ie';;e genet- a 1 
r_r_'t-lr_II_·~l·r_'I~I~ -~ll'~ l·t-,t·,-, +w- ~yr-- l' 
1_ - =-r' '_. _.- _' '_I '_., .-":=-: cc,nc 1_~Slons cc'ncet-nin'3 
definin9 di ff~t-ends~ 
---.---_. 
and 
Pt-c.blems he has due his mul t.iple 
presentation of the diff~r~nd. t.he 
that occur when Lyotard's ontology is 
studied alongside his philosophy of lan9uage can suggest 
conclusions concernin9 the particular approaches taken by 
but these contradictions can also 
general conclusions on the topic of the conjunction of a 
ph i 10sophy c, f langua99 and an ontology. The question is: 
Are the problems encountered in Lyotard's work intrinsic to 
profound obstacles to attempts at grounding the validity of 
1:"1 ph i losophy of language in an ontolo'3Y? In a more general 
version the question becomes: Do the contradictions and 
inconsistencies of Lyotard's philosophy of 
indicate any wider 
in law~ pCll i t.ics, 
philosophy mixing 
multiple presentations of a central concept? Before I move 
toward an answer to this question, I wi 11 t-eca 11 t,he more 
specific criticisms I made against Lyotard's work, lest. 
these points reveal clues to the wider question of the 
1 essons t.o be learnt from the verification of my initial 
rna i n hype-thes is. 
the purposes of my conclusion I will only retain 
the following specific criticisms of Lyotard's philosophy 
from the main body of my text: 
1 ) Lyotard's use of points from the affectual backgrol..~n':j 
to his philosophy - his feelings and impressions on 
the topics of Auschwitz~ on the hegemony of the 
capitalist economic system, on the violence implied by 
speculative reason~ and on the material constraints 
inhibiting aesthetic creation and speculative reason 
does not differentiate their legitimate exemplary and 
paradigmatic function from their illegitimate role In 
arguments about the universal and necessary status of 
it-I chapt.el·-s V and VI (in my discussion of 
quest. ions t.he passage from particular events to 
take sufficient care to exclude subjective 
albei t. t.hol...lght. t.hr.:.u9h 
i mpr'ess ions ft-om t.heot-et i ca 1 arguments serving to 
absolute condition of judgement and the concatenation 
of sent.ences: wherever a sentence follows another 
there can be a diff~rend~ certain concatenations must 
lead to diff~rends, when diff~rends occur they cannot 
be resolved. 
'-:-'="-1 
.:: ... :._'.:- . 
Ir', t.\···,e presentation of the d i ff~r>:::'nd 
-_ .... -- ... - -.-.- ---_ ... ---
the definition of the category of the 
judgement of tribunals 
unsuitable criteria~ most notably, in Lyotard's use of 
the Faurisson example and in the assimilation of the 
t. (.- i b '.04 r', d. I .:=. c09ni t.i ve of 
V ct. 1 ida t. ion .. In or'del'- to achieve a clear dis t. i net. i ()f"", 
between the judgement of tribunals and the judgement 
'.:;:·0 t.hat. t.he 
distinction can serve in the explanation of how legal 
L yot.a 1'- d ';:1 i ves a simplistic and 
incorrect account of the judgement of tribunals; t.his 
point. 1 ~-5 most. hlS U~-5e of 
FatH- i '.:;:·'.:::·on ' s logically false argument as ct va. I id and 
---- .. _ ........ -.. __ ... _ .. __ ._ ..... _ .. - .. .... 
t. t- i bt.lna 1 S ~ and 
where I make the remark that tribunals can and do use 
ot.h~21·- t.hcln E!V i dence (t.h i s 
wc..=:· t.8.ken ~ ln from Alain Badiou's work ln 
" C t·1 S t. 0 S 0 t~ i d N CI C t. is?" ) a 
The philosophy of 
criticism for the prejudice the syntactic and semantic 
properties of names and sentences bring to Lyotard's 
ontological definition of senten~es and the 
concatenation of sentences. This criticism arose both 
I considered his philosophy of 
lan·~uage~ and in chapt.er· I cons i det-ed his 
ontology and the concepts of presentation and 
situation. In the philosophy of language names are 
defined as rigid designators~ sentences are gIven as 
linguistic entities capable of self-reference and of 
. ) j. InC.U~lng names, and concatenation ~s defined as the 
linking of sentences through parataXIS (where a 
sentence IS appended to another by the conjunction 
II clnd Ii ) 0 However, In Lyotard's ontology the same 
concepts of sentences and concatenation are given 
ontological definitions and are associated with the 
concepts of presentation and situation, themselves 
concepts corresponding to his work on ontological 
occurrenceo These latter definitions must leave the 
sense and syntax of sentences undetermined, so that 
once ont.ological occurrence IS gIven as sentencial 
occurence no conditions allow occurrence to be fixed 
according to universal rules; similarly, there must be 
no rules for the concatenation of sentences, so that 
Lyotard can uphold his statement that concatenation is 
necessary but how to concatenate IS contingent (see 
chapter This cannot be the case if the 
restrlct~lons from the philosophy of language are taken 
into account because, there, sentences and 
concatenation satisfy fixed syntacti~ and semantic 
propertieso Lyotard's omission of a full elaboration 
of his philosophy of language, In the light of the 
work of philosophers of language from Frege to Kripke, 
IS symptomatic of the problems he encounters through 
those syntactic and semantic restrictions: the more 
precisions he brings to bear on the definition of 
rigid designators and sentences the more determined, 
less plal. ... sible, his become .. 
Lyotard's cursory and erroneous use of Descartes I 
method of doubt In the ontological definition of 
sentences is also indicative of this problem: it is 
possible to doubt the occurrence of syntactically and 
semantically well-defined sentences. 
4) Lyotard's assimilation of the presentation brought 
forth by a sentence to ontological occurrence, and his 
assimilation of the situation of presentation through 
the concatenation of sentences to the representation 
of occurrence, does not guarantee the heterogeneity of 
presentation and s i t.,-~a t. i on the 
val idi t.y of t.he st.at.ernent. "cclncat.enat.ion is necessat-y, 
(see chapter V). This IS 
because his argument depends upon a metaphysical 
prejudice similar to Aristotle's distinction between 
have mentioned in the 
Lyotard must define pt-esentat. i on 
without determining ontological occurrence~ 
I·)ave shown ( in chapt.et- V) how the definition of 
pt-~:=:sent.at i on as the bt- inging specific 
instances in a specific configuration constitutes one 
such determination~ and therein lles the metaphysical 
prejudice to undetermined occurrence . 
......... 
the heterogeneity of presentatiorl -t-d -l·t t· t c\ I =- _.t~a _·1 on mt-ls. 
than metaphysical 
Lyotard makes ontoloq_.ically t-I~_-I.-_~_~~~t-y -l-l'rn- t~-t '-
--"" 1- c\ ::., ·rlC\· 1=-, 
he defines a sent·erlce as t.hat. which i~ and then claims 
that the concatenation of sentences is necessary but 
(This ct-i t.icism and the 
previous one can be seen as aspects of my general 
L L • t l • 
·' ... r-Ies 1 S , _.r""121 t- specific element is in my emphasis on 
the particular mistakes made by Lyotard and indicating 
the correctness of the wider thesis; t.hese m i st.akes 
the syntactically and semantically i ncc'mp I et.e 
definition of names (rigid designators) and sentences, 
the mist-lse of and 
Lyotard's metaphysical prejudice in his definition of 
the concepts of presentation and situation). 
5) Finally, in chapter VI on Lyotard's use of theories of 
t.he stAb I ime;. I ct-i t.icised his B'...Irke 1 S 
definition of the sublime towards the universal 
definition of occurrence; in fact, Bur ke I s t.heot-y 
centres on a subjective feeling that need not be 
or be caused by the same event in all 
subjects. Furthermore, I criticised Lyotard's use of 
Kant's theory of the sublime in his politics, most 
specifically, in his description of the recognition of 
the economic q_enre. Kant's ar_r_~_lllt-I~_. r_C\-~1 tl=_ 
.... J ~ seen as an 
taxinomic classification of sublime 
feelings~ as such~ it contradicts the critical role it 
must fulfill in Lyotard's politics (see chapter VI). 
In the attempt to register similarities in the above 
C t- i t. i c isms, I note first of all that they have little in 
in terms of their content~ they do not involve 
discussions of a same problem in Lyotard's philosophy. This 
is unremarkable sInce the topics under consideration range 
se
'
:min9Iv ph i 1 o S I:;' ph i ca 1 
approaches and issues~ from legal theories to theories of 
·the sub 1 i roe , and from the problem of post-holocaust 
philosophy to the problem of how to recognise absolute 
dIfferences. For this reason, it is only when the form of 
the criticisms is observed~ rather than their content, that 
similarities begin to appear. Most notably, the criticisms 
resemble one another in the type of flaw they detect In 
Lyotat-d I S work, in the explanation of why those flaws arise 
and of why they can be difficult to detect, and also, in 
the possible solutions to the question of how those flaws 
and mistakes can be avoided. 
In t.ype, the flaws my criticisms have brought out 
share an element of expediency, is a lack of 
an incompletion to the theories leadin9 t.o 
the fal~l ts in Lyotard's work; for example, in the way his 
definition of names as rigid designators does not take full 
account of the historical background to the term (from 
Frege to Kripke)~ and in the way Faurisson's argument is 
crudely - but generously (it is taken as a valid form of 
into difficulties over the very points it does not 
develop fully or accurately; this is most clear where the 
deve l.:.prnent clf t.he ·fot .. ndat. i c.na.l ont.c.lo·::zy in Le d i ff~t:end is 
restricted to a notice section of the book, the notice on 
Aristotle (see chapter V). However~ it would be wrong to 
infer from this relation of fault and lack of development 
that the incompletion of certain aspects of the philosophy 
i t.:~ flaws~ on the contrary~ the lack of an 
adequate exposition of particular theories merely indirates 
deeper faults in the work" The absence of Burke's theory of 
the sublime from Lyotard's ontology based~ as I have shown 
(in chapter VI)~ on the sublimity of occurrence, and t.he 
appearance of that theory in the context of occurrence much 
later than Le diff~rend in L'Inhumain~ indicates the flawed 
----
nature of the ontology where a universal state, occurrence, 
1S based on a subjective feeling~ the feeling of the 
St,lb 1 i me. The metaphysical origin of Lyotard's ontology 
would have been easier I- j -t--t ~-d t~- t·~_,1~_ of t_.~I~_ .•. CI I I;:! •• f.:;!'-. r let .·r II;:! r 
sublime been developed in Lp diff~rend. And thus, a more 
complete exposition of Lyotard's theories only emphasizes 
the faults in his work - this is also why the faults can be 
1_-/ J'. 'f' 'f: l' 1.-_1_ I 1 T_. ./- _. -I T .L. 1 L. 1 ~ _.'_1 '_E~ _.ec 1_.;, :)eCal.AS~:! ·I_··-Iey ·='.I·-~::: indicat.ed by rnissin'~ 
or incomplete aspects of the work. 
As I have shown through the work in this thesIS, the 
F'd. i nst.clk i n'3 of t.he· om i ss ion':.::. and 
incompletions of Lyotard's philosophy reaps remarkable 
dividends with respect the criticisms that can be levelled 
against the philosophy. errors are divulged 
through his omlSS10ns~ but~ in themselves the omissions are 
how the flaws in Lyotard's work come about - given that the 
incompletion of his philosophy IS only a clue to those 
flaws -~ and how, if at all, these faults or errors can be 
avoided. The answer to the first question was advanced 
first in the introduction to this thesls~ it I':.::· my ma.in 
hvpot.hes is, d.nd I have demonstrated its validity in t.he 
conclusions to chapters III, IV, V and VI. The deep-rooted 
cause of almost all In 
the multiple presentation of t.he cent.t-a 1 concept. of 
Lyotat-d's philosophy, t.he 
presentations of the term depend upon one another, and yet~ 
they lead to contradictions and inconsistencies when they 
In conjunction. The legal presentation is 
of the irresolvable nature of legal diff~rpnds is proven, 
the categories of the judgement of tribunals and 
adj ud i Celt i on (my t.'~t-m, see chclPt.et- I I I ) from t.he I e'3a I 
presentation entail severe contradictions in the philosophy 
of I d.n9ud.ge ~ "'~I~_~olr~_- t_~~IP_ ~..J~_·rnlr_~.t-Ilj t- °fo L t-~f f li~ or specI IC 0eJerogenous 
entities corresponding (t.he 
cognitive. interrogative~ prescriptive r~gimes) 
property of sentences ("II concat.enat. ion is 
necessary, a concatenation is not. II ) ll~ads t.o t.he oppos. i t. i on 
of a syntactic and an ontological definition of sentences. 
Similar effects can be registered when the affectual and 
legal presentations are conjoined, and when the intricate 
enmeshing of the philosophy of language and Lyotard's 
ontology is taken apart (see chapters III and V). This same 
conflict of ontology and philosophy of 
I consider the problem of the recognition of 
~iiJt'~t-ends t.h~"ough t.h,~ feel i n':;i of t.he s.ub I i me (in chapt.e(·-
V I ) n 
Given the above explanation of how the flaws 
Lyotard's philosophy arIse from the multiple presentation 
of the t.he final '=tt~est. i on t.his t.hesis 
becomes: C21.n the contradictions bet ....... leen t.he 
p(·-esent.at ions 
consider pointless answers to the questions such 
for completely different approaches to the 
that Lyotard should have presented his philosophy in Cl. 
single presentation~ say in his ontology or his philosophy 
of language, would be to miss the point I made in chapter I 
concerning the conjunction of philosophical issues and 
leqal ;0 soc i 8.1 and political issues through the multiple 
in L~-::· st.Jch 
suggestions render t.he wor'k from my thesis redundant 
insofar as they do not take account of my study of the 
necessar'y, yl2t. cClnt.r d.d i ct.CI~~y;r t~121 at. ions bet·ween t.he 
different presentations. It 1· '=. t~II-_1 t_. '-;'1-•• 1--.-. --_-. l' tl I r_... t I-I -- 1 I q ..... .::. -- + t '-~ - + 
- ,.. . ~. _ =. _ .. _ ::;t .... =- .' ·r Ic:\ .' 
Lyotard abandon sections in Le diff~rend in order to 
concentrate on others, each aspect of his 
depends on all the others in a necessary fashion. To ignore 
this is t.o ignore one of the most important lessons of my 
t.hes i s: the presentations in Lp diff~rend are int.el·--
d~::pendent .. 
Thus, in the final conclusion to this thesis, I accept 
as the fundamental aspect of Lyotard's philosophy that it 
rn'-~s t. involve a multiplicity of presentations of the 
in law, 
necessary state of the concatenation of sentences defined 
according to Lyotardls philosophy of as the 
conflict between incommensurable linguistic genres, as an 
ontologically necessary consequence of the heterogeneity of 
occurrence and representation of occurrence, and as t.he 
state recognised through a sublime feel ing t.hat. indicat.es 
--
its irresolvable or incommensurable nature. Furthermore, I 
accept. o:.rnp 1 ement.at- i t.y t.hese P t- esent.a t. i I:.ns; 
parallels can be drawn between the legal presentation, the 
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ph i losctphy 0 f the ontology and the affectual 
politics based on the sublime feeling - the key to the 
~. 
i·s~ of cot.lt"se:. 
it=:.elf. over and above this cornp I ernent.a t- i t.y, 
Lyotard ascribes a necessity to the relation between 
presentations. this occurs because the central statement in 
each presentation II CI:lnca t.enat. i on is 
necessary. 
i n 21.not.het~ present.at. i on. It. is t·hi s neceSSity,. t.he 
h i et~ at~chy gl··ounding Lyot.at~d I s affect.ual 
statements in his philosophy of law~ his philosophy of law ~ 
in his philosophy of language, his philosophy of lan9l~age 
in his ontology, and his ontology in his theory of the 
that makes the contradictions 
inescapable. 
interpretations of S~batols novel, 
other than the one given here there is also a Freudian 
cl.n I~ >; i s t.'~nt. i d.l i n t. e t- p t- e t. d. t. ion, an 
t.j·",clt. on 
In nuclear physics, d.n 
a nihilistic post-
holocaust novel, 1 ] ~. t. 1 send 1 e5=· 
l~leehd.n, j'iet.aphys i cs: Theml~ 
i 1"'1 E 1. TI.:.ln~:: 111., I'Tjod~~I'" n Lanqu,'=tqe l\Iot·e~~, LX X X II I ; 
._._._._ .• _ .. __ ._",~ ___ , _____ .. . _. ____ . ____ ._.M_ .. _ .. __ .. ___ .. _ .. ____ ..n~ _______ _I.II.. _________ .•••• _._. - •••.. -'----------...... ,--- . --_ .. -
L, 1967~ and BeverlY G. Gibbs, 
"EI of I '.O::.cI1 d.t. i on II , 45, 
1961u 
2'j:3 
L_~.· I·-\···j>.-_':'. '.'-_-:., ·t .. ·.J_·, ~_: .. \ 0 j 'J_:'{ H'''' --1'1_-.'1., -r " - -. t· I 11- t- - 1 r l r ._._.J:::~ .. __ :: .. ::;_:.L . J~._ ,. r' u 
I and t.he book 
published ln the same Au ·iust.e .. • ______ ••• __ ... _tl ___ •• _. __ •••••• 
wate~shed between Lyotard's early work and his later 
\1-.101" k 
stages 1n the development of the philosophy 
7. ThIS point 1S very important because the theory of 
upon the separation of names from 
territories. See .. Lyot.al·-d I s 
names and worlds of 
".Jt_.,dicil:::-'_.I~-: dan':':~ .Le .jiff~t-endl': 
It. 1 ,-' ._.' t· h ~:: c i viI language with itself. 
critical scout observes that war .. watching it. clnd 
it. The name Palestine belongs to 
a number of worlds of names. In each of those, a 
!"" rl ..• lmbe I'" of regimens of sentences 
r"oHle P c~.l.:2= t. i ne • 
C'est la guerre civile du language avec lui-m~me. 
critique surveille cette guerre .. i ]. 
ve ill 0::: et. 
Et.!O dans 
disl~uterlt l~_' \rlr_'\'/il ~- F'--l ~. 
'-1':= ct. es '_·1 ne .. 
1/ .Jt.td i c i eu~{ dans Ie 
terminology helps to 
+':.hl~ bib 1 i og \.- 8.ph i ca 1 ant.ecedent.s 
of t.he concept. of th:,,£! 
In ter~s of justice establishes 1 ird<s 
through his many theoretical analyses of justice; as 
9. In certain of the books and articles by Derrida and 
I into consideration as directly 
critical of Lyotard's philosophy, the reader will find 
that Lyotard is not mentioned by name or oeuvre. This 
to focus on a particular subject-matter and 
instead, to work by analogy or parallel, is a feature 
-. 
of both Derrida's and Nancy's writing. VI_~e to t.h i s 
d j, f f i c:u 1 t. y I will in demonstrating the 
di.r"ect. \'''elevance of books and at-t.icles s,-~ch as L~ 
11 • 
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v~rit~ e~ peinture" 
.~ .... -.... --.- .... - ...... -.... -._ ...... -~ .. --.... _-._" .......... _ .. --..... _.-.. _- --.. _--- . 
n::-' ..... , (.~~ r''::' :-.r··· nl~' j 1 - ~ - r.I·~ i -
. _.~.:::~ .. i~! .. :::.~::-:: ..... __ "::" __ ...... _.~::::.~.} ........ __ .. .J:~.: ... ~_:.: .. ~: .. ~~.=:::.~:-~x:~ ..... ~ .. ::-==. :- "Pt-E'=jU9~~s deva.nt . loill~ 
b~offrande sublime and ····· __ ···_· .. _ ..·_· .... _-···· .... ·· ___ ._ ... _._ .... n_._ ..... _ ... ______ . IIDies 
critique of Kant. 
Thi~:::; interest in Kant IS best shown by Lyotard's 
!.-•. II-•• II-•. I ',.:'. I·.'.! :.'.', ~, ::-. ,--.'1. ,,'-, T .._ "n L I ,...- 1- t 1- - I 1'- J' -.- rn -
_.:_ ... _:::!_~J_~::_~.!~::~.:::.·2_~~~.:2 . ..:1:~:;.! ... 
collection of most of Lyotard's work on Kant (passing 
1'n.1...(ch t·el .J" L. " Nancy's reading of Kant and~ to a lesser 
Geoff Bennington 
(Lvotard writinq t.he event) 
••••• J.' ...... • __ •• __ •• ~ _ •••• _ •••••••••• __ •• _ ........ __ .• __ ..... ___ •. __ ...... "1. _____ •..•.. ___ •... ___ . ___ . __ .• _ .. _ •. ___ •. _ .. ,._-_, 
(Paraesthetics and /1 F~ephl.- ;::.;,$ i n9 thE.' pol it. i ca 1 wi t.h KCI.nt. 
..................... __ ....................... _ ...... _ ....... -... _ .. . 
Suf~ice it to say for now that if it is true that 
much of Lyotard's most vital thinking is carried 
out in some sense against Marxism~ his pretention 
has never been that of refuting Marxism, but of 
~. h () 1.r.J i n ':;:/ t.. h (:1. t. 1. t. 
pretention to be the way of 
t.h i nk i n'~? be 
these themes will be presented 
in due course, but this general orientation may 
h~:: 1 p t.o rni:tk E: some prelirninary sense of the idea 
t.I···\ i:.i t. L. v 0 t. Cl j'- c! i ~~ f- I .1'.- d -::1 rfi .-:. .- .... - 1 1 ' - - l' . --
_ ...•••.. __ .• _ ............. _. __ .. " ........................ _. _ ............... ,, __ .... --...... · .... ::.:L!-=~.I;-.: ... .!..:::.! .. L~::!~. ___ :...Y. .. ______ ~ ______ F.:.'::~ ___ !... t.!.~-· 1:\ '1:.. 
-J::.hl::! t.ot. 21.1 i. ~=:;;::d: 1. ()n~=~ f 1.1· ... .-1-:: . PI·-,t:-:· 1 .j.. -. .. - .... t . - -,.... -
._ ........ _ ...... _ ..... _ ........ _ .............................. _._ ....• _ ............. •• 7 ...... _ .... _ ...... ::.:1..1 .. -;:;.:.:-~.!J~..;;::.~ . .: . ..:~.,.:.':..:~._ ._~~ ~:~ .. __ .. .!.D!:::: .:::._.::=-... ___ J..!~::;;!.::~ _-:=!~=-!. f 
':"'-11 i t l' -1"": ::-.:-:.: ... : ...... :::.-.. :: ....... ~:~.:?:.:. 
hidden reason that Lyotard chooses to phrase his _ •• _ ..... _ ••••••.•••• __ .. _ .. _ •••• _. ____ .. _ • .-.l. ____ ._._. ___ ••• __ •• _. ___ .. , __ • 
terms a philosophv of chrasp~-
...... _ ........... __ .... _ •••• __ •• ___ •••• _ ...................... _ ••• _ ... " ••• ,'" ........ _ •• { __ ••• _ ••••••••• _ ... _.\. ••• __ ... .:. 0" ___ :: __ .:::.;:.":_ .. 
1·-, .. ,::." to the postmodernism debate that issues 




.::" .:::.. I~ 
from Derrida and Nancy (and 
also~ possibly, Philippe Lacoue-Labarte)~ see note 4. 
IS true of the philoso-
phic2\1 C 1 •• ·1 TO ph i 1. o~·()ph i eel 1 pol it.iea.l 
I mean is that the debate is couched in 
pol it. i Ci:I"1. lines of allegiance to 
differring philosophical positions; I will explain how 
these allegiances debated and cashed out 
in a discussion of Lvotardls position in those debates 
At this stage~ my position is that the 
debate has gone through many phases~ conft-ont.at.ional" 
II ad hom i nem II , ent.,·- enched :0 na.t. i ona 1 :0 
et.:.I:: ••• :r "'J i t. h 0 u t. s \"', 0 W i 1'-,,_,. ;::_'.1'-, Y '::: l' ,-._ t-, '=.. ,-_, f' fl\ ,-, V l' ,- .., .~ - _. 
-t ,_ _.... - 1_' ":":1 1_.'_, (:\ 
properly philosophical level r_lf ~l'~r_'_'~~l'r_'t-' - t~l-t 1'-
.... - 1__ _·r<.. ... _. =.., 
where the terms used in the debate become defined in a 
manner independent of the factions in contest~ instead 
of remaining focused around pc. 1 i t.ical, 
t.e I'" rns s'_4ch as II left.:.pea.k", 
II post.model'-n i sm I, itself (although Lyotard 
has often tried to give it an exact definition, 
best example of this residual political content to the 
debate can be found in t.he latest stage of the 
as collated in Critique n° 493-494, where 
Richard Rorty and JQrgens Habermas pull back from the 
debate to convene with those ct"· i t.ics t.hey 
de f i r,e as t.he i 1'- II bE!~'; t. II opponents (i.e. least damaging 
and most politically close critics). Rorty finishes 
his paper by a truce offering based on the political 
We social democrats, i nte 1 1 ect.ua 1 s:o 
must maintain a similar degree of flexibility in 
our own tactics. But this depends upon the 
between empirical pt-ed i ct. ions and 
interpretation remaining 
•• 11,-0 ' •• ' 
.::... _: I •• ' 
st.lff i .-. 
C l' ..... _ - 1'-1 +_ .. ·t .... -. f ,_.- _'1 ,=-_. r'_-', (." .. .·l- t·.. .• 1- ,... + ' . 
. , - d :,:,0 iOl::d.ns· .... n a 1:. we rn,-~st. a.void 
t.I· .. ,.::-..·.-t.·.. • •• - fl" ,,-+ ,_.1.. L ft I t 
\"I I:::: I -,,:, _. . ,.:. 1_. us· e _.§:_-== s E' e <:I_t::;' • C) 
accuse one another of Jlcompl ici tyll ~ and t.hat. we 
must be ready to join (instead of trying to rise 
i..=-tbove exoteric political 
discussions between those of our fellow citizens 
who are not intellectuals. Finally, t.h is. i rnp lies 
that we must tre~+ ... t"t-l·n __ .!~_'I~ld~ t-r_,~ w~-.1.. .1..~_y -1'-
'-, -., - I r 11:\ I... I .. ·r II:::: c\ e ~ 
(:t.nd cc,nsidet .. intellect.ua.ls as 
intellectuals~ instead of fighting to associate a 
particular intellectual to a particular brigand. 
Nous Ies SOClaux d~mocrates, qui sommes ~galement 
des intellectuels, devons maintenir Ie m@me degr~ 
de flexibilit~ dans nos propres tactiques. Mais 
cr::::la la 
pr~dictions empiriques et interpr~tations philo-
sophiques reste suffisamment claire. 
16" In my analysis of this strain of critique particular 
to Derrida and Nancy I will mention critics that might 
equally well be classified in the categories 1) and 
2) of approaches of Lyotard's work (see t.he t.ext 
above> • Th i S Ct.nc.ma I y IS due to the point that, 
although they participate mainly in the debates upon 
t.he "pol i t.ical" the II postrnodert1" :0 certain 
philosophers also exploit Derrida and Nancv's work (be 
that positively or negatively). This remark applies to 
David Ingram and Peter Dews In hi.:::; 
Nancy's Kantian Ct-itl',r,_l'-_-.,r,~-,-_~ -f I \ -~ j ~-f f I .... ' • ,-, .l ' ... ' _' a ,.- 1._ !,.' '.,) 
make a political point on Lvotard's work in L...? 
1:::\ J' f oF ,:!:.!,,, I~~'I'" rl 
.::._.:_ .... _1._ .. ::::_ ...... ::: .... 1 ..:. ..... = 
approaching Lyotard's books from the 
Habermasian critique of postmodernism~ ,.- e t,I,.,II'- n s t. Cr .::!. 
political treatment of Lyotard's early books i nr:::'.t"?3.d 
work on Discours. fiqure 
••• ___ ._ ... __ ...... _ .. ·• __ ••. I_ •• _ ..... __ ...... &n. ••• __ ~_ .. _._. (i n 
':34) 2,nd 
t,hE'~ CI'- :i, t. i -:=lI .. ,II~ of 
Dews uses that work to support 
given the discontinuity within Lyotard's oeuvre. 
17" 
diff~rence, 1987. In addition to his philosophical 
Lyotard has written many books and articles on 
-.. 
artIsts such as Adami, A,'-ak,:;,w8. :' 
ot-';:!an 1 ses 
collections and exhibitions of modern 8rt~ the biggest 
19. 
of 
Beaubourg center In Paris; for 
.:=c. 
philosophical appraisal of that exhibition 
Art in America (October 1985). 
Flammarion, 1984. 
Lyotard writes short polemical novels linked to ideas 
he is art criticism aGd philosophy; 
Q~ri~c ~rQ~h]~~~c !~~.:::_:::.: .. ::'_ ... :: .. ::.:.~ ........ _ ... n:::':., ..• :::::.·.I_:.~:~ . .:.:..: .. ~.~ ... ! .. .:::.=..:: :-
d l' F:·-,I-·j fl· -1 11 -
.:::. . .:::! ........ --...•.. - .. -<:.:-::: . ..:!:--.-... :.~::: ... :;:~.~::.:' 
of .:.-: .... .,-, 
.!. .••• l l t; 
1.977:. 
,. ,.- ':: ~ ,'-1 ,,-+ 1· ' .... 1 ... '= .::_~I_ J_,.:.: .. .:::_ ._._ :::! .. ::: .. "::: __ ..:::. __ l.!,,:.:. 
20" See note 14. 
:21 u 
eSS8V Lyotard explains his 
the of d i ffl~'I'-;:::'nd .... - .. _. __ ." .. -...• -........ __ .- --.-
heterogeneity. Lyotard's 
so much so th?t when an i. ':? ,:?I ... ; E: 0 f t.he 
LIA,"'c t.o 
II L. yot.2J.I·- d II ~ 1 976 :. t1ot· 
to contribute to Tc:r 
disdain was merited by Lyotard given hIS 
IV! i nu i t. :. 1. 974. 
17" 
2:3.. \I W i t.t.'3en~st.e in? r.1.(::·I·-~S 1/ in Tombe8.t.l di? 1- I i nt.Ed. 1 1:::·ct.I..'/I::-. 1 n 
.--... --.. -.. -.---.. -.. -........ ~.-..... -.-.-.--.-.--..... _--_ ... _---_ ... --------... ""::--. 
24'11 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
._--_.-._ ...... _ ... _-_ .. -... __ . __ .. _ .... -_ ........ _- .. - .... _ .... -- . 
1,975" 
26.. Certaines valeurs 5e trouvent engag~es pour combattre, 
et surtout pour se j t·I=:· t. i. f i .??, t- De 
leur d~gradation rapide. 
XX~ si~cle a fait de plus concret~ la guerre, dans une 
IndIgence monstrueusen Nous evans 20 ans 
Camps nous vomissent ce qu'ils n'ont pas eu Ie temps 
OlA llapp~tit de dig~rern Ces visages creus~s harc~lent 
L1Europe y a assassin~ son -1:.1'-0 i s I~U 
quatre si~cles de tradition gr~co-latine. 
\I f\lr~~s I:::,n 19:;;-:5 11 , p" 2053 
27. Note that this view of Lyotardls IS far from original. 
The status of reflexion and art after the holocaust is 
the greatest challenge to all post-war thinkers and 
most ta~e it as the ultimate measure of their work. 
Tak~=:. the works of Hannah Arendt and 
.-,,-, 
oi=:, ,::t 11 
29. 
t. h 0 1 .. ·1 '::1 h t. 
Neqative dialectics~ 
.••• _ ... ...C'L_ ._ •••• _ •• ~ ............ _ ... _ ...... __ ...... _._ ...... _ ............. _. __ ._ •• _ ••••• _ •• - sirni lCl.r-
dOI...,I-:)t.s , ~ J •. __ -.. fully aware of the 
remarks on Auschwitz CI.nd his 
situation of all thinkers and not only on 
Lyotardls own work to the exclusion of otherSn 
Lyotard is also aware aT Adornols b00~S~ he analyses 
and 
l.t"I hi,::. ",7.: '::. '=. ;:, \/ •... - ... - ....... 
~lPI·-e~.:, AI . ..!s.ch~h.li t.z II 
Adorno compte Ie temps t.ernps?) 
[Auschwitz] qui d~signerait ce qui nla p~~ de 
nom dans Ia sp~culation, un nom de 
la sp~culation, 1 'anonyme tout court. 
A section of 8eoff Bennington's book, L.,\lot.Cixd I.h.W i t. i nq ._ ••• J •. __ ._. ___ . __ ._ •. ___ . ________ •• _ •• _Ul .• 
t.he E!v'::l~nt.·, 
........... _._ ...... __ .......... -.... __ .... ' 
1· '= • oJ 
devoted to the problems of the examples of Auschwitz 
fc)llo{....;=.. tl'"'Ilo- () 1 .. -19 h t.he clf 
- a French historian of the holocaust (see 
and Auschwitz for Lyotard's thesis on 
8.nd Ij l' f f (!-... - ,::0 .. "-,1'-1 '= 
.:== • ..!.....-.-. ___ ~::1-._.::::l.._:::..:::..:. n 
J.S 
reality in a philosophy of language wIth his central 
.-f l' f f ,!.:. r' t=. tool .-1 
. :=-.. -.-.--... -"::: .... -... ::--.. ... -.::~. ,. 'j]' f 'F 6,'" ':'1'· -I !::---':-......... ..:::: ___ .::."::._1.~= . .J ew:=:· 
t'!'''lt-OU9h 1. ink and 
B'?I"',n t n9t.on (.- 2 .. 1 ~-:-:·E~~~ t·h~:~ fo J. lot·.} t n.:.-.... l - 1- ;..-:: -t- J' -,-
'_,I .... , ._' _: '._ ,,' • '_I . I 
tf II At.IS.C!'''lw it. z II 
cl.t:i r::a 11 Y:o 
at.t.~:~nt.l ve t·o that which cannot be presented 
according to the cognitive genre, then. on this 
(l .. II [:r n :' § 9:3)" A~ a sort of emblem. Auschwitz 
signals the limits of historical competence: but 
t.his limit. is In the st~ucture of 
How then can Lyotard maintain on the same page 
somethtn9 new happened in 
-. 
Where lyotard uses his paradigmatic examples within a 
t.he becomes:. 
The point. 
F_.f ~.":"_~ .... 1 f~1 J'. Y'j f..:."!. .!::. C., I", ''-1 "'._'. '.=. rfi, ;;\ 1-._1 .-.... _ '.'1. '.=_, t .. I·-! ;-_" t. l \/ - '1- •. tOo -I , . .£: 1 . 1-I ~'I _ _ ~ _ ,~_ • " _ ...... U ... !:l. 1 •• 1 ::::. \1 1 e IfJ ()! tOo E! <:1. J. 1 _. Y 
d .... '-... 1 ;:'._J '-.' .  ", t-,,-_, ~ ..., :::! 1. 1 '-... 1!·1 f -, .... Ij - ..., L- - - - - f . . t· T I f 
'.0 • \.'" '._ ! . ';:.~ '::.! '=:! I~ '=, U 1 n J 1..-1 S .. ' 1 C I:;? = n '::: ,.- e . 0 1'- I:;: ~ t·O 
retain the urgency of 1"'~_·.~.-_·,FJr_.II"'I-.· . ~,~._'. L .•..• ~ ..• t· .. I .... ,~.~. I·-t]·~f~t~-t~j-t 
, _ r _ .::::....~ .. !. __ ._~_ .. I:;:! __ I!=_.;.:\ .. ' 
AUSCh'rJ i t. z ~ Lyotard must supplement his 
account of reality by a theory of gentiment. Feelings 
become the key to the recognition of particular 
,:::11' f: 'f: .:!:. ,." ",:, ,.-, d ':: .. 
.:_-!.... __ . __ :..-.: .• _ .... :::.:..-.... :;:.::!. n 
If 1/ AI".tschw it.;! 1/ is the name of a silence~ 
sentiment, then it 
dealt with by the cognitive. Lyotard would say it 
]. '=, Cl• ~?" l. .:::j 1'"1 •• 
•.•.•• _ .. nt._ .... and more specIfIcally a 
hist.ct!·-Y" r." •• ] r. 
LVot.21·-d , ... ,It" it. i nq t·I·-II:? ever·"'It.. '::'. 15:3 
..... J ..... __ .... _ ... _ ••• _ •••• __ ._._ ............ __ ._ ... ____ ._ ..•• ..uL ...... __ ._ .. _. __ •••• _ ........ _ .. _._ • I 
Bennington shows the tension implicit in Lyotard's 
dependence on emotion - or II sent. i rfl'2nt." 
ph:i 1 cl~·;()pl·",y of language the attempts to univer~alize 
t.ht2 po=:·s i b iIi t. y of event.s t.hat. le8.d t.he 
experiencing of such emotions. Lyotard grounds a 
in a theoretically necessary 
F' L') J' ] -,.. - F I- \/ '.1 - t - 1 - .; rn'= t .. L-,;.:. TOo' '=.' ... 1. '-._ L-I ::.ll·-' ~_ .. ' ~.'\ F·' ~_.'''- l' p._ t-, 1-_' • .:..... ,-._::'_ t-, tOo, '-... 1 TOo' r . . ' ... ' :::, ' •. ' •. J • 1.,:0 .7 '=., '_. (:1..1...... r ... , - r >. • I ,-, 
The difficult status of such an event [a sign of 
history] is that it must apparently reconcile the 
bet.weet'l t.he C09nitive 8.nd t.he 
SPE:C1 ••• 1121.t.lve;. t.h~~ c121.ims C'+I' d-+-,-rnl't-J' :I +1 
.- 1:'.:: _.~:!'. I. '::''-·1'3 anl_ .. ' ·-,E: 
claims of freedom. 
In chapters IV~ V and VI of this thesis I tAl i J. 1 PI...ft- SUI::! 
Benningtonls criticism. 
des cont,t-e'- e~<emr-'l es ~ 1'::'111- [1 - ,- F 1- l' 1"" f j + , .... ' __ " _'==r "!. ,_,sop'-":?'S 112 nO_·J'-e 
T ot...ft. ce '=I!...' i est. \ 
t.CII.,.Jt. I?st t- cl.t. i clnnl:?l 
ce crime~ qui est r~el~ n1est pas rationnel. 
[My emph2t',;; is] 
En 18 1 'Allemagne seule avait su SBlSlr 
raidissement du capitalisme~ a 
l'horreur de ce chaos 
syst~mes totalitaires il y avait un d~sespoir. Et 
c1est en Allemagne que la tradition m~canique trouve 
son ~panouissement; ]~~ Camps nous signifient jUS'=lUIO~ 
conduit l'exploitation de l'homme si elle slexasp~re. 
Ie d~but du Xxo 
associ~ dans leur histoire un certain lib~ralisme des 
~charlges et. SP~~:C:'-.Ilat,if a I.. .. n posit.iviSI1l!:= qui E!nt.t-a~nd.it. 
11~lision de l'homme dans I'~conomie. Notre g~n~ration 
Ie mirage lent ou l'~clatement catastro-
phique de llun et de l'autreu 
La grande affaire, c'est la terreur (ce n'est pas la 
Ie pense Kant)~ c'est 
1. ien s Cr C 1. a 1 '.' '-_.1_-1 r. n C,_' t- 1.>.--_. ,- ,-, r" rr' ,::. rn I • 1 .L. .; .... 1 ,. - l' .L. .L -,. +-.l. 
.. .._ .• II !._ .• j _.\ '.' ". t··' _ ... 1_. '_.r::: C!e J eu :.~ .... l"-I==~. 
di ff~~yel"'lt.s avec chacun son 
efficacit~ pragmatique 
positionner les gens ~ des endroits pr~cis et de leur 
faire jouer des r~les, est travers~ par 12 terreur~ 
c'est-~-dire par Ie peur de Ie mort [ •• "]~ 
r~pression, Ie famine~ [ ..• 1. 
33. Les diff4rends entre r~gimes de phrases ou entre 
genres de discours sont jug~s n~gligeables par Ie 
mode d'entra£nement n~cessaire d'une phrase ~ l'autre 
~CCt.I·-t.e 1 I .;§v.f::nE~ment.:, 1a 
l'attente d'une communaut~ de sentiments. 
Le contr8le que la finalit~ du caPItal exerce sur 
phrases occurrentes n'est certes pas nul, il est celui 
de la rentabilit4, done leur subordination ~ un enjeu 
semble @tre l'enjeu de les -.. . enJeu~·~ :0 
[ n .... ] :' gagner du temps, mesur~ par l'int~r@t caleul~ 
..... ,t::" 
• .:., .... ' CI 
I .-. lj i 'f f~~ ,.- - t- M ~-'::=_" __ ::""=-__ ""4::-_. ==_ ... ~!:-:::. :1 p. 21Zl1 
,;:-. Ij J' of 4= 11:. t- '=-·1'- j L 'I - t - ... ...1 I ~ ,~: .. ::::_ ... __ .... :::...;.:."~ .... ! ... ;=:" ..•... :::: ... _!.!:= .. , .:'; 1 •.. 1 _. Cl.! I.:J =.. novel 
and feelings that can 
t.hinks ()f 
publishing for the production and publication of 
philosophy .. the example of 
a philosopher whose 
IS dependent upon his posit.ion 
and publicist of the books of more talented 
men under topical and opportunist banners. 
notes that philosophy left. in t.he ha.nds of" B·-I-I-'-.." 
(the name Levy uses for hIS press and television 
c·:ont.I·- i but ions) will become first and foremost subject 
to market pressures. The market and manager such as 
L.E"!VY wi I 1 control the dissemination and interests of 
philosophy .. 
Acte coup~ de sa fin~ entreprise vid~e d'ambition; 
sont. Vet 1. cl.t:. 1 es· 
F'al~' all E! 1 ement. ~ I' al'-t. lao 
--repr~sentat.ion noie €!t'- - Raphae 1. 
ennuie. L'objet subit Ie m@me proc4d4 que Ie I ieu des. 
l'expression surr~aliste 
rn~rne se livre au hasard~ c'est-~-dire o~ j8.mais 
l'homme ne fut plus libre. 
liNes en 1925 11 , p. 2054 
Et clest sans doute la plus grave que 
1 I t="_" ',,!. F"'· €'~. "'_ .•. ~ .. , ,_. 1-_11.'-'( ;-•• ; •• l' +.' .... I I tl l' - j - r.: I I l' .... .. . .-=....... 1= I.. !~.: ,-'.'1 .-:;, 
1'". 01." V C., ]'. ,.- .::10 1'-• .1.,,··.·1::· ~.". ,...." , --_"', S=.o'. .... --.-"., ('::,,1." r" - t l' 1. I'- - L- .- r-] r- I !lcl.· ~ ~:::' I !t::! 10 .' .I..·IS 
liNes en 1925 11 , p. 2056 
L.;:::~ seul insurmontable auquel St~ ~-tet"I·-t.t::~ 
des r~q" .. imes de ohrases e+ ... 1-.... ~.-".1 .. 1 •. ~_ dpe dl'-rnL'r-/... .. .. _.--! =- .•. _ 1 =':0 clest. 
qu' i.I n' y a. p a. s· mi:!. is des. 
L'obstacle ne tient pas ~ 
des humains dans un sens au dans un autre, mais au 
in order to process problems essentially 
outside that philosophy such as the problem of 
just.iCE!u There is a tension in Lyotardls book between 
the theoretical study of language and the set of 
examples illustrating that study; this-i~ because the 
examples form a coherent area of study all 
()Wt1 : the notion of an unthinkable in j I.Ast. i ce. This 
chapter serves to investigate the tension between the 
the philosophy of language. 
41. In this chapter I 
a.s a 1'-, deSCTipt.ion of I v-t--I-d l --
..... _ I_I _.ct . '.. .-::-
the relationship between the .. rl?a 1. II 
B.I"'Jlj I wi I 1 explain the relation more fully 
IV .. 
chal.pt.E!I'" I I .. 
La diff4rend est ll';?'t.8.t. i nst.8.b 1. e et. I I i nst.CI.t'"tt. dt.! 
langage o~ quelque chose qui doit pouvoir @tre mis en 
phrase ne peut pas l'@tre encoren 
de phrases possibles~ chacune relevant d'un r4gime de 
phr'as.es II Me;.. i s 1 ... ln al .. lt.t-~':! g~':!nt-e d~'? d i SCCtl .. ·II·-S fOI . ..trrli t. '_·In 
ensemble dlautres phrases possibles. I I y 
':lJ'ff~t-- ::f ~t-tt-- --- ~.-.'.I.~-_~p_.rn~_I'J.~_"·-_- (r_il_~ entre les q .. enres qui L. ~ ~nL  I~ ~ L~~ ,_  . 
les appellent) paree qulils sont h4t4rog~nesa 
Le diff~rend~ p. 10 
.---------~ .. :-----.-----
45. A 12 diff~rence dlun litige~ un diff~rend serait un 
cas de conflit entre deux parties (.::tu mt:) in=..) qu i 
pourrait pas @tre tr2nch~ ~c,uitB.bl~_.m •. ~_·.·~I~.+_. f +- ::II at.! .. ·e 1._ t.!nE~ 
r~gle de jugement applicable aux deux argumentations. 
46" Je dirais nulil 'oJ a diff~re~.1d._ r.~_rl+_.t-~._ ~ I + :f , J Le~x par~les quanL 
Ie r~glement du conflit qui les oppose se fait dans 
llidiome de llune d'elles alors que 
llautre souffre ne 5e signifie pas dans cet idiome. 
] ~-:.,- t.' .I~' ] .=. t. ":t I ~ t 1'- ~":. '= P ~I ~ • .; ~. ,.- '= p 07,' q 
._:_-==-::".:....::.. .. ::. ... :;".=. ... :._._:::-::. ___ c.: __ ::_::: __ .. :::_::! ___ .::...~.:.c ... ~--==-__ .:.:. := ... II .. - -
Note the evolution from this quote 
In 
L.yr:)t.~I.rod ' s book the concept of irresc,lvable 
conflicts has replaced the idea of singular unjust 
in the earller works, it is these claims 
that put a heavy responsibility on the philosophy of 
language introduced in the book. 
Da,'-,s Ie diff~rend~ quelque chose "dernB.,o,de ll a ~tore mis 
et souffre du tort de ne pouvoir l'~tre ~ 
Ie genre ~st celui des 
Ob'!!:..';:~lo-vato i cans:. Remarques~ Pens~es~ Notes~ relatives ~ 
4'9. 
5111. 
1 .• ·ln forme discontinue de 
I do not claim~ here, that Lyotard's style is the sole 
cause of the clash between and I inguist.ic 
pl·-esent.d.t. i on-=, n In fact, the contrary t.he 
'::.t.y 1 e reflects the complex relationship between the 
ph i lo:-::,ophy 0 f and the consideration of 
justice. My remarks concerning Lyotard's choosen genre 
are meant to explain the difficulties involved in 
distinguishing the two related presentations of the 
La vengence n'a pas d'autorit~ l~gitime, 
l'autorit~ des tribunaux, el1e en appelle ~ des 
~ des familIes de phrases. ~ des genres de 
discours, peu importe, qui en tout cas n'ont pas voix 
au chapitre. Elle demande la r~vision des comp~tences 
ou 1 I .i. n:3t. i t.t.lt. i on (je nouved.t~>~ t.t- i buna,-~>~. E 11 e d~savoue 
t.out. t.I·- i bun a I .jes pht-a.ses qUl Sf~ 
Pt-~~:sent.el·- a i t. comme 1 etH" tT i bUY'ld.l suPt-~rne un i que. 
,=-I~._ d i ff~t-end, p. 54 
A la diff~rence d'un litige, un diff~rend serait un 
cas de conflit entre deux parties qui ne 
pourrait @tre tranch4 ~quitablement faute d'une r~gle 




Lit. i '~H? :: 
justice. 1111 
Cont-es t-a t- i on 
.~, 0. .--: . 
. -:.!..~ 
en 
ajouta que ce nl_' I l' 1 d-rn-tlj-" A+-~ 
.., .. '= d. , d 1 "t- '= _-cll T';_ 
conforme aux 1015, qui ordonnaient que, dans un litige 
et- d. van+.:- 11~ j uo;Jeroent. d,~ fit"" 1- +_-1- t- ••• II V - t-~ + , '= f_-OU _- , R~vol. 
Li t.tn:~·_ 
Dommage. Terme de jurisprudence, dommages et int~r~ts, 
ou dommages-int~r@ts, somme al1ou~e • quelqy'un pour 
l'indemniser d'un pr~judice. 
Plaignant. Celui qui porte plainte en justice. 
53. Un tort serait ceci: un dommage accompagn~ de la perte 
des moyens de faire la preuve du dommage. 
n'y a personne pour en administrer 
personna pour l'admettre, et/ou si 1 'argumentation qUI 
la soutient est jug.e absurde, Ie plaignant est 
d~bout~, Ie tort dont il se plaint ne peut pas ~tre 
attest~. II devient une victime. 
Le diff~rend, p. 23 
.j 1.:::'; 
r,::'r.::' 
.... 1._1 :.. porte plainte est ~CI_~I_'+_'.'~_"" ~. l' ~ ",alS ce Lll qui est. 
v i ct. i me I~t. '=\1..,1 :t peut §tre Ie m~me, 
sIlence. 
~56. ._T'al'rnp,_,t-~l'-.-_, ~FF-l-t- dl'ff£ j 1 . II .. , '_' oJ 'l:::~ l:::! _-__ ~t:§n~_ 12 cas ':'1..-1 Ie plc\ignant 
est d4pouill~ des moyens d'argumenter et devient de ce 
fai t, Ia vict.irnE~n 
57. Faire droit au diff4rend~ c'est instituer de nouveaux 
dest, inat.a i t-es~ de nouvelles si9nifications~ de 
nC'I...lvea l .. .f:'{ ql-le Ie 
s'exprimer et que Ie plaignant cesse 
victime. Cela exige de nouvelles r~gles de formation 
et d'entrainement des phrases. [ ... l Tout tort doit 
pouvoir @tre mis en phrases. 
Le diff~rend. p. 29 -~.-.. -.-------.' 
DClns Ie di ffEf:!t-"2nd ql.Jelq .. .fe chose "dernal'-Ide " 
en pht-ase~ et souffre du tort de ne pOUVOlr 
1 ' i nst,ant.:· n [ .... ] C: 'est I' enjel...1 d'une littEf:!rature~ 
d'une philosophie~ peut-@tre d'une politique~ de 
t~moigner des diff~rends en leur trouvant des idiomes. 
[ ... l II faut lever ces n~gations silencieuses. 
[ ••• J L"", t.l"·ibl ... II"·ld.l faIt. F'I"·~_v;::._.I'-_'l· ,.- '.-_~-_~ j_........ .;../ 
. ~.:!.:::t 1 me e '_. 0 U c e 
g~nre sur les autres, '---'+-' -. =_"-1 t t- - t- ,... - ,- l' V t j ~, ~ d I~~' an· I ans son 
idiome dans Ie 
:::,oc i c:i 1 et son commentaire, il fait n~cessairement tort 
Le diff~rend7 p. 203 
60. En montrant que l'entrainement d'une phrase sur une 
autre est probl~matique et que ce probl~me est la 
po lit. i (=\I ... le ~ ~riger la politique ~ l'~cart de celIe des 
" i nt.,~ 11 ect.ue 1 s" et. des po 1 i t.1 ques. 
Le diff~ren~. p. 11 
61. Ce 1 ... ·1 i ql..-li d i t. CII ... , ' i 1. quelque chose est 
P 121. i ·~~Wlcl.nt., i I doit en apporter la d~monstration. d.U 
moyen de phrases bien et de 
d'~tablissement de 1 'existence de La 
II-J'ai des rn ill et-·:=; document.s. J'ai 
inlassablement poursuivi de mes questions sp~cialistes 
:3 i::. 
"! . 
.J ;:\ 1 frI·::· t s E:n vain:o un set~ 1 
ancIen d~port~ capable de Me prouver qu'il cl.va i t. 
serait la condition qui donne l'autorit~ 
de dire qu'elle existe [ ..• l. 
Le diff~rend, p. 16 
my p os i t. ton IS at odds with the argument 
of the Faurisson example. and is prepared to accept 
Faurisson's argument as a challenge to positivist 
Positivist historians are at the mercy of a 
Faurisson if they imagine that justice consists 
so.tely in the application of cognitive rules in 
such cases. If history were merely a question of 
such t-U 1 es., i t. is hal·-.j to know how Faurisson 
could be accused of injustice. 
I believe t.his view tT ivied i zes t·he F' 0 sit. i vis t. 
historical position, whose cognitive rules amount to 
f at- mot-e than t.he max i rn: /I To see wi t.h one's own eyes". 
t.he 
consistency of a historian's Investigative method, are 
applied to measure the validity of historical claims. 
To is Faurisson unwarranted 
credence, a mistake with serious implications for both 
Lyotard and Bennington. 
In gent-e as a st.t- i ct 
apl=' 1 ieat. ion of rules of correspondence between reality 
interpretative statements it. is too easy to 
instigate categories of events outside co':=!n i t. i ve 
vel""' i f i cat. i on. Havin9 followed Lyotard's lead on t.he 
Fat.w i sson C,3.se, Bennington also allows the example of 
AI..I~-::~chw i t. z t.e) fall outside the realm of cognitive 
anCl.l ys is: 
if II A t~ S C h wit. z II S'-~I~'::res t.s, a 1 most. 
that the historian needs to be 
ctccot-dinq t.o t.h>2 r'ules of t·he o:I'~_!t.ive __ ·:=!enl·-.~, 
._--.. ---_ .. _------------------ --------.. -------- .. ----------------------
then on this account, 'Auschwitz is the realest 
of the realities'. 
'~ i qna J '':. t.t-I'=~ 1. i rn i t. ~:,f _J.li st~2.t_~ ,-a 1 I-omp~t.en-~: but. 
___ .... tf" __ •• __ ••• _ •. __ •• _ '_"' __ " ___ "0"_" __ ' ____________ • 
t.his limit l':~ implied in the structure of 
'reality' in general. 
I: lY1y empha:=, 1 s ] 




I in the rest of this chapter~ how the 
restriction of the cognitive genre and the situation 
leads t.o false 
categories of judgement based on the distinction 
judgement of tribunals/adjudication. Geoff Bennington 
accepts the validity of those categories too readily 
due to his favourable reception of Lyotardls account 
of Faurisson and the Positivist cognitive position in 
Le silence ne signale pas quelle est llinstance 
niee:o i I signale qu1une ou des inst.ances sl:lnt 
ni~es. Les survivants se taisent, et. lion peut. 
ent.endt-e (1) que la situation en question n1est 
pas l'affaire du destinataire; ou ( 2 ) ,=!u leI 1 e n I CI. 
pclS lieu; Ot·\ (3) qulil nly a rien ~ en dire= ou 
(4) que ce n1est pas l'affaire des survivants 
plusieurs de ces 
II C).A:'; t.os Qu i d Noct. isH 
It· is:o howevet-, no ordinary review; 
Alain Badion gives an extensive and careful reading of 
Lyotard's book. It is common practice in Ct- i t.iql~e t.o 
present Qssays as reviews {~_.·Ji.t_~lrlr_.'l •. r~.-..• t'-1 +,_.t'~I=._.·~1 j 1 . 
- ~ -' ~ I. ~"":!V!? op t.I·-lernes 
than to the book 
F 1 •• .1 r' t. h ~:! t·· rn 0 \.,. ~-_-'. -. "C.{ ;:'_". '-._11' '-_11'-, _. 1 ]'. ~ .......... _ T - - L \' I j 
. L . ~ ~~ctn- uc ~ancy anL Philippe 
I_;.~_.r_(_~ll~_-I._~.t'~.t-~_.~II~_· ('~l-- --t--l'j j LL' L 
.• _ _ r .... , .::.·u 1_.1_' I=..- I '2('-12' In ·t·r-,lS cr-Iapt.et-), has 
i n t. E! t .. est. In the themes tackled in Le 
1;1 __ 1_' f' t..-.1:_, (._ .... -_,(.,.! Ij • I J .,' .- t I F'.L. 
-1 .. =..- own '00 -:: s, ~!::..j I_·-_on penset- _1 ~E~.O Ij . .:!=. i qu.::;.·-;:' 
face of unpredictable events or 
In his book on 
Jean-Luc Nancy sums up t.he common of 
himself, LacQue-Labarthe, Badion and Lyotard as "t.he 
just. meast.n-e of t.h~~ incornmenStH-able". The 
quote aptly expresses the motive behind all t.~-teSI~ 
. .. 
lnCISlve C 1'- i t. i c i :.::, m s ':1 f Io-JOt- k Sa 
common philosophical ba.ck9t"Ound 
and pol i t. i C cl 1 
pursue a debate on a common topic at a very high 
1 ~ v-I -r' L- - -II I _. 1 l' .L V '-_.1 'f' tOo' L-I ;;'l -r-_. ,j 1-'_-. t, =:. ~_.I-'.-_ J' ,_ r e. +_. l' f l' e e. my 1...1 S e 0 f _ I::!.. r I~::: '- .• ' c\ '_. .. r - .. , • - -
t.he i t .. as a unified critique of Le diff~rend, 
rather than as a set of disparate criticisms COmIng 
from disparate philosophical positions. 
66. Tout se joue pour lui [Lyotardl dans 1a question 
du r~f~rent comme pour Ie specialement 
•. -__ .'·.r.'+ ...•. -._.·.L.·-I~ ...•. ~ .. _.t .. ,-.-_I.~_.ll.,J· .• I~ I~._.~._· ~--- L lL . 
.. 'r-! ~r.I .... ' .. .1,.-, ~-- J::!'~ J:::e a 
f'::!.lt. sent assignables 
67 .. [ .. n " ] L: La pesanteur de la m~taphore juridique 
la 
les phrases math~matiques ~ elles 
(~I. mot"! ·3.\'1 S ~ t. 01.·( t. e s· le~, ph,·-a.ses 
dont l'enjeu effectif est 12 v~rit~ - falsifient 
cette d~finition du cognitif. Ce qui fait que Ie 
d'I .. W·1 
( j ur i d i '=1t~,=).. [ " .... J ~ Elle ne s'oriente pas selon 
Ie bon paradigme" 
"Cus.t.r::rs Pu i d I\k~.::t. is" ~ p. :361 
[ n ... j 
,,=, 1;'~ Pl"'j i l':)'.::co.,'='he·:-.-.. r-'_- '.:.~. ·::' ••• r" l' 1'-11--_'1"'1.1..._. l' 1.'-_'1' t 
" 1 c()mmE:~r'l _. 
ql ... land loi L I OCC.3.S ion 1 etH- I~n est. 
l~~ ~crits de I'un d'eux, Lyot.at-,j, 
1982. Le pr~sent 
[ II L.a facul t.e d~~ fa i t. 21 1 us i on a 
71. Tout un devenir-maderne et post-moderne de 
la politique comportait 
comm,;:: 1 •..In dE: ses t.t-a i t.s specifiques de se 
F' t- I~ sen t. E: I'" 1 u:i - m,§rne avec d'un 
II cons t.,~ t i f II , St·lt- Ie mode d'l-lne 
[ ••• J. On constatait 
Ie destin au la d~rlve de l'epoque. On d~crivait 
un effondt"ernent. , ou une fragmentation, des 
d i s:,po':~; i t. i f·=:.:. des branchements, des desirs ou des 
pIa1S11··S .. d. que t.out. cela. 
imp]. i q1...la i t. jugement - et aux deux sens possibles 
I'expression: cela comportait d~ja jugement., 
et cela eX1ge guion juge. 
72. [ ... ] dans cette sc~ne de notre epoque, cet.t.e 
sc~ne de la modprnit~ qui croit en avoir fini 
avec I'~poque classique du jugement~ celIe o~ la 
:~2i 
pl"" i 1 0 ?':' (:q:::+', i. f:~ CiJ.,1 .'.: I.A ':.=,1 e m ~:~ n. t, .~' ;::_. ]'. t, t·.j.' j Fit 
- , ,- d.U _·Ot-1 ~:,~:, Ie" d, _.on 
Jean-Fran~ois Lyotard viendrait nous 
dire~ attention, Je vous arr~te~ il y a paradoxe~ 
la signature post-moderne~ en effet, 
fonde, i1 est. 
'-'1-'_-' I .. ' t. - ~_- to' ,. ,::"_' r-._.,' ~_'_-·.I-_'I·"'lj :::.. l' ,- =_ ' I t r.- I _ ~ malS c eSJ pour cela mi~me 
SUI·-t.out. s'en 
debarr'asser; et, 5i vous croyez vous en d~faire~ 
il ne vous laissera pas en paix de sitBt. 
Les " j I_H' i '::; cons 1..·1 1 t,es " nomment. II deduct. i on II la 
r~pond dans une cause ~ la question 
"G!u i d 1 I et,ab 1 i ssement. 
du d~-o i t.; 121 d~duction transcendantale 
concepts purs de l'ent.endement doit etablir Ie 
"Lapsus .Judi c i i", p. 56 
jeu des ressources kantiennes - ou 
for·,damE!nt.a 1 e 
• j .:.. I - - ,. I - ~ t 't' - t- " I 1 t..,' P_ '=. t_, r. 21 '=, k ant, i en n e • t- .::: p 0 n 0: t- 12 cI t· t "::;! ..... ,_. '=:=, _', U I '.., ..• I - r 
II Die s I t- a e", P • 1 2 
75. Lyotard entend tenir le rnot.i f du 
OJ -:. 0:. 
-:~~ 
.. f i ct. i onnE!rnent." ql_.1 i 11..,\ i., 
probl~matique du fondement et de l'oriqine. 
avec Ie jugement, la probl~matique 
de 1 I 0 f' i ';:I i n e 
f i n-.=, II • [ ••• ]" I 1 ne s'ensuit pas que la fict.ion 
Ie r6le de substitut 
et. 
st~bt-ept. i cement. la 
th~matique m~taphysique g~n~rale de I l origine. 
II L8.PS'-~S Jud i c i i", P. 59 
[ ...... :I J ~~ me:: refuse ~ faire pencher, ~ l'instar de 
les modes et. de la 
pr~sentation du c5t~ de II f i 9tU- at· i on II Ot.1 du 
" f i ct. i c.nnern';::~nt. II .. I 1 rn.~ 5emb 1 e, 
termes rel~vent dlune probl~matique du fondement 
This quote and the quote under note 36 do not make 
if t.he takes account of the dates of 
pl...lb 1 i cat. ion of ctnd Jt.\d i c i i". 
However, the work in Lvotard's book was completed long 
its publication and, by his own admission, 
dc.~t.es back t.o 1981 (having appeared 
po 1 it. i '3,-~e ed i t.ed by Nancy). In fact.,. Lyot.at-d I sand 
7"7. 
. '-- •. - l 
-' .. ~.~ 
1 a po lit i (=lU~2 Ii organised by Nancy and Philippe 
I 
that Lyotard and Nancy's analyses of Kant owe much to 
to a certain extent part of an 
ongOIng dialogue between the two philosophers. This 
theSIS IS supported by the note on page 148 of Nancy's 
t.I···, is pa t- CI.';:.:I'·- aph rnus t. wi t.h 
[ .... ]ft~ 
.justement la consistance propre et l'auto-
legislation des sciences qui les qualifient comme 
mod~ ll~s r ••• ]. !'r·lel. i s 
comme telle~ pour 
la raison ne s'y trouve pas 
cet.t.e 
Tel est. 
raison; elle doit d~s 
. , -
J.I::: 1:", t- 0 E' t- e m I~ n t . c. _______ .. _____ 
let qt.j~2st.ion cl·-it.i'=!ue; "G!uid jt4t-is?". 
Elle ne Signlfie pas qu'il fasse 1 ~9 i t. i me ,.- 1 e s 
. ; j - - t- - ,- f 1· ,-._. ' .. ·11·- ... _-, ;!_'. 1 (-::._ r- :. 1· '=. 0 n • sc 1 E~nce~::, mc,. 1 S C:~2 , '_'t'll::!· -t ._ -, '-,-
"LEl(='·:O;US JUdici i!l > pu 51 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lyotard le laisse entendre. 
II [:r i es F' • 27 
different reading of Jean-Luc Nancy's work on 
Lyotard see David 
1'/\ - t ,- Co (1'-, \1 ':: l' - '::: ~~-t..c-_~~-.!.:-::.=!. :a XL I I, n° 16~i. In an approach similar 
to the one glven in this chapter~ David Ingram uses 
Nancy's ~eading of Kant and Lyotard to criticize the 
latter's definition of in my 
op1nlon, Ingram oversimplifies Nancy's argument by 
it. t.o c\ on Lyotards confusion of 
determinant and reflective judgement: 
[ ••• ] by prescribIng very determinate boundar1es 
to the prescriptive and de-=:.ct- i pt. i ve 
games of morality and science respectively he may 
he,.v,:'.! confused (so Nancy argues) determinant and 
reflective judgement. 
A ,.- end t. c\ n d L y 0 t. at .. d ", p • 7 1 
As I have shown, Nancy argues against Lyotard from the 
point of view of judgement seen as a fiction or 
I believe this argument goes beyond a simple confusion 
of reflective and determinant judgement. Without the 
more complex account of Nancy's work i t. i s d iff i cui t. 
to see where his discussion of Lyotardls principle of 
plurality can find its justification. 
In·;::wam sees Nancy I s Ct.rgt~ment. as "del=isive" In i t.s 
Lyotard's theory and its IIl clC k of 
cent.er edne'5s C1.nd I find t.hat. 
conclusion very difficult to accept given the common 
and Nancy t.hei r 
and ';:Ii ven i nt.e t- p t- et.a t i 1:lns 
Nat·"ley I s st.at.ed i nt.ent. iCJn t.el fl::t 11 ow and di SCt- im i nat.e 
Lyotard judges that we judge and that we must 
I judge alonside him - this means more 
than recognising the importance of his work or 
agreeing to certain of his propositions. 
@.t:~!;! __ ._d.;!;.:~cL.~.f1..:lnat.e [Eat-t.aq.::. - au sens Ie plus fClt-t. 
du mot] in the statement of his judgement. 
IIDies It-aell~ p. 10 
Lyotard juge que nous jugeons~ et que nous devons 
Je Ie juge avec lui - et cela si9nifie 
plus at autre chose que reconnaitre llimportance 
dlun travail ou que souscrire • certaines de ses 
1 e pI u·=.-
du mot - la motion de ce jugement. 
Ie 
progt-amme qu'elle n'affiche pas, 
I::es [les passages entre 
autrement que comme des 
suppl~ances destin~es ~ conjuguer les fragments 
d'une origine, Etre ou sujet~ disloqu~e. 
Dans l'instant insaisissable o~ el1e joue la loi~ 
une litt~rature passe la Elle se 
cBt~s de la ligne qui s~pare la 
loi du hors-Ia-loi; elle divise l'~tre-devant-la-
loi, elle est ~ la fois, [ ••• ], II devB.nt. Id. loi II 
et. II av<=\nt. loi". Avant l'~tre-devant-la-loi 
Les dlscours sur' la peinture se destinent peut-
f clssent. quel i QU' i Is disent.: il y a 
~ ~ t j-L-.- r - I~O 1 11_'P_I_ 'vt-e. 1_lrIP_ pour eux un ueuans e~ un I I:::!rW ~ ~_ 4 
s4rie d'oppositions vient ensuite de celle-ci qui 
Pc' .. :::.:. forc~ment premi~re 
.:: e 11 e 
2PP0vtient a un s·.~.'st~~~_. ,jC.'t-r~_. l<~. t,'-_'t-,~r_'I-=_ -1 -II. :7 ..J _~ ~ e 1 ':;:-ml~me 
reconduit Ie probl~me). 
Toute l'analytique du jugement esth~tique suppose 
qu'on pr_~ i sse 
1 i i I"',t. t- i ns~~q' . ..Ie et. 1 ' e ~.~ t.I·- i ns~qt~e. 
la beaut~ intrins~que, non sur les atours et les 
abot-s. I 1 done sd.voi t-
fondamental du fondamental 
- comment d4terminer 
l'intrins~que - l'encadr~ et savoir ce qu'on 
exclut comme cadre et comme hars cadre. 
89. As noted In the conclusion to this chapter, Lyotard's 
presentations of his philosophy of j t~dgement .. I 
distinguish the strict philosophy of language from the 
In this chapter I 
have shown how the critical distinctions necessary for 
( ot- outlaw) definition of the 
the distinctions between the justice of 
t. t- i b t·w, ct 1 s and adjudication~ t.he legal and t.he 
nece':;sat" i 1 y out. law bot.h and 
I will 
,
., '. ,:.....: ':.'. t .. ·. 1_-. L-, ,:::'. F:' t ... e'" _. +,_'. ,'_-, ;:;_'. '_=. tOo'. 1_ 'Ij '.' , '-_' .. ", i " - l' ] • _. 1 
-' r - _.. ,_ -"7 I :·'P=':: pr-Il .o'::;opny ot a.lrI91_~age 
tropes and distinctlons 
I claim that Lyotard must deduce the 
A critical theorist who does not see the need for the 
distinction I draw above IS David Carroll. Carroll 
In his e~=:;say wi t.h ~:::ant. and 
Lyot.a t". d: F I'" om r.:les t.het. i c t.o pl:11 it. i ca 1 j ,-~dgement.s II ~ in 
Met.hmen:. does not separate what he calls 
Lyot.2it-d I s and " 2~na 1 yt. i c II 
he claims that Lyotard's 1e9al definition of 
diff~rend. which 
_ .._._-_ .... _----.. _ .... - ---_ ... 
mot. i on fo~-
1 i n·;.II.A i ·::;t. i c Ot-
phrasic definition wot"k inq on a 
categorisation of sentences: 
What could be called the II co,-~p clna.l yt. i que" is 
continually countered 
both of which are 
c()nt..cl i ned Ot- :. t" <:t t.he t- :. d,:. bat.t.le in t.he t.et- ro 
di ff4t-end i t.sel f. Fot- t.he di ffet-end 1S, at one 
and t·he same tirnE~, a kind of limit. case of t·he 
analytical and the .==, of f ~-::, - +- J' 'I -, [ 'l 1",- -
-... . .-. '.- •... . '.t 1:=. • n II tI _ IS • II;:! 
historical-political and 
theoretical in general 3. means of 
the theoretical b~vn-,rl 
-,r _I _ itself in pursuit 
it cannot capture or .present~ that is, 
IS aware of the dIfference between 
Lyotard's use of legal tropes and his philosophy of 
the two are distinct. On the contrary they complement 
I am 
deeply worried by this notion of complementarity based 
does not supplement 
it·, IS the foundation for absolute 
r:::: 1. ,::'; i rn ~-:. I. V ':-:' t. <:t ~ .. d rll 2. k I? .::; in the definition of a properly 
t.hel~t-et. i Cel.l cetnn'::tt. 
fOl ... !ndc:lt. i clnell If 
feElings are not given a theoretical basis~ then there 
cannot be a distinction between feelings that are 
~ I t-=_.r,.,~.,ra,tl].=_ tll~_.f-_t-=_ ~ ~_~_It_./t-t_., and 
.::al...I'E:.p(.1 ::r\/ cl 1 .... ..If· .. 01·19 ~,... _, ~ I I ~ '-, • 
-- . 
beal·-ing d i ffet-ends 
------_ ... - .... -_ ..... 
out.side 
equitable legal resolution. 
90. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe makes a similar point in his 
,:::.1'"1 ,:::'-1-. j nt-·':"=:. _. t-,.-·,I 'e "~. II ___ ._ 1 _ _ .... " I • ..J. , 
on the exclusion c.f any 
judgement based on what is proper or essential to a 
I=as.:~ • In us i \'-1';1 sl.Ach an e}{c 1 ,-~s 1 ()t"I LYI:.tat-d must. define 
Whclt. l.~~ Pt-OP~::t- t.o t.wo t.ypes clf j I..lljgeroet-,t. :s he t.het-eby 
falls foul of his own exclusion of judgeroent accordin9 
t.e. t.he r:·t-OF'et-. lI·r·I.' -,- v· +. d tI'  ~ ~~ lC~lme e ce que ·u exc us'
(You are the victim of that which you exclude) is 
Lacoue-Labarthels soroer.-Jhat. I..lnk ind yet. 
In" 0':'1 en ~:§t. i clns-nous? II LCl,=,:,ue-Labat-t.he is Ct- it. i.= i s i n9 
Ly.-_.t::.. t-.-.J ' ""_-, t. ,-.'} ,-_, I •.•• "AI_.! J'I''-+ -" tilt L- 1·.- -t-l' t l' -1' '-rn -FF 11' -,-.  , J t .1':' ....... :0 I....... rl,:, ,_ _. '-::. d" e::. 
eql.·la 1 I y we 11 In the effort to do 
justice to victims of the judgement of tribunals:o 
Lyotard makes victims from the application of his own 
Although Lyotard parries this point in 
by as irresolvable 
tht-Ol~9h jl.-Is'l::.ice only a particular tort and a 
what. 
t.o:. 
L aC':'I.·le - Laba t·· the implies is that the syst~m Lyotard has 
constructed for the reC09nition and righting of tort 
is itself a source of diff~rends: 
rehabilitat __ -, tl~,~_ rl-!l",'r!=_~l--, j 
- ~- - con, ernned 
only are yoU subjected to the same 
determination as hIS interpretation of 
m i ml~=, i '::::, ( th2,t, its submission to mimetical 
r:: 0 n -_-I tOo' 1'- <::-1, ]', t-,'f_', '=.) -, t.' 1'1- 'Y - " - 1 -- -
- , -, ' .. ' -' ,,_, _~ d :;.'_,1 find yourself involved 
In t,hOU9ht, ba,sed on discrimination and 
that is to say a thought of justlce 
t l c:-=,'_:::_, r:=.-_'_ Ij '-_,II''', t, l_,I:::'_ 1- =- t t", =- tOo - I' -- '-I +' 1 =- tOo .." ,- .., - .., - r" 
- r - - '-, _,r '-, =- ;:, _, "" !'::o _~C:\ '::or: '::oct lIe's ~ CII'- if 
one prefers it, the properness of sentences. You 
find yourself dependent on an insistance of the 
II C)(~ en ~t, ions - no,-~s ''?'', F' " 1 :39 
la mim~sis condamn~e par Platon; 
non seulement tu subis la surd~termination de son 
interpr~tation de la mim~sis (clest-~-dire de sa 
propre soumission ~ la contrainte mim~tique) mais 
t,!..,1 t,e t-et,t"OI".lVE!S aV~2C de la 
discrimination et du crit~re. clest-~-dire avec 
la justice, fond~e sur la catharsis 
des jeux de langage ou r~f~r~e, si lIon pr~f~re. 
la propri~t~ des phrases. Tu te retrouves avec 
une exigence de propri~t~ [ ... J. 
In referring to mimesis In Plato and to 
or sentences~ Lacoue-Labarthe highlights two reasons 
quandat-Y. The f i t-st, .... eason 
91. 
'~2" 
f~ >~ arnl=·ll~s 
bring extraneous constraints to the terms 
illustrate - this is a mimetic problem. 
the i rn i t.8.t. i on of forms of discourse independent of the 
form and content of the discourse one seeks to 
alters both that form and content. The 
in the attempt to restrict the 
play of creative. F'1::!da·~o'=1 i ca 1 mimesis, Lyot.at-d 1 ,--. 
forced to set down what IS proper to the language 
games and sentences he uses 1n his system (this is the 
r~gime of cognitive sentences; see my 
work on Alain Sadion, above). I have not furthered my 
analyslS of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe's work because 
Jacques Derrida makes the same points 
generally applicable This 
bot.h Na.tv:y 
books and teaching" 
libidinale dlun dispositif narratif: 
t] L j F' ,-_'V' I-=: 1'- t-I"_~- \/ II • t- a co n _. e . e me tH- '(T e 1- e. ~ :T 
1· ,-::, no coincidence. 
"Pet.i t.e ~conomie 
La FM~g i e Renau 1 t. 
j 1 j
.L __ j_, ___ 1I 
II E >~p~d i ent. 1 ans a 1 ,=1_<:\1 '=' 11_'= • 
·.3·3··=+ 
9 :::: .. I n ~:::.§.':. __ .I~:;.12r~;LLt i ~,r', po '.-:':' t. rn o.j e tTl ~-;, u 
- -------.-.. -- .. --.. -- .. ------ .. - .. ---~--.. 
'~}4" The aCCOfflpi:"iny i n';;J t.e. ;.,: t.:=; t.o Le ._ d i ff':'t-.::.nd ar'-e usud.l 1 y 
incll..·lded in the book in part or as a whole; they are: 
':;12 1 on ~:::ant. " ~ II D i ':-::;cuss i 1:lns, ou: 
,0t,_',=:,-_L-. h , .. ,'. t_ .... -:r II II _. II L 1_-""_ l' ''''1_''-_" ,j=_ L J.' II II T j' 
<- r no . .... .., <~ ~ ~Vlnas, ._ u' lcie,--,~{ dans Ie 
Other texts could be added to this I have 
it. to q,-~oted Le 
In necessity replaces 
Lyotard states and grounds necessary In t.he 
domd. i n-:=, of language, justice and polit.ics; the book, 
therefore, marks a move from criticism to critique in 
his work. Furthermore, L~ diff~r.::.nd must be understood 
in t.he line and context of Kant.ian critique and its 
definition of the 1'29 i t. i mel t.e realms of pure reason, 
reason and judgement. In the propaedeutic 
'~I-t··I. t·- L"l'~ t---I' I y-t-t-j rn::.:..,j ... -_" =-. '=: .... _-t-l.::._'=· ,_-,f ,-_;:.t-efuI,. 
"" '_I t'. _,' .. .1 r , .::. _"_"_'~., _. I_I _. cl' "-, '-, - - "" 
yet. i nnovat. i ve t-ear::l i ngs of t.he Ct-.i t. i'3t.Je~ and of Kant.' s 
po 1 i t. i ca I 
po lit. i que 5e 1 on Kant. 11:0 ",h.ld i c i eux dans Ie diff~t-end" 
·.J:j~i 




pl..~bl ish,~d aft.E:'·· Le dt ff~I··~~nd, In t- r . t f" L 
.. -.------___ . __ .. ____ .. ae.· 1.· Wc\S 1 n I sned 
prIor to 1984 - see the p~eface to ~'~nthousiasme). 
St. a t. ~:' rti 1;:: n t. s a::-:. II Conca t.ena t. i on 1· '= • oJ a 
concatenation IS not "indicate the importance of the 
ph i ]. osoph i c,:\ 1 ~;:;; t.I_.ld i e'~ leading to them wi t.hin Le 
d i f f {~ t- I::' n d • 
--_. -
from the statement quoted above I 
begin to deduce that the concept of concatenation In 
Lyotard's philosophy of language must provide the 
basis for the notions of necessity and contingency in 
Le d i ff~f·':'21-··ld. A less decisive factor is gIven through 
---------------
Lyotard's own appreciation of his work; quotes such as 
to 1 O~-J II and liMy 
book II ~ liThe mode of t.his book IS 
t.o the status accorded by the author to his 
Of COI . .-II""·SE:,. my interpretation of Lyotard's 
-;::.t·ctt.ed intentions can only point to a direction of 
be defend~2d through a close 
analysis of the texts (this is the practice of my 
thes is) • 
-. ... 
. ...:.~._li·=. 
97. of t·he and most. 
to 
OT 
sPE:ci ficallY fragmented, teleologically 
reflexively self-criticising 
architecture, politics, science and philosophy. 
In addi t.ion his 
artists such as Duchamp~ 
Adami ~ and the composer John 
see (:t 1 S() curator of the postmodern 
al--t. .:~ ~.: h i bit. i on ilLes . (reviewed In John 
October 1985, and discussed In Paul Crowther's article 
"The Kant.ian t.he avant·-9at-de i:t.nd 
po~;t.rnodet-n" , 7) and his articles 
on the respective roles and duties of philosophy and 
politics in Tombeau de l'int~llectuel and Le 
----_.---------------_ .. _--- ... 
E'ost.mod~rne eXDliou~ aux enfants. _______ •. ____ •• ______ .. __ .. ____ •. ______ .1.. _______ ] ________ • _______________ • ______ • 
Th~2 L.,;::~ d i ff,~t-end fi t.s t.h is 
------ --
concerning the presentation of Lyotard's ideas through 
and t.h i=:· how 
Lyotard describes the genre of his book: 
the sense of poetics the genre IS that 
c,f Obset-vat. i on':S, Remarks, Thoughts~ Not.es~ all 
relative to an object~ that IS~ the discontinuous 
form of an ASC~\I H~ ~I~~~I-I~ 
• ... •• - _J _.:t n _: t .. , ._ 1_, _ I book? The thoughts are 
T I--H;:! :~-e 1·-- i e::::. -:1 f t-II I rn tl A_'-- '_=:' • '. t ~ 1S ln~errup .ed whenever 
by I··~ot. ices:: reading 
philosophical texts. However~ the book is to be 
1 ·-~ L~ 
des Observations~ Pensees, 
relatives ~ un objet~ c'est-~-dire une forme 
discontinue de IIEssai. Un cahier de croquis? Les 
r~flexions sent disposees en une serie de numeros 
La sect.ion est 
interrompue selon llopportunite par des Notices, 
::-ont- des not.e:-s de de t.e~-~tes 
Mais 1 I ensemble est ~ lire ~ la 
SI...li tea 
The question of whether such a genre clashes with a 
critical philosophy is too vast to be answered here as 
a general point~ although one of the main themes of my 
thesis is to address Lyotard's plural presentation of 
his topic. Suffice it to say that strong disagreements 
exist over the merits of the combination of genre and 
argument in Le diff~rend: 
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• 
abu~e that which one could call 
st.yle, 
r:i'-I~+· I ~: ._. _: ..•• of t,he an 
1 ink t.o t.he 
-.oJ.. 
~.' .. ' [ •• ,,]u 
Jacques Bouveresse, 
1 -::,.~ . .&-.'_, 
appeler Ie style ~num~ratif-allusif, qui proc~de 
par accumulation d'exemples n'ayant entre eux, la 
plupar~ du temps~ qu'une analogie extr@mement 
Compare the above quote to the one below (- Are they 
discussing the same book?)~ 
[In le diff~rend] you will find an accurate and 
demonstrative style that follows 
t.enc-i.c i ol ... I~.l Y II 1';:· t.he will b:, careful 1 y 
examine all possible objections and the plot of 
the demonstration is even tighter due to it.s 
l'::] -:: i 1"" F' - -I . - II -'.L. -. • 
, I . < •• 1 -. , ._.'d' ... ! 1 ul...! '-.. I ... 1Sr~.():;-, 1.:.!t...11 d NCu=t.l S ":0 
une prose probe et 
demonstrative, qui suit son fil avec opini§tret~. 
Une volont~ dlexaminer avec soin les objections 
possiblesu Une trame d'autant plus serr~e qulelle 
99. The two mlstakes mentioned in the text are made 
individually by commentators according to 
their criticisms: rna 1 evcll ent. or 
Richard Rorty and JQrgen Habermas that I am addressing 
The words malevolent and benevolent classify 
fe!!'- discussins Lvotardls work ( in 
lnsof3r as he wishes to ally himself to 
Lyotard's opposition '::~wand 
narratives" Hab~rmas is malevolent in his attempt to 
advertise his own philosophy as the -Qnly consistent 
posi t.ion ( I- - 'H- 1 1 \ , - t- -f ,.- ~l t. i CI n all \I ) t.o t. i:l. k e vis. - ~. -•••• 11.-1 .... I mo t- E; .. L. .,' ct 11._. .7 
vis the conservative nature of postmodern society. 
The Lyotard-Habermas-Rorty have led t.o 
comments following these initial 
The essays by G&rard Raulet and Seyia Benhabib in New 
German Critique n° 33 and Christopher Norris in The 
are typical of·these after-shocks 
of t.h,== they merely replicate the 
by HC'.bet·-mas wi t.hQt~t. 
questioning the political motivations behind their 
CT i t.icisms .. I 1 .... d.Il now point out and explain the 
formed by some of these seminal mIstakes and 
stenciled arguments. Take~ for example, 
rejects the consensus view of truth 
entailed by Lyotard's pragmatist outlook. 
Christopher Norris, The Contest of 
f ,:t C 1.·1 1. t. i !::~ s C' F' u 1 7 
defending Habermas's 
interpreting Lyotard as an anti-theory and hence 
This conservative ideology has clear affiliations 
-. 
t."li t.h Lyc,t.c\t"·d' s naturalized narrative 
It also brings out the very marked 
Pl~ lit. i cCi.l implications of any such wholesale, 
Th i'~ con'::;er' vat. i \/i=~ ideo 1. ()·::.I· ..... / 1- - ~ 
_ ·Id.=- clear affiliations 
idea of naturalized narrative 
pragmatics. It also brings out the very marked 
po 1 i t. i e2t.l implications of any such wholesale, 
del i be t- at. e retreat from the claims of rational 
Idem, p. 24 
In a deliberate return to 
in t.o 
definition of legitimate realms as presented in Kant's 
Ct- it. i (:lues. ____ :::1.: __ Lyot.at-d ' s ct"itical and his 
interpretation of Kantls critical philosophy has been 
syst.eme..t. i eel 11 y den i ':wat.ed 
HabermaSlans (except. Emilia Steuer man in her essay: 
m i Sf' ee\ din q .:0 f .------.------.--.~- Kant (to put it charitably) which 
ignores every protocol of reasoned exposition in 
t- he t. ':1('- i cal , e s s en t. 1 a I 1 y 
pragmatist cast of ethical dictates. 
Lyotard is marked down 
as a pragmatist~ Habermas 
<: ?JJ!;i R Ct 10- to y f 0 '0- that matter) r_l~l·~n +~-+ 
... ," _or Id _0 he 
i~ t~'P_rp_fl_~t-~o-_' ~Ir°l-lo 10 :::1--1 j 
- r ~ I~ - I ~u ogy ani anti-system~ I hope 
that the content of this I_-~'::tn+_.p_r -1· L + 
r-r d one IS enoug~ ~o 
demonstrate the presence of systems in Le diff~rpnd~ 
_0 
identification of system and ideology: it 
does not follow that the lar_'!. f ·fO d t 
t I;) Qr.L~ ___ !:-!'J..L_~..e sys oem 
implies the absence of ideology, there can be an 
il:l~_~.r_.III_-ol~_-oIY ~_,·f dl·-n-r~tp 
. =-ro c\ ... , 00_:0 even conflicting systems 
although Norris does not agree: 
For Gadamer:o there IS finally no escape from the 
circle of tacit or intuitive fore-knowledge that 
makes interpretation possible. The same line of 
argument underlies Lyotard's claim that first-
at-e all t·hato we 
can reasonably hope for? given the failure (as he 
it) more ambitious systems of 
The Conflict of faculties? p. 27 
Ito takes for granted the 
exist.ence of a broad-based consensus on what 
makes sense at the present stage of an ongoing, 
open ended cultural tradition. 
ldem~ P. 
G~rard Raulet and Seyla Benhabib make the same point 
as Christopher Norris when they attack Lyotard for the 
"na 1: vet.y II in his 
deduction of the validity of pragmatism. They t. 1=1 0 
completely ignore the critical background to Lyotard's 
argument and therefore~ 
which they could not use against a critical philosophy 
dedicated to an aware and difficult study of the 
possibility of judgement: 
In the absence of radical~ democratic measures 
social :0 cu I t.lW a I 
inequalities and forms of t.he 
plurastic vision of groups Lyotard 
t- ""_'I'll :. l' t-. -:::. ,- - ]" v = ~ ... , - .:J..c:.L:._-=." 
Seyla Benhabib~ in 
IIPost.m,:,det-ni sm: A 
POI 124 
..' t tL-'el" w:::.- v TI··.p assl.lmpt.ic1n t.hat. rl c~_!'.Y.§": __ .J....tl...-~ " ___ iE,!.n I:-L.:!..!. . .:..~_.!.!Sl.z... -
1 at)gl~age ';:lames would be games of 
information:o suggests that language games do not 
compet.e" struggle wit.h,. or contradict one 
Not. IS Lyotard naIve, J!rlr·.~_'. 1'- -1 . 
. -::; do ~30 cynIcal 
(according to Benhabib; note that this view coincides 
WIt. ~., ._T cl l= '=I 1.,_' .::~ ::::.. t:~ () I, A \/ ~:! t·- 1::'. ~. __:., '.:_:., ,-_-,_ I,.=:. ...- - • i C L' 
..• ! ~.:::!·n;:lx r:::· 1 n '-\21 ..... ]. on;:..} it .• :!=- .=.t . 
... __ .. _ .... _--_ ... _-------_._._."=-----= .. .::.. 
t.I·", i:d:. t h '? r:, J_ {-'.:t. \.f '-._1 f 1_ ;-.-•. '.~. -'. ,..,:-_ ! ... I."'_~. ":-"'_ ':-.. _J. .... - r r\ - -- t I' -I' -1 '::;'0. hI:::! ::, m~l.y nCI_. 
t.t...I,·-n into a matter of life and death, and t.hat. 
the intellectual cannot remain the priest of many 
gods but must take a stance, is cynical. 
Id'~m, p. 124 
Given Lyotard's enduring concern to think through the 
holocaust as a conflict of language games or genres, 
the above quote leaves me confused (see my work on the 
Auschwitz paradigm in chapters II and III of the 
Equally worrying in the context of this 
IS G~rard Rauletls claim that Lyotard cannot 
be refl...lt.ed II I hope to have shown that criteria can be 
certain aspects of Lyotard's work; thereby~ I will 
have refuted this statement by Raulet: 
Their attraction [the philosophical 
--
Baudrillard and Guillaume] 
the suggestiveness that they radiate in bestowing 
the status of proof upon concrete indices; since 
:345 
they simultaneously 
mvt.hs :' t:J:~!:~ y <:1. \f () i r:l 1'- e f '-~ T. - t· . .; '-I -
. -.. --.-.----.-.- ·-·-··------·-----.--_..::.9 ~_::...:::l..!. ~ 
which, given the lack of metacriteria~ cannot. 
even make itself heard! 
,-: • .:!:. ~ .. -. ~- -I c· - ] - t 
.• ..1 ",_.. ,:t! t ... ! ,-~ .. :-::\ t·, . i;::~ .,':1 Ilf-:I'-om r'",- -I-'-t-l' t-v 
" 1_.iI .•• ~:!' t ~ ... as 
What is remarkable about the three authors cited above 
in which they take on board the 
parallels Rorty draws between his post-philosophical 
and Lyot2ll'~d I-=:. II postrnc;den'-' i srn II ~ and 
cl d.ssi fi Celt-.j. on of neo'-
conservative and anti-theoretical (in the light of 
I find thi~ second position 
particularly shallow - at level of 
scholastic research 'i-l· .. · Th.::,y 
Vir2WS of Habermas and Rorty without takinq account of 
... ~----_ .... _-_... -
Lyotard's replies to both of them (in Critique Vol. 
3:?'~ Pp. r:;k~ r est.-ce 
le inC ,.- i t i ql...!e 41.~ 
only applies to the later criticisms because it was 
published towards t.he 
debet.I!:!1I 1'~86) ) at"Jd w i tho,-~t. 1. nvest. i 9at. i n:;! the 
foundational work 
- their reading of 
" 1,- _. l' '/_. II t - ,- t! t ct . I:~ .... , J:::~ ..... c\ t~ ';;:. J:? _" "-1 E! ~..; steadfastly refuse 
look beyond it for an explanation of the problems they 
find t.here .. 
The point is: neither Habermas nor Rorty seeks out the 
or even bibliographical back9t-c)und t.I:' 
Lyotard's postmodernism. This is because both assume 
plurality of language games 
ungoverned by a meta-theory, is to imply that this 
position must be arrived at pragmatically and not 
through a critical e!<pos i t i (WI. They do not justify 
that assumption, bl...lt. it IS how they are able to 
classify Lyotard as a pragmatic neo-liberal or'- '· ... e.:1 -
IS Rorty's version of the point 
The fundamental motivation of Habermas's thesis 
Foucault~ Deleuze and Lyotard, is that they offer 
reason for taking one social 
direction rather than another. They abandon the 
--
dynamics upon which social liberal thought (such 
as t.hat of RctW 1 'Eo ~ in Amet- ica:, and Habr?l'-mCl.s 
himself, i t1 t:.h~t-many) is fOI...!nded~ t.hat. is, t.he 
347 
need to be in contact.·.. I.A.II·t.'.-, .=_1 ] . 
r rea.lty hidden by 
"idE~oloq ..... \ .. /1I 8.1 .... ,d_. "-'::"1--1 -l ~l 
. -'. '=d_.I~U ·-.!-I!·-ou·~h "t.r',eot'"'y'II • 
\ 
1 ;:1. th~se de 
Habermc;..s 51:;; 1 on 
F ot·lca!...f 1 t. :. DE! 1 ~?I ... IZ e et. 
.. neo-· 
est qu'ils ne pr~sent.ent 8.1.·lcune 
IIt.hE!OI,·t·::tI...IE!1I d'aJl-t- j-I-- "1-- j' t' 
•• , -. ':::! I •• <::\; I:'::.. .. •.• ,'== 1_ 11'- ec _.1':)1'''' 
sociale plut6t que dans une aut.re, I:::~t. qr .. ~ 'iI s 
1 i:J.qr...le 11 e =.. I e=..t. 
la pens~e sociale lib~rale (comme celIe 
m@me en Allemagne), ~ savoir la n~cessit~ dl@tre 
r~alit~ ob~curcie 
1. I II j, deC! 1 09 j, ell I?t. I·-.;t~v;;?'ll~'? pa~" 1.:;:1. " t..h.~o 1'- i,~ II .. 
Note that the above quote holds the seeds for Rortyls 
subsequent realisation of t.h,= :=.t.~-()n·? 
between himself and Lvotard, to come out 
debate in Critique vol. 41. It IS t.he abandonment of 
consensu~ that will eventuallY scare 
Rorty away; however, Rorty never considers that such 





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Emilia Steuerman). I have sketched a general 
1-._~J·.t .. ·.·I.r_.l·.'.= .. ffi.1 ~ ••If 1~~ ••llrl~.·.= .. Qrn~,r-t~t·~ ~t--n 1-1 t I ·t· I • V'> • ,.. "'. 1<::1 •••••• 1';:1 1 '_,r. c! _.'E:t-rnr...s S PO:=,l ... J. on 
V. __ .l.·, •• _'-'--_,_-:.--_.-_~.~:._-.~(._;t· •. _'--·.-_' ..... -' "... .. 1 '=: -1-•••• r" '-... llj ~_-. "-,.-, l' .... -  r". - - t- I l' - (- - .. - . + I . .L • 
. , ,- • ~~ - II ~ I - " '= <::f. 1:= • U.' 3. n .. ' '-1 1 S no ,_, '?- :. g 1 V e n 
t.hE: spax sit. Y Q'f" d j 1'- .:.r·J-- ,- .-.mrn,::.n+ ,- - ,- I" - t - ,- -l L.., l 1- t 
... - _. -' - _. . .- .. ' =- u' ! .... Y U .. ' <::I. • I.... 1 •. 1 ~/ r- ct -' e t- mas 
I will not extend my general criticism to the details 
and 
I 1.-'IIi 11 ~ give the seminal 
.. ant. 1. -t.h€!Ot-y" labels that have been stuck to 
Here is Habermasls definition of neo-
the 
development of modern science, as long as this 
only goes beyond its sphere to carry forward 
t.E:chn 1. ca. 1 Cet!=' i t.a 1. i st. and 
t- a.t. i ona I administration. Moreover, they recommend 
a politics of defusing the explosive content nf 
cultural modernity. 
I f · .... _~a.'·- tL t t.... '::J ,- 1:lf a.nt.i-ml:,d,=t-nit.y~ ~ •. r-Ia .• ' .. ·r Ie 1 rea. :::.. 
an add i t. i 0''"12\ 1 p,--e ._. 
t . ~.-·'-.~'F·I_'l~t- l'n t_.~ .... ~_ r_l'rcles of modernity, are Jecomlng ~ .. ~ = 
alternative culture. 
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Idem:, /=,a 1.4 
it. 1 ,....-::, t,'::.-_'.'."f"" ..lrld. t .. I·",""'_' ,.... - -,- - f t I' t I y - ~LU~~ 0 ~~lS ~~esis to 
mot.i ves behind 
categorisations - it. 
does seem that an investigation of his sense of the 
=;pl ... ,~::t- .. '?s sl...rch a.s. ;:'1-••• =-.. ,-1. p_f". P_ -,- d 1 t t . 
-, <~, '.J!I c! . I i:! .·e t- nE\ _.1 V€: 
mi9ht. a. personal 
in finding Lyotard's pl--, i 1. osophy .. ant. 1. _. 
'1-1.',,::,,1'-' I'" a:",t l' ,":.]" ':It-Id , ... -'1· ... ·- - t· - t W - t-t I·' y - f 
.. ', ..... ,.' ...... -, !-,. <.. _. 1':....._ '= 1' . .1 _. 1 .. .1 ..., 1 • .1 II popula.I'- i t.y /I • 
100. The types of exegetical reading I am here referr1.ng to 
in the works by Geoff Bennington 
writinq the event) and David Carroll 
._ •.•.•. _ .. _ .... _ •. __ ...... _ •• r.: ............. _._ .. _ ... _._ ••. _ •••• _ •• ___ ...... __ ...... . 
po 1. i t. i c 2., 1 with Kant and Lyotard: from aesthetic to 
\::.,-;:,), it. i eE! 1. 
8nd Carroll - to a lesser extent - offer careful and 
t.hey 
a.t-I;::: both inclined to follow Lvotard's argument without 
raising or attempting to solve problems that come out 
of specific aspects of his theory. This means that 
15 sometimes uncritical and;o at. t.imes!, 
l.::\c:k J. t-'9 it"! 8. full e ~.~ pos i t. i CIt'"! .:. f --t::.1·11~ Pi:'! i nt.s of 
lvotard's argument i t-. p8.t-t. i Ct~ I at-: t.he p':'!int.s t.hat. 
imp 1 i ci t.. Le di ffet-end. _ ..... _. __ ... _--_ .... _ .. _- The 
Bennin~.ltonls and .. r.~~.·.,.lrl~r ...I].l .. '-,_ .. t''---I t 
- . ~ctLY accep~ance of the 
steps In Lvotard's argument is that they aim to form 
of his work, in Carroll's case a 
study of the socio-political and aesthetical value of 
'-._c:'.SI2 <;1. dec: on'::; t. t-uct ... 1,' C.'I·-, '-If' -t- ,....tl'...Iy --1= tl It· L.' 
- - - - ~ U ::. • , .. <I..J '_II •. (-Ie tOe c\ ... ll:)tlSrllp 
phtlosophy of 
d~:=!vc\nt, 1 all:) t \I. The flaws i r. 
these approaches is that they cannot consider the 
strongest version of Lyotard's work because they have 
not challenged and reconstituted the many~ 
For example, David Carroll ends his exposition of the 
use of a philosophy of 
wi t.hOI . ..It, met kino;! direct criticism ~.2. 
]. n..=..t.ead =' he i rnm~~d i a t.E! 1 Y 
.- to - _. _. -::I"'" t - - - - .. -,... i .-I·-Jr" - ..... i ,-, .... , I-• .If it.=.· S':II= i B.I r'" ' •• 11 ••. 1= l:-! ,_ ~-:.. .' 1.,1 d I ••. ' ... 1. I =.. .• _ .:. . c:o. '", _ •• , 
Keeping the social as a que~tion does not imply 
that no judgements are to be made, however~ that 
on I:::'! fnl.ASt. On the contrary, it 
imp 1. i es t.hat. judgements must continually be made 
d tl t ,tt-all'1-y l.s imc'l:)ssible al,ool.. . ·-,a .. ' nE!t· .. · ... ' ,_. 
-- . 
becat~se all j t.,do;!ernent must. d i ff~t-etlds -~- ... ------.... --... -. 
when there IS no universal concept of society, no 
law, i ud':;lement .. 
d i sr.:·,-.!t.E"~S ,")v.::-",·" t·.I'-I/=' "1-11 ; +- j ,- 1 ~. - . 
.. _ ..... _ .... J ............. _ .......... - _._ .... _._-=-_ ... ::=_. __ .. _ .. _ .... ::_~ .. ~-=_ ...... _ .... _.: ... =-.. __ . .:::.-=:....:.. - S':_._.2. ____ :~~~E? 1 ~ ___ '!;l'le 
t.he pol it· ical 
In the quote~ Carroll has taken the consequences of 
Lyotard 1 s philosophy of language as given: 
One advantage provided by a philosophy of phrases 
IS that the social is evoked and in each question 
In each phrase but without being defined before 
Idem;< p. 75 
He is therefore able to proceed to a discussion of 
judgement as free determination. In mv ., 
is not preceded by a critique of the philosophy of 
. +-' . 2. CT 1 .... 1 -=It.le it will be possible 
granted that judgement 
and, furthermore, i t. 1 .. -.1 i 1. 1 be possible to ignore why 
t.l:::·t-m~. 
, tIL' 1 I 'f] .. t"'''''1 1- ""e ( .... 1· ~_, 1'.d dp_I""_-·l' -=1-- nat.ors 1 n .. ' '-,e pr') 1 OSCIP '''IY 0 . d I-:'~I .. • (::\':, I .,' 
Fil"'lc\ 11 y, I do not. ident.i fy I-':;Pi ff 1:"-1"-1-' + I 
• • .... - _.1 • },:'II:=: "! 1 ng .. ·on S B.ne! 
David Carroll's work with the books and essays 
f cll1 Ol/'J 1. n9 t.he Habermas-Rort·.~-L'./otard ~-t-+-I • ..!I::! .I<..-I. ••• ~ t.hei r 
is of a much higher scholarly value - due to 
their exegetlcal approach. In fact~ both Bennington 
and Carroll are at pains to point out the theoretical 
and ct- it. i ca 1 
of theory and a practice of theory questioning any 
Carroll, Critique n° 491, p. 269). 
101. Auschwitz est la plus r~elle des r~alit~s ~ cet ~gard" 
historique voit sa comp~tence r~cus~e" II ne s'ensuit 
pas qu'on entre dans Ie non-sensu L'alternative n'est 
p2\ ~-5:: 01 .. ·1 la signification ~tablie par 
l'absurdit~, mystique comprIse. 
10:2. Un nom [Auschwitz] qui d~signerait ce qui n'a pas 
la sp~culation, un nom de 1 I anonyme. 
Et. POl.U- 1 a SPI~C'-~ 1 at. i on:, 1 
I - + .... 1 ,+ ,-_I .... _I_'t-+_. 
_ 2\not'"lyme 0''- -~ -' ~ 
[ •• " ] II Le nom 
m4canique, abandonn4e par Ie concept. 
:354 
II ['11' '=rl ,...,...' .-,... 
.' .J ._ .,,1::.:::,101 !:::, :> 
103. Lvotardls idea of a name as rigid designator is taken 
Si:.tYs II 
1:-1 ... l' '=.'-... '--I --.-_, ""_-, l' ('.,', tOO, 1-•• 1 f L(', t- 'J'. p' I :', ~.-_ I 1-_-, W'-' t- I , 1'.... + L ... l' .- t.: L-..-,... , 
- .. r t ~' ,_, r:. I I _·r I .-=, ·r Io::!::'l. S 
t.II::' ..• c <::~ '-~ s '::! ., ':::', 1 t. h '-.. II .. -I'=r_ rl L" "I-I t- "'" .... r-I r-I r- ::. W'- '-I t- L,",_ " pi, - ',=, .... ,-.,.... L . - -- y _. _. <::t. I _, ,_ ,~, :::, _ 1 1".,' •• - r:. t::! .J I 0::::::" e a t- r:: r-' , 
he does not retain his theory as a whole, 
leave the idea of a rigid designator unaltered. In 
to his own purposes with scant regard for Kripke's 
original intentions, or for the subsequent criticisms 
of Kripke's theory; I will, therefore, 
Lyotard's definition of names alone. Note that this 
IS true of Lyotardls relationship to most 
analytic philosophers - except Wittgenstein and his 
theory of language games-, his readings of Frege, 
1<,· .. i pk€!:, and von Wright are strictky 
rn - t- -.-.,- - I t L_ - Y ,.. - + 1-_II_'t, ro,:::.._ t-p._l '.' +_........ p_. ',", D, lc, i t. what.evet- of e '_o::::'h~ '''y: _·rl':::! =,e _,,, ,l 
t.he i t- - -'ve I,,=,pfl-ll W l' +_.h i n t.he pt 1_, .. ' ._._ .. CI:lnt.e~·~t, of 
Lyotard's own work. 
:355 
1!214 .. On r~pond ~ tout I'- .L - 1 ' ~ct_1Sme que personne ne peut 
vo i t- "1 a. t- ,6_ (":!_, 1 1- t",6_ II t ~ PI'-opt'-emr2n _' di toea Cel~, SI_~PPclse 
lIon np_ vn_l'+_, r 1 /····a'=. e 
nom propre. Nommer n'est pas montrer. 
For a short, clear and simple exposition of his theory 
of rigid designators~ 
they s i '::In i fy not-h i n9, [ .... n ] II u 
105. The case of phenomenology must only be understood as 
to Lvotard's discussion of reality and 
Instead~ the closest context of his argument is the 
i t, is 0;:1 i yen in 
of my thesis. Whether the many, 
versions of phenomenology, and in particular such 
theories as Husserl's phenomenology, can be 
reduced to Lvot.ard's idea of a naive realism of pure 
is not properly raised 
in t.a.ke 
not take account of the details of the history of 
'::I + \I tI_ ne phenomenology when he passes such Ju~gemen~s as: 
t .. I~I~._'. \rll_IW ~_.-.~ ~.~!~_ ~-J'~L f " 
'"' - l~r"'" I··'U.I !~:. 0 O'·-lg1.1""1 clf Ct. 
+ ... I= ..,.P,'1t:::',-_".- ;::.. •. 1 t·,.- ;::..n-:::,·-I::-.,·-..j-::ll'"II-.:;:.1I .. ,1·- - t- '-F' - - I ... -
.- ''1- .... '.' .. .-' ... - .'. ~.... '-'- :' v\ Ie I =.- - '=;::1 t·. 1 t 1':;1 of AU9uS t. i n 2t.nd 
the problem of presence in phenomenology in chapter V 
the absence of a discussion of phenomenology together 
with allusions to it for the purposes of the argument 
:i. n !:;::.§! __ . __ :;!j._.t.f.~.r.§'E~;l. mu ~~ t be =; een a s Ct. flo. win t.he boo k -
despite Lyotardls extensive knowledge of phenomenology 
d i sp 1 d.Yi?-d 
Discours. fiqure . • ___ •••• _ ............... __ ._ ....... __ ... __ • __ .... 1 •• _ ••• _. ___ • 
L'impression sensible est, comme 1 I 4cr it. Kant.:, 
nomm~ ph4nom~ne. 
fonction r~f~rentielle qui apparait alors r~sulte 
de la capacit~ quia Ie 5ujet, capacit4 active, de 
mont.. [-- e t- 11;::0 moment. et. 112 lieu de ce qui par sa 
fait. 1 I objet. ( W i t- k ,-.1\'-1':":1 ) • __________ .-L- 11 impressi':tn 
sensible [ ... ]. Ce que no us appelons la capacit~ 
Le di ff4t-.§!nd.:o p. 97 
_._---.. ------
1.07 .. LYCtt.an::l f · L L L ~ ~.~- t-~t-l'nn of deicticity and 1 t- Sc.~:· t- er.\ T~.~":!U "c •• '= 1'- -' . -. 




of a ri9id 
d.~s t gna.t.ot" t.o by-pass the corporeal 
in the earller book where the act of ostension 
was analysed as inseparable f~-m +~ ~ d f Lh • '_I _./ fl~ uO Y 0 r.:. e 
person indicating an object: 
Above and below, in front. a.nd 
loci that m.u-_-.. t... t,~_,. ll·t~'·~d to -
- r t· .. _ __. <:\ 
generating volume, a living, talking body and its 
indicating gesture. 
reflected in those lociu The 
i nd i CE\t. i on t.he '::~§~_t~.!:~ I""'efers back t.o a '=I::.-e}~ i st.en.=e 
clf br:ldy c\nd =;pace t:.hat. hEt.=:. no pai t- in t.he 
experience of language. 
Discours. fiqure, pp. 38-39 
.. _ .. _. ___ .... ____ .. __ L.--, __ ......... __ .. _ .. . 
Haut et bas~ droite et qauche, avant et arri~re, 
qu'il faut rapporter ~ un volume 
Ie corps vivant et parlant et 
son geste gestateur, sans ~ulon doive n~anmoins 
1 . d :I' -' .... .-1·,.. r - 9=-:-_. ,-_.",,_, 1._f""_lrp-=. u 1 ~"?I ... I :.~ 1._ es 1 1 m~.:! . I:', . ,_I 1-::.· ~ ~ _ 
corps et de 1 lespace qui nla pas sa pareille dans 
l'exp4rience du language. 
--. 
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1 '71.-', . Iv 1::- " les inst.ances de 
1 I r .•• W!:i. VI2!"'~. la phrase o~ 1'1- -_ L =. .:,,_,n '.' 
If· •• • 
Je-lCl-ma.lnt.'2nant.". Ce=:o d~ict.i'=!I..~es 
leur objet par une permanence extra-linguistique. 
cet.t..E! de 
pr~sent.~e au co-present~e avec l'univers de la 
ils sont marqu~s. Elle apparait et 
avec cet univers~ done avec cette 
1.10 .. p 1 cl st.. i c 1. t. ~~! (du nom propre) est.. evidernment. 
appartenance a un ou des mondes de 
noms :. ltd est.. at.t.t- ibuee 
constitutivement parmi d'autres noms selon les 
~~ c: a ,.- t.~, ~, P i:t t.. i a 1...' ~.~ :' anthroponymiques~ 
nornmes k i 1 omet.t-es ~ r. .. J ~ 
[ " u .. ] n Rest.€! que ~ ~ l'interieur de 
1. 1. 1. • 
112. 
1.1:3 " 
non ,::!t6+ t=o t- rn l' ,.- - t 1 -
. .- .. ' _. Ict , '= 
:359 
de sens 
peut venir s'abattre ':::".'--I!.. un nom SCi.t"I':::". change.... st<. 
valeur de d~signationn 
II Tt ,;-\ ~ - J' -.,,, -1- •. ~ 1 
'0 o' •••• .!. I.-. . J:::: _~ ..... I... d t , :=.' • e d iff ~ t" end" ~ F' • 228 
LI~ nom d ~: S i ' .. -... WI ~-._-: "'f' J'. ~.~ 1.=.'. r"l t=o_. t", + .. , 1\ =-.. + j .  ~ _ravers I es univers 
il s'inscrit alors dans des .... ~seaux 
de noms qui permettent les rep~rages de r~alit~~ 
P,,-. ·t.... .] iC!C·,. :;:, .! •• ne dote pas son r~f~rent dll.'t",t=o_ t"t6~ll'+~ 1 _C". ""r:::: • 
san~· 
modification de sa valeur de d4signateur (et 
c'est sa rigidit~) sur toutes les instances des 
univers d0 phrases at sous les r~gimes les plus 
Le nom remplit cat office de cheville perce qulil 
d~signateur rigide et constant. Sa port~e 
-- . 
ind~pendante de la phrase dans 
laquelle il figure actuellement~ et il peut @tre 
360 
qU' i]. 
avec sa place dans les ~- ~~ '.-:: ,:. ~ I '" -t - - ,-. 
.-.. _." -- .... -~ ,., '- '= t I () rn :=, • 
11.4. II ... l:i. r_ 1,=-.. · .. · ~··II-'rn J fn- 1· 1 ' -. , .. - .. :, (='. _ • .L '_',-! 
1. ' i t"lst.Clnt. t. 1 I i nst.ant. t·+l peuvent. 
et. 
(Ci:;t.ens i cln) • La possibilt~ de y 
dans Ies 
"d.vant." '=\I...le lao t-ealit.e s,~ mont.re 
et se signifie dans une exp~rience. 
Le differend. p. 76 
---_.-._---_ ... _-- _._--_ ......... . 
1.1.5 .. On ne peut pas prouver que tout a ete signifie 
d I 1 ... ln nom (ql . ..fE~ non SI~U 1 ement. 
mais 
lui-m~me un 
d~signateur de r~alit& <11 faut pour cela que lui 
soit mssoci~s I..~n sens et un referent ostensible)~ 
1. I infla·I::.l.on d~:~s pel...!v~?nt. 11 ... 1 i 
attaches n'est pas born4e par 
:361 
fois fortement d~termin~, 
,." E! I::' ~~: 1'" r. . . -=_ ..1. 1".'-.'.'. 1.-1 .. , '-.::'.1'-, -.-.. , 1 ,-_. -=.. 1- j, 
r- : .. .::! S i:';! ctt., }~ de noms et. 
de r-e 1 at. ions ( 1. e-=:· mCI!',des) et. 
f 2t i b ll:::ml:::nt. 
grand nombre et de l'h~._.t_,~_,I.rr'_'~~.~_t-,A,·t.A -I . :::' .= - .. = , __ es un 1 V'?I·-S de 
phrases dans lesquelles i1 peut prendre place 
1.17 .. Mi~ 1 S 121. 1- .I. - 1 i '1-.1. -II I t - + t . • I:::! .:::\ _. . ... ':=: '.-. ,,' .. ' ' .. 1 t- _. '7.. U .. ,11 a AI...lsd·-,~'-J 1. t. z [. .. ] 
restait et reste ~ ~tablir~ et elle ne peut 
ll@tre pares qulil est du tort de ne pouvoir @tre 
~tabli par consensus. 
118" A philosopher who takes an extremely critical view of 
lyotard's philosophy of language is Jacques Bouveresse 
the book~ Bouveresse attempts an ironic attack on what 
2\S 
--
j. 1'- , ... at. i (:Ina 1 i t.y:. anti-foundational ism and' relativism 
sadly;. Rationalit~ et evnisme is neither funny nor 
._ ...... ____ ._ ••• _._ .... _._ ............... _ •••• _._ ..... _ ......... __ •• _ ...... M ... _ ......... __ .~ ........... . 
tl .... · .... t---:1 ~--t- imr-:·in·::1 .... e it's line of 
.. ' . II=- II::~:~I" (II.) -' .... 
:362 
'-. '. ,.- '_1 roo. j. '-._. 1'. r-__ •. c..._ •. r-."",.. I, I - .L.. j , h ' 1 
- - - - .'C ~".y ur,:·'c\I~' S p. 1 osciphy 
of language from the presupposition that he IS a 
"'=',,'n 1. c21.1 II F'h i 1. oSOF··h€: ,.- -,' .-,-.. ". F'I- J' 1 -,- r F I .L..' .L. 1 • .' . I. ' • .1 ::', .. ! :. '-112 tOO 1 .. ·1'- Y 1 n9 ' .. ,0 f..l~,e a 
reasoned theory in the undermining of all 
Bouveresse then notes that despite his 
CI,t.t, 1. t.I .. K!e =' 
obsessions in his celebration of conflict~ 
that a problem of incommensurability 
must necessarily be posed on the subject of the 
relations between any genre and any other and, 
eventually, between any sentence and any other, 
Lvotard. 1.5 no small paradox) . 
... _J.'._~ ••• ............ _. _ .......... '- ............. _ ... _ •••. _ .......... _ ........ _ •••• ~ •• _._ ..... _ •.•••.•• 1-•..•.•• _ •• _ .. __ ._ •• _._._. -.-.-. 
[My ,:mphas i s J 
p ~ 1. 55 
du m~me 
[d'incommensu-rabilit~] 5e pose n~cessairement ~ 
relations entre n'importe que! 
entre n'importe et, 
n'importe quelle autre, 
363 
.... .::,] ~'''/ t=> ,::I I , 11'-,,::, .j ~-!:. r" =, I~' ,-1,-, -. ,. '.- + - ] ] - + , J I _ •• ~ - ••• - ._ •• '1. 1._. '._ .... 'tl ... _. _. 10..:: _.1! •.. f=! .. 1-._'.'-._ •... l ... !_~._. J .• ~.",._. • • 
r- .:':fl..~ 1 .=.:tt-tS 1 st.e 
obses:=. i I:.ns 
de 18 
c,~ 1 l,:::~ d,~ la radicalit~ et, 
1 E! t. ':)I.xt. dans Ie cas de 
Lyotard, n1est pas Ie moind~e paradoxe), celIe de 
la l~gitimit~ elle-m~me. 
Lyotard's argument is, therefore, at best paradoxical~ 
at worst cynical and lngenuous. The principal flaw in 




question is: Why should this be the case? Bouveresse's 
answer to this question is deeply unsatisfactory: 
if. as Lyotard affirms, +- h,:::- r-clst.mod'~I~n 
society only counts through dissensus, it. wi 11 
only last if a minimal consensus and a relative 
societies prior to the postmoder~. This consensus 
and stability necessarily implies an agreement on 
the obligation to preserve and, 
institutions and t.ypes 
] . t -' t . ,... m - P 1 :-_-:2 Rat. i l:=tna . 1 _.f:: e _. C..Y.n 1...:.-;· __ ':, - • 
.. ----------.. -.. ---~ --_._-_ ... __ ... -_._-
:3(·4 
la postmodern~.-_'. t-.'~.~_. v t 1 
. d. t·! -' P '-~S ~ 
c()mme 1. I ::.. f f J'. 1'- r.n. 1-'.-... f ·",nt.? .. -,...I ...... / ,,-. .-, -. t- 1·- ...I l' - - - t· . 
.... , " --'.)' 'M - .::o.! -':' -l .. ~ =: j-. <::'. _ ~ '.J.:::" ·=·,=n _.1 rnel·')'t. ~ 
comme tQutes celles qUi I' onto 
ql.../I~ 12. condit.ion de pr~server un 
c::onSE~t"IS'-"S min i m:::o1. p_+.... / !1'-I':::' ~t -,1-,]' 1 ]' t.L t- - 1 - t . 
-\ .. ' ~-. =.: ... ,c. _. '. _.~.:~ ~~ J. ct .. ' 1 v~'? ~ qui 
12t r~alisation d'un 
1 I ,:,b 1. i -:;leo.t. i on cJe 51. 
C€=!I·-t.2. i nes t nst. i t.ut ions et. 
certains types d'or-:;lanisation. 
quote utterly misses t.he point. t.ha.t. 
~,t" _ . .-t " ,_._] "\'0" 1- l' m - ] r: ___ :..:.!.::::._:::-.:...:.-~E!:-..:.. . . I cI., II tOe 1 c'.t. i ve st.at. iIi t.y II 
1· '= ._, s t.ctb 1 e \I and i nvo 1 VE~S Ct. "minimal 
consensus" Cif only the consentment t.o co-exist. with 
one's oppressors'. .::\t.t ;:"o:::k Le 
diff~rend. is the view that practIcal 
............ __ ............. -_ .. _---- . 
necessarily implies an agreement upon an obligat.ion 
and a legitimacy of the universal type. 
119 Th ' tl ]' tl ... -.L.. '-_.I\/~ .•.• I."'].y t=o_' • ..',eq_-et.i,=Ct.1. !-eE:,,jit-I'~~;:' . -" 1. S 1. 'E.. ..' .-,~'? cl:,nc, us 1 on .: ,d I ... 
C f I j , f f .I. I L- - .- t-.. L-I P__ ,_' to,. t-_. t':'_J t- c' r'- et. at. i c, n b v r3 eo f f I .::-.:.§_. __ .';_L __ ~.'·- .gr.!.!.~:. :0 s '-~ C r I a::r r ,-
B 't -' r' l' d ,-.- r I" - 11 ::. t"~· t-'I.t- ctb 1. e t.,:, c':lme ,enn 1 ng .. ·Ort anu ,av _·ct' '_I :' <., _. . •. -' 
wtt.l'-I 
[. U 0 ]" o. pp. 74.0 .76. 
1.21Z1 .. de fa,.=on stmoll·f·J·.r._~::\t ... t-i.,-_~~. I 
., fO' _ '. ql ... , I...!n~:! 
phrase pr~sente ce dent il s.' aq:i. t.:, t.CI. 
dest.inat.ai r'e; ce "pat-" qUOl au au nom de quai 
cela est signifi~ du cas~ Ie destinateur. La 
disposition d'un univers de phrase consiste dans 
de ces instances les unes par 
t- 8. FPC' 1'- t. au ~.~ au't. t- e s .. Une phrase peut comporter 
p 1 ' . ..I=~ i E:I..·1 I'" 5 P 11_~s t E:I .. ·lrs sens:o plus i E'Ut-<=' 
destinataires, plusieurs destinateurs. Chacun de 
,-_ .. ,.-.o.~= ::.~ quatre tnstances peut @tre ou ne pas gtre 
marqu4e dans la phrase. 
121. Celui qui dit quelque chose est Ie plaignant~ il doit 
en apporter la d~monstratien, au moyen de phrases bien 
et. de procedures d' et.ab Ii. sSE:ment de 
~f~ ~ L ~-ll't~ ~_.-_-.,~ +_'~_'o'.oiours leur r~ eren~. a r~d ~e ~ • 




Faire droit au diff~rend~ c1est instituer de 
significations~ de nouveaux r~f~rents 
tort trouve ~ s'exF·rl·rn~.-_~.r ~.-_'.~ .. , n.I ... J~.-_ •. ] l' 
Jl • ,. e p. a 1. SWI8nt 
cesse d'@.tr~_· I_./~Ir_~ Vl·I.~~_.l'l1n=_" '-_·.~_l~.. . j I - - - ~ eXlge I e nouvelles 
r~gles de formation et d'entrainement de phrases. 
I.::. dl·+ff-:,.r-:.~-:f :;';:-::.--:--.-.-!..----:::..--.!"::::.~ . .!.!;:- ~ p .. 29 
123. As I have shown 
in language allows new formulations for the 
expression of wrongs that remained ineffable prior ~0 
the invention of idiom proper to th,:::, 
possibility of redressing tort does not. , imp I y CI 
{."her·-e 
t-E!$I=:t 1 ved ~ does not define 
problems within a common discourse and hence~ as cases 
requiring ~ translation back into that discour~e~ 
cases int.rfnsic t.o 8.'·'"!\' 
sentences are formed~ 
point differentiates Lyotard from Habermas. 
Where Lyotard seeks to ground a radical 
Habermas posits the possibility of --1-.I.Jn,=·ensl..~S = 
A C t- i t. i c 21. 1 1 y 
bet.w~?I::~n insi9ht. 
incorporates the meta-hermeneutic awareness of 
for pass i td. 1 i t.y 
syst.I::?rnB.t. t Cct 11 y eli st.()rt.12d [t.his 
unlimited communication free from domination and 
... -.. _.-.- .... -_ ... --.. --_ .. __ ._ .. __ ._._ ..................................... _-... _ ..-_ .... _ .._---.... _-----_._-_ ... -.. -_._ .... _ .... --_ .... __ .. _------_._--_ . 
.. The he t- met-Iet.lt. i c 
clEdm un i verse! 1 i ty" , 
pa 21Zt5 
Lyotard's work in Le diff~rend attempts to show that. 
-_ .... __ ..... ----_ ... _----
there can be no legitimate theoretical ground on which 
-.. . 
to base the Habermasian " idea 1 speech s i t.,-~at. i on". Nc. 
.... 1 t t IIf frnrn dorninat.i':)'·l" cw pal-t lwea sen~ence can ,e ree -
a,·"'! " un 1 i m i t.r2d • .L • 1/ c()rnmt~n 1 ca '.·1 ot-, be'=Ct.use t.h~ 
124. 
:368 
and of sent.ences IS 
II ideB.l i zed condi t.ions" are 
therefore contingent and cannot form the basis for a 
principl~ of rational discourse associated with a 
transcendental truth. In place of- an ideal speech 
situation? events or occurrences call 
Heterogenous commentaries 
which cannot ground a consensus in dialogue 
r·, 1· -:: I.'j Ir'= • !-:._-=.!_':":. .. :!. __ .=!. II 
The net.wol·-k by all t.he phrases [of 
commentary]~ for which no common code exists~ 
becomes mOI·-e in its 
increasing complexity. It seems to me that the 
only consensus we ought to be worrying about is 
one that would encourage this heterogeneity or 
I'.j i. SS.I~t-'''':'I.AS II II 
3.-F. Lyotard, P4r4grinations, p. 44 
See also;o his II {~ppend i ce svel t.e a la quest.ion 
f\\1:=tt.e t.hat. Lyot.at-d I s l-iSe I:-f the expression as if 
( II cClmrne si") is an expl ici t. reference to his 
reading ()f I<ant ... The not.ion of the use of 
:369 
analo9ies in the application of the rules from a 
given faculty to a realm other than its own~ is 
legitimately applied to a realm governed by rules 
to which they are incommensuraee. 
the throwing of a bridge over the 
trope of a ship navigating between the islands of 
an archipelago -, as such this use of analogies 
is a necessary transcendental illusion because 
the abyss cannot legitimately be crossed. See:, 
PPu :31-45: 1/ 
InS·l st·=· it. 
1 ;~5. [.n.l Ie sujetne peut avoir des pr~sentations, 
. .--lll· ... rn:::.l.-t dt=.'" !·-'::;'_.F't-esent.ati'::tns ... rna 1. S .-=..1;: 00' 0::: ~:. '-' ,- _ •• ,,:, 
se,"',5 t.he§t.t-c\ 1 • 11 . ':IU ce eS-Cl viennent ~ la place 
d'un objet absent, mais plut.5t.. en ce sens 
le~s t.rnes· al..·!~·~ t-I:'?morlt..r ances:, .jes 
doleances, C I est.-~.·-di t-ede en 
confrontant leurs objets respectifs. 
12<::: •• 
siq_ne) dans un 4crit. T_l ---"~-.. F·~ ... ·l~!~_ -- - "1 'L ~ o L~ ~u 1 unlG. ~e 
mot. . . f" S l·:;.ln 1 1. e C:E: E::-=:· t.. ~l c:8t.~ .. 
01 ... 1 ' ... In cont.t-<~t." 
Ie d~fenseur ~ Ia recevabilit~ d'une 
ajouter une clause~ en 
particulier frauduleusement. 
Paragrapher, c'est 
t.ol ... lt..efc, i S n 
... _ .......... _ .... -_ ....... _---_._-
Ie litige, entre Ie 
loi et Ie cas incrimin~" 
Le diff~rend. p. 104 
-_ .... _ .._ .. __ .... _ .... _ .._--_._ .. _ ..... 
Ie sens d'une phrase ni sa r~alit~ ne sont 
indubitables. Son sens puisqu'il 
son enchainement al...lt,,"'e pl· ... rase 
Sa r4alit4 puisque son assertion 
est soumise aux r.gles d'~tablissement de la 
r~alit~ qui comporte l'~preuve du dciute . 
. ff.l. -I 1'''':7{_ L.e d 1 I::! , ... en'_l,:' P n "-' 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































"- " .. :... 
,-, .. 
,-,':::! 1"',1 E:st. J. E: 
r',?s i -:. t.,~ 
phrase et Ie temPSn 
T~··· -I-I!'~'-:::-- :.:.: .. -...... -.~;;~.~::~:::. .. ~:::~:.=::. , 
suis, il suit qulil y a une phra-:.e. 
L r-::' d]' f fr:!:, I'· .-::.t- ::I 
--::-:.-•• ~-:. ..• ~.-••• -.::::.--::;.-.!!:::.. , 
1:34" ~chappe au doute, clest qulil y a i t. cl'-~ 
phrase est un qUOin 
135 .. 
est. 'E.i9nifie: l.t 
~-~- I] -1~I~l'V- I~I~-t F'--I'd:\ J • . -:.' ~ .... _.-=-.. __ .... 5:~ ....... _._ .. _:. ___ ~. I .~:::,. _. et. .-:.' 
au sel'')'5 ( r:)'~.1 
pr~sentation n1est pas la situation'. Done est ne 
, 'f' 
=:,l';:Wll 1e pas: moins enCI:lt-e: 
-.. 
1 I r:'CCUt-t-ence 
1/ ctvant, II la si9ni fl.C8.t.ir:rn ( Ie cr:lnt,en'-~ ) de 
1:)6. 
i ci ~ i 1 n' cl e'I":! •. '=". ,,_'....... ,-·r::. f I 1+ 1 - ::r" '1 ,-I·' - ::., .• ',_, •• '.' o· '_I'::: _ ' .• , .. ' '== " il n'cl 
pas pour fonction de fixer Ie sens d'un termeR II 
en appelle ~ Ie facult~ du langage ordinaire de 
se r~f~rer ~ lui-m@me. 
this quote illustrates Lyotard's avoidance of 
the metalinguistic status of his own commentary, as 
. 1::1 . unIverse. Llscourse, insofar as such a dIscourse could 
refute his own claims. l,;)gical link 
between hIS text and the occurrence of sentences that 
1.:37 .. 1..·!nE~ phrase 
surgit du n~ant et s'enchaine ~ elleN La parataxe 
connot.I::~ C1. i ns i l'ebime de non-~tre qui s ' ()!..Ivre 
entre les phrases, el1e insiste sur 
que quelque chose commence quand ce qui est dit 
LE' et. est. la conjonction "qui laisse Ie 
p It.I:=;'. 1 • .::rub 1 i ) 
constitutive du temps, tout en Ie d~fiant par Ie 
374 
(01...1 la ~9alement. 
(ql ... ;!~~::. t. i on mais 
( .-, I 1 ~-.:. -:::.t- J. ,-,'.- ,- _..-;. ) 
.. .., .. ' ..• ..... .•• . •• I I .:::J.~:d!:~J: ... L .. Elle ne se fonde pourtant sur 
aucune ~vidence. Celle-ci exigerait qu'un sujet 
ind~pendant de l'enchainement de phrases 
puisse attester qu'il a toujours lieu. 
1 ::7:', II 
Mais il peut @tre d~clar~ pertinent~ 
ph t·- 2-1. s I::~ q I.A 1 Ie une 
d'enchainement. FIle est une partie constitutive 
d'un genre de discours~ 
phrases~ voici celles qui sent permises. 
. T t=. ;~i ,.- ... r.:- t·· :: 1·-' ,-.-, 1· -= 
.. ........ I t- .... l. :,.. .... ._~ f1 r:.t . 
heterogeneity of r~gimes of sentences in his paper on 
the work of Emmanuel L~vinas entitled "Lc,g i ql .. ·le de 
:375 
L~v i n~::t~::·. II his work on the philosophy of 
language, though, dates back to Discours, fiqure (in 
-_ .. _._--_ .. __ .. --_.. 
+ ... ! .. -:~-...... L .•.. II-•. II· .. !·:·. -1- j- J' _.L • ) U . I I ... t::! . 1_. ~:. 1 C S .. 
Lyotard attempts to establish the incommensurability 
orescril~tive ~Irllj r!~-rlr]'rtl'\I-
• " ,~, .- .- .:- .-".' ... • 1-" •• ' l;::! ~·tat.ernent.s .. 
this property of prescription and description, he 
defends L4vinas l s work agaInst the Hegelian principle 
o f A,-~ fl·"II~b!.Anq 
~'_'_""_"" ~ ......... _ •••••• _ .......... UL. 
Syt-It.hesis of a 
prescriptive and a descriptive statement; 
Lyotcird further notes that his dernonstration raIses 
specific problems concerning the status of L~vinas's 
own text., itself a description of a prescription~ 
How does L~vinas's commentary on this situation, 
incommensurable to denotations, escape t.he t. t- ap 
of denotative metalanguage? And how does his 
comrnentaire de L~vinas sur cette 
~: j t.!,.!.::::. t:. j, ()n 
~'f:: c h;::1 p P E~ .-. t. _. i 1. au pi~ge du m~talangage d~notatif? 
Comment son lecteur re~oit-il Ie commentaire? 
Lyotard's early 
LL t- ~_.+ .., t .. lrl~_ •. r._r .•II~ .• iunction of Kantian critique and a a 1 •• 1;~. e rn p .: .. -.:.. . 1 
:376 
r~ ~-! J' 1 .-, '::" I' F" L-," , I-I ... 1 - ,.- -, I • - -1 - t j . f.c.l. ::I r· .•.•...... ~ ...... ;~. -. I . d l'~~, .. ·!d'~~ I:::!" _e '._ 1 T':::!I'''E!t-,,_ ctt-,,-I 
_ ..... _ .. _ •••.•• _ .... ____ .•• _ .. _ •• __ .• ___ • • .. 1 II I-I 1- 1-,-, ,-,-. -._ 
.' .J _ .. ~ .-.., .7j l.:)t I ~ :. 
pursue this attack on 
and resolve some of the issues raised in the 
paper on the relation opposing L~vinas and 
of t·he bookn 
specific arguments against L~vinas and Hegel are, 
though, outside the scope of my thesis, ctnd I tAJi 11 not 
develop a study of Lyotard's complex relation to 
either philosopher. 
141Q Certain translators 
Georges Van Den Abbeele, do not translate Lyotard's 
F·t-~.~.'.I~,r.~I.~1 I.A.!~.·.;·.~rl._. ,~ .. ·_,.,·_-_ •... ,._'_·_=_~.-c-,· ... ·.~.:-.--.' .. J'I~I~n t-'~I~ E:'~la]J'~~1 ~nrd ~pn~~rlr~· _. ,-. ~  . '.' ". ..' .•. _. ::....oJ . "" _ _ :..--:..=_....!:::::_=-=-:, 
i n~.t .• ~.=!ad:, t.h':;:~\l 1 • ..I~=.e. t.h.~ En'~ 1 i =:.h ptL!:':-.~.:?·~~ At. first. sight. 
this seems to threaten my argument concerning the 
une2SY relationship of the ontological and semantic-
syntactic definitions of Lvotard's sentences. However~ 
it does not, in fact~ undermine my argument to use the 
irrespective of the word 
USr:?d 
ph i 1. s:,s,:tphy of 
language and his ontology. 
I 
I wholly agree with 
:377 
Geoff Bennington's argument in favour of the word 
that Bennington does not 
foresee the contradictions involved 
given the problematic grammatical status of sentences 
dE!finl:::!d -.,---::'. :::.' t ! '·-'Ij .-::. t- ~-::. ,.- rn'; •. -).:, ,-I _' • , ._ ._. _0 ._. . J. f '0: •. _! 
of Den Abbeele elects to 
I 
follow Van Den Abbeele and instead, I a'3I·-ee 
with Bennington's commentary: 
I hB.\/E"~ p!·-,~fel·-t"·,~d t.() t.t-B.nsler.t.e E.t-It-as~ as 
an ambivalent relationship with the Anglo-
American philosophical tradition: 
of an:! 
ina way t.ha.t. 
of 
completion and unity, phras~ 
-. 
carries a strong sense of designating a 
fragment of such a unity. On balance, it is 
:378 
as a l"'!',~I~.t ... ·.~ tl~.,..-_·!t-! ",-._1.-.-_" f . f • . - a ragmen~ 0 a 
t·w·, i t.y. 
[in the third and last reason~ Bennington 
claims that it IS intuitively odd to think 
r:! f ~. I::! rn (=._.: !-... ' '.f: l_. • ...•l ,-_: t_ .. =-._-1. !.- ,~-I_, I --_'-., - "1 - r".... 1 f t 
- ~Ad,!~_es 0 sen~ences 
Geoff Bennington, f..::y 0 t. ';:'. ,.- d 1,".11'- i t. i n q t. h '2 
••. '-'''-~''-'''-''-. __ ...... __ •• _____ •• _ •• rn.. ........ _. __ ... 
124 
142. Lvotard's use, of the distinction 
typical-sentence/occurring sentence 1S pat-t.i.cl..~larly 
In defining his single t.erm .. sent.ence .. he 
has been forced· to take &ccount of the distinction 
between grammatical t.his 
demonstrates the validi~y of my point concerning the 
determination of occurring sentences by the syntactic 
and semantic properties of grammatical or "t. YI=' i ca J. .. 
Ie 
t.Cd(E~I·-1 ~ 
_ ... _ ....• _ ... -... -- . phra.'E..e 
~v~nement. Une phrase-type est Ie 'r~f~rent d'une 
phrase ~v&nement. I] 1,.·1 e 
l'~preuve du doute universel~ cela ne vient ni de 
:379 
.- ,-- t· ,- J. - ] ] '-l 
'::! .-.:.' rOO I' '::~ J::!. 1-":( ,,--; 1 ~; !-~: t-,::s -::r I r , ~ 1 J~. ~,-. .... 
• •••• • M, ._. .... _ •• _. ._, •••• r ._. • r.=. -=! ::',' 1_, 
mais de ce qu'elle est seulement ce qui E1.n·- i ve~ 
what is occurrinq. 
....... --.• - •..•• ---.... - ........ - ••. --.-.~- ......... - •• --.· .. ·••••·· ... · .. _ •. tn •• • (j '::1. ~.; F Ci. 1. ll::~ ,'-I (::! t:"? n 
... .,.--_ .. -.... -.. _._ ... _ ..-_. __ .. -.. __ ... _---. 
1.44 .. P~r~grinations, p --.., '\ If •••• 1 J. 
145 u I wi 11 put particular emphasls on Jacques Derrida's 
it. is relevant to Lyotard's deduction of 
Thi=~ IS because Derrida is t-h,~ 
philosopher best suited to an investigation of the 
of laws as opposed to a study of their 
applications or consequences .. He abstracts from the 
of 
to analyse the presuppositions. exclusions and limits 
of the genesis of the foundation of the theory. ° , ... , ce 
such flaws have been uncovered~ 
deconstruct the philosophy without entering into a 
polemIC concerning the advantages and dIsadvantages 
involved in a given philosophical approach. This gives 
him a tremendous headstart over philosophers such as 
Rorty and Habermas, who must concentrate on the legal 
of +-1·· - ,--1; f fa!. .. ,.- Pt- 1:1 
-' I ~:~ :~~ ... ::_. ____ :::=--=:; __ l.~-_. and 
implications of L.yotard's theories when they should, 
in fact, criticize So, even though 
i~; in L.yotardls ontoloq_.,." t---j 
.'1' _.ld::: >.=' 
II t.hE'.t. II\'h i c:h 
-_ .. _--------------- .. _ ... 
;:-~ too ~- ; \' i:-~ '=. If .';:, 
::::.-. ..... _I_._.:!:. •.. '!.._= .. ":=_ . '4-1 ,_. b,==lon9~· t.o t.he 
order of the absolutely unpredictable, and that 
is allt-,avs. t.h,;? cond it. :i. on of - -- -I -~-U! __ ' ...... H . E:!"'p=e u EV'2n ~ .... rhen 
it t r·· 
....... 1 51 . ..1 r f l~C~'? f t .. om 
which arrives always comes from the future [ana] .. 
-::. ,." I'" .; ",-:.-::: ~::.~-.. _ .. :._ .. ±'. ,.or. ... ::::...·.:L only one did nc)t. 
maintenant souligner cette expression 
I'CE! ':::lI...Ji r.'.I·"I·-iv~:~"? Pal'-c~:: ql...ll::~ CE~ld . •.. _ ............... J __ ...... _ .... _._._. __ • ___ ...................... . 
. ~ 
mOl ct l'ordre de l'impr~visible absolu~ et c'est 
toujours 12 condition de l'~v?nement. M~me quand 
cela semble remonter d'un pass~ enfoui~ 
arrive arrive toujours en provenance de l'avenir 
[ ,. II U ] K' la 
1S still ct·-itteal of Lvotard's deduction of the 
contingency of occurrence and j udgernent ... is 
there, in the deduction, that the source of fur·-t.her 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































,= I ;.:, r t· 1 I -.:.] .; e: I::' .... r. -.:{ 1'- ':: - 1'- r" - " - ,.-
.... . ........ ' ..... (.;, .. J ........... I ,- C ._ .. 1 .. ) t ~! 1_,1 Y r.::! i 11 En ce sens une phrase qui 
c{ r ,-- i v~? i?. s r_. rn I' '-_-. f!: __ ' '-."" • 1'-,' _~J' p_.'_.', ,j .""_ .. 1'-, ,.....-_.. I 1''- fl' .L. -I- j . ~ -' .! con. J. 1 I~. ,::;:n ,_·1'-'::;: ,_ 1. ;:::·c0 I..H- =: .• 
in addition to the definition of the 
irresolvable conflict, t.hel·-'?- IS a 
second definition of the term. This other definition 
no·~:. , 1 I] It''I'''E!SO va::, .~? confl ict.?, it. be. fOI...lnd 
LI:::~ di ffr:':!,·-end., 
._. __ ... _--_._ ...... _-_ ... -_ .. __ .. 
f,'-.:srn 
I w CI u ], d S (;:! Y t. h 2t t.. t.. h,:~ t- E! i ~. <:1. gj.:E.f.~~r..!~.tJ.:;;! bet. wee n t. w () 
parties when the conflict brIngIng them into 
wh i 1. e t. he t.Ot-t. 
suffered by the other party cannot be expressed 
in t.hi:t.t. i d i om" 
Tombeau de llintellectuel. P. 29 
._ ... - .... __ .. - ..... __ ._------_ .. _-_ .... _------_.--.---.--_._----
Je dirais qulil y a diff~rend entre deux parties 
f · 't :1-"'1"" 11 J' ::11' -rn-" ,::1.-::. 1 II'n~-:. d I ~::11E:s c~lr:lt-S qUE: le . c{ 1 .:. ,_ ell' I ::, • I.. • ' • .1 1::. . .•• . .. '. ,,-
t.OI·-t.. dont .. l' ;:.:\I .. .'.,+ ... I···~.-.'. 1- ••• !f'fr " f' 
. ~u~ e ne se slgnI Ie pas dans 
This second rl_~_~f'_·I~fl·t_.l·r ...,t-1 -JJ W ~·ff~ j t t 1::1. . . 0 ~. ~)~ __ ~X}§?E~~.2. _·0 _i e SCI 1 ved 
idioms Ci:\n be tra~slated into 
if torts can be translated 
universal idiom. So it is important to associate the 
t-II-_d-... '_. '-•• 1('-1 I-.~) f 1· '-1 ..... 1· I-_.Iro WI· .L ,.. 1 y .. .f.. - 1- ..J 'r- ..J f· . -'-- . r-.. • r •••• I ~_ i ... 1 ,_. cl. • U =.' U I:;:': 1 n 1 ",=. 1 ':1 nOT 91? n t- e 5 so 
t.h~~t:. idioms can be seen as heterogenous. If t.hi s· 
a 5':::·0':::: i a.t. i. on 1. s not. 
Ij]· ·f f ~ I'·· .::".- -I,.., 
.!.-:' •• _:' •• __ f:~L. __ :::~:..J~::.!.2. ci:ln be resolved and thereby 
III) i~ 
c.:::ant.t- etc! i ct.E~cl .. I·!::. is to recognise this 
of Lyotard's philosophy of language. 
commentators find the limitations inherent to a system 
admIttIng to irresolvable conflicts too pessimistic or 
II V :i. 0 1 .::'nt:. II to be acceptable. Take, f () r'- e }~ a. m F' 1 '== ~ Gil 
Delct l . ..Inoi 
19::::4. CI.n 
notes that Lyot.ard 
offers no teleological 
thereby follows Lyotard the conclusion that 
~·ff~..J ~-ly be witnessed and never resolved or 9)." •. _ •. _~.J:.g~J:~~. C <::1. n I •• t' 1 _ 
does not believe in consenSt.IS .. Hts 
realism. ~-y w 11 h 
" ! ~:! . I:;; _ _ .. '2 correct but his 
of a !.- E:pub 1. i c IS 
i n·?- f f ect. j. VI=-_ Ij. , •. ,1-.• _" + I-I -j.L. .- 1· t- - _._,0-. . ~ . 1 . .L T.L· 
.... - "'- '.~.=. [.=:I.'_.I_o::::SS].!...! 1 1 I_·V u _ '.. 1 S nc,t. 
I:::! v e n 2'. -, •. ' '-•. 1 J. 1· r ... J'. 1-••. '.::"... 1-' 'f' .L 1·-,""', 1 L- - .- t· w ,- ,0- t·.... t.L. .L I~ 
••. I... <;:;. L ,:! (=\ .-::, _. •.• ,_, ! '=! I t.I-~:. ,.- 2\ I ... n e ,.- :' t t. 
r-:,,-, 1 l' r. ; ,- ,= r .•....... ....... _t <possibly) t.he 
wrong to be seen but never to be wiped out tn 
Lyotard ne croit pas au consensus. 
hobb~sien est peut-@tre Ie bon. Mais son id~e de 
r~publique est alors 1. cll·- ':::IE!met-,t. 
ll~vidence de son inaccessibilit~. Ce nlest m@me 
pas la politique du moindre mal~ crest celIe, 
01.:" d~l ib4n:l.t.i f 
~ventuellement~ que Ie mal soit vu~ constat~ at 
From the point of view of Lyot~rd's philosophy this 
,." 
nl:lt. fo 1 low ft-orn t.hl2 t-eCol.l i sat i eln t.hat. gj ... f.f§x~.~.nl;!.~ CI. t-e 
permanent stat~s that one's practical politics will be 
"r::!ffE:ct. i v i t.y II is brought under review and shown to be 
j. 11 ,-~sot·y if it. entertains the hope of resolving 
I1. Ie dest. i nat.el...w et. Ie 
destinataire sont des instances, 
pr~sent~es par une phrase. Celle-ci n' est. pas I...frt 
d'un 
destinataire to us deux ind~pend~nts d'elle. Ceux-
ci sant situ~s dans l'univers qu'elle pr~sente, 
tout comme son r4f~rent et son sensu 
:1.51. .. Une pr~sentation est qulil y a un univers au 
mains. Une situation est qulau sein d'un univers 
pr4sent~ par une phrase, des relations indiqu~e5 
par Ie forme des phrases qui enchainent sur el1e 
les instances en relation les unes avec 
1. 5:~:~ II 
c'est-~-dire un monde. 
1.53 .. 
I _ 
t •. ~:! nom propre est ~ 
fortement d~termin~ quant ~ son rep~rage dans les 
r~seaux de noms et de relations entre noms et 
faiblement d~termin~_~. ~r ... I~_·.~!+_" ~_l -_-_ .• -... I~! :::f f "L j 
'1 , ,_ I $121'-'5' 1.../ a 1r_. I U 
,::.1- .:1,::. ] I L ••• .I', L .I. I~' - .... L ... L " L L d 
...... ' .- .•. . r !''::' I_·e '_.l'~~I,=!I!'=:! 1 ._.E;=! es de 
lesquels il ~eut prendre place comme 
154" Une phrase pr~sente au moins un univers. Queis 
les r~gimes auxquels e11e ob~it~ elle 
II y a ce qui est signifi~, 
Ie d.:st. inat.eur, Ie 
destinataire peuvent ~tre ~quivoques" 
155" .?5 t. 1=i1...I I Etl..l 
pr~sent~ par una phrase, des relations indiqu~es 
par la forme des phrases qui enchainent sur elle 
lnstances en relation les unes avec 
l~:!s ~\I...It..t-eSu 
1.56" occurrence and concatenation 1
" '= 
.J a 1 =.·0 
raised in chapter VI, where occurrence is analysed in 
:387 
Lyotard's theory of t.he --'It l]'l1n- TI =:: .. , _.I.. ., I::! D • '-,e claim 
concatenation is considered further in that chapter. 
157. The question arises, here~ as to whether Lyotard's 
should be translated 
Georges Van Den Abbeele 
chooses the term regimen because of 
The government of one word by t.he 
relation which one word in a sentence has to 
another depending on itc 
O"E.D .. 
It is true that this sense 1S close to one of the 
however~ as Van 
Den Abbeele admits .-. .. t.h:=! po 1 t t. i ca 1:, as we 11 a.s t.he 
senses of the French word, r~gime~ should be 
there are further senses of 
also employed in Lyotard's book. Because the notion of 
a sense of the government of 
-,-,-, "- t-,:::.t-'r-':-" . -:. J ~-''::' oj t t.~·H-OUq_ h q .• I·- E,mmEtt. i Cel J. r ... ' ........ _~ , ..... '.' .... , ~"' •. 1...' ._." .. ' I 
have preferred to retain the English -~~gime for the 
diff~rend, namely, 
--_.-.... -_ ....... -_ ........ . 
Lrincommensurabilit4~ au sens de l'h4t~rog~-n4it4 
des ~~_L.·~_'l·rfi'~_-_-, .jr_-. ~ ..·~,t-~-_-,F-_~ ~_'.~. ~ 11' 't· l'L~ 
I ~ ~r ~ ~C we ImpOSSl~l- l~~ de 
les led (sauf 
t- PI It· ,.- - 1 . ,- .-, - ) . - - -1._ .. ·... <:\ l. ::'-0:::. t :0 10<:\ I' ql . ..I~ i:\I_~SS i b t €:n 
des pl'-eset- i pt. i yes les 
11:::s les 
Le diff~rend~ p. 187 
.-.. _--.---_ ...... _----_. 
1,59 .. Des phrases ob~issant ~ des r4gimes diff~rents 
SClnt. intraduisibles les unes dans les autresn Ne 
consid~rons arbitrairement que Ie sens dQ ~ Ie 
forme (syntaxe) dlune phrase en n~gligeant celui 
qui proc~de du lexique. Une traduction de 
~ langue pr~suppose que Ie sens pr~sent~ par une 
phrase de Ia langue de d~part peut @tre restitu4 
I .. - - ~ - 1- 1 - t- .... , ,- Ij_ • ::0_ t- t-l' \,'.6_p_. '-_'I'" 1 P__ '=:P_.I·-,-.-_. P<::t t- I..-Ine pn ,. d Se u,= a <:! 1'::< _. t:::! ,~, -
li~ & la forme syntaxique d~pend du r~gime de 
Ie phrase ob~it, et du genre de 
d 1 scot..ft-S dans lequel ~~11e est. inset-e.en [ ••• ] II Une 
traduction pr~suppose done qu'un regime et un 
genre dans une langue ont leur analogue dans une 
B.I ... rt. n=. [ •• a J • 
161l1" ~~I_-.II···lt... 1-1-,-'- t .; t I 1.1. 
- _.1 'I:j .. ' J •• ' •• ·.J::!s pa ,.-
dl;;:~~. 1 nst'clt"!CeS mais Ie 
r~f~rent, Ie destinateur, Ie d~stinataire) et par 
[des i.nst.ances J • Or J.e 
destlnateur dlune exclamative nlest pas situ~ par 
rapport au sens [de la pr~sentation] 
celui d'une descriptive [ ••. 1. 
161" Note that in my discussion of r~gimes, I have ignored 
the discussions turning around the heterogeneity of 
c,f t.h .. ~se 
d i :.?: C I . ..! 'E.. S ions concel'-ns t.hl;? het.:.el·-o'~ene i t.y clf 
prescriptive and descriptive r~gimes, t.h i sis becat.lse 
their heterogeneity leads to important considerations 
in the question of obligation as addressed by Lyotard, 
in the section bearing the name of its topic, in Le 
Th.::! 
in the context of his work on Kant and 
L~vinas~ and he has discussed both of them in t.he 
light of the heterogeneity of r~gimes in his essclYs 
.. Log i qLH? de Lev i. nas" and II f" i scuss i clns:o phl'-aser 
, c\pl--~s Au~~chw i t. z ' II .. I ';'Jill ignore these studies of 
ob 1 i 9at. i on i n rf1":f t. !.-,,~-: sis for the same reason as I 
ignore Lyotard's 
my 
project concerns the edification of Lyotard's system~ 
It.S 
on L~vinas and Hegel 
and cQntradictions. His 
1 ,.. . 
. - :::.. con::=. e q t.1 I:::! n t. t.o t.I···,at. 
edification and not an intrinsic part of his grounding 
t·his point. 
in terms of the more general law of 
,. ,-
0 •• :;:. abominable model of t·l-1is 
r ()f 
prescriptive sentences). incommensurability 
has been developed by Kant, Wittgenstein and 
L.1~V:i. t"-lelS:. 
as a that which arrives, 
.--.-.. -... _._---_ ... __ .- _._ .. _---._-------_ .. 
pht- Elset-
I C~Pt-l~~S A 1 ... 1 S cht'l! it.;:: , 11:0 P u 308 
i n Sl~?.::~.r·-ch of an analytic discussion of 
st.I ... ldy of incommensurability 
prescriptive and descriptive sentences should refer to 
Vincent Descombes' "C:ons i der' cIt.· ion=.. t.I·- anscendl?-nt.·8.1 es " 
in La facult~ de iuqer. 
•• _ •••• __ ~_ ...... _ ... _ .... _ .... _ .... _ ........... _ .... _ •• _ .... _., ............ _ •• 7. •••• ___ .r.... .......... _. 
,. 
J • have ignored this work 
,-I"; I-r···Jr-r-:;-..:._=._7..::'.::::.~:::._:;:' .. '=:' L.yot..o.;·-d 's \fiew~ 
1 n~~t.E~(:~d:. Descombes develops an independent analytic 
study of sentences about the 
This approach is too 
genres de discours d~terminent 
ils soumettent des phrases de regimes diff~rents 
une fino.lit~ unique~ I' e~·~emple, 
10. narration, 1 'exclamation dans 
la s.ont. des rnOYE~ns 




persuader, convaincre, vaincre, faire 
etc. [II peut @tre opportun d'enchainer 
de fa~on non pertinente pour parvenir a t.e1 Ot·l 
t 1 j - --,... ~_~.ffr-.-_~~ .... ~.-_.l- ,--~ . . ',= "~"! ' •• I:::~ !-:. r . t~leologie commence avec 
non avec 1es phrases. 
Mais:. en tant qu'enchain~es, sClnt. 
392 
t.· .. '_-.11 •.• 1 .J' '-.. ! 1 ••• \ J'" '_=, J:::, ,.- J. '_:::., .-.. .. ' --.-.', ,...I ::. t-· ,... , ./..... -. - n 1_ 
,_. r :2 ... , ! . __ ~ .. I I ':;:I'=~ I' E~ 
164 .. 'L_. \::. .. . ,. ,.......... r .. , 'I'-I"" "" .•. ' ..• -.... ,._"::,. '.::-." 1-' ,", , I" "'. ,- -I- .::'I .... t-.- ::l - L j . 
I" ~. • .- r.:.' ... 'I <:!'! ' .. ' ~:! ' .. , ~:! 't::~S mGu'-'=r-lcH",' 1. ses $ ':'1..,1 S 
que des genres de discours (des enjeux) 
tr'ouve un idiome universel~ Ie genre ~conomique, 
:l L'r.::-• ':: ..... .1 11 L. I::: ~-:; e 1...,1 obstacle insurmontable auquel se heurte 
.:II.-! 
l'h~t&rQg~n&it~ des r~gimes de phrases et celIe 
1 - - •. -. - II - .. L. "1 I O,t' to -, II rn',:, J' t-
.... cl.I' I:~~:t ':::1 ~:! f::! I:~. . 1::. .. ' 1::. ., ( •• , . • -.:1 C!CCI...ft- t-enCE~S • 
arrive est mise en jeu dans 
un conflit entre genres de discours. Ce conflit 
est un diff~rend~ 
propre ~ un genre n1est pas celui ou 
[ •• ul .. La 
393 
mu]. t. i r::']. :i.e 1. t.I~~ d~:::s -'1'-" - I 1" t:! 1_ I::! •. ' ,', qui va de pair avec celIe 
fait que chaque enchainement est une 
l'un de ceux-ci sur lE~S 
possibles 
n4g1ig~s~ oubli~s, refoul~s. 
I' enjet.1 d' t·ln 
d iff.t~ I'- end ent. ~- E"~ des genres de discours~ 
':so it. son Ce diff~rend proc~de de la 
question: Comment l'enchainer? qui 
phrase. Et cette question proc~de du n~ant qui 
"SI;?PEI.I"- e " cet. t.E:~ ph t·- a Sl?, de 1a IIsuivant.e" n II y a 
il y a 
1 'Et .. I?, t qf"'1 i -.:;; . MEtiS. ce 1 c:~ S ' Club 1 i e aut.ant. 
,-10 
.... : ...... 
.. __ .... -... -......... ""--- .... _--
genres de discours sont des modes 
1 I ol...lb], i du n~ant au de i Is 
Je C'est. 
ouvre la possibilit~ des 
~. 
·_.1 
~tait n~cessaire (combl~e), i1 
, . . t 
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II fo i s II act.t.1121 1 e .. 
[ A ... Iii' ] If I =---~:=.. 
sur une phrase qui arrive, il faut 
[ .... J • Deu~·: i I?mement., !:::st. 
comment enchainer est contingent. 
genres de discours d~terminent des 
ils soumettent des phrases de r~gimes 
diff~rents ~ une finalit~ unique: 18. quest. ion, 
1 I e ~.~ ~::mp 1 e:, l'argumen-tation, la 
l'exclamation dans la rh~torique judiciaire sont 
h~t~ro-g~nes de persuader" II 
s'ensuit pas que les diff~rends entre les phrases 
A partir de chacune d'elles un 
autre genre de discours peut l'inscrire dans une 
finalit~. Les genres de discours ne font 
que repousser Ie diff~rend du niveau des r~gimes 
~ celui des fins .. 
ne rel~ve nullement de la question du temps, mais 
de celIe de l'@tre/non-@tre. Cette question est 
appel~e par un sentiment: i 1 pe,-~t. ne 
1. 7:3 n f .• ·ln!2 
L.e 
t-efOI.A l'::!!ment. p ~- I?:~ =.: 12 n t .. 9. t. ion sous 1 a. 
( ., -
• J. !=' et . 
la. 
la m~taphysique du II SI...lj et. 1I " 
eel='· ne rn2l.i S .jes 
citations ~ comparaitren L.21. (=!f..le·:st. t on clt.1 I 1...y.. el .. 
--- .. _--_ .. 
un instant ~voqu4e sous les esp~ces de la donn~e 
sens 1 b 1 E!:. E:st. vi t.e OI ... lb 1 i ~~!f:=~ PO: .. ·I'·- ce 11 e de ~'§'-...:31 ... I~j~.l. 
1.74 .. L'id~e d'une donn~e imm~diate) est une 
pr~sentation.' Une pr~sent2tion ne pr~sente un 
univers ~ personne~ 
pr~sence Cinsaisissable). Une donn~e est donn~e ~ 
lare~oit et 1a traite. 
C I ~:::~s.;t. Ie placer dans un univers de 
p~·H- a SE"~ • 
-.. . 
Le diff~rend~ p. 96 
... - ........ _ .... _._ ... _ .. _------_._-
:397 
1.75 .. L I uni. \/el'-'3 que pr~sente une phrase n'est 
r-:Jr~sent~ ~. aUI.~_la:_·e. !-_I.~I·s-._!-...•... f-_- '-••• I! ...• , '~~"'. ' f 
- , .. ~ , • - - que 1.. qu un cCtmm!~ 
t .. ·!n II S 1 •..1 j E!t. II.. L. I 1 ...In i vS: ,-- S est l~ aut ant que la phrase 
1 ..'1'-, II "" __ .. ' •.. ' .• oi, !-'_-. t. II '-.. _" <:C.'. +'.' '.L.I.-/ 
_ r- ~. S 1 1_. tJ fo.::! !_ !:: .. .r·-i S 
pr~sent~ par une phrase. 
t7f:.. .. II Cornm1:'? l~t.(:I.nt. c~'? qt.! IiI 
maintenant est pris comme une occurrence~ 
l'~v~nement-phrase. 
phrase prise comme 
cerrnme CII ... le) i 's •• J __ •.•.• _ .. d t ,.-~:=! n'est. pa=:· 
1 e roa i nt.ena,.-,t.:, mais maintenant. 
lloccurrence est saisie dans 
(t.5 1 Clq!J) 
...... _ •• _. ____ ..&n ......... r~f~re ~ e11e comme 
maint~nant devient 
i1 ne peut pas ~tre saisi comrne 
11 S1...lbit. 
1 ' i n'2v i t.o b 1 ~? c! 1 t.et-at. i eln dE:~ d i acht-c,n i e:s i1 
rel~ve du r~gime des phrases .. 
:1.77 .. Aristote d~connecte Ies op~rateurs diachroniques 
-. 
les univers de phrase et l'occurrence 
de Ie ( nt·' lloccurrence-phrase). La 
II a ct.'-~,::.!! lIe" e:=:· t. 
(l'apr~s), s'anticipe (l'avant), au se 
.. !"I"18. i nt. i ~?nt... ( 1. e rna i 1 ... !t.E:~nant.) .. 
1. 7 B ,. I t-, "'-.. 11_.''''_'':, ] •. ;::_, .-.L '-·1·· - rnrr. .L r· . j . t-.. I' 
-- ,-, o::;!f_ •• ::1: <~ .f!;:!: •. ·'E!t-t-l'. a Cl·-l· .. ·1ClZE:S '.,::::91:::1 t.h,.-ou-;:th 
an analysIs of Aristotle's distinction of originary 
d. ''''1 d the starting point of 
Heidegger's work in Beinq and Time. ._ ......... __ ...... _ .. __ ._ ... _. __ ... _---_ .. __ .. l..8. t.e r·- , in 
it becomes apparent that Derrida was also 
implying a critique of Heidegger's conception o~ a 
fall into vulgar time through in 
Derrida raIses the quest.ion of 
!~egel's and Aristotlels analyses or time, in order to 
introduce the problematic of Geist 
Beinq and Time. In t.his thesis, 
._ ..... ___ ........... U'I ............. _ ... _ ••• _ ... _____ ._ ••••• ~ ............ . I \~JiI1 
time belongs entirely to metaphysics, and it names the 
dorn i nat. i on of pr--es'=::t"lce" , "C)I ... lsia. I~t. Ci,·-a.rnm~lt, Pv 7:3 
because Lvotard, having taken account of that work~ 
melves on t.o -. ,-, .::1.\10 i d 
privileging ot presence. It 1. 'E. t.h i s 
I will criticize from the point of view of 
( seJ::~ 
comprehenslve study of Derrida's deconstruction of 
17':1 .. 
t. i ITIE!:o 
deconstruction nf ~im~_ 
............ --.-.... ~---.. ---.... -.---......... -.... -...•.. -.- .. :::.-.. - ........ .:: ... :::..-: .... :: .. -
1-1·-;, rn -. l' t-.t - ,.- - .. - t 
-, '::'. -!! .. ~ ... -.-..!. .. !::..~ __ !..s.!-.! ... :::. &: 
qu'une phrase arrive. t1a is 
comme quoi, 
............. _._--.. elle n1est pas dans 
temps vulgaire est dans l'univers pr~sent~ pmr la 
Mais i 1. n • y 8. pas dl: t.ernps VI...119ai "-e, 
C:~t t"' a]. SOl"'!:, CII ... 1 i 1 n • y a ql..·IE! 1;:'::1, ., Cel t- 1.::\ 
1::::121. In invl=st.i9at.ing t.hE: f·"'21at.ion of t.he "t.h':::!·-'2 i :.:. " t.o 
the "Is 
notion of present.ation into what. Geoff 
c a]. 1~; II '::·0 IT: !::~ c! f t. hE! rn G s t. d iff C 1 ... 11 t.. 
Bennington himself 
those issues around presentation: 
of pr·-esr?ntat. i on 
event.s 
.?nt. it. i es in 
-.. . 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Scti t. . . 
.!clm21S 
Phrase dans a.:.I~_-.]. l·,jl··.~'r~!~_~-.~ -! 1 
• _liP Le que r~gime? La 
+ ... r_·.llrt.· .. r .. _.. _._.~+ .. ·. '1-- j 11 
r. ~uuJours i e ~ 2nticiper~ clest-~-dira de 
I ,=:· rll' f f ¢:, .~ .... -"," Ij 
.:"' . .::::--.-:::~..;.... .. --.. --:::-!...-.~:-....!..:.... :' 
pr~sentation comport~e comma une phrase-cas 
n1est pas pr~sent~e dans I'univers que cette 
/::"'"'11'- a s E! r:: ..... 1-_.1.,. '"',-.:, ~-.·.'.I·-I to' ~-.-_'. ( r" - 1',... - 1 ] - .- '-'1 It ,_. I ... c' .. =.. e . r::! '_"0::: ...... ' @tre marqu~e dans 
II v cd. 
-............. --~ ....... ---.. 
Toute phrase est . 
. - .. -........ --..... ---.&..-... -....... ------.. - ... -.. ~-.... ---- . 
s i ';:In i f i I:~ = iI\./ -, _. __ . __ .. L.. __ = , 
I "I .=, t- t- 1 \/,::, 
.: .. ..:!:_-=-._-' ----=. 
n I ~~st. pas (01.:., 
pr~sentation n'est pas la situation'. 
pr.:-t 1""t!: • .::..1 Er.::-+ 
.::-.:.:= ... ::: __ .. _-:_~_:.. II ._..:..:!-_.:. 
s i ';;In i f i I;:: 
\I i:tV2tnt. 1\ de 
La d~signerait at ne Ie d~signe 
puisqu'en Ie d~signant 
la at donc occulte n ':-I tl dans 
Aristote). Est ser2it 
p 1 '-~ t. 6 t. : 
une place vide ~ occuper par un r4f4rent). 
185" See note 30~ and~ 
. 
sIlence non pas comme phrase au attente~ mais 
comme non-phrase, 
l'angoisse au II~tonnement: 
,-. 
_·e s.ent. i rnent. 
il y a quelque chose 
plut8t que rien. A peine cela est-il 
et. 
ol...!b 1 i '~!'::! di::lns J. I '-_"',::-,1,'-.,1 .• ".,,- t- '=' ... 1'-',,-_ . .::._, ,::I~-.~'. I __ ·~ __ '''::'.L. . ,~. __ . F 1- 1- _ . .-.- ..... • 
- • - ~ I~ I ~ -,' ' I . ti ::.~~:! "-IU 1:, E!n 
Ie r 1 va,., 
........... _ ... _-,-----.. - . 1 ie la 
comparant avec son absence. 
obstacle insurmontable auquel se heurte 
c'est. 
l'h~t~rog~n~it~ des r~gimes de phrases et celIe 
des genres de dlSCGUrS, c'est qulil n'y a pas Ie 
L'obstacle ne tient pas ~ la des 
humains dans un sens au dans 1 ' a '.,·1 t. t-':£! :' mais au 
Cell.Ai -ci renait m@me des r~glements 
1 it. i 9~::S n II met 1 E!S hl...lrna i ns en 
demeure de se situer dans des univers de phrases 
inconnus~ quand bien m~me ils n'~prouveraient pas 
Ie sentiment que quelque chose est ~ phraser (Car 
41Zr) 
necess i t.E~ ..... - +_. t-I '-•. ' ".-! -I- ] l' + . ... I U~. gaJl0n,. _e Arrive-t-
.. _._-----_._--
de 98.9ne,.- du 
l88u See S'_-~tl·.~_,t'r_ll~_~t.~.~,., ~~ 
._._ ... _ ..__  ._ .. _._ .. _ .._  ... ~ __ .. _ . F-' II .... ~ 
190. See Schibboleth. p. 103 
.... ---_ .. __ . __ ._ ...... _--_ .. __ .. - . 
Ou bien. ou bien. Cela ne forme pas 
._ .. __ .. ____ •• ___ ..... -'0.._ •• ___ ._ .... _. __ ...... _ .... ___ _ ici I..-Ine 
alternative; Ia double d~marcation de Ia date ne 
f t:I. i t. Pel .=.. deux ph4nom~nes ne se 
contredisent pas~ 
dan'=.. 
rassemble et sly constitue. La possibilit4 de Ie 
lecture et du retour, l'anneau, l'anniversaire et 
c'est aussi sa folie. 
of ash and fire recur 
rfl ~ ..• rl_l·+_.=.+_.l·.r_.lt.-ls r_I'~1 1-•• II-_.CI_·lrlr=_'~!I--__ -... -t-~ -~/~~+-. ---~., _ ~ ~ ...- d. II...! 1:'': T 1_ •• I .. ' =- ~ =/!~':I= , 
t.he b,:.clks [~~=L .. _I l_:;:._._ .. c ... ~ .. ~r._ld._I·~_,=_-:~ and I'.:;. ]' '='--E'r j t ,_" _ _  _ .. : .. ::-.:_._: __ .- 2 -:... __:....~ .• 
For a Derridean treatment of events and occurrence 
independent of such tropes 
DI~r·t .. idc~' ~.;::. 1::~SSiEJ.y 'Ipsych€':!, invent.icln=.. de I' aut.re" in t.h,= 
book of the same name. In the essay~ Derrida considers 
the notion of undetermined occurrence through a study 
of the novelty of inventions and of whether t..he II new II 
lS ever absolutely new~ in art and technology. 
1':;-5 .. 
5e voue ~ perdre Ie sens, dans I' ot.,bl i de 
SOl, n' at-'·" i vant. 
• . I .1 ell ns 1 qt·, <::i. 
di t.: ".Je":, [ ..... ], j~'? st.tis:. je ne SUi5 qu'un 
405 
chlffre comm~morant celc~ Q . LtL 
. m~me qUI aura ~~~ vou~ ~ 
1 I Clubl i:, 
197. Andr.-e! ..... J BE"~nj8.min~ 
~=-. t. ! .. ·l c! V 
.). 
!:I. d ~._ •. \/ ~._"I·-f .,_. t- t- - rn • fl._I ... :, un t.emps 
Translation and the ......... _w ... ____ .... ______ • __ ._ •. __ ._ ••. __ .. ____ •• _ .. _ .. _. 
of 
of vie .... J of 
limitations and value of 
01'- i 91 nal F'1. t·ll·- 8.1 i t.y 
it. IS no 
longer possible to provide a conception of time that 
will go beyond Derrid?, makes Benjaminls study 
is an ontologico-t~mporal description of the 
~?vt:::nt. of pI f_.W ell i t.~.lll .. 
198.. There ~re many works by Lyotard on the concept of the 
t.he of 
L I ent.hcluS i Cl.sml!::!:-_ .. _.-_ ....... -._-_ .. _ .._ .. _._ ...... _ .. _ ...... _._- ilL I i nt.I~!·-I-et. du II L I i nstclnt. ~ 
Ne.l ... Imcll·j II:, II L.~= st.Ab I i me t::!t. 1. I.::!. v ;;:t.nt. -. '~I';:'.I·-dE! II .~:I.nd II Apr~!s Ie 
sublime, ~tat de 
406 
head of the list sh;:~ 1'- (~: t.hl-:::: i ,.- t. r- E~·=1. t.ment. C.I f + 1- - --,'b] ; rn _ _ •• II:::! .";j •• ~ _. • _ e 
and, although that study 
t t.. J ,--. :;;~ 
is not the centr-e-piece of 
of bot.h. Not.e 
also that Lyotard discusses his views on the sublime 
in the talks and interviews in the leA Documents, n° 4 
._ .... _ .•.• _ •. _____ ._. ________ •• ____ .. _ .... _..t._ ... _________ • 
("Comple}~ i t.y 
21Z10u In ~=S.S8.YS .. Thec,r'-Y 
21Z1 1 • Le secr-et est que chacune, bien qu ' elle enchaine 
P2tt- 1. es 
formation d~ chacune, =:.()nt. les 
m@me la premi~re, mais ~ chaque fois Ie seule. 
-. . 
4rZl7 
I ] . L .. S I~ P Ct I ... ! ". ,.- ;3. 1 ',=. '-·-11 .. ' , l' 1 r!vl I . J . + . j.L 
i .1·!acC~erOn1. 21J lL~e que ce 
~\ -::.; a \lO i ,.- ~ rl_·,,-- ~~~ ~:!I""·lt .. ,:..._ ... - '1- - I ,+ - + , ... ,_' .. ' .. ' '_.Ol .. ·lt- .:." 
~=I"', l~? t. t- I::: pf..lis,~ dc!ns c '?- t. t.,? oeuvl·-e.: de 1 c!n9a.ge la. 
p}I ... !S commUI'1f:! :' 1..-11"""12: pht- elSE: u Et. .. '=;1 . .-1 I en PC!l-/SSclnt. S2l 
Ie ne vise pas la 
bavarde combinatoire dont en 
pU1ssance" mais Ie n~ant auquel une phrase~ prise 
E: 11 e "-rn~!ml::!;, et gr§ce auquel 
propose" les mondes qu'elle pr~sente un instant. 
simple soit-elIe" une phrase pr~sente. Ce 
[ .... II ] .. Un 
microcosmes fortement organis~s ~closent, 
ins~ances bien en place comme 
d'une fleur au d'un ciel nocturne, leurs espaces-
+ j.L J .L ::I' ',n ,-I ~r i rnrnob i 1 es ~ eVclnclu is" .. ·~::mps· " I::!p . oy~:!s '. ..' _'_.I .. -'" 
ne rel~ve nullement de la questio~-du temps, mais 
de celIe de l'@tre/non-@tre. Cette question est 
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208. This point IS missed by Manfred Frank and Jacques 
lE!ss~?I·" .:::!~·~t.ent .... \ylc\I·-I·f:I,-~_",-I.. Ft--I-L' -I-';+-J' -.; -- t""+'-I--/ f- !' 
.. J . c i .. ! ,:. !._. J. _. • I ••.• !: .<.. I:=! _. Y 1 .... '_. '='. . I.... 1._11'- '-11 '=.. 
misinterpretation of in 
his work on the incommensurability clf 
lc~n9ua.ge 9a.m
'
2S n Their criticisms are 
ignorance of the project ~~.Ih t ch 
is not to give a detailed and faithful C!CCOI ... lnt. of 
Wittgenstein's philosophy, but to use his work as a 
fot" Lyot.c~I·-d I s own well-defined i:=1.nd 
stand or fallon the merit of the interpretation of 
Wittgenstein made in it; instead of concentratIng on 
both Bouveresse and Frank should have 
implications of errors 
interpretation for his own project. 
compose avec lui Ie sentiment sublime, il fi:l.ut. 
eCI"'it. BI 'I'" I .. ,:::. ,-" I':::' ] i:t .' ._-li t·. _ , ... -" .. - . menace qui l'engendre 
so i t. suspend'-.II~, 
cet amoindrissement d'une menace ou 
d'un danger, provoque une sorte de plaisir qui 
mais plutBt d'un sQulagement. C "~st 
I I .... l~-::' .-, ,- ·i '1-' .... l' -I~ 
•• ' I . •.•. r-' J. '. ct I~. . '~.I • I , mais au second degr~: l'~me 
de 
Ie distingue du plaisir positif, 
L' . ~, ~~ I =.' ~~, 
_. __ -1J..!_J..=~!fl.:::.:J: . .:. .. !. , PI=' tlll1:, 111 
C::,::! est sublime c'est que du sein de cette 
cit.! l"'I~8.nt., quelque chose arrive quand 
qui annonce que tout n'est pas 
fini u 1 B. I=' 1 '-~~. 
1=' .. 95 
:::.:~ 1. 1. " II ne s'agit pas d'une question de sens ni de 
r~alit6 portent sur 
cela vel.At. Avant de se demander 
c'est, ce que ~a si9nifie, avant Ie '::'!u i d .. i 1. f 21. U t. • ...1: .. ____ .. _ •• 
"d ' atll:.t-d II POI...lt~ ainsi d i 1'- e t·I::'t~ j CII .. ·1 t- S 
St .. t~ at-t-iv'~. 'CJr ... r pll~.lt.8t. 1 E1. 
pr~c~de elle-m@me" .. ql .. , , i ]. 
at~I'" i ve";o c'est Ie question en tent qu'~v4nement;t 
'-'j .-, L . ... ::. u 
411 
.. e!'-IS·I...1 t t.e" e 1. 1 €! porte sur l'~v~nement '=11...11 vt i:::nt. 
L ' evenernent. c()mme point. 
" C:1. v ant. II 
"el' a.bol·-oj II 
est-il J:~ossible? 
--._---_ .. _._---- _ ..._---- .. ------_ ....... 
II Ens!...1 i t.E~" 
1 1 i nt.el·--
rogatlon~ arrive-t-il que ceci au cela~ 
1 __ • ""'_',1-__ l' 1-_1',_' 1_- F-_·· 1 :::. ~. .-::-. ,- .J.. ,. 1 F -..-,... ,. t 1 - . 1 .-, ~ - • '-, 0;;::.":: 1_.'- __ ·'U:=z ~ _ , 1= que cec 1 C)! .. -i CI= a:'. 
L.e pClint d'interroqation du Arrive-t-il? arr@te. 
- -_. __ ...... _.-.---.... _ ...... _._ .. __ . __ . __ . 
la volont~ est d~faite. La 
t. §. c: h I;? .~ V8.nt.···':;lct ,rei i st.'::! 1 :-::, 
... "_'0 
l'esprit par rapport au temps. Le 
sentiment sublime est Ie nom de ce d~nuement. 
11 :~: 
21:3" Th t:=, is in Pctl .. .!l 
Kantian Sublime~ the avant-garde~ 
argues that Lyotard's deftnition of avant-
garde art as art that generates a sublime 
some and not all avant-g~fde artists as 
. __ ._--_._-
well as some non avant-garde artists~ 
412 
r " " n J 
,:"_.-\I,-... d .. :,.,-__ .. ""_ .. t··,' ·-'··'I-·u·!,.,I- -] ro' f' +' 
. - ..r-r 1_" .~ .. :-.:: t .At t' i!:= .! 1 f'-"~ S ,;? r'-' s e ':1 _" i-! f~ 
]. i:'. t. 0::: n t. Jr.,: i t·h po~=;sibi 1 i-l::.ie'3 
this is surely a striking exception 
rule which defin~s what counts as 
-::., It· [-.,::-.. , .. + J' ,- -: J 1 'I..' l .. ,.· .. r • .•. !.. . ... t:.~. .r 
intrinsic reason why the best non avant-garde 
works should not also sometimes achieve this. 
II ThE! 1<i:I.I·",t. i l:t!"', C', -I:: ] I' rn - + 1- •. 
. :'1 ... ; •. '. .~:! :. .. .. ! ':::! 
I do not wish to enter into a long argument about what 
is really designated through the term "8.VCI.t"'lt'-92t.r'-de II 
But that argument is the focus for Crowther's 
analysis of Lvotardls work. Th i-.::;:. is of course a 
legitimate approach, it does however ignore that the 
relevance of Lvotard's appeal to theories of the 
IS not primarily 8rtistic but 1S 
ph i 1. osop!·", i Ci:~ 1. and 
Alternative definitions of avant-garde art 
Crowther's own revolves around Kant's concept 
they do not~ however, provide a baSIS for 
a critique of Lvotard's use of the sublime 
,':I]" f: f ~~. I'" ~~ t'" .. -I 
.:."'!._.:.._ .. __ ....:.-:: ... __ ::'..:_ •. 1.:.-... n 
41::3 
214.. I have drawn a distinction~ here, between Lyotard's 
use of the sublime in Burke and his use of the sublime 
• ..... L 
1. n t<.ctn\;.;. distinction underlines th~.-.~. ::I·~f ' .. 1 I el"-enCE! 
t.h .. ~ I .• ·I~;'::: .. ~_ ,-_, r. T_. L_I ,::. •. _ ,..., It' . . .J..l ::I r :J o· '.~ 1 ff1r:=! , .. oJ 1 , ... ,-[ '·-'298. t- i OeCt.II·- renee 
and its use with re~ard the political 
confl ict.s i nvol "",led it. 
and pol i t·icel.l uses~ because Lyotard uses artists to 
i lll ... I~ .. t.t-at.e t.h~·:! ont.o 109 i Ci:t I aspect of the sublime 
(Mclcche;···oni ;0 Newman and C~zanne), in f c'. C+':. it. is 
important to realise that such artistic illustrations 
important within the political aspect of 
Lyot.at-d' ,=, I, .. ,or·k;. in the political role of avant-garde 
(sublime) This point. 1 =:. mc~de 
Cir?a.rheart. 
in ol·-de;·- t.o ,j'::monst.t-a.t.e t.h'2 
infll..~ence of clt-t. clga. i I'-,st. Hegel's aesthetics. In 
P'.At.S it. 
II it. is my final wish that the higher 
and indestructible bond of the Idea of beauty and 
t.n_~t.h may 1 ink us and keep us firmly united now 
414 
d.f·ld fOI--E!Ver' II .. I t~1 rl-I'~ + I'~ - ,-.~. l~ -. -
" .. - _.1 ! .. , l::l. ::: ...... ~ It-J' !~.::!I·! 1.I-• .1E! 
it. i =. easy t.o 
imagine Didero+_. I -.-.... + response JO this conclusion: 
the purpose of art, if it has a purpose is to 
d j f oF ~~ !." ,=o!.-; (1 0::: 
.. ::::.._:_ .. _' ..... :.-..:-~ .... ..:::;.!.-:-=:-.: . .:.:! ... that characterize 
not only aesthetic judgement but .judgement in 
would like to emphasize the importance of the 
previous section for both the understanding of the 
role of the sublime and the explanation of ontological 
J. 1- l,=o .-1 J' f·F~.1. 1'- _. t.. .-1 • • J •• ~.: •• :=-........ _ .... :~_:._. ____ ::~_ ... ..!:~.:..J~~=. It his 
aspect of the sublime in 
its polItIcal role In the conflicts between 
t·() t.he 
problems Bennington encounters in his treatment of 
occurrence (I have mentioned these problems in chapter 
V of the thesis). Two philosophers who do make the 
the sublime are Jean-Luc Nancy and ~hilippe lacoue-
Their criticisms of Lyotard's work revolve 
this very point and in particular around 
4i5 
it. is K2lI"'lt. I s st.I ... lcly of 
] t · t",:? . c\ ... J. on between occurrence and the sublime (I h3.ve 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe in chapte~ II of my thesis). 
I have mentioned earlier that I will not consider the 
?nd 
ontologies because such a study requires an extensive 
reading of Heidegger's work and this 1. S beyond t.he 
scope of this thesis. For this reason~ I 
pursue Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe's interpretations of 
c:tt"'JY f'-.Jt-t.h,~t- :' t.he 
can refer to Nancy's essays IIDies I t- ae" c..nd 
latter essays are found tn t.hE! 
remarkable collectIon of essays on the sublime Du 
it is also posstble to find Lyot2rd l s 
The reader could also refer to 
t.he II deb2tt.E~ II between Lacoue-Labarthe and Lyot.ard In 
I.C.A. documents n° 4. P._._._ .. __ .... _.·_·_· .... ·_····_··· __ ... ·_··_ .. -· .... ·_ .. _-
2:1.6 .. lIon nomme ordinairement 1 e sent. i rnent. 
signale cet ~tat [ 1 e d iff I?- , ... end J • --- . _ [ • • • ]. I 1. f E'. U t. 
beaucoup chercher pour trouver 
r~gles de formation at dlenchainement de phrases 
416 
capables d'exprimer 1e rl]' f 1- .I. t- - or -I ", -
-. . I:: 1::!1 11_ '--I ""J:=~ t.,-- d.h i t. Ie 
21.7 .. 
mIS en F)hra-.-./e~.,_ p._t.: -__ r_.II_.lffr--=_ ,jl .. ' L_~L j- ~ . 
• ~ 1 ~U, ~ L~ n~ pOUVOlr 
1 ' t nst.ar,t .• 
'=1' ... 1 i 
d'un 
instrument de communication apprennent par ce 
sentiment de peine qui accompagne Ie silence (et 
de plaisir qui accompagne 1 'invention d'un nouvel 
idiome), qulils sont requis par Ie langage [ ... J, 
qu'il leur faut permettre llinstitutton d'idiomes 
qui nlexistent pas encore. 
Le diff~rend. p. 30 
... -..... _ .._ ..._ .. _._ .. _._---_._ ... 
In .. i nst..n .. ·lrnel ..... I::. of 
Lyotard is alluding to the problems 
t.hE~ st.lb 1 i me in defence of 
against Lvotard's t.h i s· 
'·i-~, -f l .. y.r.Jt .. ?rd's IS developed further ., •. I:::~ V'. '.,1 < .. , in his eSS2lY 
Ia '=luest. i on ~ Glu' est.-ce Ie 
'-,,-,,= t· rn '-1,-1 .:=0 ,.,. ,"',.:::, .:;. " f'" _. .iii -' _;....J .-. ".-.. :a pp. 24-29, see also ~is remarks in 
4.i.7 
l'esth~tique de Burke 
de ce que je crr_.ir_~ t_3t_~I~~_ ~r_.t-i . 
- enJeu majeur, qui est 
rn ont.l- ~::~ r' 1" ,::,,_. r-.-_·.·.I ••• lc.ll· l'fi~-_' t 
- es~ suscit~ par la 
menace que plus rien n'arrive. 
essaie de fournir 
dCi.ns 1 I i nt.t.1 i t. i on , C I est.-a -d i t-I~ de 
pr~sentation pour une Id~e de la 
raison [ •.• ], el1e nly parvient pas, el1e ~prouve 
son impuissance, mais el1e d~couvre en m~me 
t.emps SCi. dest. i nat· i on est. de 
t-~ct 1 i set- son 
par une pr~sentation convenable. 
L 'E' t- t.I.- '-11 I '::: l' -. '::: i'I' ,:=. 
. -------__ !..~!.~_::._~~ .'::!. __ s~=.' __ l.-=. , F' • 
220. I must distinguish my ideas concernIng two versions of 
t.he ~-=:''-.Jb 1 i me 
by t1J i 11 em van Reizen and Dick Veerman. 
t.heii··· i nt.E!t-v i ew tAJ i t.h Lyot.at-d 11 .. Jmi~t-es, 
slAb 1 i me II (i n 
draw a distinction between a 
where the notion of unpresentability IS 
held f.:. t- ern c. s t. i n the definition of the term, and a 
of the sublime that takes account of the 
j ui:) i 1 at. i on d.ccornpd.n·y' i n9 t.he 
fo 11 01;,.) i n':':1 t.he P2.t 1 n felt when the impossibility of 
presentation 1S realised. I disa9ree wholly with this 
if cl is to be sublime it. mu=:.t. 
contain both pleasure and pain, and hence only their 
second version 1S a correct description of the sublime 
In If Jot .. k " Lyotard himself makes the same 
point at length in his answer to Reizen and Veerman's 
tort s'exprime par Ie silence du sentiment, 
[ •• n]. Le tort que Ie capital fait aux 
phrases ~erait done un tort universel. M~me s i Ie t.Ot-t. 
n'est pas universel [ ..• J, Ie sentiment silencieux qui 
[ " If • ] :' 
cette Beqebenheit [donn4el •.• _ .•• __ rn. ______________ •• __ .. _
i n du i ,.- 2. i t. une nouvelle sorte de sublime, 
p II . ..!'.=..; celui de 
• 't r-- -_~.=_t-It_.l· -_~p_I_'l ..... _-ment 1 ' ,~n t. h 0 U =:. i 21. So m I!:! , 0 U ne s e t- a 1 -' r' a :, ~ • 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 I •. j .' .. _.1.. . c1. 1_ fill t ,-:\ 1_·1 on:. Ie 
I . ] 
S l. a son fondement dans Ies Id~~~ rnnl~~]~~ 
--_. 11 _ _ •. _...Ja 
"~I"~IC:' 
.a.-..t._'"_'" kclnt. i en] Cc. .jes i::ol_·!te une 
g~n~ration d'autres individus sublimes. ·JE~ ne 
peux ici en d~tailler la collection, ne serait-ce 
celIe que Kant ~num~re~ II co I ~ t- e It , Ie 
Ie StH·· 18. 
It .t.\.- i ::.;-1::. e s s E~ II ou Ie It 1 lin cl c c e s sib i 1. i t.~ 
"devo:i t- ~ nom ,::::ub 1 i nll:~~ 12t. ·;w ctnd". [ • a a ] a [t12V a.nt. t~ne 
t·E~ 11 e Ie d~mon de la 
anthropologique nlest pas 
possession de l'esprit criticiste [ .. ul. 
·1 ~ ... 
J. It::.., 
development of this thesls, concernlnq 
emF'i r' i ca 1 anthropological deconstruction of the 
b.:::t.tAJeen feel i n':;IS 
-.. 
and can be c09nit.ively e~-:plained 
according to given causes~ the reader should 
.Jacques In 
42i 
o f t./-··I'::: book invest. i 9at.l::: Cr.nd 
Kant's theor"y of the sublime as it. is 
In the Critique of iudqement. 
-'--'-"-.--•• --.-~- •••••••••• --_._ ... ~ ____ .~.~. __ 'J: __ . __ • __ ,:.... ___ ._. __ _ 
t.o justify the pure 
pure") disinterested nature of the sublime feeling. He 
even if that survey IS Cr.nctloglC8.l in 
it explains the disinterested aspect of the 
~.;:.ubllme~ i:'.l 1 ° lAl =:. for' an 
anthropological comparison according to the measure 
of man - of the sublime and the non-sublime: 
!<c\nt· ~ ... ) i 11 have introduced a comparIson where~ he 
there should be none. He does t.h i s :0 he 
comparison appear:o in a very subtle 
re-implying SIze wi t.hin t.he 
the incompar"able. 
1< a t'". "t. a '-4 t- Cl. i n t. tOO 0 d 1..-1 i t. di t.-
I 1 
el1e ne devrait pas ct VOl tOO 1 i eu a I II' i n t. t- 0 d u i t. :0 
ill ala. i ss'~ s'introduire de mani~re apparemment 
subt. i IE! a pas en la 
mais en comparant 
Ie comparable ~ l'incomparable. 
The above remark~ ~t'~I'_~l'l,j c',=_ ~ I 
- - ~ ~ ~a~en In conjunction with 
ITtY of lIl)evant. la loi " 
"E-.'-_'-_It-t'-._Ir"tl· r"=_'=-I' '=. " l' t- '-'1- - r t - I T f t l Ii II~ - - i ,_. let.,' _.1= 1'- _ 0 nr:v' _-r)e=-, 1 s. 
'-"-'-7 
.£.. .... ::. .. Le travail est soumis ~ 1a r~gle de 
Les conditions de travail en syst~me 
capitaliste r~sultent toutes de 
genre ~conomique o~ il s'agit de gagner du temps. 
Par lui-m@me~ Ie travail ignore cet enjeu. II y a 
un diff~rend insoluble entre travailler et gagner 
Les ~7;ent. i men-t.s 
haine, ali~nation, frustration, humiliation) 
les dites conditions 
228. I am put In mind, here, of Michel Serres' s t.unn in'=, 
~_~r_~_I~I~P_~_-' ~t_~I_~I:I\' demonstrates how an appeal ? E":!:::~:=-~ • -:r t.o t.he 
category of the sublime is unnecessary in the task of 
the differentiation of feelings. 
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